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Abstract
Historians often dismiss the Jacksonian Democrats’ “spoils system” as a program
without serious ideological underpinnings. A prevalent argument holds that Jacksonians
were political realists who used the “spoils” of office to reward themselves and their
friends, and in the process built an interest-based political party. Such interpretations
overlook the ways in which Jacksonians strived to reconcile their patronage policies to a
preexisting ideological landscape. This elision is significant. For in the process of
rationalizing the so-called “spoils system,” Jacksonians completed the development of a
lasting antiestablishment, “Manichean” political idiom.
This dissertation looks at how Jacksonian Democrats drew upon older political
notions to explain the ideological rationale behind their “reformation” of 1829. Drawing
upon newspapers, published writings, correspondence, and letters of application for
office, it traces the development of Americans’ ideas about political patronage and
officeseeking from seventeenth-century England through Andrew Jackson’s first year in
office. Seventeenth-century Anglophone political actors feared that a chief executive
could use patronage to create a potentially dangerous separate interest of unprincipled,
officeholding hirelings. This fear informed Americans’ attempts to shape their own
republic throughout the revolutionary and early national periods. By the 1820s, it had
become commonplace to dismiss one’s political enemies as unprincipled officeseekers
hiring out their services to the highest bidders. Jacksonians exploited this political idiom,
pitching themselves as those who sincerely defended the will of the people, while
dismissing John Quincy Adams’s supporters as an unprincipled faction held together only
by “corrupt bargains.” To protect themselves from similar accusations, Jacksonians in
1829 attempted to prove that their political engagement had been motivated by sincere
principles rather than officeseeking opportunism. They demonstrated their sincerity with
performances of defiance and antagonism in the face of officeholding adversaries, and
simultaneously advanced a radical Jeffersonian idea that democratically elected
presidents could prove their devotion to the people by punishing their enemies. In
developing these lines of thought, Jacksonians made one’s propensity for militant
antagonism the basis of moral authority – a development with fateful implications for the
development of American democratic thought.
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Introduction
Historiography
Sometimes history obliges its chroniclers by providing ready-made images to
punctuate and explain the larger narrative. Historians of the French Revolution have thus
been grateful to the Parisians of 1789 for storming the Bastille, giving subsequent
accounts a single “spectacle to rouse the imagination.”1 Thirty years later, on the other
side of the Atlantic, another moment of democratic revelry served a similar purpose, as
supporters of the newly elected American President Andrew Jackson stormed the less
imposing edifice of the Executive Mansion. Accounts of this day testified that “a vast and
motley multitude” had greeted the President before finding their way into the White
House, where they availed themselves of the complimentary orange punch and ice
cream.2 For some observers, this moment was a boisterous, bacchanalian coming-out
party for American democracy, symbolizing the triumphant liberation of a longoppressed “common man.” Less sanguine observers felt that they were witnessing the
death spasms of the old republic, as the era of elite statesmanship drowned in an orgy of
democratic excess.3 Both interpretations probably contain a grain of truth.
The most critical observers thought they knew exactly what these raucous
democrats were celebrating: the prospect of gainful government employment. These
1

The allusion here is to lines from Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the
Proceedings in Certain Societies in London Relative to that Event, in a Letter to Have Been Sent to a
Gentleman in Paris, Seventh Edition (London: J. Dodsley, n.d.), 96.
2
James Parton, The Life of Andrew Jackson, Vol. III (New York: Mason Brothers, 1861), 170-171. Other
accounts unfortunately contest the details about how long it took for the crowd to consume the cheese
wheel – but the legend is perhaps more revealing than the true facts, whatever they may be.
3
The pithiest articulation of this view came from Jackson’s political enemy, Daniel Webster, when he
remarked that the “reign of King Mob seemed triumphant.” (Quoted in Parton, 171.) This interpretation is
echoed by historian Daniel Walker Howe in What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America,
1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 331.
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people were not just releasing their long-suppressed democratic energies – they were also
clamoring for jobs in the new government, and that clamor would continue, albeit in a
less spectacular fashion, long after the crowd had exhausted the White House’s
refreshments. Throughout the rest of his presidency (1829-1837), Jackson found himself
besieged by hundreds of supplicants pleading for government jobs. The only way that the
new President could make room for even a fraction of these aspirants would be to remove
incumbent officeholders en masse – and this is exactly what he did. “Rotation in office”
is the term that Jackson settled on to describe this sweeping policy of removals and
appointments. Posterity refers to this policy with the less flattering title of “the Spoils
System.”4
The chaotic festivity of Jackson’s inauguration thus came to seem like a
synecdoche of everything worst about Jacksonian Democracy, both for contemporary
observers and for later scholars. For the late nineteenth-century sociologist Mosei
Ostrogorski, the introduction of the “Spoils System” was indeed democratic – but in the
worst possible way, as it allowed the reins of government to pass into the hands of
unprincipled professional officeseekers. As he luridly explained:
From the very foundation of the United States, the advantages attaching to
the management of public affairs had not only let loose ambition but also,
and in a still greater degree, cravings of a purely material kind… But in
proportion as the old generation which had founded the Republic
disappeared, as the development of the country entailed that of the public
services, and the political contingents increased both through the extension
of the suffrage and the violent rivalries of parties which brought every
available force into the field, the scramble for loaves and fishes became
closer and keener. There arose a whole class of men of low degree who
applied all their energies in this direction, who sought their means of
subsistence in politics, and especially in the troubled waters, – men ready
to sacrifice everything to this object, devoid of all scruple.
4

Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 333.

2

Once these career officeseekers succeeded in placing Andrew Jackson in the presidential
chair, they came in for their share of the rewards, terrorizing innocent incumbent officers
in the process.5 Max Weber was more measured in his language, but he essentially
accepted the same conclusion. The Jacksonian Democrats, in his estimation, had forever
reduced American politics to a back-and-forth fight over appointments to office, with no
genuine principles at stake.6
A few twentieth-century historians tried to recover a more nuanced picture of the
Jacksonian Democrats. Eric Erickson drew up some numbers to suggest that Jackson’s
purge was not as ruthless as others had claimed, and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. popularized
that opinion in his 1945 classic, Age of Jackson.7 For the most part, however, Schlesinger
dismissed Jacksonian patronage as a sideshow to the more dramatically satisfying Bank
War. In the three pages he devoted to the subject, Schlesinger praised “rotation in office”
as a policy that democratized the civil service and pried offices from the hands of
officeholding aristocrats.8 Richard Hofstadter, viewing the Jacksonians in a similar but
rather less flattering light, perceived them as fundamentally acquisitive liberal capitalists
removing all aristocratic barriers to their own advancement.9 Leonard D. White was more
concerned with the emergence of American administrative practices, and found the
Jacksonians to be reprehensible in some regards but commendable in others. On the one

5

Mosei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties, Vol. II, trans. Frederick Clarke
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902), 45-52.
6
Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays on Sociology, translated and edited by
H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 107-108.
7
Erik McKinley Eriksson, “The Federal Civil Service Under President Jackson,” Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 13 (1927), 517-540; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Company, 1945), 47.
8
Schlesinger, Age of Jackson, 45-47.
9
See Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It (New York: Alfred a
Knopf, Inc., 1948; Vintage Books edition, New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 66-67, and AntiIntellectualism in American Life (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), 170.
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hand, he concluded, the Jacksonians had undoubtedly diluted the ethics of public service
and allowed partisanship to infect the appointment process. But on the other hand, White
still felt a grudging respect for the wide-eyed idealism of the Jacksonians’ “huge
experiment in the education of citizens by direct participation in officeholding” – even if
that experiment had yielded dubious results.10 Political scientist Matthew Crenson took
an even more sympathetic view. In his analysis, the Jacksonians had reacted to the
temporary decline of professional and commercial institutions with moralistic rhetoric,
and tried to restore an older style of administration by honest, personally accountable
men. When confronted with the malfeasance or ineptness of their own appointees,
Jacksonians like Amos Kendall seized on the idea of “rotation in office” as a way to
make government more impersonally bureaucratic and systematic.11
Whatever the merits of these provocative reassessments, they all eschewed or
downplayed the single most controversial aspect of Jacksonian patronage. Generally
speaking, Andrew Jackson’s contemporaries did not criticize him because he appointed
the wrong class of men to office or because he applied a general theory of rotation. What
irritated Jackson’s critics was that he seemed to predicate his appointment policy on
punishing political enemies while rewarding political friends with “spoils.”
Mid-to-late twentieth century historians studying earlier political epochs provided
helpful ways to frame the magnitude of the Jacksonians’ alleged break with prior political
traditions. Scholars of English politics uncovered a seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
“republican” tradition whose acolytes feared that a powerful executive would use his

10

Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History (New York: Macmillan, 1954),
16-17.
11
Matthew A. Crenson, The Federal Machine: Beginnings of Bureaucracy in Jacksonian America
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
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patronage to build up a separate interest of officers who owed their allegiance to their
patron rather than the people. And historians of the “republican synthesis” traced the
influence of these ideas on Americans during the revolutionary and early national years,
during which time classical-Whig-inflected thinkers worried about the corrupting
potential of executive patronage.12 This historiographical conversation helped to explain
the American Whigs’ horror at the sight of Andrew Jackson using patronage to build up
and reward his personal following; such a practice seemed congruent with that of corrupt
monarchal “courts” where despotic ministers used patronage as a form of coercion.13
The historiographical rediscovery of classical republican thought coincided with
path-blazing works on the origins of American political partisanship. Richard Hofstadter
and Michael Wallace traced an eighteenth-century Anglophone intellectual tradition in
which political parties were generally regarded as being, at worst, self-interested factions
who sought their own ends rather than a common good, and at best, provisional alliances
of virtuous men joining hands to defeat such factions. According to this interpretation,
Americans did not truly embrace political parties as permanent institutions until they had
abandoned the mystical notion of a “common good” and embraced the politics of
interest-group competition. The plucky hero of this story was Martin Van Buren, the
allegedly practical partisan who openly used patronage to promote partisans’ objectives,

12

Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of
Harvard University, 1967); Gordon S. Wood, Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1969; reprint, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999);
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican
Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975; reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2016), chaps. X-XV; Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1980). Banning and Pocock, at least, saw Anglophone thinkers’ concerns
with political patronage fueling similar concerns with political economy.
13
For the Whigs’ reaction to Jackson’s patronage, see Wallace, “Ideologies of Party,” 281-284; Daniel
Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979),
51-54.
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almost cheerily reducing politics to a competition between different interest groups.14 For
Wallace and Hofstadter, Van Buren and members of his “Albany Regency”
conceptualized two-party competition as a healthy, even amicable affair, keeping both
parties vigilant and ensuring that more divisive issues of sectional politics were kept
subordinate to the casual competition between career politicians. The parties might claim
to rest on some difference of principle, but what really inspired them was their
enthusiasm for well-disciplined, business-like political organization. Party competition
served the purposes of middling individuals like Van Buren and his ilk, men who could
only thrive politically once these proto-bureaucratic institutions displaced the older world
of personal loyalties and disinterested statesmanship; the party was a ladder for
advancement above all else.15 Other historians elaborated on these lines of thought to
explain Jackson and Van Buren’s policies toward federal patronage. With the emergent
Jacksonian doctrine of “rotation in office,” the way was paved for any man to claim the
spoils of office – as long as he cast his lot with the winning political party.16
Historians in this school were certainly less histrionic and more thorough than
Ostrogorski, but their conclusions were essentially similar. Jacksonians ushered in liberal
democracy, and with the same stroke, swept away Americans’ fetish for disinterested

14

Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States,
1780-1840 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Michael L. Wallace, “Ideologies of Party in
the Ante-bellum Republic” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 1973).
15
Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party System, chap. 7; Wallace, “Ideologies of Party,” chaps. III and IX.
16
Ralph Ketcham, Presidents Above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789-1829 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 151-154; Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American
Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1992), 302-305.
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patriotism and the common good. The American Whigs in this narrative simply
represented the last gasp of classical antiparty resistance.17
At the turn of the twentieth century, then, it appeared that the conversation had
gone full circle, taking us back to Ostrogorski’s basic argument, with minor variations.
Richard R. John was able to identify ways in which some Jacksonians harnessed classical
republican discourse prior to taking power, but discerned only hypocrisy in the way that
they harnessed patronage for their own selfish ends once in office.18 Sean Wilentz’s
intensely ambitious Rise of American Democracy emphasized the democratic aspect of
rotation in office, but overall treated patronage as, once again, a sideshow to issues
involving Jacksonian political economy.19 Daniel Walker Howe’s equally ambitious
What Hath God Wrought also sidelined discussion of political patronage, but did so by
situating Jacksonians as being, first and foremost, acquisitive and imperialistic white
supremacists. To the extent that Howe discussed patronage at all, he saw it as another
exhibition of Jacksonians’ fundamentally unprincipled ways.20
One of the most original early twenty-first century works contributed a crucial
argument challenging the notion that Jacksonians could only embrace partisan patronage
by disavowing interest in the “common good.” Gerald Leonard’s Invention of Party
Politics painstakingly showed that Martin Van Buren and other Jacksonians’ conception
of a political party went beyond interest-group competition. Rather, as Leonard argues,
these thinkers saw parties arising from a fundamental division between the nation’s
17

For the Whigs’ reaction to Jackson’s patronage, see Wallace, “Ideologies of Party,” 281-284; Daniel
Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979),
51-54.
18
Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), chap. 6, especially pages 208-210.
19
Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 2005), 315-318.
20
Howe, What Hath God Wrought, 331-334.
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“aristocracy” and its “democracy.” Van Buren imagined his Republican Party as one that
existed not to serve particular individuals or even any particular ideology, but simply to
serve the will of the majority. In other words, party politics was a clash between those
who cared about the majority will and those who cared only for themselves.21 And with
such presumptions in mind, it made patriotic sense for Van Buren and Jackson to appoint
only fellow partisans to office – for only fellow partisans were capable of executing “the
will of the majority in their official capacities.”22
Leonard’s arguments seem all the more crucial in light of the conclusions
suggested by James Kloppenberg’s recent work, Toward Democracy (2016). Carefully
tracing the history of democratic thought in European and American history,
Kloppenberg offers an understanding of democracy not as a simple political schematic
but rather as an aspirational “ethos” predicated on “reciprocity.” Central to this ethic of
“reciprocity” is the individual’s willingness to contemplate seriously the arguments of
those who disagree. In this democratic ethos, the individuals who constitute the majority
must still respect certain rights for the minority, rather than simply plunder and oppress
them.23 But such feelings of respect toward the minority do not seem to characterize the
early republican party-thinkers described by Leonard. If anything, many political actors
in the early republic seem to have believed that their party was the only party whose
views deserved serious consideration. Van Buren, especially, did not even seem to
believe that the opposing party spoke for “the people” at all. If Leonard’s argument is
correct and Kloppenberg’s understanding of democracy is applicable, then party thinkers
21

Gerald Leonard, The Invention of Party Politics: Federalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional
Development in Jacksonian Illinois (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). See especially
pages 39-47.
22
Ibid, 81.
23
James Kloppenberg, Toward Democracy: The Struggle for Self-Rule in European and American Thought
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), introduction.
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in the early republic did not share any “democratic ethos” of mutual reciprocity. Only one
party could be trusted, because only one party represented the will of the majority.
Such observations bring the conversation about political partisanship into a larger
historiographical conversation about American “populism.” As historian Michael Kazin
defines the term, populism entails a political idiom more than a discernible political
philosophy. It is, in his words, “a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people
as a noble assemblage not bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as selfserving and undemocratic, and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.” Those who
deploy this idiom tend to draw lines of demarcation between “the people” and their
enemies, generally along lines of economy and education. “The people” tend to be
independent members of the middling sort, “‘neither destitute nor privileged,’” in one
insightful novelist’s words.24 And as historian Sophia Rosenfeld notes, “the people” tend
to be imagined as possessing an innate “common sense” superior to the artful sophistries
of their cleverer, more erudite elite adversaries.25 Both Kazin and Rosenfeld see
symptoms of populism in the Jacksonians. For Kazin, the Jacksonians espoused a form of
producerism; for Rosenfeld, they channeled a reactionary brand of anti-intellectualism.26
In the course of my own research on the early republican discourse surrounding
political patronage, I began to recognize a political idiom that bridged the broad
categories of classical republicanism, liberalism, and proto-populism. I refer to this
political idiom herein as the “Manichean” style of American politics: the belief that the
body politic can be easily divided along moral fault lines, with one disinterested party
24

Michael Kazin, The Populist Persuasion: An American History (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 1-2.
The quotation he cites is from E.L. Doctorow.
25
Sophia Rosenfeld, Common Sense: A Political History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2011), 5-9.
26
Kazin, Populist Persuasion, 19-22; Rosenfeld, Common Sense, 218-219.
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representing the will of the majority, and the other representing the venal self-interest of a
fringe minority.27 Adherents of this Manichean tradition did not – and still do not –
recognize political adversaries as reflective thinkers who use their logical and moral
sensibilities to formulate alternate political principles. According to political Manicheans,
enemy parties lack any principles at all – their guiding lights are their self-interests, and
their sheer lack of scruples renders them dangerous to the people. This line of thought
leaves room for classical republicans’ concern with disinterested virtue, without forcing
adherents to deny their self-interest altogether; the Manichean can righteously claim that
his own self-interest corresponds to the self-interest of “the people.” And for the same
reason, a political Manichean can take up classical liberals’ battle against entrenched and
privileged aristocrats without identifying as simply an acquisitive and self-serving
individual, let alone the champion of some particular interest group; the only meaningful
interest groups that exist in this tradition are “the” people and their assailants. This
bifurcation between the people and their oppressors is, of course, a cornerstone of
populist language. Unlike populists, however, Manicheans can divide society into
categories of good and evil without denigrating intellect or tethering themselves to any
specific economic or racial group. Champions of the Manichean style can therefore be
republican, liberal, populist, or none of these things.
The Manichean style allows political actors to be selective in how they distinguish
the virtuous people from the selfish few. This dissertation will focus on a particular
strand of Manichean discourse in which those who engage in politics itself are imagined
to be opponents of the majority will. Debates over political patronage catalyzed the
27

I suggest this “Manichean style” as an alternative to the style described by Richard Hofstadter in “The
Paranoid Style in American Politics,” in The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New
York: Knopf, 1965; sixth edition, New York: Vintage Books, 1967), 3-40.
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emergence of this Manichean strand in the early American republic. For individuals all
along the American political spectrum, the enemy of choice was not the principled
ideological opponent but rather the man of no principle who pledged fealty to whichever
patron promised him a political office. The heroes of such narratives became the
independent “people” and their champions, whose legitimacy rested on the claim that
they were not motivated by promises of employment. Party rivalries at both the national
and state level became, in effect, arguments about motivation: which men stood for the
people, and which men simply wanted offices? Jacksonians deployed such language to
masterful effect, promising to rescue the people from the unprincipled officeseekers and
their guileful masters. Their denunciation of rival partisans as dangerous opportunists
provided Jacksonians with a rationale for intolerance, thereby justifying the decision to
purge federal officeholders and replace them with disinterested friends of the people.
Ironically, this same Manichean logic guaranteed that Jacksonians would be
denounced as officeseekers themselves. By 1829, American political writers had so
thoroughly deconstructed the possibilities of hidden selfishness that no appointment
could ever be innocuous. This meant that whoever held office at any given moment
became inherently suspect, which in turn meant that those involved in politics and
government had no defense against charges of corrupt intention. Jacksonians tried to
defend themselves by insisting on their own sincerity of purpose. That strategy worked
about as well for them as it has for every antiestablishment party ever since.

11

Methodology and Chapter Summary
This dissertation began as an attempt to discern the precise criteria behind each
instance in which President Andrew Jackson removed a federal officer. I decided early on
that I would focus my research on appointments and removals in the year 1829, before
the Indian Removal Act and Bank War took over the Jacksonian persuasion. What, I
asked, were the Jacksonians discussing when they first took power? My natural starting
points were the State Department’s letters of application and recommendation from the
Jackson administration, wherein I expected to find detailed discussions of particular
policy agendas.28 I soon became disappointed in this expectation. The vast majority of
applicants and recommenders spoke very little about banks, Indian removal, white
manhood suffrage, or any other cause we associate with Jacksonian Democrats now.
What these men did say, again and again, was that they were staunch “Jackson men” who
possessed “sound” or “correct republican principles.”29 Superficially, the men’s
insistence on their own partisan purity might seem to vindicate what the Jacksonians’
enemies had always claimed: that these men were officeseekers who traded their
partisanship for employment, possessing no principles other than party identification.
But as I continued to scroll through these thousands of letters, it became clear that
the applicants and recommenders of 1829 were obsessed with refuting charges of
insincerity and opportunism. Even as they sought office, these men took almost
excruciating pains to insist that they had identified with Jackson for sincere and patriotic
28

Letters of Application and Recommendation During the Administration of Andrew Jackson, in the
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29
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rather than mercenary reasons. The incumbent officers were frequently depicted as
unprincipled hirelings who had sold their political services in exchange for lucrative
public employment. The standard Jacksonian applicant, on the other hand, claimed to be
above such mean arts. These claims may sound platitudinous to the modern reader, but
applicants and recommenders often furnished tremendous detail to support their
allegations. They sometimes recounted long anecdotes, attached newspaper extracts, and
gathered testimonies to prove that they had been disinterested while their rivals had been
opportunistic. All this evidence was meant to show that they had remained firm and
upright in a world of corrupt bargains. Far from being unscrupulous men hiring out their
services to the strongest chieftain, they had defied any man who would presume to
purchase their loyalties with patronage. Such narratives allowed Jacksonians to maintain
their status as the challengers of the patronage-dispensing status quo while seeking
patronage for themselves. Their innate character and their histories of defiance were
enough to establish them as sincere patriots rather than grasping officeseekers.
From this perspective, Andrew Jackson could not be accused of purchasing
support, because the supporters he rewarded had never required any purchase. And from
this same perspective, the Jacksonian officeseekers could not be accused of prostituting
themselves for payment, because their partisanship had never rested on the promise of
office in the first place. The “reformation” of 1829, as Jacksonians termed it, thus
became, in the applicants and recommenders’ minds, a moral inquisition. The objective
of this inquisition was to determine, first, which of the incumbent officers had struck
corrupt bargains of their own and used offices to carry out the previous administration’s
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dirty work. The second objective was to determine which of the new officeseekers were
truly sincere and which ones were mere flatterers.
This study is, in one sense, a study of motivation. It does not, however, attempt to
parse the sincerity of each Jacksonian who got involved in disputes over patronage.
Instead, it asks the question of why it mattered for Jacksonians to be perceived as sincere
and disinterested, whether they were or not. The very fact that so many applicants and
recommenders insisted on this point is enough to suggest that many Jacksonians in 1829
were not comfortable with the idea of party politics as a competition between liberal
individuals from conflicting interest groups, as many historians would have it. They saw
themselves as members of a party with a monopoly on disinterested patriotism,
challenging anyone who belonged to a mere interest group. The most threatening interest
group, in their eyes, was the one being created by the government itself: the dependent
officers and officeseekers who carried out the bidding of their despotic patrons. To
understand this conception of American politics, and to understand why these men
attached so much value to their own sincerity of purpose, we must begin by looking
backwards.
This dissertation therefore traces the development of Americans’ phobias about
patronage and officeseeking across a wide breadth of time and space. The first half looks
at the development of an American oppositional tradition in which patronage-wielding
executives and their “dependent” officers posed a threat to the interests of the larger
population. The second half looks at how American oppositional political actors, starting
with the Jefferson administration, had to negotiate the difficulties of administering
government without betraying their fundamentally antiestablishment logic.
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Chapter 1 looks at the English ideological inheritance, and particularly at the
“country party” tradition that pitted independent statesman against the “dependent” class
of royal “placemen.” Synthesizing historiography and primary sources, I trace the
development of English politicians’ concern that the crown could augment its power by
building up a separate interest group of appointed officers. The issues here were not
identical to the ones that Jacksonians would address in the 1820s. Country party thinkers
tended to focus specifically on the crown’s tendency to lavish sinecures on sitting
members of Parliament (MPs) and thus render legislators dependent on the will of the
executive. Americans would address that particular issue at length during the
Philadelphia Convention and throughout various congressional debates in the early
republic. But the most significant result of the debate over parliamentary “placemen” was
that it conditioned Anglophone political actors to see all appointments as bribes, and all
officers as fundamentally dependent on their employers.
Importantly, English oppositional thinkers disputed the most efficacious way to
solve the problem of corruption. One group of thinkers focused their energies on
legalistic reforms that would block crown ministers’ efforts to purchase supporters in
Parliament. Others, led at first by Viscount Bolingbroke and later by Edmund Burke,
argued that the problem was moral rather than legal. Bolingbroke proposed, first, that the
solution England needed was a party of disinterested and virtuous men to counteract the
crown-created “factions”; later, after losing faith in the idea of a noble oppositional party,
he placed his hopes on the ideal of a “patriot king” who would transcend corruption and
purge the people’s enemies from public office. Burke never entertained the idea of a
patriot king, but he did champion Bolingbroke’s arguments that a party of preternaturally
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virtuous men could prevent corruption from taking hold. In the process of developing this
argument, Burke depicted the figure of John Wilkes as a charismatic hero who fearlessly
challenged all the forces of power and patronage. These discursive developments
foreshadowed the idiom of Jacksonian Democrats, who similarly liked to depict
themselves as a band of patriotic brothers defiantly united against the temptations of
patronage and the frowns of power.
Chapter 2 traces Americans’ understanding of patronage and corruption during
the revolutionary era, roughly from 1763 to 1787. Avid readers of English oppositional
polemicists, Americans like John Dickinson depicted crown officers in their midst as a
venal separate interest, loyal to the ministers who appointed them and hostile to the
citizens whose tax dollars furnished their salaries. Political thinkers during the 1780s
agonized over the question of how to prevent this separate interest from forming in the
newly minted United States of America. Antifederalists, most notably the anonymous
“Federal Farmer,” worried about the possibility that a corrupt executive would promise
appointments to members of the nation’s acquisitive, officeseeking “natural aristocracy,”
in exchange for their political support. The Federal Farmer’s ideas constructed an eternal
tension between the “natural aristocracy” whose constituents hoped to survive on taxfunded public employment, and the taxpaying, independent “natural democracy” of
honest Americans who lived off their own labor. In establishing this binary, the Farmer
laid foundations for a Manichean political tradition that would flourish in the 1790s.
Chapter 3 looks at how Americans adjusted to their concerns about patronage
during Washington’s first term in office, before party lines fully coalesced. Americans,
seeing all appointments as forms of bribery or coercion, had to debate whether or not the
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President should even be allowed to remove his officers. And the men who applied for
offices during this time were keenly solicitous to make sure that the President did not see
them as contemptible beggars; very often, they relayed personal narratives of heroic
Revolutionary suffering to demonstrate that they were sincere patriots rather than
grasping courtiers. Meanwhile, political developments on both sides of the Atlantic kept
the Federal Farmer’s concern with the “natural aristocracy” alive. Alexander Hamilton’s
controversial political economy, combined with Thomas Paine’s writings on the French
Revolution and the wickedness of royal “courts,” inspired some Americans to imagine
that a gluttonous “aristocracy” of officers had imposed itself on the industrious,
taxpaying people.
These simmering concerns exploded into violent party conflict between 1793 and
1800. Chapter 4 looks at the important themes that Jeffersonian Republicans developed
during their period as the oppositional party. The Washington and Adams
administration’s seemingly Anglophile policies fueled oppositional writers’ concern that
the new nation was deteriorating into an English-style government of patronage. In
justifying their opposition, Thomas Jefferson and likeminded Republicans developed a
Manichean style in American politics, celebrating adherents of their own cause as
independent taxpayers while dismissing all enemies as either dependent officeholders or
venal officeseekers. The hero of the emerging oppositional narrative was the man who
boldly and contemptuously defied all the bribes or threats of men in power.
This anti-patronage narrative foreshadowed difficulties that Republicans would
face when they took up power themselves. Thomas McKean, a Pennsylvania Republican,
had to confront these difficulties sooner than most. After being elected governor in 1799,
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he quickly purged more than a hundred enemy officeholders, and thereby found himself
facing accusations of inconsistency. In defending his actions, McKean articulated three
important and lasting arguments in favor of partisan patronage. First, he suggested,
without any elaboration or clarification, that “rotation in office” was a good thing in and
of itself for appointed officers. Second, he argued that an executive had to restrict
appointments to his supporters in order to maintain harmonious administration. Third,
and perhaps most significantly, McKean declared that only the voters themselves could
approve or censure an executive’s use of patronage. All three of these arguments –
rotation in office, the need for a united administration, and the executive’s democratic
mandate – would later be taken up by the radicals who pushed Presidents Jefferson and
Jackson to be more ruthless toward their enemies.
Chapter 5 looks at discussions of patronage during the early years of the Jefferson
administration, and in doing so, reveals ways in which the Manichean theory of society
could lead different Republicans to different conclusions about which to remove and
appoint. Thomas Jefferson so believed in the righteousness of his party’s cause that he
presumed most Federalists to be temporarily deluded Republicans at heart. His objective
in 1801 was to draw those closet-Republican Federalists back into the fold, an outcome
Jefferson believed he could best secure by leaving most Federalist officeholders in place.
He tried to focus his policy on removing only the officers who had been actively abusive,
rather than punishing men simply for difference of opinion. But Jefferson’s more radical
supporters thought the most efficacious way to destroy Federalism was by stripping every
Federalist of office. These radical writers elaborated on lines of thought that Thomas
McKean had previously introduced in order to justify his own purge in Pennsylvania.
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They argued that a regular rotation of officers would prevent any official aristocracy from
establishing itself; that a President needed to fire hostile officers in order to unite the
executive branch behind the principles of “reform”; and that the President had not just the
people’s permission but even the people’s mandate to remove every officer who did not
possess the requisite republican principles. Jefferson himself never endorsed the
argument for “rotation in office,” nor did he insist that all officers share his views. He
did, to some extent, accept the radicals’ argument that the people had demanded the
appointment of more Republicans. But where Jefferson saw “the people’s” demand as a
plea for fair balance between the two parties, radical Republicans interpreted that demand
as a commission for utter ruthlessness.
Chapter 6 examines political developments at the state and national level from
1802 to 1820, during which time the Jeffersonian Republicans dominated the
government. The Republicans’ ascendancy bred internecine factionalism, however, and
members of each faction took pleasure in deriding their rivals as hypocritical
officeseekers. At the national level, President James Madison’s administration faced an
oppositional coalition of Federalists and jaded Republicans denouncing him as a
hypocrite who now wielded patronage in the same way as the enemies he had once
denounced. In Pennsylvania, William Duane and the radical “Old School” Republicans
similarly thought the party leadership had lost sight of their former anti-patronage
objectives. These Old School Republicans ultimately found themselves denouncing the
Republican Party itself as a haven for officeseekers with no consistency of principle. In
New York, Martin Van Buren and the Bucktail faction accused DeWitt Clinton of using
his patronage to strike “corrupt bargains” and thereby build up an army of unprincipled
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hirelings. Both Duane and Van Buren called for a party whose membership would
transcend old party names, uniting all men of genuine Republican principles behind a
common cause. This call to arms provided a rationale for accepting nominal Federalists
into the fold, provided that those Federalists were actually Republicans in word and in
action. But that same rationale implied that it would be “corrupt” for Republicans to
appoint former political enemies – unless, however, it could be proven that those old
adversaries now genuinely shared Republicans’ principles.
As chapter 7 shows, Andrew Jackson’s supporters were able to exploit the
increasingly pervasive suspicion that politicians were buying up supporters with
patronage. Jackson’s presidential campaign literature depicted him as being “aloof” from
all the intrigues of politics, and too high-minded to offer any appointments in exchange
for support. 1825’s apparent “corrupt bargain” between John Quincy Adams and Henry
Clay vindicated Jacksonians’ claim that politics had been reduced to horse-trading. The
fact that Adams had appointed a former political enemy indicated, for many Americans,
that neither man truly cared about any political principles. The Adams administration was
henceforth stigmatized for allegedly relying on patronage, rather than the people, for its
support, meaning that all its advocates were presumed to be unprincipled officeseekers or
officeholders. As Adams would learn throughout his presidency, it was no longer
possible to make an innocent appointment. If Adams appointed Federalists, he was
accused of restoring the aristocrats to power; when Adams appointed Republicans, he
was accused of trying to bribe his enemies into submission. The possibilities of corrupt
intent had by this point been so thoroughly mapped that Jacksonians could perceive a
sinister agenda behind any use of executive patronage.
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Chapter 8 looks at how Jacksonians in power faced a dilemma of their own
making: no matter which officers Jackson appointed, removed, or left in place, he could
still face accusations of corruption. His supporters seized on the older idea of “rotation in
office” as a way to defuse criticism. But when it came to discussing their justification for
specific removals, Jacksonians deployed the more radical argument that the President
held the people’s commission for a comprehensive purge of all those officers who had
struck “corrupt bargains” of their own. They further defended Jackson’s refusal to retain
enemy officeholders as proof that he was too incorruptible to buy any man’s support. The
men who applied for office in 1829 claimed that they were incorruptible not because they
had transcended partisanship, but because their partisanship had been sincere. And the
basis of that sincerity – and thus their moral authority – was that they could point to their
histories of defiant antagonism in the face of power and patronage.
This dissertation does not attempt to explain the practical reasons behind
individual appointments and removals. It rather attempts to explain how American
political actors came to identify themselves as servants of the people at war with selfserving officeseekers, and in doing so made militant antagonism the basis of party
politics. The foundational question of American politics, from the time of the
Philadelphia Convention through the age of Jackson, was how best to ensure that the
government served the governed and not itself. With this question occupying such a
central place in political debate, partisan disputes were represented as clashes between
those who wanted government to serve “the people” and those who wanted government
to serve their own ends. The “officeseeker” had gradually become a mainstay of the
American political imaginary. By the time that Jackson arrived on the national political
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scene, political parties’ moral authority rested on how convincingly they could prove that
they had more high-minded objectives than acquiring and maintaining “power and
patronage.” Jacksonians in 1829 believed they could retain their status as disinterested
outsiders as long as they could prove that they had not engaged in politics just to obtain
office, but the only way for them to establish their sincerity of purpose was by making
flamboyant demonstrations of their reckless, adversarial nature. The President could
prove his sincerity by purging the people’s enemies rather than conciliating them; the
applicant for office could prove his own sincerity by pointing out ways in which he had
courted persecution at the hands of the political establishment. The people, in this
narrative, needed oppressive enemies for the patriotic President to punish, and Jacksonian
partisans needed enemies they could defy. The two-party system that emerged in the
early republic, then, was not imagined as a game of give-and-take between conflicting
interest groups. It was rather imagined as a system predicated on virulent warfare
between the people’s servants and their unprincipled enemies. Intolerance toward the
latter became the basis of democratic moral authority.
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Chapter One:
Political Patronage in English Oppositional Thought

American colonists in 1765 may have been groaning under the yoke of the mother
country’s taxes, but as always, a few of them could find solace and inspiration in figures
from their shared English past. The visage that one patriot chose to exhume from the dead
was that of Andrew Marvell, one of seventeenth-century England’s most celebrated
metaphysical poets. But in 1765, Americans did not celebrate Marvell the wry poet who
had chastised his “coy mistress,” but Marvell the patriotic Member of Parliament (MP)
who had elevated his own coyness into republican virtue. In the vignette that one New
Yorker shared with a local paper, the impecunious Marvell could be found refusing a
200-pound note from the scheming Lord Treasurer. “I live here to serve my constituents,”
Marvell was reported to say. “The Ministry may seek men for their purposes, I am not
one.” It was a modest gesture of defiance, but in 1765, American polemicists chose to
project all the virtues of Englishmen onto this simple act. “Such,” wrote one writer, “was
the spirit which actuated these illustrious Patriots, who laid the Basis of that Liberty
which was confirmed at the revolution.” That same writer contrasted the self-denying
patriots of yesteryear with the self-serving politicians of the present who saw fit to
“sacrifice their own honour, and their country’s interest, to bend the knee to an unworthy
favourite or Minister, for a paltry place or pension.” The unflattering contrast only proved
how far Englishmen had “degenerated from” their “brave ancestors, at least with respect
to public virtues.” And without “some portion” of that same ancient patriotic “Spirit,”
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there was no way to ensure the survival of those liberties that Marvell and his brothers-inarms had so preciously secured.1
As always with such acts of historical appropriation, the anecdote is as notable for
its elisions as for its insights. The correspondent’s triumphant depiction of the 1688
“Glorious Revolution” overshot the mark. That revolution had established permanent
limitations on the English monarch’s prerogative, but it had not secured any restriction of
the one royal power that Marvell had so heroically resisted – namely, the monarch’s
power to bribe a legislature into docility through patronage and pensions. As early as the
1690s, English MPs could be found lamenting this shortcoming in the Glorious
Revolution settlement. The crown’s official powers had been checked, but its
overweening influence – an influence that threatened to unbalance the entire English
constitution – remained. The American patriots of 1765 unwittingly acknowledged the
failure of 1688 when they acclaimed Marvell, a Restoration-era figure, as their hero; had
the Revolution been an unqualified success, there would have been no need to seek
inspiration in stories of those who had distinguished themselves by their opposition to the
despotic Stuart kings. The historical Marvell had been admired in the 1670s for resisting
the Crown’s efforts to corrupt Parliament with patronage; for such efforts, and for his
legendary “incorruptibility,” he had earned the appellation of “honest Andrew Marvell.”2
Independent men like Marvell had been able to resist the tyrannical seductions of royal
patronage in the reign of the Stuarts, and now, in the reign of George III, such men were
still needed to resist the same soft despotism of the royal court.
1
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These next two chapters seek to explain how “independent men” like Andrew
Marvell could serve to rationalize revolutions in both 1688 and 1776. In both cases,
executive patronage was the specter that haunted the Anglophone political imaginary, and
the “independent man” was celebrated as the virtuous renegade who remained untouched
by the shadow of this sinister “influence.” Even before Marvell’s time, seventeenthcentury Englishmen constructed the binary of independent “country” men locked in battle
against the dependent “courtiers.” The Stuarts’ attempts to influence Parliament with
patronage would provoke a century of partisan discourse, and subsequent English
politicians would cite their distance from government patronage as evidence of their
independent and virtuous character. And as chapter 2 will show, the American colonists
imbibed this discourse for decades, with significant consequences for the development of
democracy in the United States.

Court, Country, and the Origins of Anti-Patronage Opposition
Whatever difficulties faced the British Empire at the time that colonists
resuscitated Marvell’s memory, they were child’s play compared to the anxieties that had
afflicted English politics in the seventeenth century, a century that had witnessed civil
war and a regicide before it even reached the halfway point. The second half of the
seventeenth century would witness the guilt-ridden restoration of monarchy, as well as
the emergence of a Parliamentary “country party” coalition that used royal patronage –
the king’s dispensation of political offices – as a rhetorical wedge to divide independent
MPs from servile crown dependents. Patronage would ultimately become the most
contested terrain in the battle over England’s “mixed” constitution, shaping English
political discourse for the next century.
25

Decades before Marvell had the chance to distinguish himself with heroic acts of
self-denial, squabbles over royal patronage had already pitted Parliament against the
crown. Although the crown’s dispensation of royal offices had once been thought of as a
chivalrous, beneficent endeavor, the Stuart kings lacked their predecessors’ romantic
sensibilities and political acumen. James I delegated the business of delegating power to
his chief minister (and possible lover), the Duke of Buckingham, who converted the
distribution of patronage into a mercenary transaction. Where the earlier Tudor monarchs
had dispensed offices to instill a chivalric sense of loyalty in English nobles, Buckingham
simply sold offices to raise royal revenue and then demanded absolute loyalty from his
beneficiaries.3 This alone was enough to irritate nobles in Parliament. But James’
graceless administrative style was nothing compared to the highhanded carelessness of
his son, Charles I, who famously dissolved and reconvened Parliament at his
convenience. Parliament struck back in 1641 with its legendary “Grand Remonstrance,”
asserting, among other things, Parliament’s right to approve or veto royal appointments.4
Patronage thus became yet another point of contention in the battle between Parliament
and the crown.
This decades-long struggle between Parliament and the Stuart monarchs had seen
questions of political patronage becoming enmeshed in debates over the “court” and the
“country,” which in turn had become entangled with questions of independence and
virtue. Such debates built on terminology that had been coined in the prior century to
distinguish officeholders in residence at the royal “court” – the “court” party – from nonofficeholding MPs residing in the “country” – the “country party.” In James I’s reign, the
3
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term “courtier” came to connote one’s dependence on the Crown, while identification
with the “Country” signaled one’s disinterestedness and independence.5 In Charles’ reign,
this idea of virtuous “independence” became a central ideal in English political discourse.
1640s’ Parliamentary writers developed the notion that a citizen could never enjoy true
freedom if he were only allowed to exercise his liberties at another individual’s pleasure,
for this “dependent” subject would inevitably censor himself to avoid potential
punishment. This idea emerged in response to Charles’ attempts to exert control over the
nation’s finances, but it also had significant implications for matters of patronage. In
1642, for instance, bishops were forbidden from sitting in the House of Lords – as crown
appointees, bishops were thought to be dependent upon and therefore beholden to the will
of the crown.6 The beneficiaries of crown patronage were, by implication, too dependent
to be honest or trustworthy. This long struggle between crown and Parliament famously
ended in 1649 with the House of Lords dissolved, monarchy eradicated, and Charles
haranguing his subjects from the scaffold. With the House of Lords and monarchy
temporarily banished to the dustbin of history, 1650s English political thinkers had to
conceptualize society in new ways.
James Harrington’s Oceana (1656) envisioned a commonwealth society in which
citizens played the role of classical freeholders. Without kings and lords, he conjectured,
there would now be a relatively equal distribution of property. Each male household head
would thus possess enough land to guarantee his own personal independence; he need no
longer be obedient to the will of a master, nor dependent on the beneficent patronage of
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his betters. But Oceana was not to be some proto-libertarian state in which every man
tended to his farm while disregarding the rest of the commonwealth. In Harrington’s
mind, the citizen’s independence gave him freedom not to seclude himself on the farm
but to act virtuously in public life. Fully self-sufficient, he could afford to prioritize the
greater good without risking starvation or destitution. This utopian society would
therefore re-inscribe an old Aristotelian binary between the fully fledged citizens – male,
property-owning household heads – and the dependent sub-classes who did not own
property and thus lacked any foundation for virtuous action. Only the independent man
was worthy to cast a vote, for the dependent citizen’s judgment would inevitably be
tainted by self-interest.7 The word “independence” could thus serve as a sort of normative
filter, prescribing a selection process to determine the legitimacy of one’s participation in
politics.
Harrington realized that there could never be perfect equality either in property or
in talents. He therefore had to address the possibility of class binaries emerging among
the independent citizenry. Harrington expected that some citizens would be naturally
more sagacious than others. The “critically applauding many” would naturally defer to
these wiser citizens as their legislators. Harrington understood, however, that this rarefied
“natural aristocracy” might coalesce into a separate interest group within the government,
potentially at odds with the greater body of citizens. He therefore suggested an
institutional safeguard to prevent the natural aristocracy from becoming an entrenched
oligarchy: regular “rotation in office” among the legislators. With economic inequality
7
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kept to a minimum, and with no chance for any men to monopolize government,
“Oceana” could theoretically exist in harmony.8
Harrington had designed this utopian schematic with an eye toward reducing class
tensions. But the logic of his analysis suggested two possible binaries in the body politic,
either of which could engender class rivalry. Those “dependent” individuals without
property would always be vulnerable to patrons who promised them lucrative offices,
which potentially placed them at odds with the independent citizens who neither held nor
needed such emoluments. And the “natural aristocracy” of talented and wealthier men
would have to be kept under constant surveillance and subject to constant rotation in
office, lest they come to see political offices as their rights and their interest as separate
from that of the majority. In time, both of these sub-classes would become fixtures in the
Anglophone political imaginary. Future republican thinkers would imagine their societies
besieged on one side by the mercenary dependents and on the other side by grasping
aristocrats. Whether rich or poor, any man who wanted an office would potentially sell
his services to the king holding out loaves and fishes. Harrington did not tease out all
these implications in Oceana. But within his lifetime, those implications would begin to
manifest in English political discourse.
The old court-country debates reemerged in force after the restoration of
monarchy and the House of Lords in 1660 – partly thanks to the machinations of a
newfangled Stuart ministry. Charles I’s son and namesake, Charles II, was equally
determined to rule without Parliament, but was a savvy enough politician to keep his
head attached to his shoulders – literally as well as figuratively – from the time of his
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accession in 1660 until his death in 1685.9 But throughout his quarter-century of rule,
Charles had to contend not only with a suspicious Parliament whose members distrusted
their king’s Catholic predilections, but also with an overzealous Lord Treasurer who
thrived on ineffectual and self-defeating schemes. Sir Thomas Osborne, appointed to that
office in 1673, shortly thereafter acquired a new title as Earl of Danby, as well as an
unparalleled reputation for intrigue.
Danby knew that his own personal power would hinge on how well he could
“manage” the unruly Parliament, which had remained in session since 1661. He
employed various managerial strategies to that end, but of all these strategies, the most
notorious – and most counterproductive – was “influence.” Starting in 1675, he
generously distributed royal pensions among MPs, hoping to create a loyal “bloc” of
voters to support royal policies. In reality, Danby’s actual influence was meager. Even
after he implemented his Parliament-packing scheme, there were only thirty pensioners in
Parliament, and they still did not always vote as directed.10
Danby’s attempts to exert “influence” may have been ineffectual, but they did
succeed in galvanizing an oppositional party in Parliament. A shrewder minister could
have predicted as much, because MPs in the House of Commons had already been
attacking royal “influence” even before Danby brought their apprehensions to life. Under
the leadership of Anthony Ashley Cooper – better to known to history as the first Earl of
Shaftesbury and the mentor of John Locke – a group of likeminded politicians had
already proposed measures to counteract the crown’s patronage, especially patronage
pertaining to MPs. Danby’s managerial designs vindicated all their fears. Shaftesbury and
9
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his allies now demanded investigations to determine which members of the Commons
had allowed their votes to be corrupted with “guineas, promises, rewards, or letters.”11
They claimed that the Crown, acting through Danby, was attempting to upset the very
balance in the English Constitution by undermining the independence of the legislature.
In developing his critique of crown patronage, Shaftesbury effectively fused the
older language of court and country with the more recent Harringtonian discourse of
personal independence. Members of Parliament were supposed to be as independent as
the constituents they represented. That was why they received no official salary for their
service as MPs (an arrangement that lasted until the twentieth century). In theory, they
cared only for the interests of the people. But if an MP accepted some lucrative royal
“place” or “pension,” he would find himself financially attached to the royal interest.
These ministerial “placemen” would vote as directed, not by their constituents, but by
their new employers. Only the independent “country” MPs, living off the land rather than
the “court” salaries, could be trusted to make decisions for the greater good. For
Shaftesbury, then, the old epithet “court” referred to appointed royal ministers who
trafficked in “corruption” – and the word “corruption, a Harringtonian term of art, now
referred specifically to the practices of royal patronage. Shaftesbury and his allies
responded to this threat with a two-pronged plan of action. First, they proposed “place
bills” that would ban all officeholders and “placemen” from Parliament, thus preempting
royal influence in that body. Second, they proposed laws that would require more
frequent Parliamentary elections, which would give the electorate more frequent
opportunities to vote corrupt representatives out of office.12 Such bills were easier to
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propose than to pass: for the next century, the “place” bill and the “triennial Parliament”
bill would remain the ever-elusive holy grails of oppositional politics.
Of all the MPs who joined Shaftesbury’s attack on crown patronage, none was
more vituperatively entertaining than Andrew Marvell. Like Shaftesbury, Marvell did not
think the Commons could resist Charles’ allegedly papist designs if MPs remained under
the influence of places and pensions. In 1677, he penned his Seasonable Argument
against Parliamentary corruption, mercilessly exposing every sitting MP who had
received such gifts. Marvell delighted in the scandalous anecdote, mocking one of his
victims as a “notorious Cuckold” and another as brazenly malfeasant.13 Many of his barbs
had a pointedly elitist edge, targeting in particular those upstart MPs who depended on
the crown for their standing. He unmasked one MP as “a man of no Estate but his
Pension” and ridiculed another as no more than “an Indigent Pensioner.”14 In a
succession of pithy summaries, Marvell revealed the sinister bargains these parvenus had
struck in order to obtain their fortunes. One MP, for instance, had received a “Pension to
betray the Country Party” and subsequently voted “against his Conscience to serve his
Majesty.”15
Unrivaled in his capacity for vehemence, Marvell became, in one historian’s
words, “a rallying point for all critics of the unreformed commons.”16 Henceforth, the
intrinsically innocuous word “pensioner” would become one of the most dismissive
epithets in English political discourse.17 Marvell’s onslaught was not enough to secure
13
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place bills or shorter Parliaments, but it may have helped to secure electoral victories for
his allies in the country party; when new Parliamentary elections were finally held in
1679, 320 sitting MPs lost their seats.18
By the time of Charles II’s death in 1685, Shaftesbury’s amorphous country party
had evolved into the Whigs, a cogent political party united against the dual threat of
Catholic despotism and “court” minions. Their “court” adversaries had meanwhile
coalesced into a Tory party that championed royal power and the Restoration settlement.
Only the most inept of kings could have acted despotically enough to unite these two
parties against him, but Charles’s brother and heir, James II, was just that king. His
highhanded patronage politics subjected Tory royalism to a stress test from which it
never recovered, providing common cause for two factions that had been at each other’s
throats just a few years earlier.
In vintage Stuart fashion, James began his reign with unsubtle maneuvers to
enhance royal influence. He replaced thousands of officeholders throughout the realm
and questioned thousands more on their political views. Officeholders who refused to
support James’ policies of Catholic toleration were duly removed to make way for more
pliant replacements. The scope of this purge included Tory royalists, thus antagonizing
James’s own support base.19 When he learned that William of Orange planned to bring an
army to his shores, James frantically offered to restore Tories to their rightful offices. But
his last-minute olive branch was both too little and too late. James’ attempts to protect
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royal influence with royal patronage ultimately backfired, famously ending with a
“glorious revolution” for Parliament and an inglorious exile for the king.20
If anyone thought that “corruption” and “influence” would flee the kingdom along
with James, they were quickly disillusioned. In the 1690s, opposition parties formed once
again to combat the machinations of the same conniving minister who had plagued them
in the 1670s. For Lord Danby had not been idle since the 1680s – except for the five
years that he had spent imprisoned in the Tower of London for numerous acts of
deception and embezzlement. Following his 1685 release, Danby had aligned himself
first with the Tories, then with the opposition. He ultimately proved himself useful to
William’s cause and was duly rewarded with a new title as Marquess of Carmarthen in
1689. But his predilection for intrigue survived his change of title. As a high-ranking
royal adviser, he was perfectly willing to exploit his power over minor appointments for
political ends. He purged the lieutenancy and the Commission of the Peace, and
predictably created a new “bloc” of placemen in Parliament. If Carmarthen had learned
anything from his prior failures, it was the importance of commitment: although he had
only given pensions to thirty MPs in the 1670s, he now doled out more than a hundred.
Carmarthen’s schemes confirmed his now-legendary reputation as the age’s most
enterprising corruptionist, and once again resulted in the formation of an oppositional
party. The new “country party” was a conglomerate of Whigs and Tories, ostensibly
united by their shared respect for Parliamentary independence as well as their shared
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apprehensions about royal influence.21 In 1693, these oppositional MPs successfully
passed the long-awaited (but ultimately short-lived) Triennial Act, which required new
Parliamentary elections every three years.22 Their equally long-awaited place bill was
rejected twice – first by the House of Lords, and later by William himself.23 The problem
of patronage only became more urgent throughout the decade. An ongoing war with
France (1688–1697) now swelled the number of offices at the crown’s disposal. The
national debt and the newfangled Bank of England furnished the crown with additional
credit, which could be used to expand patronage and engorge the class of men dependent
on the crown.24
One of the most important oppositional voices from this time was the young
freethinking Whig, John Toland. In 1698, Toland warned readers that corruption and
dependency had reached epidemic proportions, as two hundred MPs now depended on
crown offices. These “offices,” for Toland, were really “downright Bribes and Pensions,”
“held precariously by the Court, and constantly taken away upon non-Compliance with
the Court-measures.”25 As Toland saw it, post-1660 kings had learned from Charles I’s
mistakes and, starting with Charles II, had begun resorting to “those mean Arts, and
underhanded Practices, of bribing and corrupting [MPs] with Money.” Parliament had a
duty to check absolutist designs by holding “ambitious” officers of government
accountable – but could they be trusted to fulfill this solemn duty if they were themselves
the officers of the government? Could they vote freely if they were “prepossest with the
21
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hopes and promises of enjoying Places, or the slavish fears of losing them?”26 The crown,
in other words, had found a loophole in the 1688 settlement by substituting seduction for
coercion.
Toland introduced a tragic note into this epic narrative, as he expressed his doubts
that even the truest of patriots could withstand the temptations of offices.
Fatal Experience has now more than enough convinc’d us, that Courts
have been the same in all Ages, and that few Persons have been found of
such approv’d Constancy and Resolution to withstand the powerful
Allurements and Temptations which from thence have been continually
dispens’d for the corrupting of Mens Minds, and debauching their honest
Principles.
The evidence of virtue’s fragility was all around them. “Persons who were formerly noted
for the most vigorous Asserters of their Country’s Liberty” now acquiesced to “the
arbitrary measures of the Court, and appear[ed] the most active Instruments for enslaving
their Country.” Corruption had changed “the very nature of Englishmen, and of Valiant
made them Cowards, of Eloquent Dumb, and of honest men villains; ‘tis this can make a
whole House of Commons eat their own words.” For Toland, this ubiquitous corruption
had made a mockery of the Glorious Revolution’s promise to secure the people’s consent
in elections, and now it threated to enervate English character itself.27
Toland was only twenty-eight at the time that he penned this tract, and he would
ultimately be better remembered for his works on religion than for his Whig polemics.
But his warnings against “mercenary parliaments” ought to be regarded as some of his
most significant writings, because they established the official anti-patronage line for
decades to come. From Bolingbroke to Edmund Burke to Catharine Macaulay, future
oppositional writers would echo Toland’s argument that patronage was simply a new
26
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guise for despotism in the post-1688 world, and thus a threat to the balanced constitution.
And many – but, importantly, not all – would share his pessimistic view of virtue’s
vulnerability to corruption.
Members of the opposition fought back with doomed legislative demands. They
continued to clamor for a place bill and, in 1695 and 1698, they proposed additional
legislation that would have added a landed property requirement for membership in
Parliament.28 Their persistence temporarily paid off, at least in part; the 1701 Act of
Settlement did include a provision banning all placemen from Parliament. The Act’s
restrictions were later relaxed, however, with predictable results. By the time of Queen
Anne’s death in 1714, there were two hundred placemen in Parliament.29
For oppositional politicians, the persistence of crown patronage meant that the
Glorious Revolution of 1688 would remain an unfinished revolution at best. Parliament
had placed legal limits on the crown’s de jure prerogative power, but as the frustrating
course of events had shown, monarchs could still wield their de facto hegemony by
offering loaves and fishes to pliable legislators. In subsequent years, ministers of the
crown would exploit patronage to concentrate power in a way that not even Lord Danby
could have imagined. Indeed, events of the eighteenth century would ultimately convince
many members of the opposition that 1688 had been the revolution that failed.
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Patriots against Patronage: Oppositional Politics in the Age of Walpole
With the death of Queen Anne and the accession of the Hanoverian kings, English
politics eased into a relatively more peaceful and complacent age – “relatively” being the
operative word. Between 1714 and 1763, most English politicians came to cherish 1688’s
achievements rather than rue its disappointments. The binding article of consensus was
their shared conviction that the Glorious Revolution had bequeathed England a glorious
constitution. The English people proclaimed themselves to be the freest people in the
world, thanks to their elegant equilibrium of commons, lords, and king, with stringent
restrictions placed on the latter. But if this balanced constitution provided some
ideological common ground, it also sowed ideological division; English politicians could
not agree on the precise means by which that balance was to be maintained. Such
disagreements would help to keep partisan conflict alive and well throughout the
eighteenth century.30 And royal patronage, the most formidable weapon still left in the
crown’s arsenal, would remain one of the most controversial issues of that century’s
politics.
In the roughly quarter century that elapsed between the flight of James II (1688)
and the death of Queen Anne (1714), English politics had been tense, but relatively
democratic – “relatively” being, again, the operative word. Although local elites often
made decisions about whether to hold elections and who would be permitted to run, up to
a quarter of white males were able to vote in those elections once they arrived. But as the
eighteenth century wore on, democratic participation dwindled. Britain’s population
increased fifteen percent between 1715 and 1754, but the number of eligible voters
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increased at half that rate. And after 1714, the emergent “Court” Whigs began to unravel
all the democratic achievements of their “country” Whig predecessors. The Septennial
Act (1716) stretched out Parliamentary terms from three years to seven years. These
longer intervals between elections made bribery far more cost-effective: with fewer
elections, there were fewer opportunities for the electorate to hold “corrupt” MPs
accountable.31
Robert Walpole was the great enforcer of the “Court Whig” strategy, wielding
crown patronage with an aplomb rarely seen before or since. He became Lord Treasurer
in 1720 and quickly acquired additional positions as Chancellor of the Exchequer, leader
of the Commons, and the king’s adviser.32 The power of appointment still technically
belonged to the king, but George I and George II routinely deferred to this “Prime
Minister’s” advice in such matters, making him the unofficial master of places and
pensions. From roughly 1720 onward, Walpole could dispense offices to successful
candidates and their friends in exchange for said candidates’ personal loyalty and
influence.33 He executed these tactics with ruthless vigilance. If an officeholding MP
refused to vote as Walpole directed, he was immediately stripped of his offices, pensions,
and any additional contracts.34
Walpole’s political management threatened to create the same monster that earlier
oppositional writers had feared – the separate interest of placemen and pensioners
dependent on the crown rather than the people. Thomas Gordon and John Trenchard
31
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elaborated on some possible solutions to this problem in a series of letters they published
under the alias “Cato” from 1720 to 1723. Believing that all men were driven by
“passions” rather than by selfless virtue, “Cato” proposed systematic reforms to ensure
that Representatives shared the same interests as the masses rather than the “power
holders.” Larger representative bodies and more frequent elections would make it more
expensive for the crown to bribe MPs, and as long as the MPs shared the same interests
as those they represented, liberty and property would be safe. Not that Cato trusted the
masses’ selflessness. Trenchard and Gordon believed that all men were ultimately driven
by self-interest, but still thought the self-interest of the masses was less dangerous than
that of the few. The great body of the people had no particular ambition and therefore no
interest in securing lucrative places and pensions for themselves and their friends; they
cared only for maintaining their liberty and property. The people might occasionally be
led astray, but they would inevitably course-correct once they realized that it was in their
best interest to oppose oppressive and expensive systems of corruption. And as long as
the Representatives shared the same interests as the people, Parliament could be trusted to
resist Walpole’s intrigues.35 These arguments were destined for a long shelf life.
American antifederalists in 1787 would use Cato’s logic to advocate larger representation
and more frequent elections, while Thomas Jefferson in the 1790s would echo “Cato’s”
insistence that “the people’s” self-interest compelled them to oppose corruption.36
As Walpole and his allies saw it, the crown’s “influence” was the only safeguard
against pure, anarchical democracy. The “people” controlled the vast majority of the
landed property in the realm, and their representatives in the Commons also controlled
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the public purse. All that was left to the king was his power of distributing patronage. If
the king and his ministers could not even wield that power without encumbrances, how
could the crown maintain its due and equal weight in the constitutional balance?37 Some
Tories agreed.38 As geometrically elegant as this defense may have been, it hardly
convinced the marginalized Tories and dissident Whigs who had fallen victim to
Walpole’s proscription. The newest generation of oppositional politicians and writers
echoed their forefathers as they protested that Walpole’s minions in the Commons would
ultimately undermine the independence of the one body assigned to protect Englishmen’s
rights.39
Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, was Walpole’s most persistent nemesis
and the most eloquent expounder of oppositional ideas. Over the course of two decades,
Bolingbroke would lambast the Walpole “robinocracy” for using government offices to
entice MPs away from their duty and render them dependent; in his Dissertation upon
Parties, he reiterated John Toland’s warning that the influence of royal patronage in the
commons would pave a slower but surer path to despotism.40 Contrary to Walpole’s
argument that royal patronage simply reallocated a modest portion of wealth and power
toward the crown, Bolingbroke argued that the king’s power in offices was, in fact, so
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extensive that it could potentially wreck the entire balance of the constitution.41 “Now if
such an influence or dependence was universal and unlimited throughout the whole
house,” he wrote, “the monarchy would be absolute; and whenever this influence prevails
in any degree, it tends to arbitrary power.”42 Bolingbroke cited the experience of other
nations as proof that a compliant legislature would always allow the crown prince or his
ministers to rule with impunity. Walpole’s understanding of the constitution was
therefore not only sinister, but even ridiculous. What, asked Bolingbroke, was the point
of having a legislative body to check crown power if ministers of the crown could still
wield enough patronage “to render this controul useless”?43 Was the English constitution
really no more than “a jumble of incompatible powers, which would separate and fall to
pieces of themselves, unless restrained by such honourable methods as those of bribery
and corruption”?44 For Bolingbroke, Walpole’s arguments in favor of royal influence
were wicked at worst, contradictory at best, and disingenuous either way.45 Other
oppositional politicians concurred that Walpole’s “doctrine of corruption” was little more
than a ridiculous sophistry.46
Although Bolingbroke championed place bills and other reforms to keep
patronage out of Parliament, he split with some predecessors and contemporaries on one
particular point: he believed that legal regulations were less effective barriers against
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corruption than the virtue and character of politicians.47 And virtue, for Bolingbroke, was
not something that could simply be engineered. James Harrington had imagined virtue as
something attainable only by those who possessed adequate property; for Bolingbroke,
patriotic virtue was an innate, almost ascetic quality, attainable by any man courageous
enough to transcend his own financial circumstances and self-interest.48 “Cato” had seen
selfless virtue as an irrelevant and chimerical notion, believing instead that only
systematic reforms could secure the interests of the people. But Bolingbroke envisioned a
“country party” of selfless men, united not by mutual interest but by a shared set of
patriotic principles, heroically determined to unite against provisional threats like the
“court party.”49 Such a party would transcend all the pettiness of mere partisanship. This
might have struck some contemporaries as a rather far-fetched, idealistic notion.
Montesquieu, for instance, could not take the idea of a principled party seriously. For
him, all party warfare was reducible to an ongoing back-and-forth game between the
“ins” who held offices and patronage, and the “outs” who envied them.50
But other oppositional politicians sometimes spoke a language similar to
Bolingbroke’s, as they imagined innate differences between the corrupted and the
incorruptible. The “placemen” who received crown appointments were likened to
prostitutes, willing to sell both “themselves” and “their country” to gratify their appetites;
in thus debasing themselves, they became “the bond-slaves of the corruptor.”51 Only men
who were “entirely governed by their avarice or luxury” could stoop to such indignities.
47
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It was not strictly a matter of class and economic necessity, but of character; a poor man
might be content with a small income, but the man who loved luxury would never be
satisfied.52 But even a man who was not corrupt by nature or by choice could still be
compromised by a place or a pension. Edward Southwell, for instance, caustically noted
that “as soon as a gentleman becomes a minister, or, as he calls himself, a servant of the
crown, he shakes off all concern for the liberty of his country.”53 A moral binary was thus
being inscribed between the “corrupt and slavish [Parliamentary] majority” and “the
uncorrupted and independent few.”54 Indeed, many of these thinkers perceived something
perceptibly “foreign” in the character of these placemen.”55 Editors of the 1740s paper
Common Sense identified that papers’ eponymous virtue with advocates of the
oppositional platforms, while those who were connected to the “Court” or beholden to
any sort of “Ministerial Employment” were presented as the enemies and assailants of
that quintessentially English trait.56 Even the manners of the placemen were suspect. An
English patriot was supposed to be sincere, direct, and independent, unlike the fawning
creatures that surrounded the crown. Their sycophantic manners represented nothing less
than a betrayal of the ancient “Saxon” spirit in favor of the “Norman Yoke.”
Other contemporaries did not see the “placeman” as some uniquely reprobate subbreed of Englishman, however, but as fellow human beings who had simply succumbed,
as any man would, to temptation. And Bolingbroke himself eventually began to doubt
that he could ever organize an effective party of virtuous men. An ineffectual political
organizer, Bolingbroke ultimately decided to place his hopes not in a principled party but
52
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in a principled ruler. In 1737, Bolingbroke penned The Idea of a Patriot King for the
benefit of his chosen royal champion, Prince Frederick. The “Patriot King” he envisioned
would rise above the pettiness of self-interested factions and parties. Any king who
merely served a party would inevitably deteriorate into a crass chieftain dispensing
“plunder” among followers – but a true patriot king, Bolingbroke believed, would not
only transcend such arts, but would punish those who sought to live off the royal bounty.
The patriot king’s first duty was to “‘purge his court’” of all these parasitical patronageseekers. He would not simply dole out favors among loyal partisans, then, but instead
would unite his administration behind the shared purpose of serving the people.57
Bolingbroke’s vision of a patriot king never materialized in reality. Prince
Frederick died prematurely, taking with him Bolingbroke’s last chance at genuine
political relevance. By the time his nemesis Walpole finally resigned, Bolingbroke had
been reduced to a marginal figure in English politics. The opposition’s triumph over
Walpole was itself rather hollow. Their demands for place bills and triennial parliaments
had become perennial but never efficacious.58 Walpole’s resignation was followed by a
further groundswell of demand for “reforms to limit government patronage,” but once
again, those demands yielded no legislative results.59
Although the opposition’s arguments were inefficacious at the time, they proved
to be quite durable. Decades later, as Americans debated their own constitutional balance
in 1787 and 1788, they would re-litigate every one of these points. Americans would
even find their own apologists for executive “influence” in the form of Alexander
57
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Hamilton and his “royalist” coterie, while George Mason and his “Whig” allies would
rehash the old country party arguments for an incorruptible legislature and limited
executive patronage. And American Presidents, from Washington down to Jackson,
would find themselves contemplating whether it was possible, as Bolingbroke speculated,
for a high-minded executive to secure a united administration without becoming a petty
partisan.
By that point, however, some English oppositional Whigs in the mother country
had already come around to Bolingbroke’s notion that the problem of corrupt patronage
would be solved not with a set of better laws, but with a union of better men.

“Good Men Must Associate”: John Wilkes, Edmund Burke, and the Party of Virtue
The rallying cries of “corruption” and “influence” had always been, by nature,
oppositional. The Tories and Whigs who felt that they had been marginalized or
proscribed could always find common cause in decrying the political system that had left
them to wither in the wilderness while less high-minded men reaped the harvests of
government spoils. This shared resentment had often been the only thing that bound
oppositional politicians together. And the 1760s witnessed an unusually odd political
alliance, as Edmund Burke, the prickly future father of conservatism, found himself
rushing to the defense of John Wilkes, a self-styled radical libertine. Their common
enemy was, as always, court corruption. But the ensuing debate would lead Burke to
some novel and important conclusions about the relationship between political patronage
and political parties, conclusions that would still be echoing decades later in the early
American republic.
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Englishmen of the 1760s continued to complain about “venality” in the House of
Commons and the undue influence of the Ministry, and they continued to demand place
bills and triennial parliaments.60 Some of them doubted that any politician could
withstand the temptations of power.61 Others continued to hold out hopes for the rogue
MP who was virtuous enough to “act an independent part” and “refuse the most lucrative
employments,” rather than succumb to a “curtain dictator.”62 These were platitudinous
musings by now, but one such “independent” figure would ultimately become the cause
célèbre of his age. That man was Wilkes, the radical journalist who was arrested in 1763
for obscene and “seditious” speech, and then forced into exile for four years.63 When he
finally exhausted his credit abroad and returned to England in 1769, the voters of
Middlesex welcomed Wilkes home by electing him as their MP. Members of Parliament
immediately passed a resolution expelling Wilkes from their ranks – allegedly because he
had been an outlaw at the time of his candidacy.64
All throughout these controversies, Wilkes flaunted his adversarial nature as a
marker of quintessentially English independence. He described the true Englishman as
one who took pride in defying ministerial power and refused to be intimidated or
corrupted.65 As further evidence of his authentically English sense of independence,
Wilkes drew attention to his past history of refusing any places or pensions.66 For Wilkes,
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as for his oppositional predecessors, politics was reducible to a binary, pitting the
independent English people and their equally independent representatives in Parliament
against the crown dependents and their domineering masters.67
Wilkes’s expulsion from Parliament sparked uproar among his Middlesex
constituents, and petitions quickly flooded in from across the country. The commotion
inspired Burke, the 41-year-old Irish-born Whig MP, to set some of his own thoughts to
paper. With his Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), Burke took a
century’s worth of anti-patronage writings and amplified their paranoid undertones to
deafening levels. But his prescription for alleviating Britain’s political discontents was
simultaneously something old and something new, as it appropriated the old country
party logic to justify patronage policies that would one day be labeled “spoilsmanship.”
Burke elaborated, first, on a line of argument dating back to John Toland, by
depicting royal patronage as simply royal coercion by other means. Despots would never
take the same road to tyranny twice. Crown prerogative had been replaced by the more
insidious power of crown “influence,” “which converted the very antagonist into the
instrument of power.”68 Unlike earlier oppositional writers, who had focused their
suspicions on ministers, Burke claimed that there was a hidden “Court,” whose members
operated even further behind the curtains in order to secure all real power in the kingdom.
The conspirators in this “Court Faction” were men who lacked any real standing and
therefore had to acquire power through furtiveness and intrigue. Their greatest obstacles
were the established Whig MPs who had spent years cultivating respect and friendship,
which made them difficult to dislodge. The “Court Faction” therefore circumvented these
67
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men by arranging ministerial appointments for men without “rank, influence, connexion,”
or “character.” These conspirators thus endeavored to destroy all ties of influence within
the kingdom except for the ties that bound officeholders to the Court, thereby securing
“the unlimited and uncontrouled use of” their “own influence, under the sole discretion”
of their own “private favour”69
Burke’s conspiracy theory was as intricate in its conjectures of malicious intrigue
as it was vague in its analysis of how corruption actually worked. But he was able to
reinforce his accusations with the time-tested argument that patronage had undermined
the independence of the House of Commons. That body, for Burke, was supposed to
provide the mechanism by which the people exerted their fair share of control on the
operations of government. Its members were supposed to be vigilant and independent
asserters of the people’s rights; nothing could be more unnatural than their “indolent and
submissive disposition” to bargain with “men in power.”70 In Burke’s hands, the
confrontation between John Wilkes and Parliament became a metaphor for this ongoing
battle between People and Court. Wilkes, he argued, had not really been targeted for his
writings, but for his “unconquerable firmness, for his resolute, indefatigable, strenuous
resistance against oppression” – in short, for embodying the true virtues of an
independent MP. The “Court Cabal” had attacked Wilkes in order to set an example for
anyone else in the Commons who might have the temerity to defy them. His persecution
would warn all observers that it was better to demonstrate “obsequiousness and servility”
than to risk one’s own career by serving the people. With Wilkes crushed, the
independence of the Commons would be the next casualty. The Court would have all “all
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honours, offices,” and “emoluments” on their side, and they would employ their
“loquacious placemen” to turn public opinion against their enemies. And once the
independent MPs finally became convinced that the people’s support provided no
protection, those MPs would lose hope and submit “to the influence of the Court.”71
Burke broke ranks with his country party predecessors in a crucial way by
denying that there could be any systemic remedy for this predicament. He disavowed the
usual proposals for triennial parliaments and place bills. Shorter parliaments would
backfire because the Court would always find it easier to pressure the legislature at the
beginning and end of the session. If Parliament refused to allow officeholders from other
departments to sit in the ranks of the legislature, he warned, it would create hostility
between the different branches of government. And besides, of all bribes that the Court
could wield, offices of state were “the least disgraceful.”72 This latter point, expressed in
passing, represented a monumental break with country party tradition. For the past
century, oppositional politicians had equated patronage with bribery, but Burke now
suggested that MPs holding crown offices could be, under certain circumstances,
innocuous. The solution did not lie in systemic reforms but in the character of the MPs
who were allowed to hold offices. Without good men, he wrote, “the Commonwealth is
no better than a scheme upon paper.” Even if Burke and his oppositional allies wanted
these offices of state for themselves, they were still more than simple opportunists: once
in office, these men would act differently than their predecessors because they were
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intrinsically better than them. Not every man was equally virtuous; nor was every man
equally evil.73
While Burke dispensed with institutional safeguards against corruption, he still
preserved the heart of the classic country party rationale: the disinterested and the
virtuous had to unite into a party against the interested and the corrupt. “[N]othing but a
firm combination of public men” could save them from the reigning “faction.”74 But
unlike his country party predecessors, most of whom had denied belonging to an actual
political party, Burke embraced the term “party” to justify his union of righteous
politicians. “Party,” he wrote, “is a body of men united, for promoting by their joint
endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle in which they are all
agreed.” These shared principles would distinguish their party from the self-serving
“factions” whose adherents maneuvered merely “for place and emolument.” Because
they cherished their common principles, they could serve the national interest by
pursuing “every just method to put the men who hold their opinions into such a condition
as may enable them to carry their common plans into execution, with all the power and
authority of the state.” Significantly, these partisans would, out of conviction, be “bound
to give to their own party the preference in all things.”75 Their loyalty to the party would
simply reflect their loyalty to shared principles.
Burke’s analysis was groundbreaking, but not for the reasons that some scholars
have supposed. His tract has often been presented as the first text to defend the concept of
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a permanent, organized, adversarial party system.76 Contemporary observers did not see it
that way. His Whig allies interpreted it as a simple restatement of country party
principles, calling for a united oppositional front against a provisional “Court”
antagonist.77 Like twentieth-century scholars, however, they overlooked Burke’s most
significant new argument. By dispensing with place bills and triennial parliaments, Burke
rejected a century’s worth of oppositional rationales. Instead of uniting to secure systemic
anti-patronage reforms, Burke’s oppositional party would unite to secure that patronage
for worthy brothers in arms. This line of argument allowed Burke to circumvent a
“tragic” paradox of oppositional, antiestablishment thought. Since Toland’s time,
oppositional writers had warned that the allurements of office were so tempting that not
even patriots could hold them without being corrupted. This reasoning could create a
problem for any oppositional politician who wanted to hold any position of importance
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beyond his seat in the legislature.78 Burke instead suggested that some men were, in fact,
more trustworthy than others, and that the goal of such men should be to join forces to
ensure that only they and their disinterested comrades held these offices. In short,
virtuous combinations, not comprehensive legal reforms, would solve the problem of
patronage.
Burke’s notion that there could be such a thing as a party of disinterested
officeholders was, in fact, the most controversial aspect of his proposal. The most
powerful objection came from Catharine Macaulay, the legendary Whig historian.
Macaulay claimed – using arguments that would soon be appropriated by Burke’s even
more ferocious adversary, Thomas Paine – that all governments had been founded on
selfishness and exploitation. Moreover, she argued, the “same circumstance which
attends the formation of government, attends what is called their reformation.” The post1688 Whigs had opposed James II, only to replace his system of corruption with their
own. They had conspired with ministers to trample liberty with a national debt, standing
armies, septennial parliaments, heavy taxes, and of course, an “army of placemen and
pensioners.”79 None of Macaulay’s claims so far were particularly contentious;
politicians had criticized the crown-dependent Whig oligarchy for decades. More
provocatively, however, she claimed that Burke and his colleagues were nothing more
than frustrated would-be oligarchs who had only set their scopes on crown power because
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they could no longer control it themselves. She mocked Burke’s pretentious assertion that
his party would somehow be more virtuous than all the preceding parties who had made
similar claims, and she reasserted the importance of systemic reforms. As long as a seat
in Parliament entailed “lucrative prospect[s]” for “enriching the representative,” there
could be no liberty. The only lasting solution would be a regular “rotation” of MPs,
which would deprive them of any “corrupt and standing interest in the legislature.” In her
emphatic, concluding words, she declared “that representation can never be kept free
from tyrannical exertions on the rights of the people, without rotation.”80
Macaulay’s argument exposed fundamental flaws in Burke’s. There was no clear
reason to presume that members of Burke’s party would be less self-interested than their
predecessors once they were in office, especially if they intended to give fellow partisans
“the preference in all things.” And while Burke claimed that his party would be united by
sincere principles, what guarantee did a politician’s proclamations of virtue really
provide? Seventeenth-century republican thinkers had often insinuated that only landed
wealth could guarantee a man’s independence and incorruptibility, but Burke provided no
such qualifications to set men beyond the temptations of bribery. He simply trusted that
virtuous men would recognize other virtuous men. Perhaps for these reasons, Macaulay’s
tract found a more ready audience in the colonies, where selections were reprinted in
various American newspapers.81
In the very long run, however, Burke’s argument would win the day, at least in
American politics. Jacksonian Democrats of the 1820s would, perhaps unwittingly,
embrace Burke’s notion that a party of the virtuous could transcend the allurements of
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patronage. Their dilemma, like his, would be how to discern which of their partisans were
genuinely virtuous.

Conclusion
By 1771, John Wilkes had become Alderman for the City of London, but the
Wilkites’ attack on crown patronage had not abated. They utilized the venerable country
party arguments for the mixed constitution, declaring that the “trustees of the people
should be pure of all interested communication with the Court and its ministers,” while
lamenting the abundance of corrupt “placemen” and “pensioners” in the Commons. They
prescribed the usual remedies of place bills and more frequent elections, along with a
suggestion that MPs be required to swear oaths that they had never bribed or been bribed
by any individual.82 Wilkes’s biography and persona provided something crucial for the
oppositional cause – a martyr for republicanism. Wilkites compared their hero to Brutus
and other Romans who dared to defy the grasping power of kings – an apt allusion for an
age that tried to inscribe classical archetypes on contemporary settings.83
When Parliament finally expunged the resolution barring Wilkes from Parliament,
he modestly attributed the victory – as well as his own alleged virtues – to his followers.
He congratulated them on their triumph “over the arts of a profligate Administration, the
most barefaced Bribery and daring Menaces, the most shameful practices of the wretched
Tools of arbitrary Power among us, the insolent Mandates of Placemen, and Treachery of
the pretended Friends of Liberty and their Country.” The antagonist, once again, was
“arbitrary power,” as represented in the ministers and their “tools.” But Wilkes also
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struck a recognizably Burkean note when he called for an enduring union against these
threats. “Your firmness and zeal have crushed the united forces of all those, who meant to
enslave this great City. I have not the least doubt that the same happy union among
ourselves will always remain a firm barrier against every future attack, from the
concealed and insidious Friend, or the open Enemy.”84
In the century that had elapsed between Andrew Marvell and John Wilkes,
English political thinkers had developed three relatively cogent schools of thought with
regard to political patronage, all of them revolving around the narrower issue of placemen
in the legislature. The “royalist” thinkers like Robert Walpole had commended royal
patronage as a useful and necessary mechanism for maintaining the due executive
influence in the legislature, thus maintaining the necessary constitutional equilibrium and
connections to bind the body politic together. “Country party” thinkers, from Shaftesbury
to Macaulay, had identified the presence of officeholders in Parliament as a threat to the
legislature’s independence, and, by extension, the democratic component of the
constitution; for them, the MPs entangled in royal patronage was an illegitimate, even
foreign presence in the body politic. Despite their difference, both arguments took for
granted that royal offices were royal bribes, implicitly calling the virtue of all
officeholders into question. Both arguments, and their implied prejudice against all
officeholders, would circulate widely in the American colonies, where they would shape
debates for decades to come.
But there was also a third view expounded by Burke, who suggested that some
men might be virtuous enough to hold executive offices without succumbing to their
corrupting influence. This idea would ultimately find traction among American
84
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democrats (and particularly among American Democrats), who would later try to unite
these virtuous and disinterested individuals into a party against patronage. But in 1770,
British Americans paid little attention to Burke’s longwinded expostulations on virtuous
partisanship. They had more pressing concerns to address, all of them relating directly to
the problem of placemen in the British Empire.
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Chapter Two:
The Problem of Placemen in the Age of Revolution

Filling out his diary entry for August 14, 1769, the thirty-four-year-old John
Adams took a moment to commend his fellow American patriots’ self-mastery. The
Boston Sons of Liberty had drunk forty-five toasts at a meeting earlier that day, and as
Adams wryly noted, no one had become too inebriated. The object of their celebration
had been none other than John Wilkes, the author of Number 45 and the last standing
hero of English politics.1
The Bostonians’ conviviality may have been extreme, but their veneration of
Wilkes was not. Patriots all throughout the American colonies imagined Wilkes as a
potential savior in their battle against a corrupt administration. Where Wilkes’s
supporters in England had been content to memorialize him as a classical martyr writ
large, his American allies celebrated him in literally messianic terms:
I believe in Wilkes, the firm patriot, maker of number 45. Who was born
for our good. Suffered under arbitrary power. Was banished and
imprisoned. He descended into purgatory, and returned some time after.
He ascended here with honor and sitteth among the great assembly of the
people, where he shall judge both the favourite and his creatures. I believe
in the spirit of his abilities, that they will prove to the good of our country.
In the resurrection of liberty, and the life of universal freedom forever.
Amen.2
Bostonians admired Wilkes for the same reason that they cherished the memory of
Andrew Marvell, but with added spiritual undertones: he was “one of those incorruptibly
honest men reserved by heaven to bless, and perhaps save a tottering Empire.” His
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“generous and inflexible principles,” combined with his “noble disdain of inadequate
ministers and contemptible salary hunters,” rendered him a hero that all Englishmen
could admire.3
Wilkes turned out to be an ironic choice of hero, for he was both a notorious
libertine and a closeted charlatan. Despite all his declarations of independence, Wilkes
was in fact a voracious office-hunter who spent years seeking all variety of government
employment and eventually settled into a well-compensated chamberlainship in 1779.4
But the ideal of patriotic martyrdom would ultimately outlive Wilkes’s reputation. Adams
would later note that political persecution was the tried and true “Method of making great
Men,” citing Wilkes as an example of a man who had been rendered immortal by his
suffering.5 And decades later, at a time when Wilkes’s name was no longer fresh in
Americans’ minds, the idiom of political victimhood would persist in the cultural
construction of Andrew Jackson and his allies, who depicted themselves as incorruptible
martyrs to the forces of corrupt patronage.
Even if John Wilkes had never existed – and evidence suggests that the John
Wilkes of heroic legend existed only in imagination – American colonists would
probably have had to invent him. By 1769, they were convinced that the British Empire
had been hijacked by self-interested politicians and their self-interested, officeholding
“dependents.” Almost no one, it seemed, was immune to the lure of the corrupt bargains
offered by the Ministry and its minions. The colonists chose Wilkes as their hero because
they saw him as the one English politician who had proven himself capable of resisting
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those bargains. But Wilkes’s theatrical displays of defiance were ultimately not enough to
rescue the colonists from the allegedly venal mother country. And over the coming years,
Americans would elaborate on their conspiracy theories and refine their narratives of
corruption, always depicting the corrupt officeholder as the lynchpin of despotic
governments.

Patronage, “Parasites,” and the Ideological Unmaking of British America
Shrewd administers have always been adept at deploying political patronage to
shore up empires. From the Romans of antiquity down to the neo-Romans of the
Florentine Renaissance, imperial theorists knew that patronage was the binding agent of
empire, the force that tied geographically disparate individuals to the metropolitan
capital. This time-sanctioned lesson was not lost on the bureaucrats who oversaw the
eighteenth-century British dominions. In theory, the English monarch had a few trusted
men who depended upon his patronage, each of whom in turn would have hundreds of
their own dependents to influence, and so on, stretching the tendrils of dependency all
across the Atlantic.6 These lines of patronage would empower a ruling class and even
some ruling sub-classes, whose members would use their own influence to ensure a
stable, hierarchical order in the colonies.7 If colonial elites grew restive, a skillful crown
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governor could placate them by offering lucrative offices.8 Political patronage thus
secured order all across the British Atlantic world.
The rulers of the British Empire implemented this theory all too well. Even before
the imperial controversy commenced in 1763, a class fissure had opened between those
privileged few who enjoyed access to the highest offices of government and those
unlucky parvenus who were stuck in local posts.9 The crown appointed most governors.
In places like Massachusetts, those governors would in turn appoint Justices of the Peace,
thus turning county seats into gubernatorial strongholds.10 Small groups of men –
including governors, colonial council members, ministers of the crown, and colonial
proprietors – came to control most of the appointments. By 1763, it was difficult to
acquire any sort of higher office without access to influential men in these narrow
decision-making circles.11
Ambitious colonial upstarts were growing restless.12 Opportunities for
advancement had steadily diminished, as the multiplication of offices had not kept pace
with the number of wealthy and aspiring colonists. Americans who were lucky enough to
obtain these offices often held onto these sinecures for life.13 Sometimes not even death
could loosen the entrenched officeholders’ grips; in Massachusetts, Virginia, and South
Carolina, many offices had effectively become hereditary.14 And although there were a
finite number of available positions, there was no limit on the number of offices that any
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one man could hold – a loophole that resulted, predictably, in officeholding monopolies.
Thomas Hutchinson, for instance, already held numerous high offices before obtaining
the Massachusetts governorship in 1760.15
These local aristocracies were irritating enough. But colonists were also plagued
by English transplants who crossed the ocean to claim colonial sinecures and reap a
paycheck from Americans’ tax dollars.16 Mid-century Bostonians were thus heard to
complain about trans-Atlantic “place-Hunters” who “would stoop so low as to pick the
Gilding from a Bit of Ginger-Bread (if it belong’d to the Publick) in order to increase
their own Store.”17 Where English oppositional writers sometimes depicted officeseekers
as metaphorically foreign, colonists saw them as literal foreigners. “Placemen,” it was
averred, had no “no natural tie or connection with the provinces.”18
The social situation was fraught, and colonists’ resentments were regularly
refueled by fresh inundations of English oppositional writings.19 British Americans had
been carefully and repetitiously trained to see the balance of society’s three orders –
monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy – as the alchemical ingredient of English
exceptionalism and the surest safeguard of their happiness.20 That everlasting bogeyman
of English politics, royal patronage, continued to cast its shadow over every political
debate in the colonies. Americans knew that Parliament’s freedom from crown pressure
was the sine qua non of liberty; the crown’s manipulation of elections, combined with its
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efforts to “impose its will” on MPs, thus seemed like a dagger pointed at the very heart of
English freedom.21 Crown ministers would have been wise to tread lightly in such a
perilous sociopolitical landscape. But the monarchy’s official attitude toward patronage
had never been characterized by circumspection, and the Hanoverian kings tended to
wield colonial patronage in a highhanded, nearly contemptuous manner.22 In the
immediate years leading up to the imperial controversy, the Crown “disallowed” the
Pennsylvania Assembly’s measure to grant judges’ lifetime tenures, and passed numerous
measures to ensure that colonial judges would remain dependent on the crown rather than
the colonists.23
Small wonder that colonists increasingly gravitated toward radical oppositional
writings, and small wonder that, in some historians’ eyes, political patronage became the
ideological centerpiece of the Americans’ revolution.24 Crown officers had been
discursively giftwrapped as scapegoats for all of the Americans’ woes. Once Parliament
began asserting its right to tax the colonies, patriot newspapers were quick to project all
the colonists’ long-festering resentments onto those officeholders.25 Polemicists claimed
that England was levying taxes for no better reason than to support the parasitical officers
whose sinecures would “suck the life-blood of the body politic.”26 These writers
imagined a vicious cycle of corruption at work. Taxes were used “to enrich a set of
corrupt individuals,” who then used the remaining tax revenue to pay the officeholders’
salaries, which in turn kept those officers dependent upon the crown rather than the
21
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people.27 This constant multiplication of official minions would only amplify the
Ministry’s power over the colonists.28 Not surprisingly, the colonists also recycled the old
oppositional line against Parliamentary placemen, whose presence in the legislature
threatened to blur distinctions between executive and legislative power.29
Obviously the sins of colonial placemen were not identical to those of the
placemen who sat in Parliament, as colonial officeholders were not eligible to hold seats
in that body. (Officeholders often did occupy seats in the colonial Assemblies, but that
seems to have been a less controversial point.) What made the colonial placemen
particularly suspect was their propensity for deception. They were imagined to be the
“insidious” propagandists for the mother country’s agenda, using sophistry and duplicity
to obfuscate the basically simple question of colonists’ rights.30 Sympathetic English
correspondents were happy to provide fodder for these suspicions by lambasting the
“mean mercenary hirelings among yourselves, who for a little filthy lucre would at any
Time betray every Right, Liberty, and Priviledge of their fellow subjects.” Such
correspondents assured the colonists that true “Men of Sense” in England knew better
than to be “deceived and deluded by the Accounts received from Placemen in the
Colonies, or the Seekers of such places.”31 The honeyed words of a placeman were
tainted at their source.
John Dickinson collected and refined these arguments in his Letters from a
Pennsylvania Farmer (1768), which equated the crown’s absolute power over patronage
with an absolute royal tyranny. Dickinson’s main targets were the Townshend Duties, but
27
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his complaints about taxation intertwined with his complaints about venal officeholders.
If colonists allowed a crown minister to “appoint as many offices as he pleases for
collecting the taxes” and “to assign what salaries he thinks ‘adequate,’” Dickinson
warned, then the minister could effectively “divide the spoils from us in what manner he
pleases.” The colonists would be powerless to stop him. Ministers could reward their
“most profligate and needy dependents… with places in the greatest trust, because they
were of the greatest profit,” all the while claiming that these offices and salaries were
necessary for the administration of justice. The acquisitive officeholders posed a double
threat, for they were not just parasites but also the agents of crown “influence.” Because
these men depended on “such salaries as the crown may please to annex,” they could
easily be used to extend “ministerial influence” far beyond its current limits.32
Dickinson published this diatribe around the same time that John Wilkes returned
to England after four years of self-imposed exile. As we have seen, the author of Number
45 found some of his most vociferous supporters among the American patriots, who
drank toasts to his health and in some cases even named children after him. Bostonians
established their own Society for the Supporters of the Bill of Rights, and the Sons of
Liberty entered into a regular correspondence with Wilkes. Although colonists celebrated
and lamented Wilkes’s martyrdom at the hands of the corrupt Parliamentary placemen,
this idolatrous commemoration did not imply any sort of rebellion against the mother
country itself. On the contrary, they cherished Wilkes because he seemed to represent
their last hope that virtuous and disinterested Englishmen could reform their corrupt

32

John Dickinson, Letters from a farmer in Pennsylvania, to the inhabitants of the British colonies
(Philadelphia: Printed by David Hall and William Sellers, 1768), 50-56.

65

government by working within the system.33 Such hopes would crumble over the next
few years. Parliament did expunge the resolution that had barred Wilkes from Parliament,
but Wilkes himself was never able to claim a seat in that body. Both crown and
Parliament would remain stubborn in the face of colonists’ demands, to the point that
Americans would begin to contemplate a more drastic assertion of their independence.
And placemen, the great nemeses of British Americans’ liberty, would be further
deconstructed, vilified, and ultimately expelled from the emerging American republic.

Patriots, “Placemen,” and the Narrative of Rebellion
Few men have ever fetishized their personal independence quite like John Adams,
and few Americans of his generation were quite as obsessive in their search to untangle
the psychological roots of servility. In February 1772, the thirty-six-year-old
Massachusetts patriot began to contemplate the character of the archetypal “courtier,” a
figure he defined as “one who applies himself to the Passions and Prejudices, the Follies
and Vices of great men in order to obtain their Smiles, Esteem, and Patronage and
consequently their Favors and Preferments.” In Adams’s mind, a man could only descend
to such levels by allowing ambition and covetousness to override virtue and reason.
“Human Nature,” Adams mused, was “depraved,” but all men still carried a natural
“Love of Truth, Sincerity, and Integrity, which must be overcome by Art, Education, and
habit, before Man can become entirely ductile to the will of a dishonest Master.”
Temptations were unavoidable, even in cases where that master demanded to be flattered
in his “Vices” and “Follies.” In such cases, an otherwise innocent man might pause to
consider the fortunes to be gained by such a bargain – and only the thought of hellfire
33
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would be enough to snap him out of this sinister reverie. But even fear of damnation
would not deter the man who allowed temptations to distort his reason. For men could
“persuade themselves to believe any Absurdity, to submit to any Prostitution, rather than
forego their Wishes and Desires… Their reason becomes at last an eloquent Advocate on
the side of their Passions, and [they] bring themselves to believe that Black is White, and
Vice is Virtue, that Folly is Wisdom and Eternity a Moment.”34
As Adams pondered the frailty of individual virtue, he came to doubt whether any
man in official power could maintain his integrity. “Ambition,” he noted, was “one of the
more ungovernable Passions of the Human Heart. The Love of Power, is unsatiable and
uncountroulable… There is a Danger from all Men. The only Maxim of a free
government, ought to be to trust no Man living, with Power to endanger the public
Liberty.” Echoing Macaulay’s recent dispute with Burke,35 Adams dismissed English
oppositional politicians’ frequent and “clamorous Professions of Patriotism.” Once these
self-avowed patriots acquired office, they invariably proved themselves to be “as little
zealous to preserve the Constitution, as their predecessors whom they have hunted
down.” The annals of history were littered with such turncoats.36 Adams would later
lament a similar tragedy befalling Americans’ loyalists – some of whom had once been
good men “untill seduced by the bewitching charms of wealth and power.”37
Adams was unique in his psychological probity, but there was hardly anything
unusual in his vilification of royal officeholders. By 1774, corruption narratives had
become commonplace for colonial polemics. Placemen could not be trusted because – as
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Marvell had insinuated a century earlier – they depended on their offices for any standing
within society. One Bostonian berated Governor Hutchinson for promoting men “from
the very dregs of mankind,” thus ensuring that the beneficiaries would never be
“ungrateful” to their benefactor:
[T]hey must of necessity adopt the sentiments, and concur in the measures
of a person of your reputed wisdom, from whom they move, live, and have
their political being; the dread of being consigned to their primitive
nothingness, should they be possessed of one spark of virtue, would
prevent their acting counter to your sovereign dictates. Could they be
supposed to court disgrace by an heroic act of self-denial, you had another
tenure to secure obedience by your assurance, that they would certainly
meet with favour and encouragement.38
As revolution loomed, patriots’ resentments escalated into paranoia. Adams did not think
it would even be possible to reason with loyalists as long as they still held out hopes for
ministerial places and pensions. “The instant these hopes are extinguished,” he remarked,
“we all know they will be converted of course. Converts from places and pensions are
only to be made by places and pensions.”39 Around this same time, the recently appointed
military commander George Washington issued instructions to seize all royal
officeholders, whom he imagined to be “using every Art that Malice can devise” in order
to please their masters and thereby receive “a continuance of such places and pensions as
they now hold.”40
So far, King George III had managed to escape this onslaught, as polemicists
politely attributed all these sins to wicked ministers and greedy officeseekers. All that
changed in 1776 with the publication of Thomas Paine’s Common Sense. Many of
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Paine’s arguments against monarchal corruption would have been familiar to anyone who
possessed even a passing acquaintance with English oppositional literature.41 What set
Common Sense apart was Paine’s claim that kings’ tendency to corruption was utterly
intractable. Looking as far back as the Old Testament, Paine noted “that bribery,
corruption, and favouritism” were “the standing vices of kings.”42 More significantly,
Paine twisted the old Walpolean argument for royal “influence” into an argument against
monarchy itself. As discussed in chapter 1, Robert Walpole and his defenders had
claimed that the king’s power over appointments was necessary for maintaining the
crown’s rightful weight in the balanced constitution. Paine took the logic of this argument
a step further by observing that the crown’s dispersal of “places and pensions” was, in
fact, the sole source of its power. “In England,” he remarked, “a king hath little more to
do than to make war, and give away places; which, in plain terms, is to impoverish the
nation, and set it together by the ears.”43
These fleeting yet forceful remarks were perhaps the most significant points in
Paine’s entire pamphlet. Most Americans in 1776 already thought that patronage led to
venality and wickedness. If, as Paine argued, all crown power derived from this system of
corruption, then monarchy itself was nothing more than institutionalized venality. Paine’s
genius did not lie in constructing entirely new arguments, but in following older
arguments to their logical, reductio ad absurdum extremes. Patronage, the most venerable
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weapon in the royal arsenal, became, in Paine’s hands, a rhetorical weapon against
monarchy itself.
The Declaration of Independence included, in its long list of grievances, a
complaint that the king had “erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms
of Officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.” It was just one of the
colonists’ numerous gripes, and hardly the most pressing. Political patronage had never
been the sole or even the primary factor in American rebellion. It had, however, focused
the patriots’ energies by furnishing easy targets to justify a heroic revolutionary narrative.
From the start of the imperial controversy, the dreaded “placemen” had been constructed
as parasites, as liars, and as the willing co-conspirators in the ministerial plot. Even if
there had been no venal officeholders in the colonies, the colonists would have had to
invent them. Americans in later years would have to invent a new villain to take the
placeman’s place – but their rhetorical inventions never strayed far from the model
antagonist that had been constructed during the years of rebellion.

1776: The (Other) Revolution that Failed
In 1776, after more than a decade of denouncing royal officeholders, American
patriots commenced a revolution against placemen. Of the 231 men who held the higher
offices of colonial government in 1773 and 1774, only fifty-two were still in offices of
similar rank in the state governments in 1783; loyalists and Tories constituted seventy
percent of the officeholders who were purged. Many onlookers, including Adams and
Jefferson, welcomed the end of the incumbents’ officeholding monopolies. Victims of the
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purge, on the other hand, feared that their inquisitors were sundering all the attachments
that held British-American society together.44
In their most sanguine moments, American republicans imagined that their new
states might be free from the selfish officeseekers that had always afflicted English
politics.45 New Hampshire and North Carolina’s new state constitutions explicitly
declared that their governments would no longer be used to provide rewards and
privileges for a few individuals.46 Pennsylvania’s constitution stipulated that public
officers’ accounts would be subject to inspections every seven years, thus ensuring that
public money could not be used for the purposes of corruption or otherwise “squandered
upon placemen” or “pensioners.”47 Some constitution-makers tried to block corruption by
refusing to allow governors to make appointments without the legislature’s consent,
while other constitutions did not allow governors to make any appointments at all.48
Almost every state constitution forbade civil officers from sitting in their general
assemblies.49 This last provision marked a milestone moment; English oppositional
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politicians had tried and failed to secure a similar “place bill” in the mother country for
nearly a century.50
Where republican laws fell short, republican character would have to fill the void.
The more affluent patriots therefore tended to talk about offices as burdens they
graciously bore, rather than as possessions they covetously sought. “In a virtuous
government, and more especially in times like these,” Jefferson pontificated, “public
offices are, what they should be, burthens to those appointed to them, which it would be
wrong to decline, though foreseen to bring with them intense labor and great private
loss.”51 Other elites performed as country gentlemen who preferred their serene rural
estates to frenzied political engagement. James Warren struck such a pose when he
assured John Adams that his ambition was “quite satisfied” at work among his potatoes,
“instead of being in Congress ‘at the great Wheel.”52 George Washington turned the
practice of disclaiming ambition into a high art. In 1778, Washington could already be
found promising correspondents that retirement was his loftiest ambition.53 He famously
fulfilled that promise when he resigned his military command in 1783, and shortly
thereafter began to wax poetic about his newfound contentment: “freed from the cares of
public employment, & the responsibility of Office – I am now enjoying domestic ease
under the shadow of my own Vine, & my own Fig tree… I expect to glide gently down
the stream of life, ‘till I am entombed in the dreary mansions of my Fathers.”54 For
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luminaries like Washington and Warren, virtue correlated inversely with a man’s
ambition for office.
Even as war raged around them, army officers sensed the high stakes of
maintaining their disinterested character. Some of them thought that America’s
republican exceptionalism hinged on its citizens’ ability to transcend self-seeking
behavior. Joseph Trumbull declined a potential sinecure in 1777, purportedly because he
did not want to be accused of being “the first American pensioner”; as he heroically
proclaimed, “I am willing to do, & to suffer, for my Country & its Cause; but I cannot
Sacrifice my Honor & Principles.”55 This prevailing cultural prejudice against placemongers made it risky for army officers to express any self-interest at all. When William
Smallwood complained to Washington that not enough officers from his state had
received promotions, he felt compelled to add that he would never mention such a
grievance to Congress. There was, he wrote, “a Delicacy which forbids, in the Breast of
every Man of Modesty & true Merit… and heaven forbid, that an American officer
shou’d ever descend so low, as to commence Courtier to obtain his just Views – a
Character which the true soldier must ever hold in contempt.”56
Benjamin Franklin, for one, felt satisfied that the incipient republic had succeeded
in ridding itself of parasitical officeholders. In a mock advertisement for prospective
immigrants, he declared that the new republic did not suffer under the weight of any
unwieldy officeholding class. “Of civil offices and employments,” he wrote, “there are
few; no superfluous ones as in Europe; and it is a rule established in some of the states,
that no office should be so profitable as to make it desirable.” Franklin cited the thirty-
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sixth article of Pennsylvania’s constitution, a passage advising the state’s legislature to
reduce the profits of any office that attracted too many applicants. Since other states had
passed similarly stringent provisions, Franklin warned that no one ought to come to
America with any “hopes of obtaining a profitable office.” Even a talented “man of
quality” would be “despised and disregarded” if he planned “to live upon the public, by
some office or salary.”57 But John Adams took a less sanguine view of the nation’s moral
prospects. Like Franklin, he discouraged prospective officeholders from immigrating to
America, but for exactly opposite reasons: European officeseekers would have to
compete with hordes of jealous resentful American competitors. “[I]n America as in all
other Countries,” he wrote, there were “two Persons who wish for Employment, to one
Employment.” 58 That modifying clause, “as in all other countries,” added a devastating
subtext to Adams’s remark, as it suggested that Americans’ political practices might not
actually be as exceptional as their republican pretensions. By that point, of course, Adams
was far from the only American to express doubts about his countrymen’s capacity for
republican asceticism. As it turned out, there were ample reasons for this doubt.
Indeed, officeseeking seems to have been the most widely lamented vice of the
1780s, with some writers harvesting old parables to illustrate this point. In one such tale,
a peripatetic traveler could be found declaring, “That he would cease traveling as soon as
he ever could find a Country where Power and Credit were in the hands of honest men,
and Preferments went by Merit.” (This sententious oath was immediately met with the
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predictable riposte: “Nay then, you will infallibly die traveling.”)59 Another tale
recounted an “allegorical vision” in which the author climbed the perilous slope of
“merit” in order to reach a temple of “Fortune.” This innocent dreamer recalled observing
other men reaching the summit through secret, less hallowed passages, with labels such
as “Good Luck,” “Interest,” and “Bribery”; the latter two passages, of course, were far
more crowded than the first. Once these cheaters reached the summit, they placed
“stumbling blocks” for those behind them. The few who actually completed the painful
climb of “merit” would invariably find themselves on the cusp of receiving their just
reward, only to have it “snatched” from their grasp “by some worthless upstarts who had
got thither by one of the more easy but less honorable ways.” Such a fate befell the
dreaming author himself, who was shoved back down the slope by one of those who had
followed the path of “Interests.”60
Whatever the literary merits of these parables, one could hardly accuse the
authors of allowing their didactic purpose to be mired in unnecessary subtleties. The oftbelabored moral was that offices always went to the least worthy men, meaning that those
who acquired such positions were axiomatically suspect. By 1786, it had evidently
become a truism that officeholders’ motives could never be taken at face value. For
instance, one polemicist drily noted that none of his arguments would be trusted if
readers thought that he was “a lawyer, a merchant,” or “an officer in any civil
department, whereby he is entitled to support from the government. Persons of the above
59
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description being supposed by many to be actuated by interested motives in vindicating
the present system of law and government.” Irony aside, the author hastened to note that
he did not belong to any of those disreputable categories, and had no personal ambitions
of his own: “I esteem it the happiest lot of humanity thus to move in a humble sphere of
action, free from the cares and anxieties that attend courtly preferments and large
possessions.” The author even contrasted his own humble virtue with the treachery of
those who possessed “aspiring disposition[s]” or a “thirst for domination.”61 For such
writers, the most definitive litmus test of one’s trustworthiness was indifference to the
prospect of office.
By 1787, then, Americans had reason to doubt their countrymen’s propensity for
self-sacrificing virtue. Resolving the problem of placemen, of course, was not the raison
d’être for the convention that met in Philadelphia that May. By 1787, there were more
obviously pressing matters at hand; it was the search for stability, rather than the search
for republican virtue, that led the delegates to Philadelphia that year. But the problem of
officeseekers had certainly accelerated the erosion of American self-certainty. The
patriots of 1776 had looked forward to a republic that would be better than the one they
left behind. They had devised state constitutions to limit the governors’ capacity for
corruption, and had celebrated the selfless citizen who preferred his farm to his office.
This greater society of virtuous citizens was supposed to form the bedrock of republican
order – yet selfishness had still found a way. Disappointment with the American
officeseeking class would haunt those delegates throughout the summer, and the
convention would witness a bitter debate over the place of self-interest in the future
republic.
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Virtue Reconsidered: The Philadelphia Convention, 1787
The subject of a “place bill” presented itself before convention delegates almost
right away. The “Virginia Plan” that Edmund Randolph presented on May 29, 1787,
included a stipulation that would have made Congressmen ineligible for any state and
national offices during their congressional terms and for an indefinite time thereafter.62
Almost no one objected to the ban on congressmen holding simultaneous executive
offices; many of the delegates would have remembered the colonial days, when general
assemblies had often been infested with gubernatorial placemen. But when they began to
debate the wisdom of extending that ban beyond congressmen’s legislative tenures, fierce
debate ensued. The resulting arguments soon exposed a chasm between Whig-inflected
“country party” thinkers who wanted to preserve the achievements of their recent
revolution against placemen, and the more pragmatic theorists who thought some
measure of patronage and “influence” might actually stabilize government. This
conversation matched, almost precisely, the earlier English political debates about
patronage and corruption. The delegates of 1787 were still thinking within the limits of
the court-country paradigm that had shaped English discourse for the past century, and
would continue to shape American politics, however indirectly, throughout the early
national years.
Alexander Hamilton’s priority was a stronger national government, and his
prescription was a more powerful network of influence. The thirty-two-year-old
immigrant not only opposed the post-term restriction on Congressmen holding offices,
but even exhumed old royalist arguments for exploiting patronage. Hamilton now
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asserted that men were motivated not by selfless patriotism but by selfish “passions” –
namely, “avarice, ambition,” and “interest.”63 The national government could only enlist
the most talented men if it appealed to these passions. In more tangible terms, Hamilton
wanted the national government to use “Offices of Honor & Profit” to exercise some
“Influence” on these men.64 Hamilton still tried to distinguish this “influence” from
“corruption,” as he claimed to be advocating nothing more sinister than a calculated
“dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an attachment to the
Govt.”65 Others quickly perceived, however, that Hamilton’s definition of “influence”
was nearly indistinguishable from “corruption.” Hamilton inadvertently admitted as much
when, at one point, he cited the old Tory David Hume’s argument that “influence” and
“corruption” had actually maintained some stabilizing “equilibrium” in the English
constitution.66 In short, Hamilton had fully imbibed the old Walpolean argument in favor
of vigorous executive patronage. This argument had once been a part of the Anglophone
mainstream, but most Revolutionary Americans had long since rejected influence and
corruption as inimical to republican virtue. By reviving Walpole’s long-dormant
“doctrine of corruption,” Hamilton effectively rejected the American republican tradition
itself.
But Hamilton was not the only member of the convention who favored some
degree of executive influence in the legislature. As Hamilton’s fellow New Yorker
Gouverneur Morris noted, patronage was an expedient and perhaps essential mechanism
for ensuring loyalty to the national government. “If the state government have the
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division of the many loaves and fishes, and the general government few,” he warned, “it
cannot exist.”67 Massachusetts’ Rufus King spoke in a similar vein. “Suppose
connections are formed?” he mused. “Do they not tend to strengthen the government
under which they are formed?”68 Nathaniel Gorham suggested that the convention
dispense with the resolution barring officeholders from the legislature, as such a
restriction could undermine “the due influence of the government.”69 Reiterating
Hamilton’s observations on the salient benefits of crown corruption, Gorham casually
mentioned that the presence of officeholders in Parliament had, in fact, brought some
much-needed stability to English government.70
Other discussants worried that a harsh post-term restriction on congressmen
holding executive appointments would only discourage talented individuals from running
for elective office.71 Charles Pinckney thought that the restriction itself seemed like a
“degrading” disincentive for worthy men who might otherwise serve in Congress.72 And
as John F. Mercer noted, a government without men of standing and talent would be a
government without any meaningful power. “All government,” he proclaimed, “must be
by force or by influence. It is not the King of France, but 200,000 janissaries of power
that govern the Kingdom.” In lieu of this military force, the government would have to
rely on “the most influential men.” But if those men found it more lucrative to hold local
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offices “within their respective states,” how could the government convince them to
participate at the national level?73
Such arguments horrified the old Whigs, none more so than the famously
inflexible George Mason of Virginia. Where Hamilton had echoed the arguments of
Walpole and Hume, Mason echoed an English oppositional line that had been in vogue
for the past century. The crown, he declared, had always used patronage to circumvent
any limits that Parliament attempted to impose. The clause against officeholding
Congressmen was therefore the “cornerstone upon which our liberties rest – and if we
strike it out we are erecting a fabric for our destruction.”74 Other delegates were quick to
concur. South Carolina’s Pierce Butler reminded listeners that King George II had
procured support for his designs by offering pensions and offices to his opponents in
Parliament.75 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts asserted that Americans had “constantly
endeavored to keep distinct the three branches of government” – but all that work would
be immediately undone if congressmen could now hold executive appointments, as
members of the legislature would soon “be too much influenced by the executive, in
looking up to him for offices.”76
Mason found it ludicrous to imagine that the nation’s best men would have to be
lured into the legislature with the prospect of post-term appointments.77 “Are gentlemen
in earnest,” he asked, “when they suppose that this exclusion will prevent [men of] the
first character from coming forward? Are we not struck at seeing the luxury and venality
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which has already crept in among us?”78 Mason accepted that “Genius & virtue” would
have to be encouraged, but he refused to accept that virtue “should be encouraged by
such a species of venality.”79 English history furnished cautionary tales of what might
come to pass when legislators fawned over executive appointments: self-interested men
would colonize the legislature and convert it into a sort of office-dispensing machine for
themselves and their friends, which, in Mason’s eyes, would reduce the government to an
engine of “Aristocracy.”80 Gerry once again seconded his Virginian colleague. “If men
will not serve in the Legislature without a prospect of such offices,” he warned, “our
situation is deplorable indeed. If our best citizens are actuated by such mercenary views,
we had better chuse a single despot at once.”81
James Madison tried to steer the delegates toward an acceptable compromise. He
agreed with Hamilton that a stringent post-term restriction would make congressional
offices unappealing to the nation’s more “useful characters.”82 It also occurred to
Madison that former congressmen would be better qualified for important offices of trust;
if the constitution ruled them out as candidates, the civil service would be staffed with
anonymous and worthless men.83 But Madison’s practical concerns did not blind him to
the wisdom of Mason’s warnings about corruption. He therefore proposed a compromise:
no member of the House would be allowed to fill an office that had been created or had
its salaries increased during his own congressional tenure; this restriction would apply to
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every congressman throughout the length of his term and for one year thereafter.84 Such a
provision would remove any congressman’s incentive to create unnecessary offices, but
would not be so strict as to frighten worthy candidates away from Congress.
Madison’s detailed compromise left most of the debaters dissatisfied. The Mason
clique did not think it went nearly far enough, while Hamilton and King found it
ridiculous to imagine that every possible loophole could be closed.85 The proposal thus
fell stillborn and the delegates moved on to more pressing concerns. On September 1, the
Committee of Detail proposed a lowest-common-denominator compromise: article VI,
section 9, would merely ban legislators from holding offices as long as they sat in
Congress.86 After rehashing the same arguments from earlier that summer, however, the
delegates amended the Committee’s report to align it with Madison’s earlier compromise:
The members of each House shall be ineligible to any Civil office under
the authority of the U. States, created, or the emoluments whereof shall
have been increased during the time for which they shall be respectively
elected – And no person holding any office under the U.S. shall be a
member of either House during his continuance in office.87
This clause dispensed with the one-year post-term restrictions altogether, but otherwise
echoed Madison’s proposal. It now stands in the Constitution as the “ineligibility” or
“emoluments” clause.
This labyrinthine maze of debates had led the delegates to a constitution that
infuriated many, dissatisfied others, but was acceptable to most. More portentously, these
debates had revealed a party of “court Whig” apostates in the midst of a nation that had
espoused “country Whig” dogmas for the past two decades. In the 1760s and 1770s, the
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specters of executive corruption and venal placemen had tormented the American
political imagination. But the political disarray of the 1780s had convinced men like
Hamilton to take a second look at the older English “doctrine of corruption,” and now
they had reopened the question of whether executive appointments could be used to unite
politicians behind the executive branch. Hamilton was understandably cautious about
broaching this point too boldly in 1787, and alluded to it only in passing. But even those
passing remarks would haunt him for the rest of his career.
The convention delegates thus diverged, sometimes profoundly, on how to handle
executive patronage, and some of these divergences would not become apparent until
after the Constitution was ratified. But they all agreed, tacitly or explicitly, on one thing:
government offices were “allurements.” They were objects of temptation. Any legislator
who chose to apply for a federal office was, axiomatically, a man of questionable virtue.
Mason never yielded on this point, and Hamilton never denied it; the only question was
whether such legislators’ selfish shortcomings ought to be condemned or exploited.
Regardless of where they fell in this debate, everyone took for granted that a federal
officeholder’s motives would never be truly disinterested. This suspicion of officeholders
was ultimately embedded in the Constitution itself, which stipulated that those holding
“offices of profit or trust” would not be permitted to serve in the Electoral College.
All of these issues had to be re-litigated once more in order to convince the state
legislatures to ratify the Constitution. For those who had not been present at the secretive
Philadelphia meeting, the ratification debates provided an opportunity to air grievances
with the existing government and voice concerns about the proposed new order. For those
who had attended the convention, these same debates offered a platform for refining or
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elaborating upon – or in Hamilton’s case, even rescinding – arguments they had already
developed at tortuous length throughout that summer.

The Ratification Debates, I: The President and Executive Patronage
The new Constitution included detailed arrangements of how officers would
receive their appointments. The President was empowered to appoint all “Officers of the
United States” whose appointments were “not otherwise provided for.” To keep
executive influence under control, the President could only make these appointments “by
and with the Advice and consent of the Senate,” unless Congress chose to place the
power of certain appointments “in the President alone” or in other departments.88 In
short, the President would dominate American political patronage as long as Congress
took no action to check his power.
Opponents of the new Constitution perceived numerous avenues for potential
corruption. “Cato” – possibly New York Governor George Clinton – worried that future
Presidents would have the power “to create a numerous train of dependents.” All of these
“eminent magisterial stations,” he warned, would “attach many adherents” to the
President, who would inevitably “be surrounded by expectants and courtiers.” The
consequences would be dire, for the President, as “the principal fountain of all offices &
employments,” would have the power to create an American “aristocracy.”89 Caleb
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Wallace, writing in private, similarly feared that the executive’s miscellaneous “offices of
profit and honour” would be bestowed on “courtiers” with no regard for the integrity of
democratic government. “By these offices, or rather creatures of the states,” he groused,
“the supreme government will be administered and Congressional purposes accomplished
without regard to the State governments or feelings for individuals.”90 Executive
patronage promised, in other words, a return to the nightmarish days of the 1760s, when
crown-appointed placemen had disregarded colonists’ demands with impunity.91
Federalists had already anticipated these arguments. Tench Coxe of Pennsylvania
pitched his defense in recognizable country-party terms, emphasizing that the new
Constitution had already secured the two holy grails of English oppositional politics –
namely, a place bill and shorter legislative terms. The executive would not be able to
establish any system of corruption, Coxe argued, because the Constitution banned all
“placemen” from Congress.92 And where English oppositional politicians had long
crusaded for triennial Parliaments to prevent corruption in the Commons, the new
American Constitution had gone even further by limiting Representatives to two-year
terms. There was no risk that legislators would create new offices for themselves,
because the emoluments clause rendered them ineligible for any positions they created.93
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Writers like “Cato” could have pointed out that the executive might still create a
dangerous network of dependencies extending beyond Congress, but Coxe insisted that
the President’s appointment power was too circumscribed to be cause for concern. The
President could not “appoint ambassadors or other great officers” without Senate
approval, and therefore could not plan to use “patronage and influence” to create
“personal obligation and dependence”; although the President had greater control over
inferior officers, Congress could still strip him of that power “at any time”; and he had no
control whatsoever over state-level appointments. For Coxe, the new Constitution had
reduced the once-formidable specter of executive patronage to an impotent shibboleth.94
Although Hamilton had previously spoken in favor of strong executives with
vigorous patronage, he now found it more prudent to imitate Coxe and defend the
constitution in country party terms. Hamilton therefore emphasized the limits of the Chief
Executive’s power to appoint officers, at one point pausing to note that even the governor
of New York had more absolute control over his appointees.95 The key element in
Hamilton’s constitutional equation was the Senate, whose consent would be required for
any executive appointments. Insisting that the Senate would provide an adequate
counterweight to executive influence, Hamilton even introduced arguments whose textual
foundations were ambiguous at best.
Here it must be emphasized that the Constitution provided much clearer
provisions on how to appoint officers than how to remove them. One clause stipulated
94
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that “civil Officers of the United States” who committed “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” would be subject to impeachment. It said nothing, however, about
whether officers could be removed for less scandalous reasons or through any mechanism
other than impeachment. It certainly did not include any explicit authorization for the
President to remove officers.
But Hamilton, stretching his argument far beyond his mandate, asserted that the
President could not remove sitting officeholders without the Senate’s consent. Hamilton
framed this imaginary provision in country-party terms, arguing that the President would
thus be prevented from removing officeholders who displeased him just to make way for
his own favorites. By implication, officeholders would never be dependent on the caprice
of a domineering executive, as they had been in England.96 It was a perfectly reasonable
argument. Such a provision might, in fact, have prevented some of the real or imaginary
abuses that would later inspire charges of “corruption.” The only problem with
Hamilton’s argument was, of course, that no such provision actually existed.97
Hamilton’s creative interpretation of Article VI did not provoke any outrage in
1788.98 But it did foreshadow important developments that would soon emerge under the
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new government. Although he undeniably wanted a constitution with a strong executive,
he publicly denied that the document would actually yield such a result. Hamilton even
applied a strict construction to the document so he could maintain this fiction. He
evidently hoped that his arguments would set Antifederalists’ minds at ease. The trick
may have worked in 1788, but Federalists could not sustain such a ruse forever. As early
as 1789, it would become clear to many former Antifederalists that the new President
controlled far more extensive patronage than Hamilton in 1788 had been willing to admit.

The Ratification Debates, II: The “Natural Aristocracy” of Officeseekers
The most formidable critique of the Constitution was not legalistic or even
constitutional, but moralistic and social. By far the most significant expounder of this
critique was the rather incongruously titled “Federal Farmer,” who published a series of
letters elaborating on ways in which the new Constitution would empower a system of
oppression that extended far beyond the executive. Because the Farmer’s arguments
proved to be so crucial in the long run of American democratic thought, it is worthwhile
to pause and examine them at length here.99
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The Farmer’s overall thesis rested on his contention that society could be divided
into numerous social groups, all of whom tried to exalt themselves at the others’
expense.100 This in itself was a rather conventional hypothesis; even as the Farmer wrote,
Madison was defending the Constitution as a document that would empower legislators
to transcend all these clashing group interests.101 But while the Farmer paid the usual lip
service to platitudes about balancing these different orders, he was evidently most
concerned with the dangers posed by “the few.” “We are dispersed,” he warned, “and it is
impracticable for any but the few to assemble in one place: the few must be watched,
checked, and often resisted.” In theory, the “few” could include anyone who combined
for their own aggrandizement.102 But the nation’s social elites, in particular, were far
more dangerous than any of the impoverished “levelers” who might try to combine. The
“few influential men in the community” would always be “the most artful and adroit.”
Armed with a host of “servile dependents,” they would always “grasp at power and
property.”103 Over the course of his letters, the Farmer developed a term for such men –
the “natural aristocracy.”
The Farmer, of course, was not the first thinker to discuss the role of a “natural
aristocracy” in society. James Harrington in 1650s England had imagined that every
society contained its own “natural aristocracy” whose leisured circumstances and
superior education rendered them the most fit class for the duties of government,
provided that they be subject to frequent rotation in office lest they became an entrenched
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governing class.104 Nor was the Federal Farmer the first thinker to warn that the
ambitions of “the few” posed a greater threat than the interests of the many. Machiavelli
and “Cato” had issued similar warnings. John Adams, a student of all these scholars, had
recently twisted Harrington’s understanding of “natural aristocracy” by identifying the
natural aristocrats with the oligarchical “few.” As Adams explained in his early 1787
Defence of the American state constitutions, every society did indeed have its aristocracy
of leaders to whom the hoi polloi would defer. But the commoners’ deference had little to
do with any superior virtue or intellect on the aristocrats’ part, and more to do with the
awe of family names and social prestige, qualities that endowed the natural aristocrat
with pernicious powers of influence. If left unchecked, Adams warned, the natural
aristocracy would overwhelm their less distinguished fellow statesmen and convert the
government itself into a tool for aristocratic ends.105 Adams’s remarks were widely
dismissed and misinterpreted at the time. But they did catch the attention of Melancton
Smith, a New York antifederalist who may very well have been the Federal Farmer
himself.106 Regardless of the author’s actual identity, Adams’s influence was evident all
across the pages of the Farmer’s letters.
In the Farmer’s social cosmology, the “natural aristocracy” consisted of the
nation’s four or five thousand most respectable men. Members of this class did not draw
their wealth from “hard labour” on “small estates,” but from “the emoluments of large
estates” and the “chief offices of the government.” They tended to be more “ambitious”
than honest, and were therefore more disposed to form insidious combinations – and this
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spirit of enterprise rendered them far more threatening than any other class in society.
The “tyranny of the one, or the licentiousness of the multitude,” he wrote, were “but
small evils compared with the factions of the few.” And that phrase, the “few,” in this
context, was shorthand for the nation’s small group of natural aristocrats.107
Between the grasping poor and the equally grasping aristocrats rested “the weight
of the community, the men of middling property,” neither indebted nor ambitious – the
“natural democracy.” The other two groups were “really insignificant, compared with the
solid, free, and independent part of the community.”108 Where the natural aristocracy
depended on large estates and public offices, the natural democracy earned their daily
bread from the “hard labour” and “industrious pursuits” they carried out on their
“middling and small estates.” Members of this class were therefore more modest in their
wealth and humbler in their pretensions. The natural democrats were not prone to
forming furtive combinations, as they possessed “less ambition, and a greater share of
honesty” than their aristocratic counterparts. Idealizing the natural democracy as a class
of retiring and unambitious cultivators, the Farmer imagined the perfect republic as an
almost libertarian arcadia, where men would be free to carry out their “honest industry
and labours” and enjoy their “private pursuits,” with only “very small deductions for the
public use.”109
But there was a snake in the Farmer’s garden of democracy, one that threatened to
introduce all the sins of the natural aristocracy into this Edenic republic. For the new
Constitution promised to create hordes of new government offices, which would
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inevitably have a corrupting influence on both the rulers and the ruled.110 These
government offices would hold no temptation for the natural democracy. As the Farmer
explained, the “honest, the modest, and the industrious part of the community content
themselves, generally, with their private concerns; they do not solicit those offices which
are the perpetual source of cabals, intrigues, and contests among… men embarrassed,
intriguing, and destitute of modesty.” But the natural democracy’s immunity to
temptation would not save them from oppression, for those same offices would be like
catnip for covetous levelers and restless aristocrats. “The honours and emoluments of
public offices,” he wrote, “are the objects in all communities, that ambitious and
necessitous men never lose sight of.”111 Offices would be hunted down by the very poor
and the very rich, but most especially by the latter. The natural aristocracy, ever
dependent on offices for their wealth, would find itself in conflict with the democracy
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whose taxes sustained them.112 The “contagion of offices” would soon infect the
legislature, and Congressmen would lose interest in the concerns of their constituents –
for once a Congressman’s term ended, he could settle into a lucrative public office rather
than return to the constituency from whence he came.113
The Farmer feared above all that government would become an interest group
unto itself, drawing its political support from the natural aristocracy and its financial
support from the natural democracy.114 The new government would require “a system of
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influence” to maintain control, and would therefore find excuses to create new offices;
those who filled these offices would become the government’s “props for its own
support.” This entire system, of course, would be maintained at the people’s expense.115
(Although the Farmer did not draw the connection himself, his readers would have
recognized this as more than a fanciful conjecture; just ten years earlier, the colonists had
rebelled against such a system of tax-supported corruption.) Presidents would have ample
incentives to expand their own patronage. Solicitous for his own reelection, a President
would place “servile supporters” and hired “tools” in offices where they would “aid his
views and sound his praise.”116
The Farmer’s list of remedies was nearly as comprehensive as the Constitution he
denounced, and they were all designed to ensure that the rulers would care more for the
common good than for their offices. Where Hamilton had urged government to exploit
the selfish “passions” of the best men, the Farmer endeavored “to guard against” those
very same “interests and passions.”117 A larger body of representatives, for instance,
would make it easier for authentic constituents of the “democratic interest” to hold seats
in Congress, which would prevent the nation’s more eminent citizens from dominating
the legislature.118 A system of “rotation” would keep congressmen from becoming an
entrenched class by periodically reminding them that government did not exist just to pay
their salaries.119 The Farmer also suggested that the legislature ought to have a more
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limited role in the civil appointment process, the better to preserve its disinterested nature
and prevent Congressmen from “becoming mere office-men.”120
Some of the Farmer’s prescriptions, such as broader representation, were
relatively new; others, such as his call for rotation in Congress, bad long been espoused
by country-party thinkers like Catharine Macaulay.121 But the Farmer’s diagnoses were
ultimately more significant than his prescriptions. He essentially reified “court-country”
division as an everlasting class conflict, replacing the “court” with the “natural
aristocracy” and the “country” with the “natural democracy.” Government patronage was
the wedge separating the former from the latter. Earlier thinkers had espoused a tragic
view of history, suggesting that all men were at least potentially vulnerable to the
temptations of “places and pensions.” But the Farmer now suggested that members of a
nation’s talented and ambitious “aristocracy” were uniquely vulnerable, whereas the
humbler members of the “democracy” were uniquely immune. The aristocrats became, in
a sense, the ultimate dependents – the affluent parasites in waiting. All the evils of
“placemen’ and “courtiers” could thus be compartmentalized, as they were now
associated with a single, financially prosperous but morally deficient class, while all the
public virtues of American republicanism were now projected onto the “middling” and
“independent” democracy. Indifference to government offices implicitly signaled that one
belonged to the latter, more legitimate class.122 A member of the natural democracy may
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have had self-interest at stake, but his interest would be identical with other members of
his class: he, in common cause with other natural democrats, simply did not want to
subsidize the aristocracy. The Farmer thus elevated disputes over patronage into a transhistorical class struggle, dividing society along moral lines rather than economic ones.123
Federalists denied that they had any intention of imposing aristocracy upon the
new republic, but disregarded the subtler moral distinctions that the Farmer had so
painstakingly outlined. They preferred to approach the issue in a narrow and legalistic
way, insisting that America would have no aristocrats because it had no hereditary titles
of nobility.124 In Hamilton’s words, “As long as offices are open to all men, and no
constitutional rank is established, it is pure republicanism.”125 In truth, many Federalists
actually cherished their own version of a “natural aristocracy.” Although they had no
interest in creating hereditary baronages, Federalists did imagine a nation ruled by those
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talented few who had distinguished themselves by acquiring wealth and eminence.126 The
Federalists’ ideal government would be, in other words, a sort of meritocratic aristocracy.
Like their Antifederalist adversaries, Federalists realized that the most tactically
shrewd way to discredit one’s opponent was by denouncing him as an officeseeker.
Numerous Federalist writers identified the enemies of the Constitution as “placemen”
who cared only about maintaining their existing sinecures.127 As one such pundit
grandiloquently proclaimed, “Tyrants and pensioners are the only men who oppose the
reformation of governments.”128 In this regard, the Antifederalists gave at least as good as
they got, as they routinely described supporters of the new government as “placemen”
and “pensioners” who planned to do well by the coming dispensation.129 And polemicists
from both sides continued to insist that they had no interests in obtaining offices for
themselves.130
This persistent, reflexive tendency to denounce one’s enemies as “placemen”
illustrates a crucial point: most Americans in 1788 still believed that the motives of an
officeseeker were not to be trusted. At the same time, such rhetorical devices obscured
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Americans’ profound disagreements on the place of placemen in the new republic. Both
Federalists and Antifederalists knew that the proverbial officeseeker was governed by
self-interest above all else. But as we have seen at great length now, they split ranks on
the question of whether to exploit or condemn such selfishness. The Antifederalists clung
to the classical Whig orthodoxies that had shaped the Revolutionary settlement of 1776.
What the republic needed, they thought, was government by the virtuous and
disinterested; the most substantial development in their post-1776 thinking came from the
Federal Farmer and his association of selfish ambition with certain “aristocratic” classes.
Federalists, on the other hand, condemned selfish officeseeking in print, all the while
planning to avail themselves of that same selfishness in practice. Indeed, Hamilton and a
few others had already begun to contemplate an ideological counterrevolution that would
return American government to the quasi-oligarchical principles of Robert Walpole.
Roughly one century after England’s “Glorious Revolution” of 1688, the
American constitution was ratified over the objections of Antifederalists. But
conversations about the character of republican society would continue beyond 1788, and
political patronage would become more and more central to those conversations. These
conversations would soon devolve into shouting matches, as Hamilton began to
implement a scheme of influence that seemed both dangerously innovative and eerily
familiar.

Conclusion
In October 1788, Thomas Jefferson had the leisure to pen some thoughts on a new
constitution for his native state of Virginia, and his friend James Madison was, as always,

98

happy to oblige him with some observations of his own. But Madison could not help but
sigh in exhaustion when the conversation turned to government patronage, a topic that
had exasperated and tormented delegates all throughout the previous year’s summer.
“The appointment to offices is, of all the functions of Government,” he resignedly wrote,
“the most difficult to guard against abuse.”131
Madison’s weary remark could be used as a summary for the entire age of
American Revolution. The American colonists had reacted against the seemingly
indifferent British administration and targeted their resentments at the venal placemen
who enforced its despotism. They had tried to create a virtuous republic free from
avaricious officeholders, and had been frustrated by the durability of human selfishness.
Finally, on the eve of christening their new order for the ages, a few of them had begun to
wonder whether Walpole and the corruptionists had been right all along. It seemed that
there was no simple solution to the problem of placemen. The Americans’ search for such
a solution gave the lie to all English politicians’ promises that a place bill would free the
world from corruption. But Madison, as it turned out, would not have the luxury of
savoring his newfound ambivalence, for patronage was about to become one of the most
controversial issues in American politics.
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Chapter Three:
Pure Patriots and Plundering Parasites: Public Offices and the Language of
Corruption, 1789-1792

The Constitutional settlement of 1788, like that of 1688, bequeathed a host of
problems. The staunchest defenders of the new dispensation hoped that affluent and
disinterested elites like themselves could impose order on the political landscape.
Skeptical Antifederalists viewed the new government with mistrust, suspecting that the
novus ordo seclorum would serve only to legitimize a rapacious oligarchy, if not an
outright aristocracy. Most contemporaries probably hoped they could embrace the
laudable qualities in the Constitution while ameliorating its potential dangers. Perhaps the
only binding agent between these disparate groups was their shared confidence in the
incorruptibility of the new commander-in-chief: Cincinnatus himself, George
Washington. Americans may have been right to place their faith in Washington’s
managerial acumen and incorruptible character, but they were wrong if they thought he
could maintain harmony between the nation’s conflicting political persuasions.
Washington himself had his doubts, and no concern fed these doubts more than the
nettlesome matter of political patronage.
Although the vast majority of executive appointments devolved upon the
President, Washington correctly sensed that he was not in control of the larger
conversation surrounding them. Congress had imposed limits on his appointment power
and would continue to debate the balance of control between the legislative and executive
branches. Moreover, ideals of public service were a subject of debate and pontification
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for politicians and polemicists alike, which meant that Washington would have to steer a
course between conflicting priorities. He had even less control over the course of political
events. His administration’s financial policies reawakened old fears that government
would become a plundering operation, siphoning off the wealth of “the people” to pay the
salaries of venal officeholders. Across the Atlantic, a burgeoning revolution in France
provoked the most acrimonious arguments of the eighteenth century, arguments that
placed Americans’ fear of the “placeman” in a transnational context. The climactic effect
of these developments was the emergence of a two-party system, based on a Manichean,
universalistic division between the eternally republican “people” and the intractably
“aristocratic” parasites. All these developments transpired in the space of Washington’s
first term in office, creating precedents that would persist in American political discourse
through the age of Jackson.

“A Throne upon the Ruins of Your Visionary Republic”: The Removal Powers Debate in
Congress, 1789
By the time that William Maclay rose to speak in the House on July 14, 1789,
Frenchmen across the Atlantic were celebrating the fall of the Bastille. Maclay was
addressing an altogether more prosaic topic – namely, the American President’s power to
remove executive officers at pleasure. Within a few years, however, the fall of the
Bastille and the American “removal powers” debate would become part of the same
transnational narrative, as democratic thinkers in the Atlantic world became ever-more
obsessed with the forces of executive despotism and court corruption. For the time being,
American Whigs like Maclay remained myopically focused on the political history of the
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Anglophone world, reflecting on the shared English past rather than anticipating the
incipient age of democratic revolution.
The removal powers debate had begun, innocuously enough, with the proposal for
an executive department of Foreign Affairs. Virtually no members of the House opposed
the creation of such a department. What made this proposal controversial was the
incendiary provision that empowered the President to remove officers he appointed.1 That
line touched off several agonizing days of debate, as the arguments metastasized into a
disquisition on constitutional hermeneutics and the nature of republican society. Trivial
though it may seem to a modern-day reader, contemporaries regarded this debate as a
crucial matter. Alexander White of Virginia thought it “the most important question” that
had yet presented itself to Congress, while Edward Carrington believed it to be an issue
touching on “the vitals of that part of the Constitution.”2 “The question concerning the
power of removing Officers was important,” wrote Edmund Pendleton “and twas much
better to investigate it fully, tho’ at expence of a weeks discussion, than take a wrong step
in it.”3
The constitutional question at hand concerned just how far the Senate could
impinge on executive appointments without unbalancing the separation of governmental
powers. This problem was largely one of Alexander Hamilton’s making. The
Constitution itself granted Congress the right to impeach executive officers, but said
nothing about the President’s right to remove those officers without Congressional
1

The participants in this debate were most concerned with how the President would exercise this power
over the department heads and higher offices of government, not the rank-and-file public officers
throughout the union. Nevertheless, these debates hinged on older understandings of “executive influence”
and foreshadowed future debates about how that influence might be exerted even among the lesser officers
of government.
2
Annals, I:533; Edward Carrington to Madison, July 30, 1789, JMP: CS: 12, 316.
3
Extract from Edmund Pendleton to Madison, July 3, 1789, JMP: CS, 12:316.

102

approval. As we have seen, this ambiguity was politically convenient for Hamilton, who
had exploited the Constitution’s uncertain language to placate American Whigs. In
Federalist 70, Hamilton had applied a strict construction of the Constitution, claiming
that there was no risk that the President could tyrannize officers he did not even have the
power to remove; the privilege of removing officers was vested exclusively in the
Senate.4 It now fell to the Congressmen of 1789 to rule on the validity of Hamilton’s
interpretation. And the ambiguity behind the President’s removal power caused, in one
historian’s words, Americans’ “first major constitutional controversy.”5
William Lowndes Smith of South Carolina took Federalist 70 at its word and
challenged his fellow Representatives to locate a single passage in the Constitution that
could be used to justify the President’s removal power.6 There was another “Publius” in
the House, however, and he pointedly disagreed with his former co-writer. James
Madison insisted that the Senate’s role in federal appointments was strictly advisory; the
full scope of its involvement was to confirm or reject the officers nominated by the
President and to remove those same officers by impeachment when necessary. The
removal of officers was properly and logically an executive duty, he reasoned. If Senators
alone could exercise this quintessentially executive function, they would unbalance the
Constitutional separation of powers.7
These constitutional issues were rather academic, but the ensuing debates also
raised some pressing practical questions. Simply put, it would have created endless, time-
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consuming headaches if the Senate had to hold impeachment trials for every inept or
malfeasant officer. It was the President’s responsibility to ensure that the laws were
faithfully executed, which, according to Madison, made the President responsible for the
officers he appointed. If the President could not remove officers who failed to carry out
the law, how could he be held responsible for their conduct?8 The “danger of maladministration,” he declared, had “not yet been found to lay so much in the facility of
introducing improper persons into office, as in displacing those who are unworthy of the
public trust.” Most officers had no fixed terms. If the President could not remove them at
pleasure, those officers could potentially cling to their positions for life. As Fisher Ames
of Massachusetts pointedly remarked, these offices had not been created for the benefit of
individuals, and no officer was “entrusted to his office as an estate.”9 Thomas Hartley of
Pennsylvania agreed that no man ought to have “a property in his office.”10 (This line of
argument, espoused by Federalists in 1789, would be taken up by the radical
Jeffersonians who advocated “rotation in office” in 1801, and by the Jacksonians who
advocated the same idea in 1829.)
Despite these pressing political and practical concerns, the more traditionally
Whiggish congressmen still thought executive despotism posed a greater threat than
bureaucratic inconveniences.11 Their counterarguments were suffused with nightmarish
conjectures of the corruption that might ensue if the President could remove officers of
the government. What would stop him from abusing this power “to make room for a
8
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favorite,” or to buy his reelection by bartering out the offices at his disposal?12 Worse yet,
AmericanmWhigs feared that the acting officers of government would become the
President’s hopeless dependents. The officer who depended on “the will and pleasure” of
the President would become an “abject slave,” in William Lowndes Smith’s words.13 The
President, warned Elbridge Gerry, would hold “the thread of life” and become
“sovereign” over these men.14 Numerous commentators, including Gerry, described these
dependent officers as the “creatures of the President.”15 Granting the President such a
power would, in short, lead to executive offices being filled by fawning courtiers.
America’s very exceptionalism seemed to be at stake, for an executive with
unlimited authority to remove officers of government could be, in practice, just as
despotic as any English minister. Roger Sherman pointed to English history as a
cautionary example, alleging – in vintage English oppositional fashion – that the Crown’s
absolute control over places and pensions had enabled it to “swallow up” all the powers
of government. Such a system of “influence” may have suited the English people,
Sherman proclaimed, but the American government was “intended to be different.”16
James Jackson of Georgia declared that the executive right of dismissing officers “may
hold good in Europe, where monarchs claim their power jure divino,” but not in a
constitutional republic. Gazing into an imagined future, Jackson even foresaw an English
Court Party reborn in the United States. Soon “a treasury bench” would be introduced
into the House, with ministers placed before Congress “to support the influence of their
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master.” The President already commanded the military. All that remained was for him to
take control over the nation’s purse, and he would “have the liberties of America under
his thumb.” Should “the Secretary of Finance” resist his measures, a President could
simply remove him to make way for a more pliant minion.17 Thus controlling the army
and the money, the chief executive would be free to erect a “throne upon the ruins of your
visionary republic.”18
Madison observed that Congress could always impeach a President who removed
officers for corrupt reasons.19 But his more thoroughly Whiggish opponents were still not
convinced. Gerry feared that the President’s influence over executive officers would give
him de facto control over the public finances, furnishing him with the funds to bribe any
Congressmen who might try to impeach him.20 John Page pointed out that the only men
who could provide real evidence of the President’s wrongdoing would be the executive
officers, but they would never dare to do so if they were the President’s dependents. In
other words, Gerry and Page feared that a President with so much patronage at his
disposal would effectively be insulated from any de jure checks on his power.21
Advocates for the President’s removal power increasingly had to focus their
arguments on less tangible measures of moral authority. Hamilton had argued that the
Senate alone possessed the requisite authority to remove an officer, for only Senators
were “sufficiently independent” to be entrusted with the “NATIONAL INQUEST.”22
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Now Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania provocatively counter-argued that the President
deserved the removal power because of his democratic imprimatur. The President, he
declared, was “truly and justly the man of the people.” “Is there any other person who
represents so many of them as the President?” he asked. The chief executive was “elected
by the voice of the people of the whole Union,” unlike the Congressmen who spoke only
for parochial state “sovereignties.”23 Scott’s novel argument was quickly and easily
refuted. Both Gerry and Jackson noted, quite correctly, that the President was not chosen
by “the people” but by state electors, who were in turn chosen by their state legislatures.24
Scott’s critics were right to dismiss his argument as a dubious casuistry – at least
in 1789. Even so, Scott’s observations introduced a potentially powerful argument in
favor of executive patronage. Scott had identified the President’s moral authority with his
democratic sanction; he was refuted on the grounds that the presidency was, in truth, one
of the least democratic offices in the union. But by implication, a President who
genuinely did have some democratic authority – say, by a direct popular vote for the
electors who chose him – would have almost unlimited moral authority, including the
authority to conduct a purge on behalf of “the people.” By 1829, Andrew Jackson would
be able to claim that authority.
Despite the impassioned pleadings of American Whigs, their argument failed to
carry the day. On June 19, after several days of Sisyphean wrangling between the
opposing camps, the House finally voted on whether to strike out the lines granting the
President power to remove officers of the Foreign Affairs department. The move to strike
failed by a lopsided margin of 20-34, which meant that the debate would now pass into
23
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the hands of the Senate. Because the Senate still operated behind closed doors, it left no
official record of the ensuing debate. No one resented Senatorial secrecy more than
William Maclay, the ornery Pennsylvania Senator who saw conspiracies and corruption
lurking in every corner, and chronicled all of his suspicions in his now-legendary diary.25
As he rose to speak against the bill on July 14, Maclay channeled all of the
phobias that had emanated from Whigs in the House. If the President could remove any
officer, he warned, no “Man of an independent Spirit would accept of such an Office”:
[O]f What Service can his Abilities be to the Community if afraid of the
nod and beck of a Superior, he must consult hims will in every Matter.
Abject servility is most apt to mark the line of his Conduct, & this on the
One hand will not fail to be productive of despotism and Tyranny on the
other; for I consider mankind as composed nearly of the same Materials in
America as in Asia, in the United States as in the East Indias.26
Other Senators counter-argued that a President logically had the right to remove officers
he appointed. But Maclay took less interest in the logic of such arguments than he did in
the suspicious behavior of the men who uttered them. As Maclay noticed various
Senators “caballing” and “meeting in knots” – that is, conversing with one another during
breaks – he thought he saw a “Court party” being formed. “[I]ndeed,” he wrote, “I
believe it was formed long ago.” Everywhere he looked, Maclay imagined bribery and
collusion, even among seemingly incorruptible men. William Paterson of New Jersey, for
instance, had once been “a Staunch Revolution man & Genuine Whig,” but had now
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“deserted” or “betrayed us” on “every republican Question.” “I know not that there is
such a thing as buying Members,” Maclay wrote, “but if there is he is certainly sold.”27
Maclay’s accusations were fueled not just by his seemingly bottomless well of
self-righteousness, but also by the same ideological impulses that had galvanized fellow
Whigs like Elbridge Gerry, John Page, and James Jackson. Indeed, the congressional
debates of 1789 echoed those from the Constitutional convention in 1787, which in many
ways echoed the debates of midcentury English politics.28 Executive patronage was still
imagined as a frightful bogey that corrupted and influenced all operations of government.
Every President was a potential Walpole, every Senator a court-party conspirator, every
officeholder a devious sycophant. In the face of such impassioned jeremiads, counterarguments in favor of bureaucratic practicality could seem hollow and anemic. It is no
surprise, then, to find that many Senators shared Maclay’s concerns. The Senate split
evenly in its vote, which meant that Vice President John Adams had to break the tie by
voting in favor of the President’s removal power.29 Adams’s vote made sense – he
believed in a strong executive. Even so, one cannot help but notice a poignant irony:
Adams’s vote cleared the way for Andrew Jackson, who forty years later would purge
officers appointed by Adams’s eldest son.
Congress’s verdict established the constitutional principle of the President’s
removal power, but it hardly resolved all the questions surrounding political patronage.
The heat of these debates indicated that a President would invite controversy anytime he
removed an officer, perhaps enough so to justify impeachment proceedings. The current
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President, George Washington, would have to tread carefully. But by July 1789, he
hardly needed the reminder.

“The Rage for Offices”: Democratic and Disinterested Officeholding in the Young
Republic
On April 24, 1789, a week before he was inaugurated as the first President of the
United States, Washington received an anonymous letter concerning federal patronage.
The author’s cautious decision to remain anonymous belied his letter’s assertive
admonitions:
Among the first duties to which you will be called in your high station,
will be the appointments to office throughout the country. There is a silent
looking on from every part of the union to see what turn that important
business shall take. There are schemes and combinations innumerable to
support each other, to support favorites and establish a system of as vile
corruption and intrigue as can disgrace a country.
Apparently some of the most respectable senators had “proofs of undue influence and
even bargains among their own members,” but the author still trusted Washington to keep
this corrupt intrigue at bay. The “people of this country” needed to “see that the subtil
[sic] and ever active influence of combination intrigue and favoritism cannot succeed
with your Excellency, and that the most honest and able men are searched out and
brought into view, for the places of trust and confidence.” As long as Washington
followed this careful, high-minded course, the “dignity” of American government would
be preserved.30
If Washington took any note of this anonymous harangue, he probably found it
both annoying and redundant. He already knew that political patronage was destined to
30
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be the “most delicate” and “unpleasing aspect” of his job, for he was already being
deluged with applications from hungry expectants.31 The flood of applicants had begun
weeks before he assumed office. “Scarcely a day passes in which applicants of one kind
or another do not arrive,” he wrote in March – and he was hardly the only person to
lament this incorrigible “rage for offices.”32 By the end of his second year as President,
the sheer torrent of officeseekers had become a scandalous object of remark; one foreign
visitor claimed that the streets of Philadelphia had become “thronged with clerks, private
secretaries, short hand writers, office hunters &c.”33 Still, Washington tried to remain
philosophical. “It is the nature of Republicans, who are nearly in a state of equality,” he
observed, “to be extremely jealous as to the disposal of all honorary or lucrative
appointments.”34 If that insight was correct, it meant that Washington – and every future
President – was destined to endure a long four years.
Washington coped with this stress by resolving to apply a consistent set of
principles in all his appointments. Prior to taking office, the new President fended off
numerous applicants by insisting that he would not enter the Presidency burdened with
any preexisting promises or commitments.35 Although he would not promise any offices
to any correspondents, he was willing to share his thoughts on criteria for federal
appointments. Early in March, he listed the criteria for executive officers as “fitness,”
“pretensions,” and, where “proper,” some “political considerations.”36 A few weeks later,
he refined this last category to say “political considerations of a local nature,” alluding
31
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specifically to a fair distribution of offices to applicants from across the different states.37
Within a few more weeks’ time, he had dropped any reference to “political
considerations,” and now declared that “one only rule” should “guide” him: “to consult
the fitness of characters and the public good.”38 Political patronage was now to be utterly
apolitical, at least if Washington had his way. But as he knew, he was not the only person
shaping conversations about public service in America.
Most Americans could probably agree with the uncontroversial proposition that
political appointments ought to be meritocratic. Orations celebrating the fifteenth
anniversary of independence, for instance, often valorized meritocracy as a defining
feature of the young republic. One speech, addressed to a crowd of artisans, celebrated
the United States as “a free and republican government, where merit, and not favour, is
the ladder by which men mount to preferment.”39 That same day, the Bostonian Society
of Cincinnati toasted that “Virtue and Talents” would “be the only road to preferment.”40
A 1791 sermon praised the Constitution and new system of government for bringing
“merit to view from obscure walks of life”; under the American dispensation, the avenue
to “honor and preferment” would not be “Title & birthright,” but rather one’s “capacity
for business, with learning, eloquence, and virtue.”41
This idea – that any virtuous and meritorious man could seek aspire to office –
conflicted, ironically, with the prevailing belief that virtuous and meritorious men would
not aspire to hold office at all. The latter notion was reasserted in numerous editorials
over the next few years. To take one example:
37
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Abilities – services – and virtues, with a visible interest in the prosperity
of the country, should be the only circumstances that determine the
appointment of an officer of government. As these qualities are generally
accompanied by diffidence, the persons who possess them should be
drawn into public stations without their seeking them. It was thus that
Cincinnatus was taken from his plough to command an army, and David
from his sheep, to rule a nation.42
“Modest men” would not want offices, according to another commenter, and “impudent
men” did not deserve them. “Perhaps an order from the President of the United States,
that the personal applicant for an office should never have one,” this author suggested,
“might prevent some trouble, idleness, and scurrility.”43 The presence of men clamoring
for offices was, in another writer’s words, a symptom of societies bereft of “public
virtue.”44
Well-connected applicants for office accordingly preferred to appear as though
they were too unassuming to solicit offices at all. “It is with diffidence that I become one
of the very many applicants which address your Excellency,” went a typical refrain.45
When Tench Coxe’s friends urged him to apply for an office, he confessed to Madison
that he was unsure how to proceed, given that he was “unused to solicitations and
intrigues” and doubted whether he could ever subject himself to such an indignity.46
Edward Carrington had initially been bold enough to visit the President with an in-person
request. But upon witnessing the sheer number of applicants intruding upon
Washington’s time, Carrington became self-conscious that he might look like just another
supplicant officeseeker.47 His friend Henry Lee tried to him help through this

42

(Philadelphia) Federal Gazette, March 5, 1789.
New-Jersey Journal, May 13, 1789, reprinted from Federal Gazette.
44
New-York Daily Gazette, March 25, 1789.
45
Richard Marshall Scott to Washington, June 15, 1789, GWP: PS, 2:497.
46
Tench Coxe to Madison, JMP: CS, 12:405-409.
47
See the editor’s note 3, GWP: PS, 3:99.
43

113

predicament by recommending him to Washington – correctly, it seems – as a man who
“dislikes to solicit for office.”48 James McHenry performed a similar service for one of
his acquaintances, whom he recommended as a man too modest to “struggle through a
crowd” and request an office – quite unlike all those other men who were “perpetually on
the watch for lucrative appointments.”49
The promise of democratic meritocracy also conflicted with the more practical
problem of personal knowledge. There were, as always, too many applicants and too few
offices, leading Washington to surmise that he would need “the aid of a supernatural
intuition” to decide between equally worthy candidates.50 More plausibly, Washington
could seek advice from men who knew the individual applicants, but even this approach
would be strewn with perils. “The public good being your guide all that you can want
will be just information,” wrote Lee. “Herein consists the danger of committing error,
because you must unavoidably depend on the knowledge of others too often.”51
Washington feebly tried to resolve this problem by reaffirming the ideal of the
officeholder too diffident to desire office. In his undelivered draft of the inaugural
address, Washington remarked that it would be best if the most worthy candidates were
already known and did not even have to apply.52
But it would have been wildly undemocratic if Washington dismissed applicants
merely because they were immodest enough to apply. As an editorial in John Fenno’s
Gazette of the United States observed, there were a great many meritorious yet obscure
men waiting in the wings. If such men could not even apply for office without being
48
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stigmatized as seekers, the country would be forever deprived of their services.53 And if
these unknown civil-servants-in-waiting were to have any chance, Washington could
only obtain knowledge of their character through their letters of application.54 By the very
act of requesting an office, an obscure applicant was, consciously or not, challenging an
elitist if not outright aristocratic vision of public service. He was defying the republican
convention of the Cincinnatus archetype: he was not such a well-known man that the
government would voluntarily solicit his service, but a man of modest pretensions and
untapped talent who chose on his own initiative to claim a space in American politics.
Anonymous officeseekers’ applications made it more difficult for Washington, or any
President, to limit his appointments to that class of men who were already known within
his more privileged coterie. In this sense, the applicants of 1789 and the early 1790s may
have impeded the development of an American official aristocracy – regardless of their
actual success rates.
At least one historian has gone so far as to claim that the early national years
witnessed the beginnings of a “democratic officeholding” culture in which there was no
longer any stigma attached to officeseeking.55 Such claims vastly overshoot the mark.
Applicants for office in the early republic, regardless of class or social standing, were
painfully self-conscious about being perceived as officeseekers. They still had to contend
with the prevailing notion that worthy men ought not to apply at all, and more often than
not they internalized that sentiment. And as we shall see, this tension between
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disinterested officeholding and democratic aspirations would persist for at least the next
four decades.

“Pure and Disinterested”: The “Suffering Patriot” Theme in Applications for Office
At one point in his search for an acceptable criterion of public patronage,
Washington had acknowledged a consideration that was neither political nor practical. He
mentioned in March 1789 not just the “the fitness of characters to fill claims” but also
“the comparative claims from the former merits & sufferings in service of the different
candidates.” Some of the applicants stepping forward had “claims of public gratitude
which cannot be set aside without a palpable act of injustice.” He continued:
Some of them are men of unquestionable talents, who have wasted the
flower of their lives, in the civil or military service of their country: men
who have materially injured their properties, and excluded themselves
from obtaining a subsistence for their families by the professions they
were accustomed to pursue.56
Washington was referring to war veterans and others who had suffered during the
Revolutionary War and now sought some “subsistence” from the government they had
fought to protect. One of Madison’s correspondents lamented “the wretched state of so
large a class of Citizens who have a claim on this Boasted Government – for what – not
for Charity: but for Justice.”57
Washington soon dropped any reference to past services from his appointment
criteria. He did not explain this sudden omission, but it is easy to fathom why: there were
simply too many suffering patriots to gratify. The War for Independence had left a trail of
wreckage – physical, social, economic, even emotional. Many veterans had devoted the
56
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prime of their lives, and often their limbs, in service to the glorious cause, only to return
home and find that vindictive redcoats had destroyed their property and businesses. Such
suffering was not confined to the soldiers. Already in the 1780s, the Revolution was
being remembered as a “people’s war” in which all citizens had borne their share of the
collective suffering.58 The economic woes of the 1780s expanded this sub-class of
suffering, impoverished American patriots. As the value of the Continental currency
collapsed, many Americans had chosen to sell their own paper certificates at a miserable
fraction of their face value, plunging themselves further into ruin.
Small wonder that Washington now found himself besieged by innumerable
applications from these suffering patriots seeking government employment – indeed, he
received so many letters of this nature that it makes sense to refer to them as their own
genre. The recurring theme in the “suffering patriot” genre was shame. These applicants
routinely had to apologize for the “indelicacy” of discussing their suffering, and often
went out of their way to note the “reluctance” they felt in writing their letters of
application.59 They knew that there were countless other applicants competing for
Washington’s attention, and were embarrassed that their circumstances left them no
choice but to join the supplicant “crowd.”60 Many of them were proud men brought low
by their “misfortunes,” commercial or otherwise.61 “If a family reduced by the fortune of
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war from Affluence to Indigence will have any influence,” wrote one, “my Situation in
that respect will claim attentions.”62 Such men only sought public employment because
their “misfortunes” left them with no other options. One applicant had been “exceedingly
harassed during the war,” to the point that he had “to quite [sic] a trading Profession and
seek Employment in one of the Publick offices.”63 He was not alone.64
Such applicants were keen to insist that their current requests for office were
uncharacteristic. “Unaccustomed to solicit appointments of any kind,” wrote a recently
impoverished Virginian, “I do it with very ill Grace, because my feelings are much
wounded.”65 A Maryland applicant tried to satisfy Washington that, although he had
enjoyed numerous offices in the past, they had always been “unsolicitted” on his part and
never too beneficial for him, “as the most lucritive never afforded me more than a base
support”; far from being a lifelong parasite, he only applied after suffering financial
misfortune in the paper-money imbroglio.66 Ex-soldiers were especially adept with such
language. From “the close of the late war until the present period,” wrote one veteran, “I
have never asked any appointment either from the United States or any individual State –
Tho my health have been much injured in the Service of my Country.”67 Even James
Warren, a known acquaintance of the President, felt embarrassed “to hazard an address
which I never made before to any man, a solicitation for office.” As an “apology for this
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intrusion,” Warren mentioned his “sufferings in the course of the revolution” and their
attendant “consequences.”68
Even as they leveraged their services and suffering as claims on the nation’s
gratitude, war veterans insisted that those services and sufferings had always been
disinterested and pure. These suffering veterans tried, first, to demonstrate that they had
never been sunshine soldiers or fair-weather patriots, but genuinely ardent believers in
the cause. Suffering soldiers rarely missed an opportunity to declare that they had served
in some capacity “from the commencement” of the war, thus establishing that they were
more than opportunists.69 One applicant acknowledged that his expression of respect for
Washington’s character might be construed as “flowing from other than the real motives
– yet, having served under you as my General from a few weeks after your appointment
to that important trust, to the end of the war, I hope to have the credit of sincerity.”70
Marinus Willett had known Washington for fourteen years, but still felt need to elaborate
on his sincerity. “The early Impressions my mind received in favour of Liberty Joined to
an enthusiastic love of my Country,” he wrote, “produced habits of the strictest attention
to her service during the revolution.” Willett’s sincerity was further evinced in his history
of patriotic defiance. “The political motto of ‘sining [sic] beyond forgiveness’,” he wrote,
“was a favorite of mine – I regularly viewed the worst situation I could be placed in
without concern. And in case of a general failure of the opposition I ever felt a raidiness
to embrace wretchedness in its most distressing forms.” The present fact of his
application was not attributable to any “avidity for gain” – his history of suffering proved
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that at least – but to his humble hopes that he might benefit from his struggles as much as
the other Americans he had served, “in proportion with the common cause.”71
The archetypal suffering patriot, then, was a man who had endured tribulations
without any thought of a future office. Benjamin Harrison, a former governor and
legislator in Virginia, remarked that he had previously held “little thoughts of ever being
reduced to the necessity of wishing to become a placeman,” until the English
“depredations” and other financial losses had reduced him to such a fate.72 Abraham
Bancker had served as a wartime spy, but had never intended to seek any
“compensation”; his application, of course, proceeded “merely from a reverse of
Fortune,” as the war had reduced his parents “to Distress.”
My Breast was fired with that Ardor for Liberty, and detestation of
slavery, which at that time pervaded the honest Citizens of America. My
motives for engaging in so arduous and hazardous an Attempt, were pure
and disinterested; as they flowed from a Cordial Regard for the true
Interests and Welfare of my Country.73
With calculated nonchalance, some applicants disavowed any special claims in the same
breath that they established the basis for such claims. One could pretend to claim no
“merit” for performing his patriotic duty, even as he conspicuously lamented having lost
the “Opportunity of acquiring Wealth and Independence.”74 “Although under this
Embarrassment,” wrote an impecunious veteran, “I find a relief in the Consciousness of
having discharged only my Duty, yet the Claims of a numerous Family upon my
Indulgence, are too pressing to be totally dispensed with.”75
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Suffering patriots further distinguished themselves from venal opportunists by
promising that they would remain patriotic even if they did not receive appointments.
John McDowell, a militia veteran and Pennsylvania politician, assured Washington that
whether he was “fortunate or unfortunate in” his “first application for any office of
profit,” his “love and esteem for the President of the United States” would remain
unchanged.76 John Hurd of New Hampshire was so incorruptible that he had even given
up the offices that he once held under the British regime. Having sided with the patriots
“from principle early in the Contest, notwithstanding a near Connection & Friendship”
with the Tory governor, he had “freely resigned all Employmt. under the British
Governmt.” Hurd now modestly asked Washington to consider whether “the sacrifice I
made of my several offices under the former Government by adhering to the Interests of
my Country” was substantial enough to “merit any Claim.” But the very fact of his
“sacrifice” demonstrated that Hurd was not a man who would blindly obey any
paymaster offering a salary.77
The suffering patriot narrative rested on an uncomfortable paradox: the applicant
believed he could claim an office because he was more than just an officeseeker. Such
men evidently sensed that the act of pressing a claim would bring them into conflict with
the republican notion that patriotic suffering was its own reward. Indeed, some patriotic
martyrs were too humble to apply at all. Anthony Cadwalader Morris, for instance, had
been captured, beaten, and mutilated during the war; since then, he had suffered the
further indignity of having to live off his father-in-law’s estate. Yet he still remained too
76
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proud to apply for any office. His daughter Debby tried to rectify this injustice by secretly
petitioning the President on her father’s behalf. She described her father as “a person who
thinks the honor of Serving his country a sufficient recompense for his sufferings –
pardon me – my dear Father – your child cannot think so.”78 But other correspondents
saw nothing dishonorable in the idea of revolutionary heroes presenting their claims on
the nation’s gratitude. One recommender praised a prospective applicant for his
“uniform, firm & avowed attachment to the cause of his country,” declaring that his
“manly & decisive” course “should not be unnoticed.”79 William Munson could only
bring himself to apply “with difficulty,” but he felt no guilt in advancing his own wartime
claims. After all, he had suffered “fatigues, Hunger,” “Cold,” and “Loss of property”
while serving the cause, but had always held out hope that his sufferings would lay “a
foundation for [his] future prosperity.” And now he still hoped to reap “the fruit of [his]
Labour, by further Employment from the public.”80
In the course of a single, longwinded sentence, Munson used the word “hope” no
fewer than three times. That word captured the feelings and predicaments of all
applicants in his situation. They had attached themselves to the Revolution out of hope
for its success, and out of hope that they would benefit from its success along with other
Americans; they had seen the second of those hopes dashed when they fell on hard times
after the war. They now placed their hopes in Washington’s “Justice & Benevolence.”81
More subtly, they hoped that their humiliation would not be compounded by the indignity
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of being dismissed as venal officeseekers. It was not a matter of contract, or even of
“charity,” but of “justice.” The words “hope” and “justice” implied a challenge for
Washington to prove that his administration was not just the seat of another self-serving
court, ignorant and forgetful of the heroes that had served its cause.
In these men’s minds, the War for Independence had produced a glorious
revolution, but it had also created financial and even moral debts, debts that were
exacerbated by the events of the 1780s. These debts had produced feelings of shame,
which is perhaps why applicants attached themselves to the persona of the suffering
patriot. They desperately needed employment and salaries, but they lived and breathed in
a political milieu in which it was stigmatic to request either. The received republican
wisdom of the day held that officeseekers were self-interested men of voracious
appetites; the prevalent headlines of the day scornfully noted that Americans were
applying for office anyway, which suggested some potentially unsettling truths about
American character. But by affirming that he was different from the other members of
this crowd, the reluctant officeseeker could claim a place in American government
without sacrificing his virtuous place in the republican social cosmology. He was in the
crowd, but not of it.
Washington, ever fastidious in prioritizing the public good over individual
necessity, was only able to gratify a few of these suffering patriots’ requests for public
employment. But the idiom of suffering patriots would ultimately shape American
development in profound and unexpected ways. The applicants of 1789 proved their
disinterested patriotism by pointing to the selfless suffering they had endured in recent
years, especially during the war. Veterans would continue espousing such narratives
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during the Jackson administration, but by that point the idea of wartime suffering had
expanded beyond the veterans of physical warfare. Veterans of the 1820s’ partisan
“political war” would utilize a similar idiom in order to establish their status as
disinterested patriots who deserved offices for their incorruptibility.82 Before that
ideological development could take place, however, Americans had to accept the notion
that politics itself could constitute a form of patriotic warfare. The seeds of that
development were already being laid in Washington’s time, as American polemicists
began to imagine sharper and more permanent lines between the worthy many and the
unworthy few, between the virtuous masses and the officeseeking cabals – lines that in a
few years’ time would harden into a schematic, Manichean divide between the nation’s
independent “democracy” and its factious “aristocracy.”

“An Augean Stable of Parasites and Plunderers”
As we have seen, Americans in 1789 had a rich intellectual tradition to draw upon
wherever the subject of the “placeman” was concerned. Polemicists in the 1760s and
1770s had identified the “placemen” as scapegoats for all of their economic troubles,
depicting such adversaries as “hirelings” who received luxurious sinecures as payoffs for
supporting the oppressive taxes. During the ratification debates of 1788, Americans had
turned their suspicions inward, as rival polemicists targeted their opponents as either
“placemen” who wanted to protect their privileged positions in the Confederation
government or as “place-seekers” who hoped to claim their own perches in the new
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Constitutional order. The Antifederalist “Federal Farmer” had warned readers of an
incipient “natural aristocracy” that would gorge itself on offices of profit, thereby
siphoning off the wealth of the nation’s hardworking, independent “natural democracy.”
All of these ideological trends persisted through the early years of the Washington
administration, as American writers and politicians increasingly perceived a fundamental,
Manichean split between the “industrious” masses and the indolent, officeseeking few.
Already in 1789, some writers were echoing the Federal Farmer’s fears of an
“aristocracy” living off of tax-supported salaries – which was to say, off the backs of the
hardworking people. Such concerns often emerged in response to local political
developments. In Pennsylvania, for instance, the relatively radical state constitution of
1776 was about to be replaced with a more conservative document, and the prospect of
such an upgrade triggered old phobias. One defender of the 1776 constitution cried out
against an emerging “aristocracy of the most dangerous kind,” whose members
considered “the government as their own, and the people as their property.” “The fabric
of aristocracy cannot be completed until every office is in the hands of the chosen few,”
he warned, “nor can the government be uniform until all the officers are of one
complexion.”83 A Massachusetts writer predicted that lucrative public offices would
become artificial channels for funneling wealth into the hands of a few men, exacerbating
the inequalities that threatened all republican states.84 These attackers were particularly
concerned with the officers’ allegedly ostentatious salaries. A New Yorker declared that
opulent “sinecures” were being “established upon the spoils of the industrious part of our
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community,” while a Pennsylvania “Plebeian” insisted that high salaries would turn
government into an engine for the “emolument of a few.”85
After 1790, this critique of an office-hoarding aristocracy was attached to
Alexander Hamilton’s newfangled “funding system,” and especially to its provision for a
perpetual national debt.86 A Pennsylvania polemicist writing as “Agricola” – more on
him later – insisted that if Congress could not immediately pay off the entire debt, then
public “servants” ought to have their wages reduced or their offices eliminated entirely.87
An anti-administration Bostonian lamented that offices of profit were “being multiplied
without reason or number,” their income “extended beyond all former example.” From
this it was plain to see that supporters of the funding system were nothing but
“speculators, placemen, and seekers” who preferred “the early income of a post, place, or
pension” to “the plaudits of an uncorrupted conscience.”88
Oppositional Whig politicians foresaw boundless corruption. William Maclay
confessed some dismal visions to his diary:
the first thing done under our new Government, was the Creation of a Vast
number of Offices and Officers. a Treasury dilated into as many branches,
as invention could Frame. A Secretary of War with an Host of Clerks, And
above all a Secretary of State. and all these Men labour in their several
Vocations. hence We must have a Mass of National Debt, to employ the
85
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national blessing,” as creditors would continue to feel a personal stake in the success of the United States
government. Many of his critics, including Jefferson and Madison, worried that this plan would effectively
make the entire government beholden to its creditors. Many other critics, as we shall see, had a less
nuanced perspective on the debt, which they saw as an excuse to pay the opulent salaries of government
officers.
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Treasury. an Army & Navy for fear the department of War should lack
employment. Foreign engagements too must soon be attended too, to keep
Up the consequence of of that Secretary…
Maclay continued to spill prophecies onto the pages.89 Every expansion of government
personnel, be it for the sake of bureaucratic efficiency or for the sake of conducting a
war, could be construed as an excuse to keep minions employed and salaries high.
Such concerns were further invigorated by news of the French Revolution’s
progress across the Atlantic. The undisputed bombshell of 1790s print culture was the
publication of Thomas Paine’s magnum opus, The Rights of Man, which was a sequel of
sorts to Common Sense – just as the French Revolution itself was, in his mind, a sequel of
sorts to the American War for Independence. The immediate pretext for this pamphlet
was the publication of Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France the year
before. Burke, in the twenty years that had elapsed since his Thoughts on the Cause of the
Present Discontents, had become the Atlantic World’s most eloquent defender of
hereditary aristocracy; Paine, in the fifteen years since Common Sense, had become the
Atlantic World’s most savage critic of that same institution. He summarily dismissed
Burke as “a placeman, or a pensioner” who lusted after the royal “Loaves and Fishes.”90
Burke may have bristled upon reading these words; after all, he himself had been an
outspoken critic of court patronage years before Paine entered the political fray. Paine’s
accusation was not just an ad hominem character assassination, however, but rather an
indictment of the systemic corruption permeating every corner of hereditary government.
89

DWM, 243, 245. Henry Lee expressed similar fears in his letter to Madison, March 4, 1790, JMP: CS,
13:87-90.
90
Paine’s work was printed in England in two parts, the first part appearing in March 1791 and the second
February 1792. They are both readily widely available in print. For the purposes of this chapter, I have
chosen to cite newspapers that included extracts from Rights of Man, thereby allowing the reader to see
how widely these ideas were disseminated. This paragraph cites the extract printed in New-York Daily
Gazette, May 14, 1791.

127

In Common Sense, he had identified royal patronage as the “moving spring” of royal
power without bothering to elaborate on the implications of that claim.91 Now Paine’s
condemnation of court patronage assumed a central place in his attack on English
principles of government. “The moving power” in a “mixed” government like England’s
was, according to Paine, “of necessity, corruption.” The elected Representatives of the
Commons would always pose a threat to the Kings and Peers, which made it necessary
for the Crown to “buy” them up – presumably, readers would have guessed, through the
distribution of royal places and pensions.92 This was a vitriolic line of argument, but not
terribly original. As we saw in earlier chapters, Country Party thinkers since the 1670s
had complained about royal “influence” in the Commons, and Paine had already
suggested in 1776 that the crown could not survive without its patronage.
This time, however, Paine did not stop with an indictment of the Crown but
carried his attack to the parasitical class of courtiers who thrived on the king’s
distribution of spoils. Burke was not merely a singular hireling but a corporeal
manifestation of this transnational class:
He writes neither in the character of a Frenchman nor an Englishman, but
in the fawning character of that creature known in all countries and a
friend to none, a COURTIER. Whether it be the Court of Versailles, or the
Court of St. James, or the Carlton-House, or the Court in expectation,
signifies not; for the caterpillar principle of all Courts and Courtiers are
alike. They form a common policy throughout Europe, detached and
separate from the interests of Nations; and while they appear to quarrel,
they agree to plunder… That which is a blessing to Nations, is bitterness
to them; and as their existence depends on the duplicity of a country, they
tremble at the approach of principles, and dread the precedent that
threatens their overthrow.93
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This figure of the “courtier,” living off “plunder” obtained from the people and dispersed
through sinecures and perquisites, became a ubiquitous archetype to be discerned,
denounced, and uprooted. Paine’s attack on Burke was in some ways the opening salvo of
a larger war on this class.
For Paine, these principles of plunder had become so entrenched that nothing
short of a complete revolution would suffice.
When despotism has established itself for ages in a country, as in France,
it is not in the person of the king only that it resides… It has its standard
every where. Every office and department has its despotism, founded upon
customs and usage. Every place has its bastile [sic], and every bastile its
despot. The original hereditary despotism resident in the person of the
king, divides and subdivides itself into a thousand shapes and forms, till at
last the whole of it is acted by deputation… Against this species of
despotism, proceeding on through an endless labyrinth of office, till the
source of it is scarcely perceptible, there is no mode of redress.
The principles of despotism had thus become “too deeply rooted to be removed, and the
Augean stable of parasites and plunderers too abominably filthy to be cleansed by any
thing short of a complete and universal revolution.”94
Rights of Man became the bestselling cause celebre of the 1790s Atlantic World,
and few Americans received it more warmly than the Secretary of State, Thomas
Jefferson. He had witnessed the birth pangs of the French Revolution firsthand and was
already in the habit of using events in France as ideological litmus tests for American
republicans. When Jefferson first caught wind of Burke’s Reflections, he lamented the
death of “whig principles” in England but still held out hope for the triumph of those
principles in his home country. “We have now some names of note here who have
apostasized from the truth faith,” he wrote to a radical English friend, “but they are few
indeed, and the body of our citizens are pure and insusceptible of taint in their
94
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republicanism.”95 When the second half of Paine’s work appeared in America in 1792,
Jefferson relayed the same sentiments directly to its author.
It is but too true that we have a sect preaching up and panting after an
English constitution of Kings, lords, and commons, and whose hands are
itching for crowns, coronets, and mitres. But our people, my good friend,
are unanimous in their principles of republicanism, and there is no better
proof of it than that they love what you write and read it with delight.
Paine’s works had “served here to separate the wheat from the chaff, and to prove tho the
latter appears on the surface, it is on the surface only. The bulk below it is sound and
pure.”96
Jefferson’s musings are of interest for two reasons. First, they illuminate the
increasingly Manichean pattern of thought that emerged in the early years of
Washington’s administration. By labeling Burke and other English counterrevolutionaries
as apostates, Jefferson insinuated that there was a true political faith to be served, a faith
he summarized as “whig principles.” And by projecting this orthodoxy onto “the body of
our people,” he denied legitimacy to any “surface”-level dissidents. This dichotomous
logic would make it possible for political partisans to imagine themselves not as factious
and intriguing men – as all partisans were typically presumed to be – but as defenders of
“the” people and their orthodoxy against heretical dissenters. As we shall see, the idea of
separating “the wheat from the chaff” would remain a powerful metaphor for Jacksonian
partisans in the 1820s and 1830s.97
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Second, it is important to note that Jefferson did not see Rights of Man as the
intellectual spark for a second American Revolution, but rather as a litmus test that
revealed Americans’ devotion to the political principles they had always cherished. He
expected good Americans to embrace the revolution in France not as an inspiration for
new democratic possibilities, but as the transatlantic vindication of pre-existing American
ideals. Jefferson’s assessment of the intellectual milieu appears to have held true, at least
when it came to matters of patronage. American polemicists who wrote about patronage
in Paine’s immediate wake did not introduce any points of argument that had not already
been present in the Antifederalist writings of 1788 – but they were now emboldened to
make those points more stridently.
The writings of “Agricola,” printed in the Independent Gazetteer in September
1791, provide one measure of Paine’s impact. In the previous February, “Agricola” had
already published some grumblings about the national debt being used to fund salaried
officers of state. But in the intervening months, Paine’s pamphlet had taken America by
storm, and Agricola now refined his arguments into a sustained class critique. He began
his “Letters” with some idyllic reflections on the years immediately following 1776,
when Americans had still believed that, “if we should exert ourselves, we should sit every
man under his vine, and under his own fig tree, enjoying the fruits of our labor, &c.” The
“end of government” had not been the enrichment of “rulers and legislators” but the
protection of ordinary people’s “liberty and property.” The “salaries of officers” had been
kept “so moderate, as never to call men from other business to become sycophantine
office-hunters.” But arcadia had now been infiltrated and coopted for the purposes of a
few conspirators who planned to live off the backs of the people. Excise taxes would
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soon reduce Americans to “slavery,” and the masses of the people would become
“hewers of wood and drawers of water.” “Where is my freedom,” Agricola asked, “if I
may not reap the fruit of my own labour?” American citizens could only halt this course
by electing men who truly represented their own interests rather than those of the
incipient ruling class. And according to Agricola, the common interest of ordinary
Americans was to curtail all the emerging “sinecures and unnecessary offices.”98
Agricola’s accusations reached their paranoiac crescendo in his second letter, as
he began to envision an entire government corrupted by aristocratic officeseekers. The
current rulers had created “a government agreeable to their own lusts,” one “that would
afford more offices and larger wages to enrich aristocrats.” High salaries had drawn forth
“ a large crop of conceited, proud office hunters, who think themselves well qualified to
fill any station.” Agricola read these signs of the times as proof that America was
exceptionally unexceptional in its tolerance for corruption.
Such a monster of government has seldom been known on earth. We are
obliged to maintain two governments [state and federal], with their full
number of officers from head to foot. Some of them receive such wages as
never were heard of before in any government on earth; and all this
bestowed on aristocrats for doing next to nothing. A blessed revolution! A
blessed revolution indeed! but farmers, mechanics, and labourers have no
share of it. – we are the asses who must have the honor of paying them all,
without any adequate services.
Agricola foresaw that the corrupt Congress would protect itself through its insidious
power over offices – for Congressmen had been busily “creating unnecessary officers,
and generally giving double wages, which some may suppose to be designed as a bribe to
retain them on their side in case of opposition.”99 Such a system could only end with an
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aristocracy imposing itself on the taxpaying people – a development that threatened
America’s very exceptionalism.
The distresses of the poor in Europe might have been a warning to us to
avoid the system, which creates an aristocracy, and upholds it on the
oppression of the yeomanry. We pretended that we should enjoy a free
country, without any impositions. This had induced numbers to come to
America, but here they will find themselves mistaken.100
Agricola’s tirades were remarkable, in part, for their lack of originality. The
critique of government becoming a pipeline to channel wealth from the people into the
hands of officeholding “placemen” had been a cornerstone of John Dickinson and other
patriots’ arguments in the 1760s and 1770s. The Federal Farmer’s letters of 1787 and
1788 had already identified these officeseeking conspirators as a “natural aristocracy”;
indeed, he had even anticipated Agricola’s distinction between the industrious, taxpaying people and the indolent, sinecured few. All these themes could be traced back to
the language of 1788’s Antifederalists, and many of them much further back than that.
If Paine influenced the writings of Agricola at all, that influence manifested
primarily in the letters’ more vindictive depiction of aristocracy, especially compared to
the earlier writings of the “Federal Farmer.” The Farmer had described distinctions
between the independent members of the natural democracy and the officeseeking
constituents of the natural aristocracy, but his analysis had been less vitriolic and more
measured. Drawing on seventeenth-century Harringtonian notions of deference, he had
presumed that the presence of an aristocracy was indeed quite natural: not all men were
created equal in talents or wealth, and the elite few could not help it if they were
“ambitious” for offices of distinction and profit. And although the Farmer’s natural
aristocracy was morally inferior to the natural democracy, they still constituted the most
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talented and educated portion of the American citizenry. But Thomas Paine’s aristocrats
and courtiers were venal to the very core of their being, and utterly bereft of any
redeeming merits or even useful skills; their presence in the body politic was simply a
cancerous blight. Agricola echoed Paine, and not the Farmer, throughout all of his
apoplectic denunciations of American aristocrats exacting their tribute in the form of
unearned salaries.
By the end of Washington’s first term, his administration’s critics had been
furnished with a new vocabulary for their dissent. “Aristocracy” could now refer not just
to a government in which the people were ruled by distinguished elites, but to one in
which the many were plundered by the pampered few. This intellectual development,
occurring simultaneously in various corners of American discourse, had a subtle yet
discernible influence on Americans’ conceptions of political patronage. It had already
become a hackneyed trope to mark out one’s rivals as officeseekers or placemen. But if
there really was an insidious aristocratic coup in the works, such accusations took on a
whole new meaning. To identify one’s opponent as a selfish expectant was to identify
him with an eternal minority of plundering aristocrats whose presence in the body politic
threatened not just the hard-earned wealth of American citizens, but also the very
exceptionalism of the republican experiment.

The Manichean Style in American Politics
Anti-administration writers were tactically shrewd in choosing to focus their
attacks on a vaguely defined “aristocracy.” Had they targeted the usual bogey of
“executive influence” at this time, they would have risked slandering the President
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himself, which would have been political suicide at a time when Washington was still
revered as the greatest and most incorruptible American of all. Hamilton, however,
enjoyed no such immunity and therefore had to endure all the slings and arrows of
oppositional polemics. The accusations against Hamilton were not entirely unfounded.
He had, after all, once insinuated that a little bit of executive “influence” might be good
for political stability.101 Now, as secretary of the treasury, he controlled by some
measures more than a thousand political appointments.102 Hamilton’s concentrated
influence over political patronage was, in oppositional writers’ minds, a time-sanctioned
recipe for despotism.
These concerns were not lost on the secretary of state, Thomas Jefferson, who had
come to despise his coworker’s never-ending schemes. Hamilton, for his part, saw
Jefferson as a profligate hypocrite. Jefferson insouciantly vindicated Hamilton’s
suspicions when he appointed Philip Freneau, editor of the anti-administration National
Gazette, to a clerkship in his own department. Hamilton was duly outraged by this
maneuver, which seemed to prove Jefferson’s own predilection for corruption. By this
point, relations between the two Secretaries had grown so caustic that Washington
himself felt obliged to intervene. “How unfortunate,” he wrote to Jefferson, “that whilst
we are encompassed on all sides with avowed enemies & insidious friends, that internal
dissentions should be harrowing & tearing our vitals.”103
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Washington’s plea for harmony within his cabinet elicited some of Jefferson’s
most passive-aggressive remarks. He was particularly bemused to learn that Hamilton
had complained about Freneau’s appointment, for Hamilton had – at least in Jefferson’s
eyes – already made patronage a key weapon in his own arsenal of bribery.
I have never enquired what number of sons, relations, and Friends of
Senators, representatives, printers or other useful partisans Colo. Hamilton
has provided for among the hundred clerks of his departments, the
thousand excisemen, customs house officers, loan officers &c. &c. &c.
appointed by him, or at his nod, and spread over the Union, nor could ever
have imagined that the man who has the shuffling of millions backwards
from paper into money & money into paper. from Europe to America, &
America to Europe, the doling out of Treasury secrets among his friends in
what time & manner he pleases, and who never slips an occasion of
making friends with his means, that such an one I say would have brought
forward a charge against me for having appointed the poet Freneau
translating clerk to my office, with a salary of 250 dollars a year.104
Washington had warned Jefferson that these internecine cabinet rivalries could ultimately
wreck the entire republican experiment.105 Jefferson, however, thought that the ruin of the
republic would be a fait accompli if he acquiesced to the Hamilton’s plans. Hamilton’s
whole system, he believed, had been “calculated to undermine and demolish the republic,
by creating an influence of his department over the members of the legislature.” Congress
had the power to enact sweeping laws for the sake of the “general welfare,” and Hamilton
now had “the means of corrupting” them with the public money and the public offices.
What then would stop Hamilton from tyrannizing the nation through his influence over
congressmen?106
Hamilton was used to fending off such accusations. A few months prior, his
resentments had conspicuously seeped into his “Vindication” of the funding system. He
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acknowledged that many Americans saw the entire system as nothing but a scheme for
increasing the number of taxes and tax-gatherers, thereby “increasing the number of
persons whose interest it is to promote the intentions good or bad of the existing
Administration” and thus “nourishing the pride insolence and power of a wealthy few.”
These attacks left Hamilton visibly chagrined, for he saw himself as the most
disinterested republican martyr of all. After all, he and his political allies had
“sacrificed… the interests of their families to the public zeal.” And “whenever the
necessity of resisting the machinations of the enemies of the public” would “permit them
to retire,” they would all “return poorer than they came into office,” having “to perform
under numerous disadvantages, the pursuits they before followed under every
advantage.”107
Hamilton perceived hypocritical demagogues everywhere he looked. Some
enemies he disparaged as men who had always despised the Constitution but were still
too proud to admit that it worked. Others he dismissed as those who simply wanted
offices and knew that oppositional rabble-rousing was the “surer road to popularity and
preferment.” But there was yet a third, more insidious class of evildoers whose motives
evidently left him perplexed. This “class of men” had, “either from desperate
circumstances” or “irregular ambition,” consistently busied themselves by sewing
discontent and unrest. “Every republic has at all times its Catilines and its Caesars,” he
mused. But even as he continued his pontification, Hamilton struggled to find any
coherent explanation for such men’s behavior.
Men of this stamp, while in their hearts they scoff at the principles of
Liberty, while in their real characters they are arbitrary persecuting
intolerant and despotic, are in all their harangues and professions the most
107
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zealous, nay if they are to be believed, the only friends to Liberty.
Mercenary and corrupt themselves, they are continually making a parade
of their purity and disinterestedness and heaping upon others charges of
peculation and corruption. Extravagant and dissipated in their own affairs,
they are always prating about public economy and railing at the
Government for its pretended profusion… Convinced that as long as order
and system in the public affairs can never be realized, they are constantly
representing the means of that order and system as chains forged for the
people. Themselves the only plotters and conspirators they are forever
spreading tales of plots and conspiracies. – Always talking of the
republican cause, and meaning nothing but the cause of themselves and
their party, virtue & Liberty constantly on their lips, framed usurpation
and tyranny in their hearts.”108
By now Hamilton was almost uncontrollably sputtering forth accusations of malice and
hypocrisy, but still could not discern any rational motives for his enemies’ restless
perversity. He was every bit as Manichean as Paine or Agricola, but not nearly as
comprehensive or cogent in his analysis of class tensions. In short, he could not
understand why any man of sound judgment and honest motives might not trust him with
his power.
Hamilton’s frantic accusations of hypocrisy were thinly veiled references to his
slaveholding coworker. It was not Jefferson, however, but Hamilton’s old cowriter,
James Madison, who first began to imagine the moral divisions within American society
as the basis not only for perpetual class conflict, but even for organized political parties.
Madison’s break with Hamilton has beggared historical analysis for decades, but
their diverging perspectives on political patronage certainly accelerated this schism. In
1787, they had both agreed that Congressmen should be eligible for executive
appointments the moment they vacated their seats in the legislature. This superficial
agreement, however, masked profoundly different ideological rationales. Hamilton on
numerous occasions had dropped innuendos to suggest that a Walpolean system of
108
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“executive influence” might ensure some much-needed harmony between the executive
and legislative branches of government; indeed, he had even cited traditional “Court
Party” thinkers like David Hume to make this point. Madison, on the other hand, simply
wanted to ensure that the nation’s most talented men would not have any disincentive to
serve in the legislature.109 He never openly refuted Hamilton’s Walpolean insinuations,
probably because he did not take them seriously. After all, Hamilton frequently
contradicted himself and dissembled whenever it was politically expedient, especially
during the ratification debates. But Hamilton and Madison in 1792 were no longer the
ingénue politicians they had been when they shared the nom de plume of “Publius.”
Hamilton was now arguably the second-most powerful man in the government,
commanding millions of dollars and an army of appointees. Madison was now a
Representative from a state whose citizens widely resented Hamilton’s entire funding
scheme. As a Virginian plantation owner, Madison could not help but share his fellow
Virginians’ suspicion that this New Yorker’s funding system would steer the government
toward the aggrandizement of financiers and manufacturers at the expense of honest
American farmers. Surrounded on all sides by more traditional Whigs – including, of
course, his friend and mentor Thomas Jefferson – Madison further suspected that
Hamilton was using the public patronage and public money to buy votes for his plans.110
Months before Hamilton penned his diatribes against the implacable enemies of
the republic, Madison had already begun to delineate the class rivalries in American
politics. Writing in Philip Freneau’s Independent Gazette in March 1792, he at first
singled out farmers as the class most naturally suited for republican government:
109
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The class of citizens who provide at once their own food and their own
raiment, may be viewed as the most truly independent and happy. They
are more: they are the basis of public liberty, and the strongest bulwark of
public safety. It follows, that the greater the proportion of this class to the
whole society, the more free, the more independent, and the more happy
must be society itself.
Sailors, detached from the land and prone to vice, were the most meretricious members of
society, while manufacturers had to be evaluated according to the usefulness of the items
they produced.111 But even manufacturers were categorically inferior to farmers, who
were less likely to lapse into any “servile” state of “dependence.”112 Madison’s
dichotomies did not include the “parasites and plunderers” elsewhere so ubiquitous in
oppositional discourse, but they played into a similar narrative. Farmers were more
legitimate members of republican society because they were the most “independent” and
self-reliant; all other groups fell somewhere on a spectrum of dependency and were
therefore both morally and politically subaltern. Madison’s description of the various
classes within society was effectively reducible to a binary separating the dependent from
the independent.
This Manichean undercurrent in Madison’s thought soon became more explicit.
Less than two weeks after he penned his odes to the nation’s farmers, Madison published
an article with the portentous title, “The Union: Who Are Its Real Friends.” The title
subtly belied Madison’s intent, however, as he was far more concerned with exposing the
union’s enemies. His dichotomy now became explicitly politicized. He claimed that
advocates for a national debt simply wanted to increase “the causes of corruption in
government,” and for good measure, he also condemned those who planned to establish a
hereditary order. Such men, he sententiously proclaimed, were not the “real friends” of
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the Union.113 A few weeks later, the editor Freneau devised a name for those eponymous
“real friends” when he penned an essay describing the “Sentiments of a Republican.”
Shortly thereafter, Freneau finally referred to this division by its correct name when he
acknowledged the existence of “two parties” in the nation.114
A few months later, while Jefferson was attempting to justify his appointment of
Freneau, Madison was again using Freneau’s Gazette to refine and elaborate on this
analysis of party lines in America. This time he endeavored to apply some historical
context to his “candid” discussion of political parties. Americans, according to Madison,
had already endured two party rivalries, first during the 1770s conflict with Britain and
again during the 1780s ratification debates. Both of those rivalries had reached their
natural expiration date and faded away. The newly emerging party divide would be more
durable, however, for it was founded upon “natural” divisions in society. One of the two
current parties consisted of those who were “partial to the opulent classes” and had
“debauched themselves into thinking that mankind are incapable of governing
themselves.” For such men, government “could only be carried on by the pageantry of
rank, the influence of money and emolument, and the terror of military force.” They
served “the few” and would accordingly scheme to narrow the power of government
“into fewer hands.” Echoing Paine, Madison identified members of the larger party as
those who believed “that mankind are capable of governing themselves,” seeing
“hereditary power as an insult to the reason and an outrage to the rights of man.”115
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Madison further insisted that the interests of the latter party were identical with
the interests of “the mass of the people,” whereas the interests of the former party aligned
with those of the factious few. The “republican party” was distinguished by its
“superiority of numbers,” its “decided” principles, and above all a “common sentiment
and common interest” that transcended its individual members’ “circumstantial and
artificial distinctions.” But the sheer breadth of the party’s constituency could also be a
political liability, for members of the smaller “antirepublican party” would be more adept
in the arts of collusion. They would draw strength from “the active and insinuating
influence” of “moneyed” men, and they would exploit superficial “prejudices” to pit
republicans against one another. The “Republican party” could only survive by
maintaining a resolutely united front in the face of these devious dividers and conquerors:
The Republican party, as it may be termed, conscious that the mass of the
people in every part of the union, in every state, and of every occupation
must at bottom be with them, both in interest and sentiment, will naturally
find their account in burying all antecedent questions, in banishing every
distinction than that between enemies and friends to republican
government, and in promoting a general harmony among the latter,
wherever residing, or however employed.116
Madison’s schema did not include the tribe of officeseekers who elsewhere
haunted the Antifederalist political imaginary, nor did it mention the spectral
“aristocracy” by name. But once again, his class analysis was perfectly congruent with
the wider narrative of a corrupt government aggrandizing the few at the expense of the
many. This, as we have seen, was an increasingly pervasive idea by 1792 – and, for many
likeminded writers, if not for Madison himself, patronage was an inextricable component
of this supposed plot against “the” American people. Hamilton’s funding system could be
imagined in a variety of ways: for Madison, it was a plot to make government beholden
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to its “opulent,” “moneyed” creditors; for others, it was an excuse to fund offices for
venal aristocrats; for Jefferson, it was both. Oppositional notions of corruption did not
always fixate upon the aristocrats and courtiers who drew wealth and power from federal
patronage, but such shibboleths could never be far from their minds.
Madison’s conception of party politics was a milestone. Here one must remember
that eighteenth-century Anglophone writers tended to use the word “party” as a pejorative
term for small, self-serving cabals. Edmund Burke had defended semi-official political
parties as necessary but provisional expedients; their function, for him, was to unite all
patriotic elites against a corrupt but temporary common foe. “When bad men combine,”
he had declared, “good men must associate.”117 Madison took this logic a step further by
suggesting that the “bad men” would never disappear, for their common class interest
was permanent and intractable. From there, it was easy to reason that the “good men”
would always have to maintain their association. This was a significant step toward the
notion that permanent party competition was not just inevitable but even necessary.
Crucially, however, Madison emphatically did not construe the permanence of the
two parties as evidence for their equal legitimacy. Only one of his two parties actually
represented “the masses of the people,” while the other spoke only for a self-serving,
aberrant fringe group. Only one of his parties embodied “republican principles” of selfgovernment – however those principles were defined – while the other espoused heretical
principles with no place in American politics. The party system, as envisioned by its first
expositor in 1792, could not be a system of different interest groups engaged in barter,
negotiation, and compromise. It would be a war, pitting the vigilant, principled defenders
of republican government against the privileged, selfish defenders of their own interests.
117
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Madison’s moral binary had significant consequences for the story of the
Jacksonian reformation. If politics was as simple as Madison claimed, quarter could be
neither asked nor given. If one and only one party could represent “the” people, then
acolytes of the enemy camp could not be treated with clemency. Self-proclaimed
republicans had to be vetted to ensure their devotion to the people’s republican
orthodoxy, while duplicitous courtiers and aristocrats had to be discerned and weeded
out. Hamilton may therefore have been right to identify his oppositional critics as bigoted
and despotic. For the next quarter-century at least, Madison and his fellow “Republicans”
would debate how strictly they would enforce these authoritarian standards. However
much they wavered over the years, this partisan absolutism would remain an intellectual
fixture for their political heirs. The Jacksonian Democrats of 1829 never doubted their
duty to cleanse the Augean stable, purge the chaff from the wheat, and separate the “real
friends” from the enemies of the republic.
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Chapter Four:
“The Sunshine of Executive Power”: Parties and Place-Seekers in the First
American Party System, 1793 – 1800

By the beginning of 1798, mutual animosity between the two parties had reached
such a fever pitch that the hostilities of 1792 seemed like amicable posturing in
comparison. The apparent ideological impasse between Washington’s Federalist
administration and the “Republican” opposition now seemed like a synecdoche of the
transatlantic battle between the forces of democracy and aristocracy; fittingly enough, the
two parties now found themselves debating whether the infant republic would allow itself
to be drawn into the ongoing European war. Comical though it may seem, however, at
least one Senator in 1798 was momentarily preoccupied by the threat of a monarchist
coupe being effected in America through the insidious use of political patronage.
As this Senator explained to a friend back home, the current President, John
Adams, had assumed the habit of “removing all those from office who differ with him in
politicks.” Now Federalists in Congress were defending this “lately introduced” system
of political coercion. With uncharacteristic understatement, the Senator noted that this
development was “no ideal thing.” Before finishing his letter, however, he launched into
a political manifesto:
[I]t is time that the American mind should be awakened from its Lethargy;
and view the true interest of his country, and I hope the present debate will
rouse them to reflect, who are the true friends to liberty and their country,
whether those, that wish to Extend Executive influence by discarding from
office every man who does not compell himself to think as the Executive
does or those that oppose that Execrable system – a system that is
bottomed upon A basis, that has for its object a change of Government,
which never can be brought about unless by some such stratagem. those
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that patronise this system, open every door to new and multifarious offices
by which they strengthen the Executive patronage. those who see the true
Interest of their country, wish to curtail the Expence of Government, by
doing away Every useless office. here then the parties are at issue and the
public mind must decide, which one are in the right.
The author’s verdict was slightly uncharitable. Although Adams was reluctant to appoint
any members of the opposition to federal offices, he had actively removed only a few of
his enemies. Inaccuracies and meandering prose aside, however, this letter provided a
succinct statement of the Jeffersonian worldview in 1798: the Federalists, simply put,
wanted to expand the executive’s already overwhelming influence by putting more
“useless” and expensive offices at his disposal, thus burdening the already over-burdened
taxpayer. It was in Americans’ “true interest” to check this development, but only the
voters could make the choice. Jefferson himself could hardly have said it better, although
he would undoubtedly have been more fastidious in matters of grammatical propriety.
The actual author was a thirty-year-old Tennessee Republican, Andrew Jackson.1
Subsequent chapters in this dissertation will explain how it came to pass that
Jackson found himself litigating the same ideological point three decades later. This
chapter looks at the broad intellectual context that shaped the worldview he first
articulated in 1798. For the young Tennessee senator was not a particularly sagacious or
original thinker; his words could have been uttered by any member of the Republican
opposition at almost any time in the late 1790s.2
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Between the end of Washington’s first term in 1793 and the end of Adams’s only
term in 1801, the oppositional party line had become clearer and more forceful. They had
never stopped fretting about the expensive, ever-swelling federal government of
“parasites and plunderers.” From 1793 onward, the Federalists’ ostensibly Anglophile
foreign policy would further fuel these concerns. “Republicans,” as oppositional
politicians came to avow themselves, would come to imagine that the republic was being
reconstituted into a monarchal court, replete with its own Augean stable of officeseeking
aristocrats. Continuing the line of inquiry that Antifederalists had commenced in 1787,
oppositional writers continued to imagine a society split between the eternal classes of
aristocratic parasites and “industrious” citizens, a bifurcation that allowed politicians like
Jefferson to dismiss all dissidents as self-interested, even un-American placemen.
Republican printers and politicians began to conceive politics as a form of warfare
between these two classes, adapting their own political personas to the image of the bold
and incorruptible soldier-martyr. Federalists, of course, found such narratives sublimely
ridiculous – and by the end of the decade, they felt they had ample proof of the
Republicans’ hypocritical ways.

of political economy. See Seth Cotlar, Tom Paine’s America: The Rise and Fall of Transatlantic
Radicalism in the Early Republic (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), chap. 4. All of these
groups were nevertheless united by their shared opposition to the Federalist administrations, so I have
chosen to group them all under the broad penumbra of “opposition” and “republicans,” terms that would
have resonated with the actors themselves. As this chapter will show, the overlaps between these different
groups were often much more profound than the disagreements, at least when they came to discussing the
matter of political patronage.
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Slouching toward Britain: Political Events and the Narrative of Corruption, 1793
- 1800
By 1793, most Americans seem to have agreed that it was only just to provide
some remuneration for services rendered.3 The problem was not that officers received
salaries, but that their salaries were simply too high for republicanism to bear. The
newspapers of 1793 were still filled with the usual complaints about burdensome taxes
being levied to funnel wealth out of hardworking Americans’ pockets and into the
grasping hands of slothful government employees. The American citizen was almost
always commended for his “industry,” the government officer almost always derided for
his desire to reap wealth without work. It grated the nerves of “the industrious and honest
artisan,” for instance, when he was forced to subsidize the presumptuous “aristocratic
faction.” High official salaries were presumably funded by “the industry of the citizens,”
thus allowing rulers to become the “plunderers of the people.”4 Matthew Lyon, a rising
star in Vermont’s state legislature, denounced a rival for allowing money to be “picked
out of the hard earnings of the industrious part of the community” and transferred into the
“idle hands” of ever-multiplying judicial officers.5 But the American bureaucracy
continued to swell in defiance of these complaints. The number of federal employees
nearly tripled between 1792 and 1801, the vast majority of them employed by the odious
Treasury Department.6
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In this age of revolution and the Rights of Man, complaints about patronage and
corruption could be heard emanating from various corners of the Atlantic World.
American newspapers reprinted, on an almost daily basis, English oppositional attacks on
“sinecures” in the mother country. One such handbill called for a new Parliament to
purge “that swarm of pensioners and placemen, who, like drones in a hive, devour the
honey for which the working bees have labored.”7 Another English reprint detailed a
ministerial scheme to wage wars as an excuse for raising taxes and multiplying offices,
thus augmenting executive influence.8 But if Great Britain furnished a cautionary tale,
revolutionary France provided an inspirational alternative. As France continued to enjoy
military triumphs, for instance, Thomas Greenleaf’s Argus proclaimed a victory over
“sinecure places” and “pensions.”9 And the Marquis de Lafayette, a hero of both
revolutions, was now toasted as “the HERCULES of LIBERTY” who would “cleanse the
Augean Stable of Monarchy.”10
Some Americans worried, however, that their own republic was slowly but surely
building its own Augean stables and borrowing the architecture from the British model.
The United States now had a public debt, for instance – and no one could forget how wily
British ministers had used a national debt to fund “swarms of officers.”11 According to
one oppositional writer, defenders of the Washington administration had encouraged
Americans “to copy after the preposterous government exercised by the influence of a
crown, through the medium of sinecures, pensions, and places during pleasure.”12 Events
in Europe fueled this perception. Prior to 1792, almost all Americans had supported the
7
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revolution in France.13 As the French veered into their more radical turn, however,
American conservatives had become overtly hostile. Federalists’ increasingly
conspicuous denunciations of French “democracy” inspired Jefferson and likeminded
citizens to defend and embrace the French Revolutionary lexicon. The term “democrat,”
rarely heard in American discourse before 1793, began to supplant the term “Whig” in
American republicans’ political vocabulary, while the archetypal “Tory” was gradually
replaced with the more sinister “aristocrat.” The Revolution itself became a litmus test for
political identification, and those who were not outspoken Francophiles soon found
themselves branded as “aristocrats.”14 And for many democratically inclined printers,
events in Europe furnished a lens through which Americans could view the Washington
administration, framing domestic events in the transnational language of democracy
versus aristocracy.15
Many Americans therefore would have been happy to assist their democratic
French cousins in the war against an aristocratic British adversary, but President
Washington would have none of it.16 In April 1793, he issued an executive proclamation
forbidding Americans from aiding or abetting either side in the European war. American
Francophiles were duly alarmed to see the President blocking efforts to aid their
republican brethren across the Atlantic; some of them construed this edict as proof of
Washington’s secret Anglophilia.17 James Madison, however, was more alarmed by the
constitutional implications of the President’s edict. If a President could unilaterally
13
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declare a state of peace, could he not also declare a state of war at any time it suited his
capricious pleasure? This was admittedly a rather hypothetical concern, but that did not
make it any less vital. Washington had opted for peace in this particular instance, but
most chief executives would likely incline toward war in order to engross further power.
Wars would provide Presidents with an excuse to multiply the “honors and emoluments
of office,” thus swelling executive influence to an overpowering level. If Americans did
not crush this precedent in its infancy, they would furnish future chief executives with a
frightful tool for expanding patronage.18
Madison’s concerns were still hypothetical in 1793, but thanks to Great Britain,
they soon became matters of more than academic urgency. Britons had never been
particularly respectful toward their prodigal American sons. As the wars in Europe
intensified, British contempt for American maritime rights grew correspondingly. By
early 1794, the British depredations became so severe that some Federalists in Congress
even proposed a provisional military force to meet the threat. Members of the opposition
had no love for the old British foes, but they were even more alarmed by the prospect of
an American “military establishment.” Jefferson’s protégé James Monroe, for instance,
worried that such an expansive military could potentially wield enough “patronage” to
“influence” the entire government. (It did not escape his calculations that Alexander
Hamilton would probably be the new “generalissimo.”)19 The Revolutionary War
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General Horatio Gates similarly fretted that the increase in military patronage might
“sink” America into “the Corruptions of the Mother Country!”20
In reality, the prospect of a “military establishment” was rather dim, as President
Washington preferred diplomacy. His pacific inclinations might have conciliated the antiwar critics had he not made one crucial misstep: the man he dispatched to negotiate a
treaty was John Jay, who already held an appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. Philadelphia’s Democratic Societies were quick to denounce this double
appointment as a worrisome abuse of executive patronage. If the President could offer
additional commissions to members of the judiciary, they warned, members of the latter
branch would soon become his “creatures.”21 It did not help Washington’s cause when
Jay returned the following year with a treaty that seemed embarrassingly deferential
toward Britain, further arousing suspicions about an Anglophile conspiracy gestating in
the bosom of the American government.22 As always, venal placemen held a central role
in this imaginary monarchist plot. Writing shortly after the treaty’s contents were
publicly revealed, a commentator in Vermont shrieked that the “revenue officers” and
“office hunters” were in league with stockholders to impose “royal domination and
20
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British despotism.”23 Washington signed the treaty anyway, and in doing so prevented –
or at least postponed – a potentially ruinous war with the mother country. But it only
antagonized the French, who – republican fraternité notwithstanding – redoubled their
own naval efforts to block American trade with Britain.
Washington soon retired to the shade of his own vine and fig tree, meaning that
John Adams entered office in March 1797 facing the most perilous diplomatic crisis in
American history. The French did not even seem amenable to diplomatic overtures; days
after Adams took the Presidential oath, he learned that the French government had
dismissed the American minister. When the frustrated new President encouraged
Congress to expand the American army, Republican Francophiles immediately began to
deconstruct the hidden motives behind his so-called “war speech.” Some members of the
opposition suspected that the real purpose of a war would be, as always, to expand
executive patronage – and certain Congressmen, they claimed, were eager to be
“patronized.”24
Adams’s efforts at peaceful diplomacy became mired in scandal when he
appointed his thirty-year-old son, John Quincy, as the first American Minister to Prussia.
In theory, the appointment was innocuous; John Quincy had already a post as Minister to
the Netherlands since 1794, meaning that his new position was nothing more than a
lateral transfer. Oppositional printers did not see it that way. A correspondent of
Benjamin Franklin Bache’s Philadelphia Aurora, for instance, declared that American
taxpayer dollars were being “appropriated to the sons and creatures of the President of a
British faction.” John Quincy’s new job seemed like nothing more than a sinecure, as
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trade with Prussia was allegedly too inconsequential to justify any diplomatic presence
there – and this was just one of the many new foreign commissions that President Adams
had signed. To make matters worse, the new diplomatic positions had been subsidized by
“A STAMP TAX!” – yes, repeated the author, “a stamp tax.” What could this be if not a
brazen imitation of the old English oppressors? And what purpose could these tax-funded
jobs serve beyond the gratification of all the “insects” who were “buzzing in the
sunshine” of Adams’s favor?25
The opposition’s concerns reached a boiling point in 1798 when Federalist
congressmen proposed a bill empowering Adams to create new diplomatic positions as
needed.26 John Nicholas of Virginia warned that such an expansion of the diplomatic
corps would only make it easier for the President to tempt members of the legislature
with lucrative post-term employments abroad – a dangerous power for any President, but
especially for one who was suspected of being a nearly sectarian party bigot. Nicholas
claimed, for instance, to have “proof” that Adams would only offer these appointments to
men who were “willing to sacrifice all independent opinions and bend at the shrine of
Executive wisdom.” In Nicholas’s vivid prognostication, no one was to be “initiated into
the mystery” of the administration’s “affairs” unless he passed “a test of belief in the
Executive infallibility”; offices would then be withheld from “all those who did not join
their confession of faith” in this sinister “new doctrine.”27 Nicholas was not the only
Congressmen to describe Adams’s patronage in terms of religious intolerance. Robert
Livingston of New York similarly envisioned a future in which the President would
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subject each appointee to a political “inquisition,” demanding “proof of his having
always acted in a certain way.”28
The bill ultimately passed in spite of these pleas, but Nicholas’s and Livingston’s
arguments soon became commonplace accusations in the Republican press. One paper
casually claimed in mid-1798 that the only qualification for an Adams appointee was that
he shared the President’s “principles,” an arrangement suitable only for the “sycophant
and flatterer.”29 The Vermont Gazette similarly spewed warnings that Adams’s partisan
patronage would open the door “for sycophants and unprincipled pimps and panders”
while simultaneously spoiling all “the fairest hopes of every Independent Democrat.”30
Rural Pennsylvanians denounced Adams for having made offices “the reward, not of
merit, but of servility.”31 The supplicant, almost effeminate nature of these appointees did
not make them any less of a threat. Numerous outlets, including the Aurora, described
officers under Adams’s sway as a well-disciplined, oppressive “phalanx.”32 And by 1799,
it seemed obvious that Adams would use war with France as an excuse to expand this
army of well-paid hirelings.33
Although Federalists were indeed reluctant to let members of the opposition hold
important offices, the logic behind such “proscription” was often innocuous in their own
minds. President Washington had begun taking political considerations into account for
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appointments as early as 1793, and with good reason. For one thing, there was always a
possibility that dissident federal officers would use their positions to undermine or
subvert administration policies.34 To appoint men whose “political tenets” were
“adverse” to the measures of the federal government would have been, in Washington’s
eyes, “a sort of political suicide.”35 When Adams assumed the office, he was similarly
reluctant to appoint any member of the opposition to office. His wife Abigail sometimes
even felt obligated to explain her husband’s rationale. She assured one acquaintance that
her husband was perfectly willing to appoint “Jacobins” if they were qualified for the
offices in question. Still, Abigail wrote, it was only prudent to prefer those who were
“friends to government and good order.” Really, she asked, “how stupid should that man
be thought in private Life who should put the care and oversight of his affairs into the
hands of such persons as he knew would counteract all his instruction and destroy all his
property?”36
From 1798 through 1800, with the prospect of a war with France looming
ominously on the horizon, Federalists’ disdain for the Republican opposition escalated
into outright paranoia. At least one polemicist warned that members of the American
Illuminati were trying to infiltrate public offices where they could carry out acts of
subterfuge, the better to lay Americans prostrate before radical France.37 And the
continuous onslaught of oppositional publications forced Federalists into an increasingly
defensive posture. Those unlucky few who accepted offices from Adams’s hand were
34
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destined to suffer various forms of “calumny and abuse,” as Abigail put it; under such
circumstances, a Federalist federal officer required extraordinary reserves of “integrity,”
not to mention faith in the purity of his own “motives.”38 In 1797, John Fenno’s Gazette
of the United States in 1797 openly condemned the “Tyranny of Democrats,” depicting
the opposition as a well disciplined “regular corps” formed “for the purposes of
persecution.” Echoing Burke’s 1770 call for good men to unite against combinations of
bad men, the author urged a “united effort” to “crush this formidable hydra.” Such an
effort would inevitably require them to meet military discipline with military discipline:
any man who could “muster up hardihood enough to walk uprightly” would first have to
“fortify himself against all the most desperate assaults, from batteries armed or manned
by the united force of the whole horde of ruffian-looking democrats.”39 Where
oppositional writers would rally the troops to be defiant in the face of an overpowering
establishment, Federalists encouraged one another to man the gates against insurgent
political guerillas.
In July 1798, Federalists in Congress passed the Sedition Act, which effectively
criminalized any anti-administration criticism. More, perhaps, than any other piece of
Federalist legislation, the Sedition Act validated every opposition charge about the
dangers of encroaching executive patronage. Describing the prosecution of one
prominent fellow journalist, James Callender explained how Adams’s control over
patronage made the Act even more of a threat for oppositional printers. As Callender
noted, the Federal judges who tried sedition cases were often ambitious for higher
appointments, which Adams alone could bestow. Moreover, the district marshal who
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selected the jurors was also appointed by, and therefore beholden to, the Chief Executive.
What chance did an independent and patriotic printer have?40 By 1800, Benjamin
Franklin Bache’s Aurora was condemning Federalists’ “spirit of proscription” against
“every man who would not sacrifice his principles and free right of opinion to their
party.”41
It was far from clear, however, whether these persecuted Republican printers had
popular opinion on their side. Francophile newspapers were now hemorrhaging
subscribers and money. Facing an overtly hostile government and potentially devastating
circulation loss, some printers after 1798 began to resituate their attack on Federalist
patronage as a vintage American tradition.42 New England writers began publishing
under pseudonyms like the “Old Soldier” or the “plain Countryman,” monikers that
communicated patriotic simplicity rather than visionary universalism. And they insisted
that the epithets “Federalist and Jacobin” were simply re-brandings of the older terms
“Tory” and “Whig.” These writers counted themselves in the latter camp, which had
traditionally opposed high taxes, high salaries, and the proliferation of “lucrative offices.”
And they explicitly denied that their party’s principles had changed or evolved at all since
1776, thus tethering their anti-patronage movement to a nostalgic revolutionary discourse
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while implicitly distancing themselves from the more incendiary aspirations of the
French Revolution.43 “A Freeman” who opposed the “placemen and Court dependants”
similarly insisted that the “republican party are not Frenchmen but Americans.”44
Federalists had simply invented the shibboleth of “French influence” as an excuse to
concoct a war and thus establish “a government of patronage and monarchy,” the better
to indulge the “Office Hunters” and the “British faction.”45
Whether or not American democrats held fast to their ostensible French allies,
they could at least take solace in the reliable consistency of the common enemy – Great
Britain, with its despotic kings dispensing expensive sinecures among craven courtiers,
and its sycophantic apostles spreading the gospel of corruption throughout the new world.
She was an enemy who could be shared by the radical economic egalitarian who hoped to
redistribute property and the moderate Republican who merely wanted to end
monarchy.46
The old complaints about high salaries had now had been integrated into a more
systematic theory of corruption. The officers’ opulent paychecks were more than
occasional burdens on the taxpayer’s checkbook: they were the telltale harbingers of a
royalist coup; they were the bribes that built the army of executive despotism; they were
the lubricant in the machine of the American court. John Dickinson had articulated a
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similar theory to describe the British ministry and its far-flung placemen in the 1760s;
Antifederalists, and most especially the Federal Farmer, had seen the blueprint for a
similar plan in the text of the American Constitution; and “Agricola” in 1791 had seen
the writing on the wall in Hamilton’s funding system, the self-evident omen of an
American court system. By 1800, all these conspiracy theories had fused into a
mainstream party line of Democratic Republican thought. This idiom of corruption had
become ubiquitous in screeds against the Adams administration.

“The Bulk Below” and the “Surface-Level” Seekers: Political Patronage and the
Creation of the American Other
Jefferson and his allies were not ashamed of their status as an oppositional party;
indeed, they positively reveled in the role of heroic patriots battling an entrenched
establishment. But even if their oppositional self-identification conferred a certain
charismatic benediction on all their efforts, it also presented a potentially troubling
problem. If they were the champions of the people and their enemies were the enemies of
republicanism itself, then how could one explain the Federalists’ ability to win elections?
How indeed could one explain all the evidence of heterodoxy that could be found in
every pro-administration newspaper? How, in short, could the majoritarian Democratic
Republicans of the 1790s account for the indisputable fact of their being an almost
consistent minority in Congress prior to 1799?47 Oppositional thinkers obliquely
addressed these questions throughout all their correspondence and publications. Their
baseline political narrative of a court conspiracy ultimately provided its own logic of
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opposition: the enemies of the opposition represented nothing more than the beneficiaries
and expectants of court patronage. Those enemies’ ideas simply did not to be addressed,
for they were not ideas at all but merely the rhetorical clothing of unprincipled venality.
Thomas Jefferson was utterly dismissive in his attitude toward Americans who
opposed the French Revolution. Even after the execution of Louis XIV, he insisted that
“99 in an hundred of our citizens” supported the cause of France. The country, he wrote
to his friend William Short, was “entirely republican” except for that “little party” of
enemies who wanted to use the constitution as “a stepping stone to monarchy.”48
Corresponding with a French acquaintance in May 1793, Jefferson acknowledged that the
nation had its share of “aristocrats and monocrats,” but insisted that they were a
superficial collection of men who merely floated “on the surface.”49 When President
Washington issued his proclamation forbidding any intervention in France, Jefferson only
doubled down on his claim that the American people were all Francophiles. The “natural
aristocrats,” “paper men,” and British-connected merchants might disagree, he told
Madison, but such men were simply “old tories” opposed to “every other possible
description of our citizens.”50 Madison hardly needed to hear this assurance; as we saw in
chapter 3, he had already come to draw his own lines separating the “real friends” from
the hidden enemies of the union. But Jefferson, more than Madison, came to recognize
that political patronage had helped to create this division between the faithful majority
and the infidel minority. “The main body of our citizens,” he wrote to Phillip Mazzei in
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1796, remained stalwartly “true to their republican principles”; among his list of enemies
Jefferson mentioned “all the officers of government” and “all who want to be officers.”51
By the time that Jefferson wrote those words, his Manichean view of society had
become mainstream. Jay’s Treaty had prompted oppositional newspapers to identify
Federalists as a fringe cabal opposed to the otherwise unanimous American people.
“There appears to be but one sentiment with regard to [the treaty],” wrote one observer:
“a proper resentment against their representatives as apostates to liberty, and connivers at
a creeping aristocracy; the powers of which they hope to share.”52 Those who disagreed
could be written off as either placemen or place-seekers. As one writer put it, “the
multitude in Philadelphia” had steadfastly opposed the treaty regardless of how much the
capital’s “flattering placemen” extolled its virtues.53 Other writers derided the treaty’s
defenders as “seekers after the loaves and fishes,” or as “office hunters and such like
butterflies, always fluttering in the sunshine of executive power.”54
For their part, the Federalists had always suspected that Republican politicians
were really closeted officeseekers who trumped up oppositional claims for appearance’s
sake. As early as 1794, for instance, New York’s Daily Advertiser dismissed Hamilton’s
assailants as “the seekers after his office, and their sycophants.”55 These noisy
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demagogues did not actually care about principles; they were merely jealous, and a few
lucrative appointments would be enough to placate them if the Administration was
willing to stoop to such tactics. As one Massachusetts versifier put it:
While seekers and pimps at Congress are railing
We’ll treat their aspersions with scorn and neglect;
A post or a place once obtain’d, and their wailing
Would change – and all measures engage their respect.56
It duly irritated Federalist when these democratic charlatans claimed to represent the
unanimous will of “the people.” If anything, it seemed to them that the opposition
represented the factious minority.57 Such pests could only “claim a general concurrence
of the people,” wrote Edward Carrington, because they were vociferous and conspicuous
and no one bothered to refute them in public.58 A sardonic commentator in the
Philadelphia Gazette repeated this argument in the form of a rhetorical question. “[W]ho
are the people of America,” he asked, “if 2 or 3 outlandish Office-seekers and a meeting
in the State-House yard, or a Democratic club are not.”59 Federalists, like Republicans,
drew their own distinctions between the mere “Seekers” and “the GREAT BODY OF
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THE PEOPLE.”60 The noisome anti-administration critics were, in a Massachusetts
paper’s words, simply “intriguing and office-hunting defamers” – quite unlike the
“industrious” and contented American citizenry.61
By 1795, these fraudulent oppositional seekers seemed to be forming Democratic
Societies all over the country, and Federalists were alarmed by these cult-like
associations’ effect on American politics. Boston’s “Jacobin club,” for instance,
supposedly commanded a large army of voters, and they were known to “denounce”
those who opposed their “usurpations” as being “unworthy the honorable appellation of
American citizens.”62 The emerging Republican Party seemed equally intolerant. Three
years before Adams was attacked for using patronage to enforce political orthodoxy, a
New York Federalist made similar accusations about the oppositional party, claiming that
the group’s leaders would demand that every candidate “make a confession of his
political faith, as a man would of his religious creed who asks admission to a particular
church; and the faith must be orthodox, that is, it must correspond with the opinions of
the party that is to support him.” These sectarian demands were, of course, just so much
cant. Once in office, the “democratic tyrants” would dole out offices among their friends
just as their predecessors had done.63
Whether the Federalists were right to suspect that Republicans were all
hypocritical officeseekers, they were certainly right to diagnose Republicans’ intolerance
60
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for other perspectives. Neither Jefferson nor his supporters ever conceded that there
might be honest reasons for disagreement on core republican tenets. Rather than accept
that the American public had been swayed by the Federalists’ arguments, Jeffersonians
simply assumed that the public had fallen victim to a sort of temporary insanity. One of
Madison’s correspondents conceded in 1797 that “the popular current” had inclined
toward Federalism in some places, but he blamed this momentary deviancy on enemy
pamphleteers who exploited “the passions of an honest, but delud[ed] people.”64 The
prospect of a war with France made many Americans’ suspicious of the Francophile
Democratic Republicans, but Virginians never lost their sang-froid; even if the “violent
war-mania” had “disordered the brains of so many of the good people of this country,”
the Alexandria Times could calmly insist that “a little reflection’ would return them to
“the paths of virtue” and the principles of 1776.65 Jefferson himself repeated this mantra
in numerous letters. “The spirit of 1776,” he claimed, lived on in the “essentially
republican” “body of the American people,” whose constituents had simply “been the
dupes of artful maneuvres”; “time and truth” had already “dissipated the delusion, &
opened their eyes.”66 Even citizens of New England, that incorrigible stronghold of
Federalist heresy, had never truly left the Democratic Republican fold but had simply
fallen into “a temporary phrenzy” after 1798.67
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It would be tempting to read Jefferson’s language as an early manifestation of the
“marketplace of ideas” – the notion that truth will ultimately win out as long as the
majority are freely left to choose among the different ideas presented to them. Jefferson
certainly never doubted that the majority of the people would choose rightly as long as
they were not hindered or deceived. But in order for Jefferson and the Democratic
Republicans to believe that the people would always choose rightly, they had to convince
themselves that the people would never be interested in experimenting with other
perspectives. If democracy chose other men, it was simply a fluke. If “the people”
conferred their blessing on the other party, it did not mean that the other party had
acquired democratic authority; it merely meant that the other party was more skilled in
the arts of sophistry and deception. In effect, Jefferson and his allies had to invent public
opinion not as something dynamic and supple, but as something immutably and eternally
pro-Jeffersonian. This provided Jeffersonians with a way to account for the people’s
disagreement without truly accepting it.68
This narrative would have been incomprehensible without the corresponding
narrative of corruption. According to this narrative, patronage, along with the Bank and
funding system, endowed the Federalists with their coercive power. But if anything, the
Federalists’ manifest political strength gave the opposition a more formidable rhetorical
power. The idea of corruption allowed Jeffersonians to create a political adversary
existing beyond the pale, a minority sect of officeseekers and speculators who were not
part of “the people” at all. And as we shall momentarily see, oppositional thinkers
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painstakingly delineated the character of the patronage-dependent aristocrat as something
palpably foreign to the character of the true American citizen.

The “Labouring Citizen” and the Lazy Seeker
Newspaper readers in 1793 would have been familiar with “the composition of an
immoral character.” In one writer’s words, such a man could be recognized by his
combination of ostentatious tastes and limited means; his absence of “honesty, honor,
incorruptibility, or decision”; and a general spirit of “effrontery” that made him readily
distinguishable from “the diffident men of merit.” Most dangerously, the immoral man’s
utter self-absorption would always compel him to “advocate the interests of his
purchasers” at the expense of the public.69 Such men were thought to be everywhere. An
anonymous correspondent warned President Washington in 1794 that the unprincipled
advocates of “aristocracy” were now “fluttering around the blaze of power,” slowly but
surely insinuating their way into the “court calendar” and thereby blocking disinterested
republicans’ hopes for advancement. Similar admonitions were repeated in the papers.
Echoing George Mason’s earlier warnings about the danger of high salaries, the
“Greenmountain Boy of Vermont” forecasted a plague of “office fishers” who had “no
other motive in undertaking to serve their country than the alluring bait of wealth” – quite
unlike the true patriots who only asked for a modest compensation.70 A South Carolinian
writer predicted that high salaries would draw undignified and desperate men, and the
President would soon be “flattered and courted by every vile sycophant.”71
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As Americans grew suspicious of the Washington administration, however, the
proverbial officeseeker came to appear less as the infiltrator who cunningly exploited the
well-meaning President’s credulity, and more as the willing co-conspirator in a
monarchist plot.72 For the officeseeker’s sheer amorality made him a tractable and useful
minion for Federalist grandees. Jefferson in 1795 claimed that the Federalist enemy’s
cause was being buttressed by a “numerous and noisy tribe” of “Office hunters” who
were “willing to give up principles” for place.”73 He was not the only person to suspect as
much. In Thomas Greenleaft’s Argus, “Warren” wrote about a “very general” class of
men who were willing to “pin their opinion upon the sleeve of patronage, and stand ready
to uphold any system, or any base men or measures, that will place them within the grasp
of post, place, or vain and empty distinction.”74 These depictions of the office-seeking
opportunist hewed closely to the 1760s template of the “placeman” – the mercenary of no
fortune or principles who hired out his services to the highest bidder. The John Adams
who had railed against Thomas Hutchinson’s hirelings in 1774 would have immediately
recognized such a man.
But other writers, building on lines of sociological analysis previously expounded
by the Federal Farmer and “Agricola,” realized that the greater threat came not from
indolent officeseeking beggars, but from the affluent aristocrats whose standing and
fortune depended upon political patronage. Agricola’s 1791 writings about the indolence
of office-hoarding aristocrats, for instance, were reprinted in June 1794.75 Three months
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later, a South Carolina writer echoed the Federal Farmer when he described class tensions
between an aristocratic, officeseeking low country, and an egalitarian, simple high
country. “One is accustomed to expence, the other to frugality,” he wrote. “One will be
inclined to numerous offices, large salaries, and expensive government. The other, from
the moderate fortunes of the inhabitants, and their simple way of life, will prefer low
taxes, small salaries, and a very frugal establishment.”76 Another South Carolina paper
reprinted a piece from Bache’s General Advertiser – soon to be rechristened the Aurora –
complaining that the federal excise tax unfairly burdened “the deserving and industrious
part of the country” in order to pay salaries for men of “ wealth, luxury, and indolence”;
the latter class, moreover, planned to monopolize the “patronage of government, without
contributing a farthing to its support.”77 By the end of the decade, as political patronage
become a centerpiece of the Republican platform, the Federal Farmer’s analysis of the
indolent “natural aristocracy” of sinecure-seekers could be quoted, without comment, in
various New England newspapers. No comment was needed. Although the words had
first been printed in 1788, they now read like any other oppositional polemic of the late
1790s.78
By that point, some oppositional writers had developed even more comprehensive
anthropological understandings of the eternal aristocracy, arguing that all societies would
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always be blighted by the plague of an ostentatious but indolent few who thrived on the
patronage of despots. A 1799 piece from Boston’s Constitutional Telegraph elaborated
on this theory in magisterial detail:
In every country there are beings so abandoned and so base, that they
would rather hug the fetters of Slavery, provided they were gilded, rather
than enjoy the rights and privileges of Freemen – Such men would fawn at
the feet of authority, and perform the lowest drugery [sic] of sycophants,
to acquire favor and reward.
Why do so many prefer Royal or Aristocratic to Democratic or Republican
Government? Because under the former kinds there is greater prodigality
and ostentation than under the latter kinds. Royal or Aristocratical
governments adopt great parade and support numbers of useless, idle
drones under the denominations of placemen or pensioners. The public
treasury is divided among the most worthless, proud, and vicious orders in
the community. Frugality is despised, and extravagance accounted good
policy, because it begets and retains a number of partisans and supporters;
but Republican governments have few charms for the idle or profligate.
The equalization of its citizens, disgust proud and vain characters, who
having acquired inherited property wish for honors and distinctions.
The frugality of such forms of government affords few sinecures and
fewer pensions for intriguing, needy men… To obtain a share of the public
plunder is the object of the courtier and the price of his prostitution.79
“Democritus” went a step still further by depicting the elite place-seekers as an early
symptom of globalization. For this writer, global trade had allowed the “Asiatic plant of
aristocracy” to be transported into Europe and eventually into the new world, where it
had taken root and spread the tendrils of corruption throughout society. “Is there not a
class in America, who… always panting after pre-eminence, endeavor continually to
spread corruption among the people”? He continued:
See them sighing after the pageantry of an Eastern or European court, full
of reverence for a titled thing, and ready to sell their own country for a
mock star or a disgraceful pension… What kind of men are those in
authority who are ever ready to lay additional taxes to the people, to
increase public officers and salaries, who object to every measure for the
79
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laboring part of the community, and who look on the poor as unworthy of
the right of voting at elections?
Such men were “most clearly, aristocrats.”80
Whether a natural aristocrat feeding off the patronage of a despot or merely an
acquisitive social climber prostituting himself for a position of eminence, the archetypal
officeseeker could always be recognized by his laziness and his dependency, qualities
quite different from those of the true, industrious American citizen. One opponent of the
land tax, for instance, could be found in 1798 addressing his arguments not to “the seeker
after the loaves and fishes of government,” but rather to “the independent citizen, who
earns his own loaves and fishes.”81 Numerous other writers continued to develop the
time-sanctioned theme of indolent seekers versus industrious taxpayer. As one
Kentuckian explained in a widely reprinted letter against the military establishment, the
republic was in thrall to a class of men who would do anything to avoid work:
Office, lucrative office, is the point to which all their actions are carrying
them. It is astonishing to hear of the immense number with you who
expect to be provided for by the government; the number of those who do
work would not be sufficient to support those who wish to live without it.
Brought up in idleness, they know not what to betake themselves to; labor
they will not, and to beg they are ashamed: their whole dependance is
therefore, on receiving provision from government.
Such men were eager “to sell their birthrights for a mass of porrage.” They would not
scruple to support measures that would create more offices and “impoverish the people.”
Many of the Adams administration’s supporters, then, were just pathologically averse to
any sort of real labor.82
80

Constitutional Telegraph, October 5, 1799. Reprinted in Bee, November 6, 1799.
Independent Chronicle, October 18, 1798.
82
Extract of letter printed in Aurora, May 1, 1799. This, as usual, was not an isolated example. That same
year, “A Friend to Peace” used similar language to denounce supporters of the war as the “IDLE AND
DISSOLUTE.” More so than other writers, the “Friend to Peace” regarded the officeseekers as a class of
insignificant, “bankrupt” men, rather than wealthy aristocrats. Independent Chronicle, January 7, 1799.
81

171

This natural antipathy between the independent citizenry and the dependent
seekers ultimately provided a foundation for Jefferson’s faith that the people, in the end,
would always side with his own cause. The fundamental issue of the 1800 party contest,
as he saw it, was whether the “monarchal” executive branch would be allowed to
dominate the republican legislature. There would, he acknowledged, always be
“differences of opinion” on the more superficial points of contention, such as the
“artificially” excited foreign policy dilemmas. But now that the Quasi-War and all its
attendant “temporary panics” were finally subsiding, Americans could focus again on the
essential questions of monarchal versus republican government. And whenever the
people turned their attention to this basic issue, Jefferson argued, self-interest would
incline them toward republican principles. A strong executive could only be maintained
by “immense patronage, by multiplying offices, by making them very lucrative, by
armies, navies, &c.” Under a monarchal government, then, the “labouring citizen” would
be “compelled” to toil & sweat for useless pageants,” a very disagreeable state of affairs
for every taxpaying American. The “labouring citizen” therefore could not help but
oppose a government of patronage.83 Because of their ingrained distaste for the expenses
of corruption, the people could not help but be Jeffersonian.
Jefferson’s remarks, uttered at the height of the 1800 Presidential contest,
provided a quintessential articulation of the oppositional worldview. The root problem of
politics was an intractable conflict between those who paid taxes and those who received
official salaries. This basic idea had been expressed decades earlier in John Dickinson’s
denunciation of the cringing placeman, and again in the Federal Farmer and subsequent
writers’ depictions of the officeseeking class. And the officeseekers’ foil remained static
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and unchanging: “the people.” In all of these attacks on executive patronage, the
American citizenry were constructed as being, first and foremost, taxpayers –
independent in their circumstances, industrious and frugal in their habits, and protective
of their money. Their eternal foes, whether impecunious scoundrels or affluent natural
aristocrats, were always constructed as dependent, lazy, and venal seekers. Jeffersonians’
image of the American citizen thus allowed them to invent the ultimate internal enemy,
granting absolute legitimacy to one party while categorically withholding it from the
other. More even than the French Revolution, this seemingly mundane matter of political
patronage spurred the creation of a Manichean, essentially proto-populist idiom of
American politics. And that idiom became, in effect, the lingua franc of the two-party
system in the early republic.

“Fellow Labourers in the Path of Persecution”: The Militant Opposition Theme
The papers of March 1798 carried a bit of news that ought to have been
momentous, but instead passed relatively unnoticed, relegated as it was to the second
page of New York’s Gazette. It was the obituary for John Wilkes, who had finally
shuffled off his mortal coil at the age of 71. The author recalled Wilkes’s legendary
“attack upon the Bute faction, which endeared him to the People, and drew down the
persecution of the Crown,” “his spirited perseverance with regard to the Middlesex
election,” and, of course, all “the duels he fought.” These “bold and popular acts of his
earlier life” were all well known. But Wilkes’s patriotic cache had steadily dropped
during the past quarter-century. As the obituary explained, Wilkes had eventually
received a lucrative chamberlainship and ultimately outgrew his earlier professions of
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patriotic idealism. “After Wilkes was provided for,” the author noted, “he gradually
forgot his patriotism. The Court was glad to quite [sic] him, and no man was more fond
of the enjoyment of life in quiet.” The story ended in tragi-comic bathos, as Wilkes
devolved into “a Curtier” [sic] before fading into irrelevance. In an ironic final line, the
obituary noted that Wilkes’s well-compensated chamberlainship would now be the object
of covetous competition. It was an ignominious coda for the once-defiant provocateur of
British politics. Wilkes’s only legacy, it seemed, was his sinecure.84
In retrospect, John Wilkes’s fall from grace seems to have foreshadowed
difficulties that members of the American opposition would face once they assumed
power. Were they really just the “Outs” clamoring to become the “Ins” so they could
enjoy the perks of power and patronage themselves? Once they assumed places of
importance within the political establishment, would they not commit the same sins as
those they displaced? The more circumspect Jeffersonians were raising these questions as
early as 1798. John Taylor, the most systematic of the Virginia Republicans, channeled
Catharine Macaulay’s refutation of Edmund Burke when he noted that a mere change in
personnel would not be enough to end corruption. “Did the British people ever gain by a
change of ministry?” he rhetorically asked. No, he answered: what the American people
truly needed was a comprehensive “reformation” in the laws of government.85 Despite
Wilkes’s cautionary example and Taylor’s prudent admonitions, however, it seems that
few members of the oppositional persuasion had any doubts about their own
incorruptibility.
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Many Americans already cherished the image of the “suffering patriot” whose
political principles could not be purchased, an image they contrasted with that of the
venal courtier whose loyalties were as ephemeral as his salary. As party politics became
more divisive, however, oppositional writers developed a more militant conception of the
suffering patriot. Their image of the republican hero came to resemble the John Wilkes of
old: a defiantly suffering patriot, ascetically immune to both the lure of patronage and the
terrors of power. By the end of the decade, both middling printers and elite politicians
would assume this persona for their own ends.
It fell to Vicesimus Knox, an English Anglican priest and polymath intellectual, to
systematize the virtues of defiance into a cogent theory of political action. His 1795 tome,
The Spirit of Despotism, has been almost completely forgotten today, and made no splash
whatsoever in his native England, where Knox deliberately suppressed any publication of
the work. But one stray copy found its way to the United States, without the name of the
author attached. And once that copy fell into the hands of Philadelphia printers, it became
a sensation.86
Philadelphia’s oppositional printers seem to have embraced it as a republican
catechism at the time. The moment it appeared in that city’s bookstores, the treatise was
praised in Benjamin Franklin Bache’s Aurora and advertised by the Irish-born publisher
Mathew Carey, who repeatedly recommended it to Jefferson’s notice.87 Although Knox
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had written this tract with British politics in mind, Bache quickly recognized that its
general themes were equally “applicable” to the United States.88 He soon published a
lengthy extract from its introduction, noting that “its language” ought to be a source of
inspiration for “many patriotic publishers in both hemispheres.” The language of this
extract presented the author, Knox – and, by Bache’s implication, the patriotic publisher
– as a man who fearlessly spoke truth in the presence of “patronage and power,” refusing
either to fawn for an office or cower before threats, heedless of any thought for his own
well-being:
I am certain, that in attempting to promote the happiness of man, without
serving any party, or paying court to any individual, I am not studying my
own interest. On the contrary, I am well aware that my very subject must
give offence to those who are possessed of power and patronage… I
certainly sacrifice all views of personal advantage to what appears to me
the public good; and flatter myself that this alone evinces the purity of my
motive… I pretend not to aspire at the honour of martyrdom; yet some
inconveniences I am ready to bear patiently, in promoting a cause which
deeply concerns the whole of the present race, and ages yet unborn. I am
ready to bear patiently the proud man’s contumely, the insult of rude
ignorance, the sarcasm of malice, the hired censure of the sycophantic
critic, (whose preferment depends on prostitution both of knowledge and
conscience,) and the virulence of the venal newspaper. It would be a
disgrace to an honest man not to incur the abuse of those who have sold
their integrity and abilities to the enemy of their country and the human
race… Truth will ultimately prevail, even though he who uttered it should
be destroyed.89
Two months later, Bache printed another extended extract from Knox’s work,
once again selecting a passage that emphasized patriots’ duty to resist the terrors of
persecution. The path for patriots was strewn with perils, warned Knox:

Jefferson in 1803 that he had been reading a lot lately, and noted in passing that John Adams had taken
“‘the Spirit of Despotism’ for his guide - & alas! ruined himself to his country.” Demaree to Jefferson, May
30, 1803, TJP: MS: 40, 452. This may have been an allusion to Knox’s work, which detailed the nature of
conspiracies against liberty.
88
Aurora, December 21, 1795. Emphasis added.
89
Extract printed in Aurora, December 24, 1795.

176

Every engine of artifice and terror will be used to suppress such Virtue:
but the friend of man and of his country will defy persecution, fines,
imprisonment, and deaths, in attempting, by every lawful and rational
means, to push back against the gigantic strides of encroaching despotism,
more destructive of happiness than an earthquake or pestilence.
Such language anticipated the real persecution that printers like Bache would later face
under the 1798 Sedition Act. But even without the terrors of censorship, the executive’s
power over patronage ensured that patriots would always have to contend with an army
of merciless minions. For the “Court” had “an opportunity of gratifying, in a thousand
different ways, both secretly and openly, the most prevalent and violent passions of
human nature.” There would always be “artful men” whispering in the ears of a “wicked
prince,” encouraging him to expand his own power.
The more the power of the prince is augmented, the greater will be the
emoluments, the more brilliant the distinction of the courtier… There is
always, therefore, a set of men (to whom pomp and vanity are the chief
good) who are constantly endeavouring to add glory and greatness to the
orb from which they derive their own lustre . . . So many advantages, do
the possessors of power enjoy for its exertion, in all countries, where
courts have influence, that the people, however great their numbers, are
scarcely a match for its subtle contrivances, its false alarms, its bribes, its
spies, its informers, its constructive treasons, its military force, its
superstitious terrors.90
All these terrors provided a context for Knox’s own authorial persona: the defiant man
who despised both the promises of patronage and the threat of poverty. If Paine’s Rights
of Man had urged readers to contemplate and acknowledge the absurdities of court
government, Knox’s Spirit of Despotism was a call to heroic action against those courts.

90

Extract printed in Aurora, February 17, 1796, 3. This extract was reprinted in 1800, without crediting
Knox, as “Extract,” American Mercury, June 19, 1800. The advertisement ran from June 20 through June
30 continuously. It was also advertised in New York Weekly Museum, October 22, 1796; Charleston City
Gazette, April 11, 1796; Columbian Centinel, September 17, 1796; New-Hampshire Gazette, October 15,
1796; Centinel of Freedom, February 15, 1797; Bee, October 18, 1797; Savannah Columbian Museum,
January 23, 1798. The Aurora resumed the advertisements on December 22, 1796, a year or so after it came
out, with some list of other items including Paine’s Age of Reason, Volney’s Laws of Nature, Barlow’s
Advice to the Privileged Orders. These advertisements resumed through January 30, 1797.

177

Republican printers found meaning in Knox’s work, which circulated widely from
1795 to 1797. Perhaps he inspired the printers to act more defiantly; perhaps he simply
articulated, in the most rousing terms, a worldview they already cherished. Based on the
attention that Bache and other publishers lavished on this particular text, one thing, at
least, is clear: even before John Adams became President and commenced his alleged
policy of partisan persecution, these printers had already primed themselves to defy all
the “court” forces of power and patronage in America.
By 1798, defiant speakers of truth began to appear in the pages of numerous
oppositional papers. “Lysander,” writing in the New York Time Piece, penned his antiwar essay in the form of a letter to the President himself, and – in a melodramatic flourish
– he even described his self-assumed epistolary persona in the third person.
Unaccustomed to the servile arts and little intrigues of a courtier, he
disdains the language of adulation… Regardless of the etiquette and
formality bestowed by sycophants, who prefer your patronage to your
friendship, he will not descend to court your favor by servility and
flattery… With the freedom worthy of an independent citizen, he will
speak to you in firmness the voice of truth and sincerity.
“Lysander” expected his bold language to have a talismanic effect, as “Monarchs”
accustomed to flattery would naturally “start back with horror from the general language
of candor.”91 In a similar tirade in the Richmond Observatory, “Cassius” – borrowing his
pseudonym from the Roman who organized the assassination of Julius Caesar – depicted
his party as a band of patriots who could not be swayed by “the frowns of a corrupt
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administration,” choosing instead to speak “boldly” against those “courtly sycophants of
unconstitutional power.”92 “Paetus Thrasea” – taking his chosen nom de plume from
another Roman, this one an avowed enemy of the Emperor Nero – similarly boasted that
he did not care if his defense of the constitution provoked “the frowns of the powerful.”93
By mid-1798, of course, these pugilistic writers had more to worry about than the
monarchists’ facial expressions. Jefferson, as a party figurehead who distanced himself
from the partisan press, had nothing to fear from placemen except their pens.94 But for a
writer like “Manlius,” being an outspoken critic of the Federalists meant that he could not
hope to enjoy any political office. As “Manlius” knew and acknowledged, Adams’s
patronage would always be “squandered” upon sycophants.95 The most dangerous
weapon in the Federalist arsenal, however, was the 1798 Sedition Act. Bache himself
quickly – and, no doubt, intentionally – fell victim to the draconian act’s provisions.
Bache’s defiance of the Sedition Act fit a larger pattern of selfless defiance in his
career as a printer. His open hostility toward the Washington administration precluded
him from receiving any government contracts, and cost him countless subscribers;
moreover, the Republican Party leadership offered him very little in the way of financial
assistance. Rival Federalist papers viciously attacked Bache in print, while young
Federalists physically attacked him and his family in person. And all that had happened
before his 1798 prosecution under the Sedition Act.96 It was not melodramatic, then, for
fellow printers to praise Bache’s “firmness” in the face of “malignant persecution,” or to
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commend him for bidding “defiance to a host of foes in league for his destruction.”97 As
a result of his arraignment under the Sedition Act, Bache became something like a patron
saint for oppositional martyrs.
Bache’s sudden death in September 1798 only cemented his place in the canon. A
eulogy written by “Democritus” held up Bache as a beacon of “manly independence,”
fondly remembering him as “the steady friend of liberty who smiled at persecution,
despised every danger and was the scourge of Aristocracy & Despotism.” Bache’s virtues
were prescriptive, his life furnishing examples of “conduct to imitate.” “Should the fiend
of persecution frown upon us, and his faithful Imps raise their infernal clamours,”
Democritus wrote, “his dignified behavior will not teach us to surrender our sacred rights,
and submit tamely to foreign or Domestic Tyrants.” In death, Bache became the leading
martyr of a republican quasi-holy war, as Democritus merged the language of martyrdom
and militancy to evoke a band of brothers fighting the good fight side by side. When
fellow republicans finally joined their hero in “the Celestial abode of the friends of
liberty,” Democritus wrote, they would all “feel happy in the recollection of past trials
and receive the ineffable reward due to persevering virtue.” It was an undeniably moving
passage, reminiscent of Aeneas’s encouraging speech to his hungry soldiers, or even
Christ’s Last Supper speech to his apostles, promising future deliverance as the reward
for present sufferings. In the meantime, Democritus endorsed the virtues of martial
solidarity, as he expressed sympathy for fellow republicans “who, in times of danger, do
not abandon the post where they may prove useful to the community.”98
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“Democritus” had effectively done for Bache what painters like David had done
for classical and French Revolutionary heroes. In Bache, the ideal of the incorruptible,
distinctly democratic republican found perhaps its most platonically pure form. He had
taken on Adams’s system of patronage and power; he had suffered persecution for his
efforts; nevertheless he had persisted, remaining firm in his democratic faith and
contemptuous of his own wellbeing. Because he was not a politician himself, no one
could accuse Bache of currying votes; because he died young, he never had a chance to
be corrupted by patronage or bribery. He was simultaneously the disinterested citizensoldier of classical republicanism, the outspoken truth-teller of Knox’s treatises, and –
idiomatically if not theologically – the fearless martyr of Christian antiquity. The duty of
the patriotic partisan, as performed by Bache, was not circumspection, but decision; not
compromise, but defiance; not reflection, but action; not shrewdness, but boldness; not
bipartisanship, but militancy.
Small wonder that other Republican partisans were eager to cast themselves in the
same mold. Mathew Carey was soon arrested for his own violations of the Sedition Act,
inspiring fellow newsmen’s admiration by the way in which he weathered his own
“persecution.”99 By the end of Adams’s Presidency, the Aurora – now under the
editorship of William Duane – was simultaneously denouncing the Sedition Act while
commending all “fellow labourers in the path of persecution.”100 Jefferson himself never
took any comparable risks, but he was willing, at least in his letters, to encourage other
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Republicans’ pursuit of “martyrdom.”101 This martyrial fetish soon became so
widespread that Federalists could even anticipate it. Writing to Hamilton in 1799,
William Heth predicted that some members of the opposition would deliberately express
their “seditions” just for the sake of being arrested – for they were all “panting to become
Martyrs in the holy cause.”102
Printers like Bache and Carey bore the greatest burden of martyrdom. But as the
election of 1800 approached, at least some Republican politicians began to apply a
similarly martial logic to their own partisanship. Senator Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina is a case in point. In the last three months of that year he wrote Jefferson a series
of letters bemoaning his efforts for the Republican cause in his notoriously Federalist
state, all the while depicting himself – for Jefferson’s benefit – as a lone soldier carrying
on the fight without support. Pinckney claimed, for instance, that he had been marked as
the sole victim to endure “the whole abuse of” the Federalist “parties” in South
Carolina.103 Just in case Jefferson missed the point, Pinckney reiterated a few days later
that he had been “charged with being the whole & sole cause” there, meaning that he had
to suffer more “abuse” than “any man” had “ever yet sustained.”104 Such complaints
provided a context that rendered Pinckney’s partisan stance heroic. For despite all of his
“abuse,” Pinckney had resolved to “push Straight on” and in support of those “principles”
he had “always pursued.”105
In the immediate wake of Jefferson’s electoral victory, Pinckney continued to
remind the President-elect about the intrepid role he himself had played in the contest.
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Now fresh off his success, Pinckney seemed to remember the election as a sort of
patriotic war. In the space of two consecutive letters, he thrice referred to the contest as
an “arduous” struggle and took care to mention his own unwavering “faithfulness” to
“duty.”106 The enemy, he recalled, had held “the Weight of Talent, Wealth,” and “family
influence,” so much so that some Jeffersonians had succumbed to “despair.” It was under
these dire circumstances that Pinckney had rushed into the fray in Columbia, and there he
remained until the battle came to an end. Pinckney’s unremitting efforts had ultimately
been sufficient to earn him “the hatred & persecution of the federal party for ever,” but he
still took satisfaction in knowing that he had stayed true to his “duty.” And at least for the
time being, Pinckney stalwartly planned to remain in Carolina and fortify that state “like
a rock against future federal storms.”107 (He was supposed to be returning to the capital
for the new Congressional session, but his partisan duty evidently took precedence over
his official job functions.)
If Bache was the ideal version of a selfless republican foot soldier, Pinckney
represented something more complicated. It was not disingenuous of him to say that he
had taken risks; Pinckney’s Republicanism had pitted him against the South Carolina
aristocracy and even his own kinsmen.108 Even so, one cannot suppress the feeling that
Pinckney was angling for a future appointment in the Jefferson administration. He had
once been a Federalist himself, until Washington snubbed him for an appointment in
1793. Pinckney did not mention those circumstances to Jefferson in 1800. What he did
mention, repeatedly, was his own disinterested fidelity. He was startlingly ungenerous
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toward his fellow Republicans; to hear Pinckney tell it, he alone had stayed the course in
South Carolina. The fact that Pinckney continued to annoy Jefferson with stories of his
misfortune even after the election passed is enough to suggest that he had motives beyond
simply apprising his superior of the situation on the front. If Pinckney was indeed
attempting to leverage his political service for a political appointment, the strategy paid
off, as he received a diplomatic position early in Jefferson’s presidency. But if that was
his conscious strategy all along, it suggests that Pinckney’s campaigning may not have
been as disinterested as he claimed. Indeed, some historians have depicted “Blackguard
Charlie” as the first southern political fixer – the “Burr of South Carolina.”109
Even if Pinckney was playing a role, however, it is more important to understand
the nature of his performance than to expose its artifice. For if this was, indeed, a
calculated piece of stagecraft, it was one that he had developed at painstaking, deliberate
length, laying the groundwork for his claims in multiple letters over the course of two
months without ever explicitly requesting a job. Again and again he emphasized his
selfless, fearless dedication, establishing that Charles Pinckney was not a man to be
deterred by threats or desert his post in the time of need. Politics was a war – an “arduous
contest” that provided a stage for valiant men to demonstrate their mettle, and he was, in
simplest terms, a good and patriotic soldier with no compunctions about suffering for the
cause. A political appointment would have been a matter of patriotic justice rather than
petty partisan favoritism.
Pinckney’s performance of grand heroic gestures and stoic resolve in the heat of
battle made it seem preposterous that anyone could accuse him of being simply a craven
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officeseeker. And fittingly enough, he did not openly request an office – yet. As we shall
see in future chapters, the narrative of politics-as-warfare would provide numerous future
applicants with an idiom that allowed them to request offices without sacrificing their
dignity. In the meantime, however, the Jeffersonians’ most formidable problem was not
that they were persecuted for their outspoken defiance but rather that they were ridiculed
for their heroic pretensions.

Dress Rehearsal: Thomas McKean and the First Republican Purge, 1800
The 1799 election of Thomas McKean as governor of Pennsylvania set the stage
for a dress rehearsal of conflicts that would emerge during Jefferson’s presidency.
McKean liked to position himself as the unflinching enemy of crypto-monarchist
corruption. Reveling in the aftermath of his victorious election, McKean echoed John
Wilkes as he commended his supporters – and himself – for their fearless stance against
the combined courtiers and officeseekers of the Atlantic World:
Traitors, Refugees, Tories, French Aristocrats, British Agents, and British
subjects and their corrupt dependents, together with not a few apostate
Whigs, all combined against your candidate; the most abominable lies
were propagated and nothing omitted that could arrest a vote; and what is
strange but true, all the officers and expectants of office under the
President of the United States, not only in Pennsylvania but in the
neighbouring states, joined in the coalition, with very few exceptions.110
McKean thus came into office proclaiming a triumph over corruption, which
understandably engendered high hopes among his followers. A Pittsburgh committee, for
instance, celebrated his election as a victory for the “mass of the people,” whose choice
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had not been “influenced by expectants for office” or any other aristocratic bogeymen.111
Now he would have to prove the courage of his convictions and demonstrate, for all the
nation to see, that Republicans were better than their enemies.
Once in office, McKean had ample power to take fearsome vengeance on the
placemen and Tories who held the offices of state. The 1790 Pennsylvania Constitution
had granted the governor nearly absolute control over state-level patronage, with his
power of appointment extending all the way down to petty officers like local sheriffs and
registers of wills.112 No legal hindrances could stop McKean from removing state officers
and replacing them with his supporters – which is exactly what he did. McKean removed
twenty-five officers his first day on the job, and would remove more than a hundred
throughout his gubernatorial tenure. “I have been obliged (though no Hercules),” he
modestly told John Dickinson, “to cleanse the Augean stable.”113
The Pennsylvania State Senate promptly responded with an address accusing
McKean of rewarding his partisans. McKean responded in kind with an address justifying
his purge. His rejoinder did not offer any comprehensive rationale for the program, but
rather a whole litany of vaguely connected explanations.
Many of McKean’s arguments echoed those of the Federalists who had
championed a stronger executive power in 1789. For one thing, he claimed, it was not the
state senate’s place to interfere with the executive’s patronage, lest they undermine the
separation of powers between different branches of government. And until the governor
committed some impeachable offense, he was responsible only to his constituents
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“through the medium of elections.” Such arguments had been raised before. As we saw in
chapter 3, Congress had taken up the matter of presidential removals in 1789, at which
time many defenders of executive patronage had argued that a corrupt President could
always be impeached for abusing his power. McKean took this argument a step further as
he effectively claimed that all his removals were legally and morally justified until the
senate found indisputable grounds for impeachment. If he abused his power in subtler
ways, the people could always vote him out of office; if the people chose to retain him,
then his actions were justified. Until the senate impeached him or his constituents
explicitly rejected him, the executive’s power over patronage remained absolute.114
McKean as candidate had run a campaign against corrupt executive patronage;
McKean as governor now claimed that the executive’s control over patronage was
categorical. It required no great discernment to see the potential hypocrisy in this
transition. The more pressing question, then, was moral rather than legal. Regardless of
his constitutional right to remove officers, how did McKean justify the particular ways in
which he had used that power? McKean shifted the argument back to more theoretical
grounds. “In a popular government,” he declared, “the principles of rotation could fairly
have been suggested.” This was a fairly novel point. “Rotation in office” had featured
prominently in republican theories of government as far back as James Harrington and as
recently as the Federal Farmer, but the phrase had typically referred to frequent personnel
turnovers in the legislature rather than the civil service.115
McKean did not elaborate on the wisdom of regularly “rotating” appointed
officers but instead proceeded to itemize specific crimes that would justify the removal of
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an officer. The fitness of an officer for his duty was one obvious consideration. McKean
also felt justified in removing officers who had engaged in “the prostitution of official
influence to party purposes” – that is, all officers who had gone out of their way to
slander him. How, after all, could the governor maintain “cordial relations” with his
subordinates when they were openly antagonistic? This was similar to the excuse that
Presidents Washington and Adams had used to justify their own partisan patronage
policies: it would be insane to entrust hostile men with important duties.116
Despite his stated intention to remove the officers who had openly opposed his
candidacy, McKean also insisted that his standards were “impartial” rather than partisan.
He claimed, for instance, that he had retained many of his predecessor’s “most decisive
and influential” appointees. This still left the question of whether McKean would offer
new appointments to those who disagreed with his own political views. Anticipating this
query, he asserted that it was his duty to reserve offices for men who had proven
themselves “tried and faithful friends to the genuine principles of our republican
institutions.” Here was perhaps the most portentous remark in McKean’s entire address.
For one thing, it was ominously vague. McKean did not define the republican
“principles” he had in mind, an elision that left him free to construct his own standards
for determining republicanism. Moreover, this criterion raised the troubling question of
whether a man could oppose McKean yet still be counted as a friend to republican
institutions. McKean did not pursue this line of thought any further, choosing instead to
let his readers savor these his ambiguities.117
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Federalist observers took pleasure in deriding McKean’s casuistic explanations.
Alexander Graydon, being one of the many recently displaced officers, was especially
amused to read McKean’s accusations concerning the “prostitution of official influence.”
Was McKean trying to say that civil officers had no right of political expression beyond
their vote? If it was impermissible for officers even to participate in campaign meetings,
then “the mere right of voting would be a sorry privilege indeed.” Graydon did not
agonize over this distinction, however, for he suspected that McKean never had any
intention to appoint anyone who had not actively supported his election. If anything, then,
it was McKean himself who had “prostituted” his power. Graydon was similarly
unimpressed by McKean’s argument that a governor had to remove hostile officers for
the sake of maintaining “cordiality” between himself and his subordinates. McKean’s
purge had not stopped with the important higher officers but had extended all the way
down to Lilliputian county clerks who had little if any official interaction with the
governor.118 Nor could McKean’s purge be explained as an effort to remove dead wood.
As another observer noted, the governor retained many superannuated officers while
discontinuing the most recent appointees. The “rotation in office” excuse therefore
seemed rather specious, especially in light of allegations that McKean had retained all the
incumbent officers who supported his election.119 McKean’s patronage soon became a
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subject of nationwide attention, with newspapers throughout the country reiterating these
same criticisms.120
In retrospect, McKean may have been a less than representative Jeffersonian;
before the end of his gubernatorial tenure in 1808, he would effectively desert the
Democratic Republicans and join the Federalist ranks. Still, his approach to patronage
was historically significant for two reasons, the first of which is that it uncannily
foreshadowed aspects of the later Jacksonian reformation. Andrew Jackson and his
supporters in 1829 would cite nearly all of the same rationales that McKean had
introduced to justify his own removals in 1800: punishing those who had “prostituted”
their official influence; applying vaguely defined principles of “rotation in office”; and
enforcing a “republican” orthodoxy throughout the federal bureaucracy. And like
McKean, the Jacksonians would find themselves in an embarrassing predicament when
their approach to patronage appeared to be, for all intents and purposes, indistinguishable
from corruption.
All that lay nearly thirty years in the future. What McKean’s policy seemed to
foreshadow for Federalists in 1800 was the predictable hypocrisy of their
antiestablishment adversaries. As Alexander Addison observed from Connecticut,
McKean and his cronies had “represented themselves as pure and disinterested
republicans,” all the while representing their enemies as “office-hunters.” But “suddenly”
those “disinterested, pure republicans” had “converted into office-hunters” themselves,
120
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“incessantly” demanding “appointments to every office within their reach,” paying heed
neither to “character” nor “qualification.”121 Their utter shamelessness only confirmed
Federalists’ suspicions about the entire opposition. If Jefferson was elected, a
Massachusetts writer warned, all those “modest republicans” who had once decried “the
baneful influence of patronage” would subsequently thrust their way “into every office of
honor and profit.”122
As the eighteenth century came to a close, Federalist polemicists could barely
suppress their Schadenfreude when they imagined the Jeffersonians’ inevitable fall from
grace. There had always been and always would be ten officeseekers for every office,
wrote one observer, and the “disappointed” men would inevitably attack Jefferson just as
surely as they had attacked the Federalists. According to New York’s Commercial
Advertiser, there was “nothing new or uncommon in this”; it was an eternal law of
politics.123 In the final months before Jefferson took office, Federalists continued to
console themselves with bitterly sarcastic predictions. “By the change of administration
which has taken place,” wrote the Daily Advertiser, “all our evils political and moral are
to be done away at once. We shall have no more taxes – no ministers abroad; salaries are
to be reduced one half; the friends of the new administration will favor the public for a
song or WITH a song”; and “every hanging office-seeker” would finally be “gratified.”124
The Federalists’ contemptuous remarks unwittingly testified to the sheer fervor of
the Jeffersonians’ expectations. They did hope that the revolution of 1800 would be
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substantive rather than superficial, ushering in a genuine change in the spirit of
government while retrieving republican principles from the jaws of monarchism. Their
joyful hopes, combined with Federalists’ bemused prognostications, presented an almost
impossible challenge for President-elect Jefferson. The question that remained was
whether his administration would deteriorate into farcical hypocrisy, like McKean’s, or
finally initiate the long-awaited millennium of republican prophecy.
Andrew Jackson, meanwhile, had removed himself from the cesspool of politics.
In the same letter where he railed against John Adams’s corrupt patronage, he had
complained about the “disquietude” of his Senatorial career. “I can assure you,” he wrote
his Tennessee friend, “that my political life will be but a short one.”125 Retiring from the
Senate in April 1798, he was not on hand to witness the inauguration of Jefferson’s
revolution in 1801, preferring the shade of his own relatively modest vine and fig tree.
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Chapter Five:
“Virtue Rising on the Ruins of Corruption”: The Jeffersonian Reformation of 1801

In the weeks and months leading up to Jefferson’s inauguration, his supporters
expressed their hopes that he would transcend the corrupt ways of his Federalist
predecessors. Anticipating a celebration, Caesar Augustus Rodney of Delaware
proclaimed that the forthcoming revelries would represent more than “the mere forced
effect of interested activity & exertions by sycophants & office hunters.” They would
instead “flow from hearts capable of feeling a change in a system which would enable us
once more to hail each other ‘as brothers.’” The new era would be a republican
millennium. Drawing imagery from the classical poet Virgil’s Eclogues, Rodney
declared, “Magnus ab integro saeclorum nascitur ordo” – “Time has conceived and the
great Sequence of the Ages starts afresh.”1
Jefferson’s March 4, 1801 inaugural address proclaimed a new dawn of
parsimonious spending, promising “economy in the public expense, that labor may be
lightly burdened.” A “wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from
injuring another,” he wrote, “shall leave them free otherwise to regulate their own
pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the
bread it has earned.” “This,” he sententiously declared, “is the sum of government.”2 That
same affirmation had been declared all throughout the past decade – in every
denunciation of parasitical natural aristocrats, and in every contrasting panegyric to the
virtues of the “independent” and “industrious” working citizen.
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But Jefferson’s stated focus on economy belied some important ways in which the
issues had evolved since 1798. Adams’s allegedly partisan appointment policy had, in
many Republican eyes, demonstrated that executive patronage was more than just a
burdensome public expense; it was also a weapon that could be used to influence the
opinions and actions of American citizens. The Sedition Act had demonstrated that a
tyrannical executive with an army of placemen could terrorize and potentially silence
those who dared to criticize his regime. The lately victorious Republicans presented
themselves as men superior to such coercive tactics. As Tench Coxe – now a firm
Democratic Republican – put it, the late electoral triumph had “proved that respectable
circles of men and even individuals cannot be compelled to yield their independence of
opinion, language or conduct for honors, emoluments or even the bread of their
families.”3 And now that they were victorious, Republicans would never stoop to such
vindictive measures. Benjamin Austin, the leader of Boston’s urban radicals and primary
contributor to that city’s Independent Chronicle, declared in December 1800 that
Republicans in power would transcend any petty “personal resentment.” Even after being
“exposed to the influence of every petty sycophant, who was seeking a maintenance form
the Federal government,” Republicans would never imitate those “abusive wretches” who
had been “basking under the emolument” and “feeding on the loaves and fishes of
government.” They would “assume no controul over public opinion,” appealing “to the
reason rather than the fears of their fellow citizens.”4
But some of Jefferson’s supporters expected him to execute a more ruthless
removal policy. Some New York Republicans, for instance, drank toasts to the new
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administration, which they expected “to purge the federal offices of federal occupants.”
Fittingly enough, these same celebrants also toasted “Thomas McKean, the inflexible
republican” who had carried out a similar purge in Pennsylvania.5 Jefferson’s campaign
manager in Pennsylvania similarly encouraged the President to emulate McKean’s
ruthlessness, which in his eyes had saved the cause of Republicanism in that state. The
success or failure of the new administration, he warned, would hinge on whether or not
Jefferson possessed the “political firmness” to ensure that “decided republicans” held the
offices of state. Members of that party were now fully rallied, and any “temporizing
policy” would only dampen their spirits.6 Another Pennsylvania Republican similarly
reminded Jefferson that many of his partisans would settle for nothing less than “a
general dislodgment” of their Federalist enemies; he himself would not presume to guess
“how far such mens patriotism” extended “beyond their expectations” of patronage.7
Jefferson therefore had to decide whether he would punitively clean out the Federalist
officeholders in order to reward his followers, or mercifully retain them in order to prove
himself above such arts.
Jefferson’s own correspondents doubted whether Federalists would even be
willing to accept an olive branch. Pennsylvania’s William Findley knew that it might
appear unduly antagonistic for Jefferson to remove too many Federalist officers, but he
could not overlook the Janus-faced way in which members of that party seemed to
proclaim “the language of Conciliation” while still continuing “to behave with the
greatest rancour.”8 James Monroe was similarly skeptical. “There is a conflict of
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principle,” he warned Jefferson, and “either democracy, that is the govt. of the people, or
royalty must prevail. The opposing parties can never be united… because their views are
as opposit as light & darkness.” Gracious Republicans would therefore search in vain for
any potential friends among “the leaders of the royalist party.” Despite his
uncompromisingly Manichean view of party politics, however, Monroe did not insist on a
thorough purge. The Federalist “leaders” might be beyond salvation, but there was no
reason not to hold out hope for their misguided followers. Monroe advised Jefferson “to
draw off the mass of the people by a wise, firm, yet moderate course, from those leaders,”
thus leaving High Federalists “to the ignominy they merit.”9
Jefferson could not simply leave the Federalist officers undisturbed – especially
after he had spent the past few years decrying their abusive influence. Federalist
marshals, for instance, had been accused of packing juries to achieve unfavorable verdicts
in sedition trials.10 That was not even the worst of it, for there was evidence that some
officers had actually tampered with the democratic process itself. According to William
Findley, Federalist postmasters had deliberately suppressed and misplaced votes for the
electors in 1796.11 And according to Thomas McKean, some officers in Pennsylvania had
put pressure on the state legislators who chose presidential electors.12 Jefferson felt duly
disgusted by such machinations. He promised McKean that officers who interfered in
elections would be removed – for the “constitutional remedy by the elective principle”
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would be meaningless if it were “smothered by the enormous patronage of the General
government.”13
But Jefferson evaded these matters in his March 4 inaugural address, wherein he
simply proclaimed tolerance for all differing opinions and dissident principles. Now that
Americans had dispelled all “religious intolerance,” he wrote, it would be tragic if they
lapsed into “a political intolerance” every bit “as despotic, as wicked, and as capable of
bloody persecutions.” Most Americans fundamentally agreed on their political values
even if they appeared to quarrel over minutiae. “[E]very difference of opinion,” he
declared, “is not a difference of principles. We have called by different names brethren of
the same principle. We are all Republicans: we are all federalists.” There might have
been a few genuine heretics here and there who rejected the principles of “republican
government,” but Jefferson disavowed any intention of persecuting those ingrates. He
would “let them stand, undisturbed, as monuments of the safety with which errors of
opinion may be tolerated, where reason is left free to combat it.”14 Jefferson thus
demonstrated the moral authority, even the moral superiority, of the lately victorious
Republican Party. Unlike the Federalists who had ratified and enforced the Sedition Act,
Republicans would not persecute men for exercising their freedom of opinion.
Federalists in the audience undoubtedly breathed a sigh of relief, hearing these
words as an implicit reassurance that not every member of their party would fall victim to
a Jacobinical purge – but they would have done well to pay closer attention to Jefferson’s
carefully chosen words. Although he had dismissed differences of “opinion” as
superficial, he promised nothing more than “tolerance” to those who genuinely differed
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not just in “opinion” but in “principle.” Jefferson now had to decide the limits of that
toleration. In contemplating his policy on who would be removed from office and who
would be appointed, Republicans would have to ponder how far the limits of toleration
ought to extend for those who – allegedly – opposed republican government itself.

“The Salutary Work of Removal”: The Jeffersonian Criterion for Removals
Once he assumed the presidency, Jefferson had to clarify his plans for restoring
“harmony.” He never abandoned his faith in the unanimous principles of “the people,”
nor did he see both parties as equally legitimate participants in the republican body
politic. Like Monroe, Jefferson imagined a strict line separating the deluded yet
reconcilable Federalist constituency from their malignant and utterly incorrigible leaders,
and, like Monroe, he perceived that the shrewdest strategy was to avoid antagonizing the
former group. For the vast majority of Federalists were, in Jefferson’s eyes, simply
prodigal Republican sons who had overreacted to the “French excesses” of 1797 and
1798. He would not waste his time on the “incurables” who led their faction. Nor would
he pursue any course of action that might frighten their deluded followers; if Jefferson
had to remove any officers at all, he would operate on “principles” that would not
“shock” any observers.15
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Some Republicans could hardly have cared less which officers Jefferson chose to
remove or appoint. Southerners, in particular, maintained that the problem of patronage
would not be solved by appointing a better set of men, but rather by introducing a better
set of measures. Nathaniel Macon bluntly told Jefferson that his fellow North Carolinians
did not want him to remove any officers at all unless they were “delinquent” in their
affairs. What his constituents demanded instead was a “system of oeconomy” – fixed
salaries for customs collectors, a comprehensive reduction of the military, and the
elimination of unnecessary diplomatic positions.16 Jefferson agreed that that the crucial
tasks at hand were to “reform the waste of public money, & thus drive away the vultures
who prey on it, and improve some little on old routines.”17 To that end, he was willing to
assure Macon that his administration would whittle down the size of the nation’s
diplomatic corps in Europe and cut back the military establishments to a more reasonable
size. But there was only so much a President could do. As Jefferson carefully reminded
Macon, many of the salaries for government employees depended on Congress, not the
Chief Executive.18
Other southerners, such as William Branch Giles, wanted a sweeping overhaul of
the corrupt judiciary system.19 Indeed, the problem of judicial oppression had been on
Republicans’ minds ever since 1798, when the Sedition Act had empowered vindictive
Federalist marshals and judges to indict anti-administration critics. In the months that
elapsed between Adams’s electoral defeat and Jefferson’s triumphant inauguration, the
outgoing Federalist Congress had taken further steps to ensure that the courts, at least,
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would remain a reliable stronghold for their party. The Judiciary Act of 1801, signed into
law on February 13, had created sixteen new judgeships for Adams to fill before
Jefferson assumed the office. Adding insult to injury, a separate act had created two new
judicial districts in the District of Columbia, giving Adams the pretext to appoint fortytwo new justices of the peace. As President, Jefferson could not legally touch the judges,
but he could remove the new justices of the peace, along with the numerous oppressive
marshals and district attorneys throughout the nation. On his first day in office, Jefferson
removed two district attorneys and one marshal, each of whom had been appointed in the
waning days of the preceding administration.20 After a three-week pause, he resumed the
slow purge on March 23, the same day that he began to discuss the logic of his removal
policy for his acolytes.21
The problem, as he explained to numerous correspondents, was that no two men
could agree on how many Federalists ought to be removed and how many retained, or
even on what the criteria for removal ought to be. Jefferson knew that he could not
conciliate the crypto-Republican Federalists if he applied any blanket political test to his
patronage policy. He had, after all, promised not to persecute any man for his opinions.
Even in the case of Federalist Massachusetts, for instance, Jefferson promised that his
decisions would be dominated by “strict rule” rather than “party passion.” The “right of
opinion shall suffer no invasion from me,” he assured Elbridge Gerry. Those who had
“acted well” had “nothing to fear,” no matter how much they deviated from Jefferson’s
own political opinions.22 He reiterated a similar promise to Connecticut’s Gideon
Granger when he declared that the “reasonable” expression of one’s opinion was “not a
20
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crime.”23 There were some obvious practical reasons for Jefferson to avoid the
appearance of intolerance. Should Jefferson remove any man for mere difference of
opinion, warned his old classmate Walter Jones, it would only encourage Federalists to
assume “the implacable obstinacy of martyrdom, which grows out of Persecution.”24
But Jefferson’s moderate course was more than a matter of practical politics – it
was also a matter of genuine principle, with his moral authority at stake in the matter. He
knew that it would be hypocrisy to remove any man for mere “difference of principles,”
for that was “exactly what” Republicans had “complained of in the former
administration.”25 Numerous correspondents agreed. William Findley, for instance,
claimed that only “office hunters” would want Jefferson to enact “a general change” in
government personnel, whereas the “old substantial Republicans” were above such selfserving vindictiveness.26 Wilson Cary Nicholas of Virginia worried that a “general
removal” would set an inauspicious precedent, one that would ultimately lower the moral
character of republican politics.
Is there not danger that after several such changes the people wou’d
consider it a mere contest between in’s & out’s in which they had no
interest, that worried by what they would believe to be a contest for
individual advancement, they wou’d soon become deaf to attempts to
alarm them when danger really existed? . . . Will not an administration that
gives offices as a reward for party services or support at elections, very
often sacrifice the public interest, and be obliged to wink at peculations,
and other misconduct of public servants? And will it not end in an
absolute devotion to one man, and a disregard of the law and the public
weal? Wou’d it not be an unfortunate thing that an administration, virtuous
and patriotic as I am sure the present will be considered in all future time
shou’d by their example justify a practice that may be used to the most
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wicked purposes, by men that the vicissitudes of human affairs may place
at the head of our govt?27
Time would prove Nicholas’s concerns quite prescient.
While Jefferson continued to fret about the troubling implications of a ruthless
purge, his supporters in the New England press complained that past Republicans had
treated these heretics far too leniently. A piece in New Hampshire’s Republican Ledger,
for instance, recast the short history of the American republic as a history of Tory
subversion. Taking readers back to the days of the revolutionary years, the article recalled
the days when the “Tories, or Monarchists,” had used “fire and sword” to enforce “every
mandate of the British King.” Some of the “officers of the crown” had ultimately
retreated into the protection of their British patrons, but “Others more dangerous to our
peace” had remained in America. They had lain dormant after the war, donning the
“hypocritical garb of acquiescence,” while the magnanimous republicans had
complacently presumed the revolution secure and thus readmitted these Tories “into their
councils.” Toryism had not died, however; it simply mutated into Federalism. And by the
1790s, these enterprising Tories “had worked themselves into offices of trust and
influence,” where they industriously wielded their power to alienate Americans from
France and draw them back into the English orbit. Thus the “tory principle” would “never
be eradicated” until “the old tories of ’76” were finally “expelled” from government;
“every true republican” hoped for “the speedy accomplishment” of that task.”28 Another
article in Hartford’s American Mercury similarly declared that Federalism, for many
adherents, had “been nothing more than Toryism in masquerade.” “Under this deceptive
mask,” it continued, “every enemy of Revolution has ralied [sic]; there is not one old
27
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Tory but what has called himself a Federalist; in all our political controversies, the Tories
have assumed this infallibility of denomination.”29
These apoplectic jeremiads about Tory officers would have felt like familiar
tropes to anyone who had read Republican papers in recent years. Ever since the
Francophobe reaction of 1798, numerous polemicists had insisted that the Jacobins were
really old Whigs and the Federalists really old Tories. Jefferson was no longer the
figurehead of an oppositional insurgency, however, but the Chief Executive who held the
fate of every treacherous officer in his hands. And to hear these New England papers tell
it, the new President had been entrusted with the commission for a thorough inquisition:
even if he did not intend to extirpate every Federalist officer in the nation, at the very
least he had to discern which Tory officers had disguised themselves as Federalists.
In fact, Jefferson himself had used similar language all throughout the 1790s, and
had consequently grown accustomed to blaming leftover “Tories” for all Federalist
success. And despite his oft-stated reluctance to remove any officer on account of his
“principles,” he kept careful track of any subordinates who had been marked as Tories or
royalists.30 He took note, for instance, when the incumbent revenue supervisor for New
Hampshire was identified as a “violent” revolutionary “tory” whose influence had been
used to secure the appointment of another “violent” revolutionary Tory; neither officer
retained their post through the end of 1802.31 But if Jefferson’s own notebooks are to be
trusted, he only removed a few men on account of their Toryism in 1801 – a district
attorney in New York, a collector in New Jersey, and another collector in Massachusetts,
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the latter of whom had also been delinquent in his accounts.32 An obvious explanation
suggests itself: despite all the Republican press’s harangues, very few of the recognizable
old loyalists had been able to acquire any sort of political office. Some of the Federalist
officeholders might have cherished Tory principles in their hearts, but most of them –
according to Jefferson’s own logic – were not closeted monarchists but deluded
Republicans.
Unwilling or unable to scrutinize the content of Federalists’ hearts, Jefferson
chose instead to focus on more empirical criteria. He removed sixteen officers from
March through June 1801, only one of whom he could identify as a Tory. Eight of them
had been midnight appointees. Of the remaining eight, two were removed in order to
restore Republicans whom Adams had fired on account of their principles; five were
district marshals who had been accused either of delinquency, oppression or both.33
Jefferson was particularly merciless toward the marshals who packed juries for partisan
purposes.34 Replying to the outraged wife of one displaced marshal, he was coldly
sententious:
[A]n officer who is entrusted by the law with the sacred duty of naming
judges of life and death for his fellow citizens, and selects them
exclusively from among his political & party enemies, ought never to have
in his power a second abuse of that tremendous magnitude.35
For Jefferson, the good Federalist officer was one who had not used his office to serve his
party. He noted, in South Carolina, for instance, both a “violent federalist” who had
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commanded “great interest” throughout the state, and a “good man” who “never
meddle[d].”36
Even if Jefferson considered himself moderate and just, his removals certainly did
not endear him to Federalists. Republicans greeted the Federalists’ predictable outrage
with gleeful contempt and mocked their complaints about Jefferson’s “purgation of the
Augean stable.”37 Federalists themselves were less amused, and Jefferson’s supporters,
having spent the entirety of the 1790s decrying the evils of executive patronage, had giftwrapped the language of opposition for their foes. Throughout the spring of 1801,
Federalist papers would painstakingly list every officer that Jefferson displaced, almost
invariably claiming that honest men had been punished for their politics while violent
Democrats were rewarded for theirs.38 More alarmingly, Federalists claimed that
Jefferson had betrayed not just his inaugural address’s conciliatory claims,39 but even his
own avowed principles. The ever-strident Washington Federalist, for instance, warned
that Jefferson was establishing the same system of “executive influence” he had once
claimed to abhor.40
If Jefferson ever took note of these accusations, they would have struck a delicate
nerve. He and his consorts obviously realized that the executive’s “influence” could be
used as bait to lure men toward their own party. Indeed, that had been the whole essence
of eighteenth-century Britain’s sinister court Whig logic, which Hamilton and a few other
Federalists had openly embraced at the Constitutional Convention. To use patronage for
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such ends would be corruption itself, and Jefferson knew all too well that his moral
authority might never recover from such a breach of trust. His preference, as we have
seen, was to demonstrate that Republicans like himself were above such manipulative
practices, allowing the momentary apostates to see the error of their ways and the
superiority of Jefferson’s philosophy.

The Limits of Toleration: Radical Republicans and the Search for Tories, June – July
1801
There was one state, however, where it seemed like only executive influence
could salvage the Republican cause – and even there, Jefferson remained reluctant to
apply such a strategy. Connecticut by 1801 had a notorious reputation as the citadel of
high Federalism. Gideon Granger was one of the few prominent Republicans in that state,
and he knew that its naturally “ambitious and Aspiring” citizens tended to fawn over
federal officers. If Connecticut’s federal offices were left in the wrong hands, Federalists
would use their influence to turn the people against Republicans.41 Jefferson evidently
agreed. After discussing the Connecticut situation with a New York confidante, he
conceded – with transparent disgust – that the “avaricious, & venal” people of that state
had only inclined toward Federalism out of “interest,” and could only be enticed toward
Republicanism if Jefferson held out offices.42 Even if Jefferson could stomach his distaste
about using corruption for the sake of the cause, however, some of his other allies
worried that such an approach might backfire. If he appeared to be proscribing the enemy
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party in Connecticut, it might only provoke Federalists to close ranks, which was exactly
what Jefferson and his coadjutants wanted to prevent.43
Sincere republicans, of course, would not need to be baited with offices – indeed,
according to Jefferson’s logic, they would not even demand a purge. He therefore found
it alarming when two New York Republican printers, David Denniston and James
Cheetham, wrote him in June 1801 demanding that he take a more aggressive approach in
their state. Jefferson had no acquaintance with either of these men. But Cheetham, in
particular, would soon prove himself to be one of the strangest characters in the history of
the early republic. Only twenty-nine years old in 1801, Cheetham’s incendiary
Jacobinism had already earned him a reputation in his native England.44 After arriving in
the United States, he landed a partnership at Denniston’s New York City newspaper, the
American Citizen, in the spring of 1801. By the end of his life in 1810, he would turn
against his former Republican allies to become a militant Burkean conservative. But as of
June 1801, his politics were still decidedly radical. He had joined with William Duane in
supporting Denis Driscol’s deist journal, The Temple of Reason, and over the next few
years would find himself fighting to eliminate the common law and expand voting
rights.45 It therefore comes as no surprise to find that Cheetham despised Tories, both in
his native and adopted countries.
Denniston and Cheetham reached out to Jefferson at the beginning of June 1801
to express their dissatisfaction with his apparently squeamish approach to political
patronage. Fellow New Yorkers, they claimed, had expected “a thorough change in the
43
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different offices,” particularly “to exclude obnoxious characters” and old Tories, as well
as those who were “hostile to the Constitution and to the principles and progress of
republican government.” If Jefferson did not gratify those hopes, they warned, he would
greatly disappoint Republicans of that state. Denniston and Cheetham assured Jefferson
that they were simple patriots with no desire for appointments of their own – their desire
for a personnel turnover sprang from disinterested and patriotic motives.46 Jefferson
rather doubted these assertions of moral purity, and promptly consulted Robert
Livingston for advice on whether to take these disaffected printers at their word.
Livingston peremptorily advised him not to trust these correspondents, as they were the
“dupes” of far more “artful” men (a clear allusion to Aaron Burr).47
While Jefferson gathered intelligence about Denniston and Cheetham, the printers
took their arguments directly to the public by way of the American Citizen, using the
paper to express Republicans’ disappointment with Jefferson’s temporizing ways.
“Hitherto the removal of Tories from office, and the appointment of Republicans in lieu
of them,” they declared, had been alarmingly “solitary and unfrequent.” Jefferson had
only been in office for three months, but the authors had initially expected that “at least”
half the officeholding Tories would be gone by now. According to the Citizen, New
York’s dissatisfied Republicans were beginning to entertain some “very serious
apprehensions and doubts” about Jefferson’s commitment. For it was the people, and not
the disgruntled authors, who had given Jefferson his commission to clean house: the
people’s votes had displaced “the capital offenders against the state,” so it was only
natural that they should “expect the removal of the lesser culprits in office. If this should
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not be the case, for what, in the name of God, have we been contending?” The authors
now tossed down the gauntlet to Jefferson:
Four years of an administration, all things considered, the most expensive,
the most wicked, the most turbulent, and the most destructive of national
liberty and happiness ever witnessed in modern times, have convinced our
republican citizens that, while a man remains in office who contributed to
this state of things, to which we cannot look back but with horror, neither
the constitution can be safe, nor themselves satisfied. Of this the evident
sense of the country cannot be misunderstood. It has been expressed in
language plain, energetic, and decisive. And an administration less plain,
less energetic, less decisive, will not satisfy the country.
Having issued these unequivocal demands, the author expressed his confidence that
Jefferson would now “comport” with the people’s “will.”48
This confrontational editorial provoked a swift reaction from men in both parties.
Federalists were horrified. John Fenno’s Gazette of the United States reprinted the piece
with an added commentary, noting that the editors at the American Citizen had lumped all
Federalist officers of the government under the penumbra of “Tories.”49 Aaron Burr
nearly panicked when he read the Citizen’s words, and assured Jefferson that most of
New York’s Republicans were perfectly satisfied with the slow pace of removals and
replacements.50 And Jefferson himself secretly felt piqued to hear New York City’s only
Republican printers accuse him of “temporizing.” He understood that it might be
imprudent to ignore New Yorkers’ complaints, especially if their loyalty to the cause
depended on their expectations of receiving patronage. But he remained unwilling “to
disgust other parts of the union” just to indulge a few suspect Republicans in New
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York.51 Swallowing his own disgust, Jefferson wrote back to Denniston and Cheetham
with a polite explanation of his plan to conciliate moderate Federalists and thereby
“consolidate the nation once more into a single mass.” More pointedly, Jefferson noted
that this plan for “reunion” would only work if Republicans followed “a just, moderate &
proper line of conduct.” Federalist leaders might remain implacable, but that did not
mean the Republican Party had to “pollute” itself “with any act of injustice.”52
Perhaps feeling appropriately chastened, Denniston and Cheetham now praised
the President’s moderate proposals. To “unite the great body of American Citizens into
one mass,” they replied, would be “no less Salutary than Just.” Rather than demanding a
general sweep, they now tried to focus Jefferson’s attention on two officers in particular.
Richard Rogers, a naval officer in the New York customs house, was a genuine old Tory.
According to Denniston and Cheetham, Rogers had worked for a British admiralty court
during the war, and the years had not made him any more republican. Joshua Sands, the
customs collector, held the same views as his Tory colleague, and at one point had
allegedly threatened to fire one of his clerks for supporting the Republican cause. “Their
stations confer an immense influence, which in their hands is extremely injurious to the
Constitution.” Continuing to disavow any personal motives, Denniston and Cheetham
assured Jefferson that they did not care who received these offices as long as they were
“Republicans.”53
But rather than trust Jefferson to take these suggestions to heart, Cheetham once
again brought his demands before the public by way of his other paper, the Republican
Watch-Tower. Here he focused on the case for removing Richard Rogers. But the scope
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of his argument took Cheetham beyond Rogers, ultimately leading him to an indictment
of all the supposed Tories who had infiltrated federal offices. The moral of Cheetham’s
story was that Americans had made a mistake when they forgave the revolutionary
Tories. “The experiment” with clemency had “been tried,” wrote the Watch-Tower, “and
a woeful lesson it has taught us.” Enemies of the Revolution had first been “pardoned,”
and then – thanks to republicans’ naïve “benignity of mind” – appointed to offices. They
had “smiled and fawned” as necessary, all the while acquiring “wealth, & influence, &
power; but they had no sooner possessed themselves of these potent instruments of
despotism, than they pointed them, directly, formidably, and terribly against those very
institutions by which they had been attained, and against that very people to whose
clemency they were indebted for a footing in the state.” Where other writers had
reminded readers of the Tories’ malignancy during the War for Independence, the WatchTower reminded them of the “arduous” political battle they had more recently fought
against the Federalist administration. Surely American republicans did not want to fight
such a battle yet again? It might be too vindictive to harass and torment the Tories in their
private lives, but that did not mean Republicans must permit them to hold powerful
offices.54 Denniston and Cheetham refused to let go of this fight. A few days later, the
American Citizen printed yet another piece, this time explicitly disavowing Jefferson’s
plan for a “reconciliation of parties,” while once again admonishing republican readers
not to repeat the mistake of allowing the enemies to hold offices in the government.
The authors now claimed that a “certain clemency on the part of the United
States” had “at one time well nigh produced the fall of the Republic.” A set of unnamed
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antagonists – implicitly the Tories – had “been seeking to overturn the constitution,
against which they fought, and against which they will again combat whenever their
power shall be such as to promise success.” But American patriots had ultimately rallied
against this internal threat, and after enduring “a struggle” that would “immortalize our
republicans,” they had finally “overthrown” the “whole iniquitous system.” Now that
American republicans had reclaimed power, it was time to contemplate the lessons of this
story so they would not have to reenact these battles yet again. The lesson to be learned
was that political patronage could be wielded for good or for evil. The recent “crisis” had
been “brought about by appointing to republican offices, anti-republican men,” who had
then used this “influence” to attack the Constitution. It was therefore not just permissible
but morally imperative to ensure that “real patriots” held office. The Federalists’
“exterior affections” could be “purchased,” but why would the President choose to
appease such undeserving men? Once the Federalists were shorn of their offices and
influence, there would be nothing left to fear from these fifth columns in their midst.55
Denniston and Cheetham had only been able to identity one officeholder who
could reasonably be accused of revolutionary-era Toryism. But for anyone who
credulously read the histrionic screeds being printed in the Watch-Tower and the
American Citizen, it would seem like old Tories were a ubiquitous presence throughout
the ranks of the government. Republican papers outside of New York were beginning to
fan these suspicions as well. The Aurora, for instance, was not willing to urge any
“violence” against anti-republican Tories, but saw no reason to entrust them with
“discharging duties under a government to which they are hostile.”56 In New Jersey, “A
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True Patriot” echoed the American Citizen’s insistence that there could never be any true
“reconciliation” between the parties. A “Tory remains a Tory,” he wrote. “[A] man’s
conduct may vary, but his principles never do.” What the people demanded was not
reconciliation, but a thorough and final sweep:
No, Mr. Jefferson well knows for what purpose the republicans have
placed him at the helm; not to reconcile parties, but to purge the country;
not to grant equal admittance into the council – but to keep out the Trojan
Horse… He is the repository of their rights; to him the people look up for
a reparation of the abuses, introduced by the former administration; and as
introductory thereto, they expect that he will not continue in office, a
single person who has been accessary to those arbitrary measures…57
As Federalists would have immediately recognized, such arguments were difficult
to square with Jefferson’s inaugural address, particularly with its promise to restore
“harmony.” Republican printers squared that circle effortlessly: according to a writer in
the Newark Centinel, all that Jefferson had meant by “Harmony” was that he would not
enforce the “persecution of political sentiment.” But surely, asked the author, Federalists
did not think the Republicans had elected Jefferson only to see him retain enemies of the
Constitution in office? After all, the President had “sworn to support the constitution,”
which meant that he had “a moral obligation to discharge” any man “hostile” to that
venerable document.58 Similar arguments could be read in the pages of Boston’s
Independent Chronicle, where an author declared that both the Constitution and the
“voice” of Republicans had ordered Jefferson, “emphatically, to remove every man from
office” who had endangered the Constitution or tried to “set at naught” the voice of the
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people. Casting his eye toward Connecticut, this Boston writer expressed his hope that
“the salutary work of renovation” would “not cease… till that state be purged.”59
As of mid-1801, Jefferson had only removed one officer from Connecticut, but
that single removal caused such a stir that the President finally found himself compelled
to issue a quasi-official statement on his administration’s patronage policies. The
controversy itself probably caught him by surprise. The one Connecticut officer he had
removed was a New Haven customs collector, Elizur Goodrich. As one of Adams’s
“midnight” appointments, Goodrich’s appointment was illegitimate in Jefferson’s eyes
anyway. But Jefferson’s chosen replacement, Samuel Bishop, was both an underqualified septuagenarian and the father of a pugnacious Republican orator. Some three
weeks after Bishop’s appointment, members of New Haven’s merchant community sent
Jefferson a “remonstrance” reminding him of his promise not to wield patronage for
partisan purposes.60 The merchants were obviously alluding to Jefferson’s inaugural
address, in which he had promised not to foment “political intolerance.” Now, confronted
directly with an accusation of dissembling, Jefferson finally found himself compelled to
explain his understanding of “intolerance” for a Federalist audience.
In his response to the New Haven merchants, Jefferson calmly explained that his
earlier statements in favor of “political tolerance” did not commit him to leave all
officers in place. His Federalist predecessors had, after all, been notoriously intolerant
when it came to political appointments and removals; the result was that one party had
enjoyed a near-total “monopoly” of federal offices. Would it be “political intolerance,”
he rhetorically asked, for Republicans “to claim a proportionate share in the direction of
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public affairs?” If the Republicans’ “due participation” in the civil service was truly “a
matter of right,” the President had no choice but to remove some officers. As Jefferson
advised the New Haven merchants simply to be reasonable and allow others their fair
share, he came across as a frustrated but patient father adjudicating a dispute between
quarrelsome children.
But some of Jefferson’s other remarks revealed the subtle, muted influence of
more extreme Republicans, as he suggested that the people themselves had mandated a
change in the officers of government. In Jefferson’s words, the “will of the nation,
manifested by their various elections,” had called for “an administration of government
according with the opinions of those elected.” He therefore had to make some
“displacements,” not just to fulfill the rights of “due participation” in office but also to
satisfy the demands of his electorate. Even as he brandished his democratic mandate,
however, Jefferson still disavowed any intent to punish Federalist officers for their
opinions. He would remove midnight appointees like Goodrich, not because they were
Federalists but because Adams ought never to have appointed them in the first place.
Beyond that, Jefferson promised that he would only target officers who had been guilty
of “delinquency,” “oppression,” “intolerance,” or “antirevolutionary adherence to our
enemies.” Hopefully, he mused, the day would come when the only considerations would
be, “is he honest? is he capable? is he faithful to the Constitution?” But in the current
state of things, the will of the people and the principles of justice compelled Jefferson to
take other considerations into account.61
Jefferson’s reply to the New Haven merchants was, in the end, a model of
political politeness, with a few potentially radical statements about the will of the people
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sprinkled in to give his policy a more democratic flavor. He deliberately elided some of
the more controversial questions that had lingered in his mind for months. Jefferson did
not mention, for instance, that he hoped to kill Federalism with kindness. Beyond his
reference to revolutionary tories, he did not address the question of whether he would
remove Federalist officers who cherished royalist principles. These omissions seem all
the more conspicuous in light of a letter Jefferson sent to his Attorney General Levi
Lincoln that very same day, wherein he explained the difference between tolerable
Federalists and intolerable royalists. For Jefferson, the “federal sect of republicans” had
only diverged from their Republican brethren on the question of how much power should
be allotted to the Chief Executive, whereas the true “monocrats,” such as those in
Massachusetts’ infamous Essex Junto, wanted nothing less than “to erect an English
monarchy” on American shores. And although he was willing to work with those cryptoRepublican Federalists, he planned to “strip of all the means of influence the Essex junto
& their associate monocrats in every part of the union.” To that end, Jefferson wanted
Lincoln’s advice on how to handle Massachusetts’ supervisor of the revenue. Jefferson
had heard that the officer in question was a rather “amiable” man – “but amiable
monarchists,” he noted, “are not safe subjects of republican confidence.”62 Such language
was nowhere to be found in Jefferson’s reply to the New Haven merchants, which did not
even mention the existence of monarchists, let alone the distinctions between the
monarchical Federalists to be purged and the republican ones to be conciliated.
But regardless of just what criteria Jefferson actually applied on a case-by-case
level, he wanted to make sure that the administration at least appeared to be moderate. In
the long run, Jefferson’s conspicuous magnanimity would inevitably lure those wayward
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Republican Federalists back to the one true party – or so he hoped. He was less than
indifferent, however, to the opinion of “Monarchists.” “[F]rom them,” he wrote Thomas
McKean, “I wish nothing but their eternal hatred.”63

The Radical Rationale: Rotation in Office and the People’s Purge
Federalists by now had assumed the role of victimized outsiders, and their presses
were filled with fiery condemnations. One piece, entitled “Fatal Persecution,”
complained about Jefferson removing district attorneys who had been appointed by the
illustrious George Washington.64 Another article ridiculed those “Jacobins” who had
accused previous Federalist administrations of intolerance. Was it “intolerance,” this
author asked, for President Washington to prefer officers who had supported the
Constitution? Jefferson’s allies had simply concocted the notion of “Federal intolerance”
in order “to justify Jacobinic persecution.” Any man who resisted these new inquisitors
was destined to find himself denounced as “an inveterate heretic or apostate.”65
Where Federalist papers attacked, the redoubtable American Citizen came to the
defense – although not necessarily in the way that Jefferson would have hoped. Its July
31 editorial heartily concurred with Jefferson’s assertion that the current state of things
required Republicans to consider criteria beyond the questions of whether officers were
honest, capable, and faithful to the constitution. But even if such criteria were applied to
the present, the proprietors of the Citizen did not think that any of the men Jefferson
removed had been “faithful to the Constitution.” All those men had been, in the end, the
“abettors” of the Adams administration, which had been demonstrably hostile to the
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principles of the sacred founding document. These New York Republicans therefore
hoped that Jefferson would “proceed in the salutary work of reformation” until he had
reached at least a fair balance of parties in the civil service. Indeed, if they could have
had it their way, the editors of the Citizen would have gone far beyond that: “knowing the
injury the republic has sustained from its clemency and spirit of forgiveness manifested
to its enemies in past times, and fearing as we do, that a like impolicey would bring upon
us like troubles, we would leave indeed, had we the power, very few of them in office.”
They would not necessarily wish to “persecute” these internal enemies for “the bare
expression of their sentiments.” They merely hoped to see such men “reduce[d]… to the
level of common citizens,” thus stripped “of their super-added power to do mischief.”66
Jefferson was surprised to discover that his conciliatory response to the New
Haven merchants had inadvertently fueled radicals’ expectations. As he remarked to
Albert Gallatin, those “Sweeping republicans” seemed to have a different, less noble set
of priorities than did his fellow “moderate & genuine republicans.”67 Gallatin was even
more disgusted, especially when he turned to Denniston and Cheetham’s native New
York, where DeWitt Clinton and the Republican governing powers had recently
completed an “almost general sweep” of Federalist state officers. In Gallatin’s eyes, the
New Yorkers’ “general spirit of persecution” discredited the entire Republican cause and
reduced them all to the same level as their Federalist “predecessors.” Gallatin knew that
Richard Rogers was an old Tory from bygone days. But he was reluctant to sacrifice a
diligent civil servant just to appease a few bloodthirsty partisans.68
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Indeed, some of Jefferson’s supporters were beginning to sound like Federalists.
One piece, printed in Ebenezer Rhoades’ Independent Chronicle, read like something that
Federalist papers might have produced a few years before, as it peremptorily dismissed
the current Federalists’ complaints as those of a “pitiful, petulant, fault-finding, carping,
and malicious opposition.” Like the earlier Federalist screeds that had defended Adams
from accusations of intolerance, this piece emphasized how minimal Jefferson’s removals
had really been; by the author’s estimate, only about fifty of the nation’s three thousand
officers had been removed. (It was unclear how the author arrived at either figure.) “He
that complains of this, would complain in heaven; and to his jaundiced optics, scenes of
perfect peace would present nothing but difficulties and dangers.” After all, an “office of
value” was not a “life right.” Again echoing the Federalists of 1798, the author
rhetorically asked if “any government on earth could be supported, if every agent in
office was in direct opposition to the principle? Where would be the confidence – where
the harmony?” Unlike the earlier Federalists, however, this author claimed a democratic
mandate for the personnel turnover. The “public sense,” he wrote, had been “made too
manifest at the late election any longer to be doubted,” implying that the people’s
commission could justify any removals Jefferson thought necessary.69
The merging of Federalist and democratic logic also occurred in the writings of
radical Jeffersonians Benjamin Austin and James Cheetham, who championed a more
democratically authoritarian conception of the presidency. Austin, writing as “Old South”
for Boston’s Independent Chronicle, had previously defended Republicans for being
more magnanimous and less inclined to persecution than their Federalist rivals. But that
had been back in December of 1800. By August 1801, Austin’s priority was to convince
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readers that Jefferson’s removal of Federalist officers ought not to be construed as an
example of Republicans’ hypocritical “intolerance.” Austin pointed out, for instance, that
it was utterly hypocritical for Federalists to complain about any partisan patronage. John
Adams had tried to ensure that all of his officers shared the same principles, removing
“almost every man opposed to his politics,” so why should Jefferson be evaluated by any
other standard?70
Once again, however, Austin put a democratic spin on the old Federalist logic: the
people themselves had mandated this change in the principles of government, and it
logically followed that the officers of government should be united behind a common set
of principles.
[A]s the people have a right to change their public servants, the process of
their administration should be uniform in all its parts, in order to ascertain
the merits or demerits of the plans adopted and prosecuted. If this position
is not admitted, how can a President maintain a consistency of conduct in
the various objects contemplated, while a certain part of the government
are inimical to his proceedings – such discordancy of parts would be like a
house divided against itself; the government must ever be in a
fermentation, while there are various wheels in the machinery
counteracting the motions of each other.
If the new system was to be Republican in its principles, it could not abide agents
possessed of different principles. “The question is: can a Republican system be carried on
with alacrity, while many of the officers of government have a strong predilection for
Aristocracy?”71 Fellow radical James Cheetham would later elaborate on the line of
inquiry that Austin had begun, claiming that the people’s “will” ought to determine the
political composition of the federal bureaucracy. “[N]no man,” he wrote, “ought to
appointed to a subordinate office” if his “opinions” were “at variance with the public
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sentiment.” Jefferson would therefore betray the people’s “will” if he appointed “a
monarchial federalist” to any position; if anything, the President ought to have removed
even more officers.72
Not just content to reiterate Federalist logic in a radically democratic tongue,
Austin and Cheetham picked up where Thomas McKean had left off in 1800 when he
alluded to the republican benefits of regular “rotation” in the civil service. As we saw in
chapter 4, McKean had briefly mentioned “rotation in office” as something compatible
with republican government, but never explained why that might be the case. Austin and
Cheetham in 1801 nevertheless seized upon “rotation in office” as a policy that could
justify sweeping turnovers. Rotation, for Austin, was utterly republican and utterly fair,
for the simple reason that no single class of men could ever claim any exclusive right to
the “pecuniary benefits of the government.” Austin was not advocating a proto-welfare
state in which offices would be used to keep impoverished men afloat; indeed, the very
virtue of rotation was that it would prevent anyone from becoming a permanent
government dependent. “[N]o man,” he wrote, “has such a claim on government as to
demand a constant support from it.” Those who opposed rotation in office were
parasitical, anti-republican dependents – or, in Austin’s words, “the political horse
leaches, crying give, give.”73 In defending a system of rotation, then, Austin channeled
thinkers like the Federal Farmer, Thomas Paine, and Agricola, all of whom had identified
members of the parasite class as enemies of society. Rotation in office would irrigate this
quagmire.
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James Cheetham, writing as “Leonidas,” similarly denied that any officer ought to
enjoy his position as a life-right. Such a notion, he argued, would have been more
suitable to a monarchy, where gluttonous sycophants regularly held pensions and
sinecures for life. If that idea ever took hold in America, there would be no hope for any
man to hold an office except by inheritance. He similarly dismissed the idea that civil
offices required years of experience and accrued expertise. The subordinate clerks knew
the established forms and conventions for official duties in stations like the customs
house; a new appointee, with or without experience, could pick up on these job duties
quickly enough to ensure that no inefficiency would ensue. Frequent turnovers in the civil
service were therefore innocuous.74
By late 1802, Cheetham was also deploying Austin’s more radical argument that
“rotation in office” was necessary to prevent aristocratic separate interest from emerging.
Americans already insisted on a regular rotation of elected officials, he wrote, so why
should the same principle not be applied to civil officers in the executive branch?
Officers who held their positions in perpetuity would not feel themselves to be dependent
on the people’s will, which meant that they would become, in short, a separate interest
group with a separate, possibly adversarial agenda. This was nothing less than an
“aristocracy” of entrenched officers.
You separate him from the great mass, his interest from your’s; create him
a sort of superior, or artificial NOBLE: a despot who looks down in
sovereign contempt on those who supply his wants, and nurture his pride.
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Here commences that haughty and overbearing aristocracy which has held
men in chains for thousands of years.
Thus the rulers would be pitted against the ruled, the rich against the poor. Cheetham
tethered his argument to the older republican tradition with such supple finesse that a
reader might not even realize that the idea of “rotating” civil servants had been in vogue
for barely a year.75
By 1802, then, Austin and Cheetham had perfected two relatively new arguments
to justify a Republican President purging executive officers. Just as the Republicans’
earlier complaints about executive patronage had furnished the Federalist “Outs” with a
ready-made language of opposition, so too did the Federalists’ earlier defense of
executive patronage provide Republicans with a way to defend their commander-in-chief.
It would be too reductive, however, to say that the Outs simply became the Ins and vice
versa, for the Republican writers had added a distinctly democratic spin to this logic. Like
the Federalists, these writers found it logical that subordinate executive officers should
share the same principles as the chief executive himself. More so than the Federalists,
however, they justified this argument by claiming that the people themselves had
demanded such a change. Federalists had always insisted that the majority of Americans
supported their party, but they never claimed that the majority of the people had
commissioned Adams to remove Republican officers. According to the logic now being
developed by men like Benjamin Austin, every election would be a referendum on the
previous President’s choice of officers.
The emerging premise of “rotation in office” was more novel, and potentially
more unsettling. On the one hand, it seemed like an effective mechanism to prevent the
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republic from deteriorating into a monarchical court. Displacing officers on a semiregular basis would prevent any of them from feeling any aristocratic right to enjoy their
sinecures. This in turn would check the aspirations of all those ever-proliferating,
dependent seekers – the “indolent” men who had flourished in the 1790s Republican
imaginary, drawing their lifetime salaries from the taxes of the “industrious” many. No
cancerous “natural aristocracy” would grow in this body politic, nor would Paine’s
“Augean stable of parasites and plunderers” be allowed to fester undisturbed. It was
perfectly republican to grant every man an equal right to office. The question remained,
however, whether it was republican for any man to want one.
The specter of Thomas McKean cast a shadow over all these debates. Both of
these notions – the democratic mandate and rotation in office – had been present in
Thomas McKean’s self-defense the year before, but neither of them had been developed
or explained at any length prior to the summer of 1801. The Federalists’ accusations of
Republican hypocrisy had forced them to explain. Jefferson, perhaps recognizing the
furor occasioned by McKean’s purge in Pennsylvania and not wanting to seem like a
vindictive partisan himself, had avoided McKean’s inflammatory arguments, choosing
instead to emphasize party parity. Where Jefferson publicly emphasized his commitments
to conciliation and moderation, his supporters in the press denied that conciliation and
moderation were even necessary. In other words, Jefferson wanted the world to know that
he would be a fair republican rather than a ruthless inquisitor. His radical supporters, on
the other hand, wanted the world to know that the protection of republicanism might
require a ruthless touch.
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Some observers might have seen these radical rationales as discursive veils for
officeseekers’ agendas. And if such were the case, the entire Jeffersonian reformation
would have been a bad joke, with all the sound and fury of Jeffersonian rhetoric
signifying nothing but hypocrisy. But if we take a closer look at the Republicans who
actually applied for all these offices in 1801, we will see that the applicants took great
pains to distance themselves from any association with mere “officeseeking.” They were
every bit as determined as Jefferson to avoid any impression of being the Outs displacing
the Ins.

Suffering Republicans
Jefferson had only been in office three weeks when he received perhaps the most
remarkable application letter of his entire Presidency. What made the epistle so striking
was its author’s almost indifferent candor about his own self-interest. He did not, in his
words, even “pretend to any superior republican patriotism or love for the country.” He
was simply a Virginia Quaker named John Sutton who wanted a job.76 One wonders if
Jefferson found Sutton’s bluntness refreshing. Most of the other applicants were still
visibly uncomfortable with the thought of being seen as selfish officeseekers.
And with good reason. The men who applied for office in 1801 had to navigate a
tricky discursive landscape, and they had to carry years’ worth of ideological baggage the
entire way. American patriots had spent the Revolutionary era denigrating all the selfish
placemen and place-seekers in their midst. Since 1787, Antifederalists and Republicans
had identified the officeholder as a gratuitous burden on the people. The proverbial
officeseeker was a venal and dependent man bereft of any lasting principles – a man who
76
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would not scruple to collaborate with whatever tyrant offered him a place or pension.
With the officers of government being set in opposition to the people at large, and the
officeseekers being set in opposition to republican principles, any man who wanted an
office under Jefferson treaded a precarious tightrope. This, of course, was not an entirely
new predicament. As we saw in chapter 3, the men who applied for office under
Washington took pains to ensure that they came across as sincere patriots who had
suffered for their country without thought of reward, rather than venal courtiers
supplicating the President for material gain.
Applicants in 1801 still sensed the stigma of being seen as a seeker. They
frequently told the administration that their “friends” had “advised” or “induced” them to
apply, thus insinuating that the thought of seeking office had never occurred to them
before.77 It is easy to fathom why: the man who sought or even accepted an office
presumably had suspicious motives. The power of this suspicion could put politicians in a
predicament. John Thomson Mason had previously run for Maryland’s state assembly on
a democratic platform, only to have political enemies claim that his real aspiration was to
set himself up for “some lucrative office” in the future. Mason denied the charge,
declaring that he would never even accept the offer of an appointment. This rash
pronunciation put Mason in a bind when Jefferson offered him an appointment as district
attorney in 1801, for Mason then found himself reluctant to break his earlier vow.78
Like the earlier applicants of Washington’s time, then, the applicants of 1801 felt
compelled to seek office without coming across as mere officeseekers. “If I have a
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correct idea of myself and of office hunters,” wrote Connecticut printer Samuel Morse in
his application, “I belong not to the class.” Tellingly, Morse noted his reluctance to
demonstrate “the trembling and fearful hope of a courtier.”79 Others tried to establish that
recent financial hardships had forced them to depart from their usual diffidence.80 “There
was a time,” wrote Pennsylvania’s Anthony Butler, “when the United States had not an
office, for which, from a motive of Interest or Support, I would have applied, but I had
not then been hurled from the most brilliant mercantile Consequence to my present
unfortunate Position.” Butler noted that others’ “political Animosity” had led him to his
current predicament – and he was not alone in that respect.81 Charles Peale Polk of
Maryland, for instance, claimed that his poverty had resulted from the “Spirit of
persecution” that prevailed among Maryland’s wealthier citizens; he only applied for a
job now under the “reluctant pressure of necessity.”82 These lamentations about suffering
were almost as ubiquitous in the applications of 1801 as they had been in the applications
of Washington’s time. One candidate had “faithfully Served the Republic during the
revolution” and “Suffered Severely” for his efforts, living to see his property destroyed
by the British and his finances ruined by the paper certificates debacle.83 Jabez Bingham
of western Pennsylvania similarly described himself as “a Great sufferer in the time of
the British war.”84 James Barbour of Kentucky had “Chearfully” spent money out of
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pocket to raise and provision troops during the Revolution, but had “never received one
Shilling” in return.85
Importantly, however, these claims of financial sacrifice were not restricted to
those who had assisted in the Revolutionary War effort; now, fresh off a heated electoral
contest, such claims were also pressed by partisans who had sacrificed for the Republican
cause. Solomon Southwick, for instance, recommended his publishing partner at the
Albany Register for a position as marshal, taking special care to note the “very
considerable pecuniary sacrifices” that he and his partner had made “in consequence of
our attachment to and support of republican principles.”86 Numerous correspondents
similarly inundated Jefferson with stories of how they and their friends had suffered at
the hands of the Federalist enemy for love of liberty. Alexander Boyd had been a faithful
war veteran before being appointed as Philadelphia’s port inspector, only to find himself
“abruptly Dismissed from office” on account of his “Known Republican principles.”87
Joseph Whipple and William Gardner had been removed by Adams a few years earlier,
and similarly complained that they had fallen victim to the “inviterate [sic] Tories.”88
Some applicants, including Aurora editor William Duane, regaled Jefferson with
stories about the “persecution” they and their friends had endured, and explained at
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length how Federalists’ “hostility” had cost them business.89 Other recommenders simply
mentioned their friends’ “persecution” without any explanation, evidently trusting that
the mere word itself would have a talismanic effect.90 The source of power behind this
invocation of “persecution” was not just that it appealed to Jefferson’s gratitude. It also
proved that the applicant was a true Republican, one who willingly suffered for his
principles. When John Vaughan recommended his nephew, he claimed that the man’s
“political principles” had been “proven by the test of federal persecution.”91 James Lyon,
attempting to establish that his friend had “been a uniform patriot,” pointed to the fact
that the man had not won any rewards for his service to the cause; rather, the only
“reward of his democratic writings and exertions for ten years past” had been
“Persecution by the tories.”92
A willingness to suffer thus signaled one’s consistency in principles, implicitly
establishing that the applicant’s actions had not been motivated by any thought of
immediate reward. This was the argument that war veterans had pressed when they
applied to Washington, and these veterans continued to do so in 1801. Numerous letters
of application and recommendation insistently noted that the candidate in question had
not only served his country during the Revolution, but had done so from the beginning to
the end of the late contest – thus indicating that he was more than a sunshine patriot.93 In
the same way that these old soldiers declared the consistency of their devotion during the
Revolutionary War, so too did Republicans declare the consistency of their devotion
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throughout the late political tribulations. “I have seen him in the day of proscription and
peril as well as in the time of triumph & exaltation,” wrote DeWitt Clinton in defense of a
candidate’s disinterested and principled ways.94 Often a candidate was commended for
his fidelity in both the 1776 War for Independence and the 1798 war for Republican
principles. James Monroe praised the New Yorker David Gelston not just for being “a
firm patriot in our revolution,” but also for being “always a republican and a bold
supporter of the cause when it was most dangerous to support it.”95 The immigrant
Frenchman Benjamin Nones drew even more explicit links between his Revolutionary
War service and his later political sufferings. In Nones’ own words, his “warm and ardent
Attachment” to the American cause had led him to take “an early and active part in that
glorious revolution,” serving from 1776 until his capture in 1780. Ever since then, his
“principles” had remained “uniform in the Cause of Republicanism.” Like so many other
applicants, however, Nones’s “Interest” had suffered due to his “firm adherrence to these
principles.” Local “Commercial” men had refused to patronize his business on account of
his politics.96
It was, then, a matter of some concern for the officeseeker to demonstrate his
moral superiority over his plight by performing the role of a man whose principles were
firm and consistent. Multiple candidates were recommended for the “steady” service they
had rendered ever since the Revolution, suggesting that such men, unlike other
candidates, had never vacillated or apostasized.97 One’s decidedness could be evident in
his penchant for boldness, even adversity. When Joel Lewis heard about the controversy
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surrounding his own appointment as the Delaware marshal, he insisted that his only
“crime” was his decision to remain “definate” [sic] – he still adhered to “the same
principles” that he had cherished in 1776, which the enemies construed as “inordinate
political zeal.”98 (He kept his appointment.) The decided man would inevitably contrast
with the ever-equivocating “trimmer” who sought out the safe middle grounds.99 When
Jacob Crowninshield recommended John Gibaut, he took care to observe that the rival
candidate had “trimed [sic] to the Federal breeze,” whereas Gibaut was known to be a
Republican both “in word and in deed, undisguised and without hesitation,” always
putting himself forth as “the open and declared opponent of anti-republican tendencies.”
[I]n the perilous seasons of federal power, in times when the finger of
scorn pointed to the Republican, and said, ‘this is a Jacobin, come let us
kill him and his inheritance shall be ours,’ in times such as these, which
we have all seen, Mr. Gibaut with about twenty others in this town boldly
stem’d the torrent, which then seemed as it were to threaten every thing
dear to us…100
The emerging image of the worthy Republican partisan was that of a man
distinguished by defiant, impetuous contempt for his own wellbeing. Samuel Bryan, for
instance, had dismissed his own pecuniary self-interest in order to support the Republican
Thomas McKean’s gubernatorial candidacy. As a Pennsylvania register general, Bryan
had “depended” on the salary drawn from his office, but nevertheless “dared every
consequence” for the sake of the cause, writing polemics against the Federalist governor
(who was also his boss). His various “exertions,” had of course, incurred the “enmity” of
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his own state’s “aristocracy,” obliging him to endure various “torrents of abuse.”101 Other
candidates were commended for their willingness to defy even members of their own
family. One youthful Virginian had been left “almost friendless” on account of his
politics. “He has obstinately taken it into his head to think for himself,” wrote John T.
Mason, “and pursuing the dictates of his judgment, he has uniformly been a democratic
Republican.” Of course, the young man’s untamable “independence of spirit” had not
endeared him to his “violent” Federalist relatives.102 And that was the point: those who
were defiant enough to court persecution would inevitably be forced to endure it.
Isaac Cox Barnet had no track record of demonstrable defiance, and therefore had
to devise other ways to establish himself as a good and patriotic Republican if he wanted
to keep his post as consul at Bordeaux. Barnet’s situation was doubly perilous: he had
already held a consulate at Brest during the Washington and Adams administrations, and
the latter President had appointed him to his new position in the final weeks of his
Presidency. As a “midnight” appointee, his commission was axiomatically illegitimate in
the eyes of President Jefferson, who removed him in June 1801. The information of his
dismissal was slow to reach Barnet in Bordeaux. When it did, Barnet and his friends
scrambled to convince the President that he was an unimpeachable Republican who
deserved to keep his job.
Benjamin Homans, a Republican merchant who had befriend Barnet while
residing in Bordeaux, tried to convince Jefferson that this suspect midnight appointee was
in fact a worthy suffering patriot. Barnet’s father had served in the war, only to see his
estate wrecked by the British. And Barnet himself had spent five years of his young life
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in public service, thus squandering any chance to establish himself in the private sector;
now, at the age of 28, he was dependent on his office. Homans apparently realized that an
appeal to Jefferson’s pity would not be enough, and further insisted that Barnet was not
just a true patriot but also a true Republican in the Jeffersonian mold. This was a difficult
claim to make, however. Unlike those defiant Republicans who had spurned their
fortunes in defense of the cause, Barnet had never proclaimed his principles for the world
to hear. But Homans believed that Barnet’s political reticence simply reflected his
“modesty.” And while Barnet had suffered the misfortune of being appointed by John
Adams, the important thing was that he had not compromised his principles – he had
“never obtained that promise by servility or collision [sic],” nor had he ever compromised
his honor “for the sake of interest.”103
With Homans’s encouragement, Barnet ventured a letter on his own behalf,
wherein he reiterated his status as a suffering patriot who would never stoop to flattery or
dishonor. According to Barnet’s own self-portrait, he had never “espoused” any
particular “party,” but still believed that his “political sentiments” as a Jeffersonian
Republican would withstand “scrutiny.” Not that he would sink to the level of
elaboration. “To expatiate,” he wrote, “would expose me to the suspicion of flattery, and
flattery is degrading to the manly feelings of a republican.”104 Barnet reiterated these
sentiments to Madison a few months later, claiming that he had been perfectly
“impartial” in his past post, choosing to cherish Republicanism in his heart while
remaining outwardly “silent” on political matters. The important thing, in Barnet’s mind,
was that he had transcended any sort of corrupt bargains: “without offending the opinion
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of any Man,” he boasted, “I never surrendered my own by collusion.”105 This was a rather
flattering self-depiction of principled political silence. It fell to another one of Barnet’s
recommenders, Fulwar Skipwith, to acknowledge the more uncomfortable truth: the real
reason for Barnet’s “complacency” was that he had been “dependent” on his salary as an
officer of the government.106 But these pleas of innocence on Barnet’s behalf were
ultimately effective; Jefferson appointed him to a different consulate the following year.
Barnet’s case is revealing for two reasons. First, the pleading attempts to establish
his credentials as a sincere Republican reveal the importance of visibility. Other
applicants were able to demonstrate their Republican sincerity by recounting their
histories of defiance. Barnet’s conspicuous political reticence, however, left him no
choice but to state his principles and have others verify them. In other words, not only
was it important for federal officeholders to be genuine republicans; it was equally
important that they be able to prove their ideological status. Both he and his
recommenders seem to have realized this point. Second, Barnet and his recommenders’
repeated insistence that he had never been involved in “collusion” reflected the
Jeffersonian Republicans’ suspicion that corrupt transactions had permeated every aspect
of the Federalist civil service. As an officer holding a last-minute commission from
President Adams, Barnet evidently understood that he was up against a presumption of
guilt.
And with good reason: numerous letters of application and recommendation
testified, in some way or another, to Jeffersonians’ prevailing sense that Federalist
appointees were the cringing sycophants of a corrupt administration. Writing on behalf of
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his own son, James Warren identified the incumbent Massachusetts collector as an inept
appointee who had only retained office through displays of “officious servility” –
whereas Warren’s aspiring son was high-minded enough to have more than “private
interest” in view.107 John Garland Jefferson thought it necessary to explain that he had
never sought an appointment before and would never surrender his own integrity to
obtain one. “I have never once applied to one of your predecessors,” he wrote, “nor
would I have accepted an office under a man who might have exacted from me any thing
inconsistent with the principles of the strictest honor, nor with my ideas of the most rigid
integrity.”108
The suffering partisan’s foil was the courtier, the man of no real conviction who
cavalierly shifted his ground with every change of the weather, always ready to utter
whatever felicities might secure him a post. In 1801, the attributes of the courtier-seeker
were projected onto all the men who had the poor luck to be appointed by John Adams.
Applicants were keen to distance themselves from their predecessors’ venal opportunism
– and, indeed, from the crassness of rival Republicans who cared only for gain.
Pennsylvania’s William Irvine, for instance, warned Jefferson about “office hunters” in
the same breath that he requested his own “chance to render some more service.” Irvine
naturally feared that Jefferson might read his Republican professions as the outward
pretext of an office hunter, but he calmly promised to “scorn” such mercenary “motives,”
“even in absolute want.”109 David Rittenhouse’s younger brother Benjamin sung a similar
tune:
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Altho I can Sollemly [sic] declare the little weight I had in the great
pollitical ballance to your advancement has been us’d without a Single
Idea of personal Interest, but only for what I conciev’d the good and well
being of the great family of mankind and from which I claim no Merit as
deserving your particular attention and favor.
Rittenhouse, like so many other applicants, only applied because his friends had “urg’d”
it on him – knowing, as they did, that he had been “a sufferer in the Revolutionary war”
who afterwards sought neither “Compensation” nor “Appointment.”110 Vermont printer
James Lyon had also served the Republican cause from the beginning, but now
“disclaim[ed] the idea” that all his “extraordinary exertions and sufferings” should
furnish any grounds for “preference” – unless, he cautiously added, Jefferson thought
those considerations ought to hold any weight.111 Other applicants tried to convince
Jefferson that, in so many words, they were more than just the greedy “Outs” clinging to
a patron for hope of reward. Some of them assured the President that there would be no
hard feelings or disgruntlement if he chose to appoint other applicants.112 It was
frequently implied that the Federalists acted on less lofty motives. When Fulwar Skipwith
ventured a recommendation for Federalist J.J. Waldo, he took care to note that the man
had supported Federalists out of patriotic conviction rather than monarchical
predilections or “personal interest.”113
The Jeffersonian “suffering patriot” narrative rested on an uneasy paradox. The
sincerity of a man’s principles was gauged by whether or not he had acted for the sake of
obtaining an office; the fact that a patriot was no mere officeseeker was precisely the
reason why he would be worthy of an office. By this logic, then, a true Republican would
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be too high-minded to apply for an office at all – hence all of the Jeffersonian
officeseekers’ tortuous attempts to distance themselves from the act of applying for office
in the very moment that they applied for office. Jacksonians would later face a similar
paradox and take even greater pains to establish their sincerity of purpose and purity of
heart.

Conclusion: Principle and Practice in the Jeffersonian Reformation
When the first Jeffersonian Congress finally convened in December 1801, the
new commander-in-chief had to provide an accounting of his first year in office, a year
defined in large part by arguments about his use or misuse of political patronage.
Jefferson’s first annual message almost completely eschewed the issue of removals and
appointments, as he tried to refocus attention on his achievements in retrenchment. He
spoke exultingly of the progress his administration had made in simplifying government
and “reducing our burthens.” His administration had begun to reduce the number of
offices at the President’s disposal, especially in the diplomatic corps. “Other reformations
of the same kind”, he wrote, ought to be “pursued with caution” so that “useless things”
might be eliminated. For the previous “organization” of government had grown entirely
“too complicated,” and offices had been “multiplied unnecessarily.” And now Jefferson
exhorted the new Congress to continue the good work, for they still held most of the
power to terminate unnecessary offices.
Considering the general tendency to multiply offices and dependencies,
and increase expense to the ultimate term of burthen which the citizen can
bear, it behooves us to avail ourselves of every occasion which presents
itself for taking off the surcharge; that it never may be seen here that, after
leaving labor to the smallest portions of its earnings on which it can
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subsist, government shall itself consume the whole residue of what it was
instituted to guard.
He remained cagey about his policy toward removing officers, mentioning only that he
had “discontinued” some derelict officers in the revenue service. Toward the very end of
his address, Jefferson mentioned that the right of trial by jury might be jeopardized if the
jurors were selected by marshals whose tenures were contingent on the will of the
executive; these remarks did not mention that he had been industriously purging those
marshals who abused the trust. He said nothing at all about removing Tories,
monarchists, or violent electioneers.114 In short, Jefferson chose to emphasize economic
retrenchment as the most efficacious way to stop the creeping power of executive
patronage, eliding all the other considerations that had entered his mind in the previous
eight months.
And now it was Congress’s turn to continue his good work and eliminate the
“useless things.” By the end of the 1801-1802 Congressional session, Republicans were
able to repeal the Judiciary Act and the excise taxes, thus eliminating all the new
judgeships and Federalist-appointed excise officers. Jefferson was eminently satisfied by
his party’s success in purging unnecessary offices and thus “disarming Executive
patronage.”115 By one Republican paper’s tally, Congress had eradicated “nearly 500
offices” along with the internal taxes; the elimination of the new judgeships alone had
saved the United States $450,000.116 “Their system of patronage and influence… tending
to corruption, is broken up,” wrote a commenter in Boston’s Independent Chronicle
(probably Benjamin Austin). Now the “hundreds of Excise men, who were eating the
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public bread, should return, from habits of indolence, to eat the bread of their own
labour.”117
By the end of 1803, Jefferson had finished the work of removing these officers.
Few removals would ensue for the remaining five years of his presidency. Although it is
nearly impossible to determine exactly how many officers Jefferson purged, we have
enough numbers at our disposal to justify some broad conclusions. In total, Jefferson
removed at least forty-eight officers himself; depending on how one defines a “removal,”
that number could be augmented to over a hundred. Collectors fared the worst, followed
by the midnight-appointed district marshals and justices of the peace.118 On the one hand,
this was by far the largest sweep ever conducted by any President so far; Adams, in
comparison, had removed just twenty-two officers during his four years. But if one takes
Jefferson’s word for it that nearly all offices had belonged to Federalists at the beginning
117
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of 1801, then one can certainly praise Jefferson’s moderation in leaving most of those
officers where they lay.
But the numbers only tell part of the story, and the other part of the story is to be
found in Jefferson’s correspondence and newspaper critiques, where he and fellow
Republicans had to hash out the objectives of the new patronage policy. Jefferson had
fondly hoped in March 1801 that retrenchment would solve the problem of patronage.
For in his and many southern Republicans’ minds, patronage was fundamentally a
problem of economics: the previous ruling party had created new offices in order to
sustain themselves, and had exacted taxes in order to fund those extra offices. By
eliminating all of government’s “useless things,” the Jeffersonians could prove
themselves superior to their profligate predecessors. But by the time the Republican
Congress of 1801 had eliminated the previous administration’s Judiciary Act and internal
taxes, a new set of questions had already forced themselves upon Jefferson’s
consideration – questions that took him far afield from the relatively sedate plan of
cutting taxes, and into the more fraught world of democratic logic. What sort of men
could be safely entrusted with the offices of government? Malfeasant officers and
“midnight” appointees furnished easy targets, but what about those men whose sins were
merely political? Here Jefferson faced some of the same difficulties that had troubled
Washington and Adams before him. It would have been patently suicidal if he allowed
his bitter enemies to wield the power of office against his administration. At the same
time, it was ideologically compromising to remove those officers – Republicans and
republicanism were supposed to be better than that. Where exactly should officers draw
the line between expressing one’s political opinion and abusing one’s official influence?
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Jefferson never fully resolved any of these dilemmas. He stood his ground when he
could, placated radicals when he had to, and frequently equivocated or dissembled.
These questions would have been vexing enough by themselves, but Jefferson
also had to contend with James Cheetham and other radical Republicans urging him to be
ruthless rather than gracious. Jefferson thought that Federalism, for most of its benighted
adherents, was nothing more than a temporary disease of the mind that could be cured by
some healthy exposure to Republican administration; Cheetham and his fellow radicals
thought that Federalism was a toxic heresy that had to be stamped out at any price.
Jefferson, believing that most Federalists still cherished Republicanism in their hearts,
wanted to conciliate those who had been led astray; radicals, believing in the basic
incorrigibility of the Tory infidels, did not want to risk their party’s cause on some
misplaced faith in the persuasive power of Republican principles. Jefferson, with his
high-minded notions of disinterested patriotism, was reluctant simply to reward partisans
with offices; radicals, less well insulated from the costs of disinterested patriotism, were
reluctant to accept the injustice of having suffered for a cause while enemies retained
their rewards.
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Chapter Six:
Corrupt Bargains: Parties, Principles, and Patronage, 1803-1820

When Jefferson left the presidency in 1809, he prepared himself for a comfortable
and complacent retirement. He soon realized that the events of his political past would
continue to haunt him into his twilight years. The Federalist Chief Justice John Marshall
had published a lengthy biography of George Washington in 1807, and the entire
endeavor struck Jefferson as nothing less than an act of post-facto Federalist historical
propaganda. At some point between 1809 and 1818, Jefferson began compiling notes and
anecdotes for his own comprehensive counter-history. The volume never reached
publication in his lifetime.1 But in the course of composing a historiographical counterattack, Jefferson penned a bitter refutation of Marshall’s revisionist tome, and his remarks
revealed a curious anxiety about the moral authority of American Republicans.
were a reader of this period to form his idea of it from this history alone,
he would suppose the republican party (who were in truth endeavoring to
keep the government within the line of the constitution, and prevent its
being monarchised in practice) were a mere set of grumblers, and
disorganizers, satisfied with no government, without fixed principles of
any [sic], and, like a British parliamentary opposition, gaping after loaves
and fishes, and ready to change principles, as well as position, at any time,
with their adversaries. but a short review of facts, omitted, or uncandidly
stated in this history will shew that the contests of the day were contests of
principle, between the advocates of republican, and those of kingly
government….2
What troubled Jefferson most, then, was that Marshall had arrayed a smattering of
evidence to present Republicans as fundamentally unprincipled officeseekers. And in
doing so, Marshall had struck at the very heart of Jeffersonian Republican identity. Even
1
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during the 1790s, when Republicans had languished as voices in the political wilderness,
the Federalist ruling party had sneered at them as a malcontent band of unprincipled
demagogues who wrapped their officeseeking designs behind homiletic slogans. Those
accusations had followed the Republican Party into power after 1800, once Jefferson
commenced his work of “reformation.”
As the party began to fracture after 1803, Republicans turned their suspicions
inwards. Different Republican sects now found themselves at one another’s throats, each
one claiming to represent the genuinely principled segment of the old coalition, each one
denouncing rival factions as unprincipled officeseekers. Republicans in New York and
Pennsylvania would eventually recognize the expediency of building inter-party
alliances, only to find themselves attacked for abandoning their party’s principles. And at
both the state and national level, Republicans would find their ideals conflicting with
more mundane political considerations. Jefferson’s presidential heir, James Madison,
would soon realize that he could not thwart British aggressions while continuing to abide
by the old Republican rulebook, nor could he prosecute a war without expanding
executive patronage; when he capitulated to reality, he found himself attacked as a
hypocrite. The congressional nominating caucus was an expedient way to concentrate
party energy, yet its advocates would find themselves attacked for endorsing a system
that was vulnerable to corruption.
In 1800, then, the Republican Party appeared to be the victor in national politics;
by 1820, that victory seemed absolute. But throughout these two decades, the victors
found themselves in the throes of an identity crisis that would persist into the 1820s and
the age of Jackson.
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Patronage and Principles in Pennsylvania and New York, 1803 – 1810
In an age full of colorful characters, William Duane was surely one of the most
vibrant. Born in America in 1760, he spent most of his young life in Ireland before
traveling to Calcutta, where he operated a local paper, The Bengal Journal. His activities
as a printer soon began to irritate local British authorities, who deported him to England.
In French-Revolution-era England, the now radicalized journalist once again ran afoul of
British authorities, and he found himself fleeing yet another country to evade prosecution.
In 1796, his sojourns took him full circle, as he returned to his native United States,
where he met Benjamin Franklin Bache and soon established himself as a leading
luminary in Philadelphia’s radical circles. He took over the Aurora after Bache’s death
and continued – perhaps even amplified – its extreme tone. Duane outdid his predecessor
when it came to enduring persecution. From 1798 to 1800, he braved indictments under
the Sedition Act and even physical violence. The Aurora never became a terribly
profitable paper, but it did become an undeniably effective political organ; Duane gave
himself ample credit for securing the elections of both Governor McKean and President
Jefferson.3 Such reveries were not to last, for Duane was ultimately better at cultivating
adversity than retaining friends. As one historian puts it, “There would have been no
Jeffersonian arguments in Philadelphia if not for the obstreperous personality and
incendiary writings of William Duane.”4
Fissures began to open between Pennsylvania’s moderate and radical Republicans
almost as soon as McKean took the gubernatorial reins in 1799. Duane and his fellow
3
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radicals did not think McKean went nearly far enough in his purge of Federalist officers.5
Self-interest factored into Duane’s calculations, as he felt himself entitled to some office
or other pecuniary reward for his trouble.6 This did not mean that Duane was simply a
venal party hack. As historian Jeffrey L. Pasley argues, Duane felt that he had rendered
an invaluable and patriotic service to his country by attacking the Federalist regimes. But
unlike the independently wealthy President Jefferson, Duane could not afford to serve his
country for free. Political newspapers were notoriously unprofitable ventures, and the
only way a political printer like Duane could remain solvent was by receiving some sort
of office or government contract.7 The journalist already felt piqued for not receiving any
political office from the new governor’s hands, but he kept his mouth shut and toed the
party line for the time being. This was a sensible strategy. McKean was known for his
vindictive willingness to remove officers who opposed his will, and Duane was not eager
to commit political suicide just yet.8
In 1803, Pennsylvania’s radicals and moderates openly clashed over federal
patronage. Duane and his allies had by now made it clear that they would settle for
nothing less than a complete purge of every last Federalist officer in Pennsylvania, and
militantly challenged the Republicanism of anyone who dared to suggest a more
magnanimous policy. Some of the more moderate Republicans tried to assure Jefferson
that most members of the party were perfectly content with his more conciliatory
approach.9 Duane and his fellow radicals insisted that such was not the case, issuing
resolutions to declare that the majority of Philadelphia Republicans wanted a
5

G.S. Rowe, Thomas McKean: The Shaping of an American Republicanism (Boulder: Colorado Associated
University Press, 1978), 330.
6
Rowe, Thomas McKean, 324.
7
Pasley, Tyranny of Printers, 191-194.
8
Rowe, Thomas McKean, 331.
9
See editor’s notes, TJP: MS, 40:348; Phillips, “Origins of Modern Politics,” 370-371.

245

comprehensive sweep.10 But Treasury Secretary Gallatin peremptorily dismissed Duane’s
crew as a gang of schismatic officeseekers, and moderate Philadelphians continued to
assure the administration that such men need not be taken seriously.11 Radicals would not
take such dismissals lying down. In July 1803, they issued another resolution, asserting
that all of Philadelphia’s officers were incorrigible Federalists who used their “official
influence” in order “to purchase proselytes for their cause.”12 Neither Jefferson nor
Gallatin could take these claims seriously. The most powerful officers in Philadelphia
were well known Republicans, and it was preposterous to believe that they would use
their patronage for the benefit of Federalists.13 What the administration failed to
understand was that, for radicals like Duane, there were Republicans – and then there
were Republicans.
As historian Andrew Shankman has shown, there were profound differences
emerging between Pennsylvania’s radical and moderate camps. The radical democrats,
under Duane’s intellectual leadership, believed that a true democracy required nearequality of condition; without it, the poor would become dependent on the rich, and
consequently less capable of exercising the selfless virtue necessary for a
commonwealth.14 These radicals were not simple levelers. Firmly convinced that the
most unjust inequalities were created by the state rather than by private enterprise, they
10
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focused their efforts on measures to keep the government more accountable to the will of
the people. The legislature was the most democratic and therefore most important branch,
and therefore the most likely to express the majority will. The governor, courts, and state
senate, being less democratic in their selection and composition, were more likely to
uphold measures concentrating wealth in the hands of the few. Moderate Republicans
like McKean could hardly have disagreed more. Indeed, they feared that radicals’ fetish
for unmitigated majority rule would impinge on the rights of private property, thereby
undermining the conditions for economic prosperity.15 These ideological tensions
gradually strained the relationship between McKean and the radicals to the breaking
point. In 1805, the frustrated Republican members of the General Assembly officially
rejected McKean when they nominated Simon Snyder for the governorship. McKean,
undeterred by his apparent excommunication from the Republican Party, joined forces
with Federalists to form a third-party “Quid” ticket in 1805. Now openly at odds with the
governor they had once labored to elect, the radicals in 1805 pushed for a new
constitutional convention to reduce the power of the judiciary and the executive.
Duane and his fellow radicals had previously urged McKean to wield executive
patronage more vigorously, but by 1805 they had come to see strong executives as a
threat to majority rule – a threat seemingly vindicated by McKean’s almost wanton
punishment of political enemies. The radicals thus proposed a new constitution that
would reduce the executive’s control over state-level patronage. “Cato,” writing in the
pages of Duane’s Aurora, warned that the governor’s nearly categorical dominion over
patronage could potentially empower despots like McKean to build up their own loyal
aristocracy. What if, for instance, the governor chose to fill all the offices with the
15
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wealthiest citizens? Such men already had their own network of “connexions” and
“dependents” scattered throughout the state; those underlings would then be united
behind the officeholders’ cause, and the officeholders in turn would be united behind the
governor’s cause.16 Viewing the Pennsylvania scene from Connecticut, another radical
paper chimed in to note that McKean could use his “strong cordon of zealous
dependents” as a weapon against democracy. The governor’s officers, spread, throughout
“every township in the state,” all knew that their tenures depended on McKean’s; they
would therefore “strain every nerve to promote his success.”17 With such concerns in
mind, some frustrated Republican state legislators gathered in 1805 to issue an address
that accused McKean of using patronage to built a third party of personal followers.18
Where McKean’s party represented nothing more than an unprincipled personal
faction, the radicals, in their own eyes, constituted the party of principles. “Agricola”
explained as much in the pages of the Aurora, where he defined true parties as groups of
men who cherished a common set of “principles” – quite unlike the mere “faction[s],”
whose adherents only cared about obtaining offices. If a group of men adhered to the
same principles both in and out of office, they were a party; if they disregarded their
former professions once they were in power, they were a faction.19 Writing from New
York, fellow radical James Cheetham’s American Citizen diagnosed a similar distinction
between the different Pennsylvania parties: some of the men who had supported McKean
back in 1799 had truly desired reform in government, while others had only desired
16
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offices. Everyone had agreed that McKean should purge state offices in order to fulfill
the people’s will; some of them had been “interested” in acquiring offices, while others
like Duane had supported McKean for more “disinterested” reasons. The radicals,
according to the Citizen, did not just want to purge the offices, but to reform
Pennsylvania’s system of government and thus prevent future abuses.20 The Citizen’s
diagnosis was, of course, slightly disingenuous. Even if Duane had sincerely hoped that
McKean’s election would lead to lasting reform, he had also hoped to obtain an office
himself. But Duane did not tease out such nuances in the Aurora. Instead, he relied on the
old Jeffersonian rhetorical binary, pitting his party of independent men against the party
of seekers. On his side, Duane counted the peaceful “men of sober habits” and
“unassuming manners”; they were “not office hunters, but living peaceably by their own
industry.” On “the other side” could be found that “whole tribe of dependents who live
by the breath of the governor… who lie, and riot in wealth, and luxury on the abuses
which we wish to remove and abolish.”21
The radicals’ efforts came to naught, at least in 1805. They failed to push through
a new constitutional convention or push out McKean, and paid the price of such failures.
McKean, vindictive as ever, avenged himself by purging all the state officers who had
opposed his reelection.22 But Duane kept up the attack for the next two years, as he
continued to contrast true Republicans’ high-minded principles with the McKean
faction’s unprincipled officeseeking ways.23 The radicals were more successful in 1807,
when Simon Snyder finally ousted McKean from the governor’s chair. Once again,
20
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however, the celebration was short-lived. The radicals and the “Snyderites” soon split
amongst themselves for ideological reasons, thus furnishing Duane with a new target.24
In many ways, the Pennsylvania radicals’ political idiom looked like more of the
same, as it regurgitated numerous clichés from 1790s’ political discourse. Anyone at any
time over the past twenty years – or even the past century – could have warned readers
about executive patronage’s propensity to create a separate interest of mercenary
dependents. In other ways, however, this snapshot reveals something that had only truly
emerged since 1801: a concern with how to prove that one’s party was bound by
principles and not by officeseeking agendas. Duane therefore had to distinguish his sect
as the party of principles rather than the party of officeseekers. Their recurring cry of
“measures not men” would become the radicals’ slogan for the next decade and beyond.
Compared to these turbulent scenes in Pennsylvania, New York’s political
landscape seemed calm and steady – but only in comparison. New York City was gifted
(or burdened) with the nation’s two most cunning party chieftains, the longtime rivals
Aaron Burr and DeWitt Clinton. President Jefferson was not inclined to indulge either of
these intensely ambitious men any more than necessary, choosing instead to play a game
of “divide and rule,” strategically distributing offices among Burrites and Clintonians
alike.25 With the President unwilling to throw his weight behind either man, Clinton
relied on state-level patronage to cement his own power. Unlike Pennsylvania, whose
governor unilaterally controlled the distribution of all state-level offices, New York’s
constitution delegated all patronage decisions to a Council of Appointment.26 Clinton
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cavalierly used his position on the Council to reward partisans and proscribe Burrites.27
And by the time he was elected mayor in 1807, he was undeniably the hegemonic force
in New York City politics.
Mayor Clinton soon found himself enmeshed in scandal when it came to light that
he and his partisans had, at one point, tried to buy the Burrites with offices. The story
behind this abortive arrangement was shrouded in convolutions and denials. In 1805, it
seems, Clintonians offered a sort of olive-branch package to Burr. The terms of this
backroom deal included a provision that the Council of Appointment – still under
Clinton’s thumb – would finally end its proscription of Burrites. Clinton seems to have
agreed to these terms, but once news of this arrangement leaked, it outraged a number of
partisans in both camps. “Marcus” and “Philo-Cato” exposed the entire bargain in print,
and it soon erupted into scandal.28 One New York City paper, for instance, described the
rumored transaction as a “corrupt, base, and insinuating bargain.”29 Clinton publicly –
and unconvincingly – denied any knowledge of such a rapprochement, taking particular
care to insist that he would never offer patronage in exchange for Burrites’ support.30 The
mayor had too much integrity to let his appointments be dictated by any “bargain.”31
Clinton’s political career was able to weather this debacle, but his uncle soon
found himself involved in a similar scandal with far higher stakes. Rumor had it in 1808
that George Clinton, a distinguished and elderly Republican, was plotting with
Federalists to steal the presidency from Jefferson’s anointed heir, James Madison.
According to the Washington Monitor, Federalists “would not proceed exactly by the
27
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system of bargain and sale, but would trust something to the feelings of gratitude in Mr.
Clinton’s bosom for remuneration.” Such transactions suggested that neither of the
contracting parties cared at all for principles, for the Republican and Federalists parties
were supposed to be too antithetical in their principles to reach any sort of compromise.
“Any coalition of parties, either directly or indirectly, for the attainment of office,” wrote
the Monitor, “implies a corrupt contract, not equitable in itself and destructive to the
constitution.”32 Clinton’s candidacy came to nothing, of course. The congressional
nominating caucus chose James Madison, Jefferson’s anointed heir apparent, and the
aging New Yorker had to settle for the Vice Presidency. But once again, these
controversies foreshadowed political scandals that would haunt Republican politics for
the next twenty years.
In many ways, then, the New York Republicans faced familiar dilemmas. Like
Jefferson, they confronted the problem of whether it was permissible to proscribe
political enemies, be they Burrites or Federalists. But in other ways, New York
Republicans had to deal with a more recent concern that had already frustrated
Pennsylvania radicals: how could they ensure that the party was united around principles
rather than officeseeking? If the parties truly disagreed on principles, then it would be
unconscionable to give offices to the enemy – to do so would not represent a
magnanimous gesture but a barefaced bribe. Critics of the Clinton family were therefore
beginning to find themselves boxed into a corner where it would be impossible to suggest
any conciliation between the two parties – for such conciliation could suggest that neither
party cared about principles. Over the course of the next decade, radical Pennsylvanians
would find themselves arguing that any true union of principled men must disregard the
32
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deceptive shibboleth of party names. But during that same time, anti-Clintonians in New
York would find themselves arguing that party distinctions were a sine qua non for
anyone who believed that political principles ought to matter.

“The Theater of Wicked Oppressions”: The Commonweatlh Critique of the
Madison Administration
The first three American Presidents had each entered office burdened with
difficult expectations. Washington had to define the character of the chief executive;
Adams had to manage the diplomatic mess his predecessor had left for him; Jefferson had
to vindicate his party’s claim for moral authority. But the fourth President, James
Madison, came into office confronted with perhaps the most difficult scene of any
American President prior to Lincoln, for he now faced opposition not just from the
incorrigible Federalists but also from the ranks of his own party. The southern “tertium
quid” Republicans, led by Virginia’s fiery congressman John Randolph, had preferred
James Monroe for President.33 And when the congressional caucus had announced
Madison as the party nominee in 1808, Monroe’s supporters declared that the caucus
itself represented a usurpation of the people’s rights, thereby casting doubt on the
legitimacy of Madison’s subsequent election.34
And those were the least of Madison’s problems. For several years now, the
British navy had been seizing American ships, impressing American sailors into service,
and generally treating their former colonists as contemptible pawns in the Napoleonic
wars. Madison tried at first to thwart British depredations with economic measures, but to
33
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little avail; the problem clearly merited a military response. But declaring war would
require the administration to commit itself to expensive taxes, which were anathema to
Republicans who still cherished the principles of 1798. On top of this long-simmering
diplomatic nightmare, Madison still had to contend with those members of his own party
who doubted the legitimacy of his original caucus nomination, and thus the legitimacy of
his presidency. This miasmic atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust may help to
explain why some members of both parties briefly united in 1811 to discuss some
possible improvements to the Constitution’s existing safeguards against corruption.
In January 1811, North Carolina’s old Republican Nathaniel Macon decided that
the time was ripe to revisit the Constitutional ban on congressmen holding concurrent
executive appointments. This “place bill,” as we saw in chapter 1, had been the holy grail
of English oppositional thinkers ever since the late seventeenth century. And as we saw
in chapter 2, many of 1787’s American Whigs had warned that this constitutional
provision was not nearly stringent enough to stop the President from bribing
congressmen. Although the Constitution forbid congressmen from holding executive
appointments during their congressional terms, such restrictions would not stop the
President from promising them future post-term sinecures in exchange for their support.
Macon evidently thought that the time had come to plug this loophole, and thus proposed
an amendment that would have forbidden congressmen from receiving executive
appointments until the expiration of the Presidential term under which they had served.
Politics makes strange bedfellows, however. In 1787, the Philadelphia
Convention’s future Federalists had cautioned their Whig adversaries not to go too far in
limiting the executive’s patronage, but the times had changed. In 1811, Macon found
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vociferous support from Massachusetts’ Josiah Quincy III, the scion of a distinguished
Federalist family. Indeed, Quincy went even further than Macon, as he suggested an
additional amendment that would have forbidden even congressmen’s relatives from
accepting presidential appointments.35
Quincy’s oration channeled more than a century’s worth of commonwealth
thought; John Toland or Lord Shaftesbury could have written it themselves, with only
minor contextual alterations. The central question, for them as for Quincy, was how to
keep the legislature insulated from executive influence. Quincy wanted to cut off one
source of temptation by forbidding congressmen’s relatives from receiving appointments.
Like John Adams, Quincy believed that the “love of place” was a “universal and
instinctive passion,” “inherent in the human heart.”36 Like Toland and subsequent
commonwealth thinkers, he believed that all men were vulnerable to temptation, even
those men deluded enough to think themselves incorruptible; a man might not even
realize that the prospect of an office had biased his judgment.37 And those were the more
virtuous men. There was another, eternal “class of persons” who since time immemorial
had craved offices with an almost pathological determination – and America, he sadly
conceded, had more members of this venal class than most other nations.38 The
Constitution therefore had to guard against both the frailty of the righteous and the
venality of the wicked, lest the President exploit either vice. What if, for instance, a
Presidential election was thrown into the House of Representatives? In that case, Quincy
portentously mused, no existing provisions could prevent an incumbent President from
35
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trading patronage in exchange for congressional votes.39 Despite Quincy’s impassioned
pleading, the amendment itself never passed.
The impending war could only exacerbate Macon and Quincy’s suspicions. As the
administration began preparing for a military struggle, Treasury Secretary Gallatin
candidly informed Congress that they would have to level some internal taxes, thus
belying the Republicans’ traditional role as the enemies of oppressive taxation.40 And
throughout the war effort itself, Madison would continue to deviate further and further
away from his party’s old orthodoxies against executive patronage. Republicans in 1798
had vociferously complained about the Federalists’ tendency to multiply diplomatic
appointments, but from 1812 through 1814, Madison created numerous provisional
foreign-service posts, almost always in the face of controversy.41
Madison was therefore a vulnerable target in the election of 1812. DeWitt
Clinton, now the lieutenant governor of New York, was ready to pick up where his uncle
had left off and challenge Madison’s title. Realizing how difficult it would be to steal
election from an incumbent President of the same party, DeWitt took a leaf out of his
uncle’s playbook by courting Federalists for support.42 George Clinton’s earlier efforts to
build an election coalition with Federalists had scandalized other Republicans in 1808,
and the years had not made them any calmer. Anyone who read the pages of New York’s
Public Advertiser would see that Clinton was up to the same old family tricks, trading
offices for votes and building coalitions with the unprincipled. Clinton thus found himself
again having to refute charges that he had engaged in pernicious transactions of “bargain

39

Speech of the Hon. Josiah Quincy, 16.
Asberry, “James Madison and the Patronage Problem,” 62.
41
Ibid, chap. VI.
42
Cornog, Birth of American Empire, 96-101.
40

256

and sale.”43 “Philo-Cato,” one of Clinton’s old adversaries, now claimed that the
profligate New Yorker had already used his influence over state patronage to build up an
“aristocracy” of unprincipled, loyal officers.44 “Refutations” warned that Clinton as
President would use his patronage to poison the nation as he had his home state.45
Clinton’s assailants did not depict him as an ideological threat, but rather as an ambitious,
morally indifferent Machiavellian with no higher aspiration than to secure offices for
himself and his partisans. According to “Americanus,” Clinton and his followers’ lack of
any creed proved that they were not true republicans. “Let republicans be assured,” he
wrote, “that whenever they perceive any man, or body of men, rallying under the
standard of a chosen leader, hunting office, and in pursuit of irregular power, and at every
hazard – let them be assured, that such men are not republicans, whatever their
professions may be.”46
But two could play this game, and Clinton’s supporters knew how to deride their
enemies as officeseekers. They adeptly turned the tables by claiming that Madison
himself had used military appointments to buy Federalist support.47 According to the
New York Statesman, Madison’s partisans had “promised offices, given official
patronage, and used the weapons of slander and falsehood with as little compunctions of
conscience, as an Algerine or a Turk.”48 Madison’s appointment of John Quincy Adams
as Minister to Russia symbolized the President’s proclivity for corruption. “[T]he more
furiously the younger Adams declaimed after his conversions,” wrote the Alexandria
Gazette, “the better our administration liked him; and offices crowded thick upon him,
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even to the exclusion of prior claims.”49 As the election drew nearer, hostile papers
derided Madison as the master of a court, surrounded by sycophants and officeseekers,
aloof from the real problems facing the nation during wartime.50
The circumstances of Madison’s re-nomination made it easy for Clintonians to
depict him as a “court” candidate. Like Jefferson before him, Madison had been
nominated by an unofficial congressional caucus rather than freely chosen by “the
people” themselves.51 Clinton took advantage of these circumstances to set himself up as
the people’s candidate who defied all bought-off congressmen and officeholders.52 “The
people want the man of their own choice,” wrote the New York Columbian, “not the man
who is selected and crowned king by a few satellites, many of whom have secured, and
many of whom expect to secure the smiles, and bonusses, more substantial than smiles,
which emanate from the bosom of royal munificence and presidential patronage.”53 A
Philadelphia Federalist paper reiterated the charge that Madison owed his nomination to
sycophants rather than the unbought citizenry; those who held or expected executive
appointments could be found “wherever the smiles of patronage extended.”54
“Aedanus Burke,” whose essays were printed in the Statesman from September
through October 1812, provided the most thorough critique of Madison as the “court”
candidate. Although “Burke” would display considerable erudition throughout the course
of his essays, he also ventured into some rather murky legal waters, as he retroactively
reimagined the Constitution as a far more democratic document than it was. To establish
49
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his argument that the President’s election ought to depend only on the people, “Burke”
cited Federalist 68, in which Hamilton had explained the rationale for the Electoral
College.55 The essay itself was a rather problematic source; one must remember that
Hamilton in 1788 had been eager to downplay the presidency’s royal trappings, if only to
convince skeptical readers that the Constitution was not imposing an English monarch
upon the American people.56 In Federalist 68, Hamilton had claimed, among other
things, that “the people themselves” held a constitutional right to choose their own
presidential electors. This, of course, would only have been true if one read the word
“people” in the loosest sense; as of 1812, numerous state general assemblies still chose
presidential electors without any direct input from the citizenry.57
Ironically, “Burke” attributed the authorship of Federalist 68 not to Hamilton but
rather to Madison. This may have been an innocent mistake, but the assumption of
Madison’s authorship perfectly suited the narrative “Burke” was trying to spin. He
pointed to Federalist 68 not just as validation for his arguments about the Constitution,
but as validation for his larger argument that Madison had apostasized from his previous
principles. As “Burke” explained, he intended “to compare the course of Mr. Madison
and his party with the rules here laid down by Madison himself.” Thus he would “prove”
that Madison’s party had “now ceased to be REPUBLICANS.”58 And this idea of
Madison-as-apostate fit rather well with “Burke’s” fundamentally commonwealth belief
in the corruptibility of men in office. President Madison’s devotion to an “aristocratic”
institution proved that the once-virtuous outs had become the corrupt new ins. “It would
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really seem”, he wrote, “as if the republicans, at the capitol, had cast their old principles
behind them, and when they stepped into the offices held by the old federalists had also
imbibed their aristocratic desires.”59 This theory of human corruptibility could explain
how the (supposed) author of Federalist 68 could abandon his former principles: he was
now in office, rather than out.60 Sounding like John Toland or, more recently, Josiah
Quincy, “Burke” wrote that the “love of office, natural to all men,” had corrupted
Madison.61
“Burke” knew his commonwealth thinkers quite well, and perceived some
troubling parallels between the woes of English history and those of the present moment.
Anticipating that Madison would promise offices to the congressmen who nominated
him, “Burke” drew reader’s attention to the British Crown’s old habit of corrupting MPs
with royal pensions, at one point even comparing Madison’s Congress to the
“MERCENARY PARLIAMENT of Charles II” – a clear allusion to John Toland’s 1698
jeremiads against royal patronage.62 In his final piece, “Burke” cited other English
commonwealth thinkers to draw comparisons between President Madison and English
monarchs. At one point, he even referenced Andrew Marvell’s 1670s’ writings to show
the corruption that had previously ensued in Parliaments whose members enjoyed royal
places and pensions. The examples from English history suggested an ominous future for
the American republic. “The paradise which we have enjoyed for a few years, is about to
be made the theater of wicked oppressions… All men will be vendible – all men will be
59
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slaves – no one will be safe but by bribery.” The only force that could prevent these evils
was, in “Burke’s” final lines, “a people resolved to put down – executive patronage.”63
The commonwealth-thinker references in the “Aedamus Burke” essays are
revealing, not just for their erudition but also for their errors and omissions. “Burke” did
not cite either Toland or Marvell by name, evidently assuming that most Americans
would not remember either author. And he botched some of the basic chronology of
English history, which suggests that he may have been a newcomer to this material. If
Americans were beginning to forget their British intellectual genealogy, however, then
the essays are all the more significant, as they suggest that some American thinkers were
actively rediscovering the commonwealth tradition at this precise moment. “Burke”
actively sought out these episodes from British history to make sense of Americans’
ongoing predicament. His essays thus foreshadowed the intellectual trajectory of the next
decade, as members of both parties began to talk about restoring the nation to its first
principles – and in the process, debating fiercely what those first principles were
supposed to be.
“Burke’s” commonwealth critique was just the tip of the oppositional iceberg. As
the War of 1812 progressed, President Madison had to contend with a full-fledged
oppositional party attacking him with the same language that Republicans had wielded
against Federalists during the 1790s. Oppositional newspapers once again pitted the
hardworking taxpayers against the corrupt administration that distributed tax revenue
among government officers.64 Disgruntled Republicans like John Randolph and David
Sheffey insisted that the party’s ideological ground had shifted beneath their feet; each of
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them still opposed standing armies and wasteful executive patronage, but the party
leadership seemed to have forgotten those once-cherished principles.65 And now it was
Federalists’ turn to criticize the expansion of executive patronage. Benjamin Tallmadge,
for instance, attacked a bill that would have let the President appoint army officers
without Senate confirmation; in his eyes, such proposals advanced “the doctrine of
increasing executive patronage” far more than any bills contemplated by the Federalists
in 1798.66 New Jersey Federalists meanwhile complained that Republicans had only
annexed the Louisiana Territory as an excuse to create more “offices and salaries” and
thus “multiply official dependents.”67 Federalist newspapers depicted all of these
additional offices as simple “bribes” that Madison could use to bind more men to his
cause. “In short,” asked the Connecticut Mirror, “does virtue dwell within the corrupt and
corrupting precincts of the Washington palace, and court-yard? . . . If she does, she is a
new inhabitant there, and we fear only a ‘SQUATTER,’ who will be ejected the moment
her tent is deserted.”68 When the 1814 Hartford Convention Federalists proposed a
constitutional amendment limiting the President to one term, at least one sympathetic
New England paper approvingly observed that such a restriction would eliminate the
President’s incentive to buy his reelection with patronage.69
The one-term presidential limit was not a mere speculative proposal but a matter
of some urgency – especially for northerners, who worried that the current President
would use his patronage to ensure that yet another Virginian inherited the throne in 1816.
Although there were numerous candidates crowding the field for the next election, some
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observers took it for granted that the issue had already been settled by “those who make
presidents for us.” New York’s Courier presumed that when the time came, these
managers would simply “get their caucus machinery ready” and anoint the candidate of
their choice – who was almost sure to be Secretary of State James Monroe, as he held
“the influence of the whole government at his command.”70 President Madison would
presumably use his own patronage to ensure such an outcome.71 “The fact is,” wrote “A
Virginian,” “that office is now bought and sold, and bargained away, with about as much
ceremony (though more concealment and intrigue) as we use, in buying and selling negro
slaves.” As long as “the treasury leeches and office holders” still longed “to bask in the
undisturbed possession of their sinecures,” those officers would have no choice but to
support the Virginians who held the reigns of power.72
By the end of the war, then, President Madison faced an oppositional party that
seemed unnervingly similar to the one he had led just a few years earlier. He now stood
accused of disowning Republican principles, expanding patronage, and even using his
appointments to undermine the democratic process. The new opposition thus kept older
oppositional thought alive all throughout his presidency, carrying a torch that would be
picked up by later assailants of the caucus and “corrupt bargains” in the early 1820s. In
the meantime, some began to wonder if the Republican Party had ever stood for any
principles at all, or had simply assumed a pleasing ideological face to hide its
officeseeking agenda. Had the battles of 1798 constituted nothing more than yet another
70
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skirmish in the eternal war of ins and outs? For some observers in Pennsylvania, the
answer to that question struck a sensitive nerve.

“A Matter of Corrupt Bargain and Sale”: Radical Pennsylvanians and Patronage, 1816
– 1820
By 1815, William Duane’s disenchantment with the Republican Party was a wellestablished matter of record. The implacable printer had finally broken ranks with the
party leadership in 1811 after Secretary Gallatin pushed for a re-charter of Hamilton’s
widely reviled national Bank. As other Republicans grew wary (and perhaps weary) of
Duane, the firebrand journalist stubbornly declared that he would no longer commit to
any party but would instead continue his path of firm, uncompromising principles.73 He
was destined to spend the next decade trying to convince listeners that he and his fellow
“Old School” Republicans represented the true party of principles in a nation of
unprincipled officeseekers.
Duane and his fellow “Old School” Republicans now doubted whether the
Republican Party still stood for the principles of its name. Such doubts were evident all
across the pages of the Aurora in 1815. “[W]hat is it that in fact distinguishes parties,”
asked one writer, “their names or their actions?” The Republicans had self-evidently
betrayed their former hostility to executive patronage. In 1798, they had condemned John
Adams for expanding patronage to reward his electioneers; by 1816, James Madison
controlled more offices than Adams ever had, and many of federal officers routinely
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engaged in “intrigue and cabal at elections.”74 “M.”, also writing in the Aurora, similarly
lamented the opportunistic state of American politics. “At present,” he wrote, “I am
strongly inclined to believe that the most material distinction between democrats and
federalists is, that the democrats are in office, and the federalists are out.” The problem
was not confined to politicians; the “immense majority” of the American people seemed
to be little more than knee-jerk partisans who lacked any sort of “fixed political
principles.” Even as “M.” despaired of finding any ideological basis for division between
the two parties, he almost inadvertently called for a new party united against the “office
hunters.” He exhorted the “honest members of the American family” to cast aside their
“petty jealousies and unworthy prejudices” so they could “coalesce, and form one
people.” Once such a union was achieved, its adherents would “reduce the ambitious, the
designing, and the vain, to a contemptible faction.”75
The Republican Party seemed to have fallen so precipitously that Duane felt it
necessary to remind readers what “the principles of 1798” even meant. In September and
October 1817, the Aurora began dissecting the history of American parties as an ongoing
battle between the forces of republicanism and patronage. The split had begun with the
forging of the American Constitution: some signers had thought that it too much
resembled the “English system,” as it allowed such wide reach for “executive patronage”;
others had found this English resemblance appealing. Hamilton’s funding system had
amplified the British elements, thus stimulating “the first inception of parties.” The
internal enemies had emerged in full strength during the 1790s, as indolent officeseekers
merged forces with some wayward Republicans to form the Federalist Party.
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Those whose passions were inveterately hostile to the principles of
popular government; and all that numerous class which is to be found in
every society, seeking to live upon the people by devotion to power and
office; all who dreaded labor or disregarded virtue, naturally cast their eye,
toward the sunshine of patronage and worshipped it.
At every stage of battle, these monarchists and officeseekers had faced resistance from
the old Whigs – the freedom-loving men who dutifully read their Nedham, their Sydney,
and their Locke, and paid careful attention to the writings of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and
Beccaria. These were the men who had parsed every detail of the Wilkes affair as it
transpired. And in 1798, these were the men who had stood strong against all English
aspects of American government, including patronage. Their objective had been “to
remove every species of corruption by patronage – by secret influence – by factious
conspirings – by monopolies of power, or offices in families – or compromises of
delegated trust, or offices for interest at elections; such arts being a direct corruption of
freedom.” They had disdained “extravagance” and “waste of public fortune,” “the
perversion of office to the aggrandizement of the officers,” “the proscription of citizens
because they were disobedient to the executive,” and all official attempts to “corrupt”
elections. In 1816, then, it was a pitiful sign of the times that any readers would have to
ask, “What are the Principles of 1798?”76
The problem of patronage was particularly acute in Pennsylvania state politics,
where the governor’s unilateral power over appointments remained unchecked. The
Aurora still argued that such power would allow the governor to create a separate interest
group of personally loyal officers.77 Minions appointed by either the governor or the
President often dominated the local meetings that nominated men for office – to such an
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extent that some Philadelphia democrats proposed regulations to insure that at least twothirds of local-meeting membership consist of men who were not tainted by such
connections.78 The General Assembly caucus was similarly vulnerable to corruption, as
the governor could always promise future offices to state legislators who voted for his renomination.79 In short, Pennsylvania’s more democratic thinkers saw caucus
nominations, conducted in collusive secrecy among insiders, as dangerous and
illegitimate institutions.80
According to the Aurora, all of the state’s current woes could be traced to the
1790 state constitution. The older 1776 Pennsylvania constitution had, in this
interpretation, protected the people rather than the officeseekers and officeholders. But
the “adversaries” of that old constitution had eagerly hungered for “power and
patronage.” When they had commenced their “new project” in 1790, those internal
enemies had been careful to concentrate this patronage in the governor. The resulting
charter had been, in effect, a bet on human corruptibility.
It was evidently a foundation of government on the worst tendencies of the
human heart. It was an assertion either that government cannot be
conducted without corrupting society; or that mankind are naturally and
universally corrupt… By making power and patronage, the basis of the
government, they undermined every idea of public and private virtue – and
the consequence is now visible; the government of the state of
Pennsylvania is a matter of bargain and sale, as much as the bargain and
sale of an ox or a horse.81
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The effects of this misanthropic constitution were plain to see, and the Aurora waxed
poetic in numerous articles condemning the mercenary character of Pennsylvania politics.
Instead of allowing the people to choose their own rulers, the rulers simply traded their
positions for offices. The once-formidable temple of republicanism had been reduced to a
miserable den of thieves, government to “a matter of corrupt bargain and sale.”82
In June 1817, a group of “independent” Republicans – including William Duane’s
son, William J. Duane – gathered in Carlisle to nominate their own gubernatorial
candidate. The resulting address included a detailed theory of how unprincipled parties
would seal the doom of a republic. The party out of power always abused the party in
power – just as the Republicans had once abused the Federalists. In power, the former
Outs would forget the principles they had once espoused – just as the Republicans had
shuffled off their former principles after 1801. The new Ins would employ corruption,
multiplying offices to “strengthen the ties of a servile subordination.” They would fund
these offices and other forms of corruption by exacting taxes from the hardworking
common citizen, by hoarding all offices in particular families, and finally, by raising an
army. The people would then be left to choose their poison, either by accepting
oligarchical rule or by throwing themselves on the mercy of a “single despot.” Either
way, the republican experiment would end in tyranny. Such a fate seemed to await
Pennsylvania, where all decisions seemed to hinge on the will of a few faux Republicans.
The authentic “Old School” Republicans had previously tried and failed to pass measures
that would keep nominations “independent” of the governor’s patronage, but to no avail.
The governor still chose all the officers of state, and according to these conveners, those
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officers of state chose all the candidates for election. (This claim was, in fairness, a slight
exaggeration; the rival gubernatorial candidate had actually been chosen in a “mixed
caucus” whose members included both state legislators and locally elected delegates.)
But the Old School Republicans insisted that they were the only ones who remained truly
independent of patronage. The enemy faction’s Harrisburg caucus, they claimed, had
been filled with officeholders and officeseekers, whereas the Carlisle convention
delegates had neither offices to retain nor ambitions to gratify. “[W]e aim at no places,”
they boasted, for they had only “public motives” at heart.83
What these Old School Republicans felt they needed, then, was a governor
incorruptible enough to restore the people’s faith in republican institutions and put an end
to party strife. They needed a man of known and reliable republican principles; someone
who had no promises to make with any officer; a private citizen who had never “sought”
the office and would voluntarily “retire” after completing his work. Such a man, with no
personal ambition or avarice to indulge, would finally put an end to officers’ interference
in caucuses and elections. In short, Old School Republicans needed a man like Joseph
Hiester, the aging German landowner and revolutionary veteran they nominated for
governor in 1817.84
Throughout the 1817 election cycle, the Old School Republicans’ campaign
literature coalesced around a narrative presenting Hiester as the incorruptible ruler pitted
against court-dwelling officers of government. “Gaius Gracchus” of the Aurora praised
Hiester as “an old farmer, an old soldier, an old republican, an old legislator,” far too
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humble to have “electioneered for himself.” According to “Gracchus,” Hiester was so
unassuming that he had even “resisted” his nomination at first.85 Other writers elaborated
on this theme. Hiester had the right to identify himself as the people’s choice because he
was wealthy enough to transcend temptation, patriotic enough to disregard self-interest,
and unambitious enough to resist corruption. In short, Hiester was too disinterested to
promise offices. Best of all, he would retire once he had fulfilled his commission to end
Pennsylvania’s “corruption.”86
This idealized picture of Hiester provided a stark contrast with the establishment
gubernatorial candidate, William Findlay. Hiester was the retired and retiring farmer who
lived off of private industry, whereas Findlay had spent the past seventeen years in
various state offices. According to “Gracchus,” Findlay had been a lifelong speculator in
the public moneys, and had spent the last eleven years exploiting his “lucrative” office as
state treasurer, lying “in the lap of indolence and wealth, basking in the sunshine of ease
and pleasure.”87 Findlay was, in short, the epitome of the indolent aristocrat. He had
already secured offices for numerous relatives and “connexions.”88 Supposedly Findlay
had struck corrupt bargains all over the state. “Gracchus” simply took it for granted –
without meaningful evidence – that Findlay had probably made promises to the
officeholders and seekers who secured his nomination.89 By September 1817, Old School
Republican papers were beginning to identify Findlay as the candidate of officeholders,
officeseekers, and office-hoarders. The campaign battle thus became a clash between the
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candidate of “the people” and “the candidate of the official aristocracy.”90 Where Hiester
was the candidate of the people and their republican principles, then, Findlay became the
candidate of a separate, patronage-mongering interest group.91
Hiester’s candidacy failed in 1817, but the Old School Republicans did not give
up their fight. By 1818, they had done the unthinkable by forming a third-way alliance
with the Federalists. Mainstream Republican presses wasted no time in declaring that
they were better off without these “mercenary politicians” in their midst.92 But the young
anti-Bank writer Stephen Simpson, writing in the Aurora as “Brutus,” was able to justify
this union by depicting his coterie as a patriotic party united against all factions of any
name: he and his allies belonged to the party of their country “and no other.” Those who
hid behind the name of the Republican Party were simply unable or unwilling to explain
their own “principles,” while those who gathered in Duane and Simpson’s camp were
united by their shared devotion to the principles of the American Constitution. Where
others simply proclaimed themselves Republicans, the “constitutional republican” would
live out that title. This may have sounded like a rather banal declaration of ideology; no
politician of the time would ever have claimed to oppose the United States Constitution.
But by using the Constitution as the litmus test for true republicanism, Simpson was able
to discredit political rivals as not just enemies of the Old School but even as enemies of
their country. The man who belonged “to the party of his country” would willingly
assume the mantle of a “constitutional republican,” which was to say, an Old School
Republican. And any American who did not share these “principles of the constitution”

90

Address printed in Spirit of the Times, September 1, 1817.
Weekly Aurora, September 1, 1817; Spirit of the Times, September 29, 1817; Weekly Aurora, October 6,
1817; Weekly Aurora, August 4, 1817.
92
Franklin Gazette, October 6, 1818.
91

271

was neither Republican nor even patriotic. “The friends of William Findlay,” he wrote,
“are the enemies of the constitution, and the principles of republican government.” Any
man who supported that cause was therefore “a foe to the state.”93
Even if Simpson did not cite Bolingbroke or Burke by name, his explanation of
party clearly reflected the influence of eighteenth-century Country Party thought. The
Old School Republican Party was not a party at all, it seemed – just a selfless band of
patriots united in their shared devotion to constitutional principles and the common good.
Ironically, this Manichean view of politics had been a staple of American discourse since
the 1790s. Although some debates had hinged on genuine differences of principle, all
parties had grown accustomed to dismissing their rivals as self-interested officeseekers
while declaring themselves to be the party of principles. And with all parties denouncing
one another as officeseekers, cynicism had inevitably set in; small wonder that
ideologues like Duane had begun to wonder if the two main parties differed in principle
at all. If the two main parties were ideologically bankrupt, as the Old School Republicans
concluded, then the solution was a newer and better party bound by principle rather than
interest. And this neo-Country Party idiom effectively re-inscribed a Manichean logic on
American politics. The Old School Republicans were, once more, the party of principles;
their enemies, the party of unprincipled seekers.
With the triumphant election of Joseph Hiester in 1820, the Old School
Republicans achieved their first real victory in Pennsylvania politics. And Duane, at least,
fully expected that Hiester would be true to his principles and resist all officeseekers’
advances. Ideally, the new governor would only appoint men who showed “capacity and
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fitness,” paying little or no heed to “party” considerations.94 There was reason for hope.
In his inaugural address, Hiester declared his commitment to reform, at one point even
suggesting that the legislature should look for ways to mitigate the governor’s patronage
and diminish officers’ salaries. That same address concluded with an encouraging,
bipartisan note, reminding readers that they were “all members of one family.”95 Some of
these readers may have remembered another idealistic chief executive speaking similar
words twenty years earlier. One can only wonder which of those readers were
circumspect enough to doubt that the second time would prove the charm.

“Corrupt Bargains” and Principled Coalitions in New York, 1817 - 1820
The political scene in Pennsylvania and Harrisburg naturally occupied most of
Duane’s attention, but he was occasionally able to spare an Aurora column or two on
developments in other states. And when Duane and his comrades-in-arms turned their
gaze northward to New York, they gave their seal of approval to DeWitt Clinton. This
benediction may have struck some observers as ironic. Within his own state, Clinton had
acquired a reputation as the nation’s most prolific dispenser of corrupt bargains.
Clinton’s support for canal construction had salvaged his popularity in New York,
where he eventually secured the Republicans’ gubernatorial nomination for 1817.96 He
won that race on a promise of good Republican behavior – and almost immediately began
to antagonize members of his own party. As governor, Clinton manipulated patronage in
a vain attempt to placate Federalists with offices. He replaced numerous known
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Republicans with Federalists, all the while criticizing the Republican administration of
President James Monroe. The strategy backfired. Although Clinton was not nearly
generous enough to appease Federalists, he still went too far for many Republicans’
tastes.97 Another wing of the Republican Party soon developed into a formidable
opposition under the leadership of Martin Van Buren.
Unlike the manor-born Clinton, Martin Van Buren was the son of a tavern keeper
in an isolated country town.98 Looked down upon by the local elites, Van Buren felt the
sting of social condescension, but still knew how to work with his superiors. With a little
help from the lordly Van Ness family, he entered into politics in his early twenties and by
1807 had acquired a reputation as a staunch Republican.99 As a lawyer, Van Buren
acquired an additional reputation as the scourge of powerful landholders, and eventually
rode this reputation into the state senate.100 He supported Clinton’s presidential bid in
1812, but that dalliance was not to last.101 For one thing, Clinton failed to secure him a
promised appointment as New York’s attorney general; for another, Van Buren suspected
that Clinton had engaged in murky dealings with Federalists to secure votes in 1812.
Within a few years’ time, the mutual mistrust between the two became irreparable.102
Van Buren identified his wing of the Republican Party as “Bucktails,” referring to the
deerskin badges that Tammany Hall men had worn during the 1790s.103 Despite Clinton’s
reputation as a schemer, Van Buren and the Bucktails would prove to be more than his
equal in the game of political chess. Clinton, perhaps the most ambitious politician in the
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nation, would spend the rest of his days locked in battle with the most enterprising
political operator in American history.
Clinton’s enemies had thoroughly mastered the Manichean style of American
politics, as they pitted their principled party of “the people” against the unprincipled party
of office-barterers.104 When one of Clinton’s partisans lost an election, Bucktail party
organs could hail the results as a “TRIUMPH OF PRINCIPLES” over “power and
patronage.”105 Bucktails similarly dismissed Clinton’s supporters as an illegitimate, even
un-American sub-class of natural officeseekers. According to the Norwich Journal, the
Clintonians had made themselves conspicuous by demonstrations of “cringing and
flattery” before their idol, quite unlike the greater body of the American people.
It is not the people generally who are engaged in this – it is only a few
office seekers, who are striving for the crumbs that fall from their master’s
table… it is only that kind of men, found in every country, who are
regardless of honor or patriotism, and are solely intent on private
emolument, that thus debase our national character.
Such men were little more than “moths, who flutter[ed] in the sunshine of power.”106
Readers with long memories might have recalled that such insects had been seen – or
imagined – hovering in the “sunshine of executive patronage” since the 1790s.
Duane had already perfected this idiom in Pennsylvania, but the Bucktails’
context was different from the Old School Republicans’ in one crucial respect. In
Pennsylvania, the Federalists had dwindled into a negligible minority, whereas in New
York, they maintained a substantial presence. Many New York Republicans therefore
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remained leery about eradicating old party lines and shaking hands with the Federalists.
Where Old School Republicans wanted a sort of non-party union of men united around
republican principles, the New York Bucktails thought such a union already existed: the
Republican Party itself. The way to preserve its principles was to keep out the
unprincipled men. Van Buren planned, in the words of one biographer, to restore an older
world of “parties rather than leaders.”107
Mordecai Manuel Noah’s National Advocate, a Bucktail paper, thus admonished
readers not to trust any Federalists who called for an amalgamation of their parties. The
Federalists were not dead but “secretly” working to subvert their Republican rivals and
elect Clinton as governor. The “‘monster,’ here so much dreaded,” was “covertly
crawling toward the republican party with a view of destroying it,” thus achieving “by
secret movements, what they could not affect by open hostilities.”108 For Republicans’
new enemy was not an open and avowed Federalist party, but rather a murky, hybrid
entity uniting dyed-in-the-wool Federalists with those politically indifferent Republicans
who supported Clinton in exchange for appointments. Noah admonished genuine
republicans to avoid any such “amalgamation.” “[L]et republicans be triumphant as
republicans, or let them be defeated by faction or unhallowed union,” his paper
proclaimed.109 The Advocate in 1819 would continue to regale readers with scintillating,
complicated stories of how Clinton had used the means of “corrupt bargain and sale” to
craft this “secret coalition.”110 As one might expect, the anti-Clintonian Republicans were
held up as principled men who would never strike these Faustian pacts. Let the enemies
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squabble over these “loaves and fishes,” declared the Advocate; Republicans would never
take any measures that might “compromit [sic] their character.” They had “been ever
opposed to the dishonest and discreditable system of bartering away the power and
emoluments derived from the people,” and therefore would “not seek profit unless” they
could “obtain it by the fair and open exercise of principle.”111
Through his negotiations with the Federalists, Clinton in early 1819 was able to
take over the Council of Appointment112 – and the Bucktails wasted no time in
denouncing the governor for using his patronage to build up a personal faction. His only
goal, according to the Albany Argus, was to remove “republican” officers and replace
them with men who were obedient to him and him alone.113 He appealed to the
“wavering, discontented, and ambitious of every party,” and proscribed any man who
refused to discard his “independence” in exchange for “preferment.”114 And none of these
purchased supporters cared at all about the purchaser’s “principles.”115 It was a simple
matter of personal loyalty. Rather than rely on “the great body of republicans” for
support, Clinton had chosen to rely on “dependants” and “the influence which the gift of
offices can create.” Such men might be worthless as officers and bereft of any real virtue,
but Clinton could always trust them to be “politically correct.”116 Being nothing but a
band of mercenaries, of course, Clinton’s partisans were expected to abandon him as
soon as the political winds blew in another direction.117 Nothing could contrast more
starkly with the Bucktails’ principled conception of party. According to the Advocate, the
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honest partisan would not care whether or not he ever secured an office, “because it was
principle that urged him on.” Such high-minded motives were nowhere to be found
among members of a party “formed to support the personal views and ambitious plans of
one man.”118
The Bucktails did not quite live up to their ideals, for they themselves routinely
collaborated with Federalists. As a state senator, Van Buren had opposed Federalist
principles but had still proven himself flexible enough to seek Federal votes when
expedient.119 And in 1819, both Bucktails and Clintonians courted Federalists. Most
Federalists chose to cast their lot with Clinton, but Van Buren was able to nab some
impressive fish. Alexander Hamilton’s son James soon joined the Bucktails’ ranks, and in
1819, Van Buren himself supported the senatorial pretensions of the arch-Federalist
Rufus King.120 But neither the Bucktails nor the Clintonians were quite willing to admit
that these alliances even existed.
One Clintonian, writing as “The Voice of the People,” militantly denied that
Clintonian Republicans had ever tried to form any “coalitions” or “political bargains”
with the Federalist enemy. “No treaty was ever offered by the federal party; none was
ever offered by the administration – none was ever rejected by either.” If anything, the
author saw Clintonians as the true republicans and his enemies as the officeseeking
apostates. The Bucktails never complained, for instance, about any of Clinton’s actual
measures; all they ever complained about was his proscription of political enemies.121
Other writers reiterated similar points. According to Clintonians, the only struggle that
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now remained was one between the supporters and enemies of this particular
administration.122 In simplest terms, Clinton’s enemies were just an unprincipled, bitter
gang of “outs” attempting to supplant the “ins.”123
But the Bucktails continued to insist that Clinton was the true intriguer. A
gathering of western New York’s Republican delegates accused Clinton of striking a
“corrupt bargain” to form this “coalition” with “the most unprincipled” of the
Federalists.124 “Number Three,” writing in the Advocate, similarly claimed that the men
who bargained with Clinton were the most unprincipled men of either party, and
admonished the “honest” Federalists not to stoop to rise by “coalition,” “bargainings” and
“corruption.”125 Increasingly these polemics came to rely on the same evocative term,
“corrupt bargain,” a turn of phrase they wielded like a cudgel and a crutch. “Phocion” of
the Albany Argus claimed that Clinton had used the Council of Appointment to remove
republicans and thereby “fulfill the corrupt bargains of a sinking faction.”126 And when
Federalists voted for a Clintonian to be speaker of the state House, “Shakespeare”
perceived the fulfillment of yet “another corrupt bargain,” which was only to be expected
by a man who had long “been supported by intrigue and bargain, and by sale.” But the
Republicans, of course, remained noble and incorruptible in their failures. They had “no
bargains” and “no pledges to make,” for they had not gone “to the shambles” to bid for
“the Swiss”; whereas “Clinton wanted, and bid high, and has got them.” “Shakespeare”
concluded with an admonition for Republicans not to yield to any temptation of
compromise. “Let the republicans continue united and firm: no bargains – no coalitions –
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no departers from the old, steady, and consistent path; the state is with us, and at the
election we shall triumph beyond all doubt, and end this corrupt and degrading traffic for
power.”127
But the Clintonian press would not let the Bucktails forget how far short of these
ideals they fell. They could point to certain instances in which the Bucktails seemed to be
conciliating Federalists at the expense of established Republicans.128 “Cato” condemned
them as officeseekers without ideology who colluded in secret gatherings to determine
the candidates they would impose upon the unwilling public.129 Samuel Jones Wilkin,
speaking at a meeting in favor of Governor Clinton and President Monroe, similarly
denounced the Bucktails as a gang of unprincipled seekers obsessed with patronage.
Their only grievance against Clinton was that he had appointed Federalists to office, and
yet they themselves could sometimes be found holding out offices as bait for the same
Federalists.130 According to Wilkins, then, the Bucktails were the ones “chargeable with
COALITIONS, BARGAINS, and RENEWED PLEDGES.”131
Van Buren had already rebutted many of these charges in a February 1820
address, which he used as the opportunity to explain his conception of a principled
political party. Unlike some earlier thinkers, he unapologetically endorsed the two-party
system. “[B]oth experience and history” taught him that the end of parties was a desirable
yet unfeasible goal. It was therefore “better to continue parties founded on principles than
to abandon those principles, and assume the dangerous and clannish character of the
partizans and opponents of a single individual.” Clinton’s party in 1820, of course, was
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nothing but a personal party or polyglot “coalition,” built around one man rather than one
set of principles; the only “creed” of his polyglot sect was personal loyalty and obedience
to DeWitt Clinton. Small wonder that unprincipled men of all stripes flocked to his
banner, erecting him as the “chieftain” of their “inglorious band.”
But Van Buren was not willing to endorse “political intolerance” of all
Federalists. Some members of that party had shown themselves honest enough to resist
Clinton’s bargains, and not coincidentally, they were the Federalists who had chosen to
unite with the true Republicans like Van Buren. Thus, the only Federalists Van Buren
would initiate into the Republican stronghold were the ones who truly embraced
Republican doctrines. He would not, however, embrace those Federalists who remained
bitterly hostile to those doctrines, nor those “swiss” Federalists who constantly changed
their views to suit their own interest. Republicans, according to Van Buren’s dictum,
were willing “to forget old controversies” but not to “renounce old principles.” Any
appearance of principled corrupt bargaining between Bucktails and Federalists was
merely superficial, then – the Federalists they conciliated were really Republicans in
Federalist clothing anyway.132
To some observers, it might have appeared as thought Van Buren had simply reinscribed Jefferson’s older distinction between the incorrigible Federalists and the more
Republican breed. But there were important differences between Jefferson and Van
Buren’s policy statements. Jefferson had imagined the larger body of Federalists as
temporarily deluded Republicans in need of some benevolent, paternal guidance; Van
Buren sought out the Federalists who had demonstrably proven themselves to be patriotic
Republicans in both word and deed. He did not talk about conciliation and harmony, but
132
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about stricter and more discernible lines of separation. Jefferson wanted to end party
politics by breaking the enemy party forever; Van Buren wanted to maintain a two-party
system in which the party of the many would maintain permanent hegemony by
ostracizing enemies to the obsolescent party of the few. The risk he foresaw was not that
the Federalist Party would reemerge in its full strength, but that its refugees would
corrode the one true party from within. His language thus implied a call for inquisitorial
scrutiny into Federalists’ past conduct before initiating any of them into the fold. Van
Buren’s views, like Duane’s, had portentous implications for future patronage policy.
As Jefferson’s party split into numerous competing factions at the state and
national levels, then, adherents of each faction had to justify their sectarianism – and this
search for justification raised potentially troubling questions. Did schismatic Republicans
split with their former brethren because they recognized a fundamental disagreement in
principles, or merely out of loyalty to particular men rather than particular ideologies?
Did principles even matter, or were they the window dressing of opportunistic
officeseekers? And if any sect of Republicans truly did adhere to principles rather than
men, could they justify any tolerance towards the party of opposite principles? In
different ways, William Duane and Martin Van Buren reached similar answers: they both
were willing to join forces with those Federalists who had effectively become
Republicans, while marginalizing those Republicans who had effectively followed the
opposite political trajectory. But this approach to partisanship imposed a severe
ideological burden. In order to justify their claims of Republican purity, they had to
discern which lapsed Federalists had truly converted to Republicanism, and which of
them simply preyed on Republicans’ credulity. Even more portentously, they would have

282

to distinguish the Republicans who authentically cherished Republican principles from
those who were willing to blow with every political breeze until they landed in office. For
the false convert or the opportunist, there could be no mercy, lest such men compromise
the ideological integrity of the party of principles. These potential dilemmas may not
have been obvious to Duane or to Van Buren in 1820. But by 1829, such dilemmas would
lead Republicans toward one of the most ruthless political inquisitions in American
history.
In the meantime, Van Buren’s political stratagem yielded spectacular results. By
uniting his party with dissident Federalists, he was able to take over the council of
appointment in 1820 and purge political enemies from office.133 The scrappy Bucktails
would soon become known as the “Albany Regency,” a nearly hegemonic political
machine in New York. But Van Buren’s triumph came at a price. A phenomenal partisan
entrepreneur, Van Buren would always find himself denying his reputation as a cunning
intriguer, deviously non-committal and casually indifferent to real principles. Which was
the real Martin Van Buren? The firm ideologue he sometimes held himself out to be, or
the wily “sly fox” of Kinderhook?134 The answer to this question is likely to perplex
historians for the foreseeable future. But whatever the true nature of the enigmatic “little
magician,” the important thing, politically, was that Van Buren knew his times and their
temper. For all his gifts as a practical politician, he was destined to spend his life denying
his practicality and political acumen – for the application of such skills was, ideologically
speaking, difficult to distinguish from a corrupt bargain.
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Conclusion: The Era of Mixed Feelings
While these old political blood feuds had raged in New York and Pennsylvania,
politics at the national level had remained relatively sedate – “relatively” being, once
again, the operative word. The course of events in 1816 had fulfilled Federalists’ dire
prognostication when James Monroe, quite predictably, was elected as the nation’s fifth
President. He did not, however, fulfill all aspects of the prophecy. Monroe pleasantly
surprised New Englanders by conspicuously eschewing the role of a sectional tyrant. In
1817, he went on a goodwill tour throughout the eastern and northwestern states,
prompting some grateful Federalists to proclaim a new “era of good feelings.”
The new President’s promises of reconciliation were almost as superficial as they
were conspicuous. Monroe in 1801 had advised Jefferson not to trust in Federalist
declarations of goodwill; his opinions remained unchanged in 1817. Monroe did want
peace between the parties, but he knew that the surest road to peace was an absolute
destruction of the enemy party. And here he proved himself to be almost as clever as
Jefferson. Even as he offered his declarations of goodwill, Monroe quietly withheld
offices from the Federalist adversaries, trusting them either to accept Republican
dominance or retire into irrelevance.135 And once the honest Federalists abandoned their
reprobate leadership and joined the Republican fold, the nation would finally be free from
party warfare.136
State-level Republicans were not privy to Monroe’s decision-making processes,
and they perceived his overtures of goodwill as a dereliction of Republican principles.
Many of these Republicans doubted whether Federalists could be reconciled at all – for
135

Harry Ammons, “James Monroe and the Era of Good Feelings,” in Frank Otto Gatell, ed., Essays on
Jacksonian America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970), 3-11.
136
Monroe’s attitudes toward party are discussed in Ketcham, Presidents Above Party, 124-128.

284

the patronage-seeking monarchists now seemed like an intractable fact of political
society, not an ephemeral nuisance that could be purged so easily. “[C]an we believe that
royal race has become extinct,” asked Boston’s Independent Chronicle.
We cannot – We shall always find a set of men hungry for monarchical
banquets. These men think, that if a monarchical government were
introduced, they should be the favorites of ‘his gracious majesty’ the King;
and of course would enjoy the fat things of the land, undisturbed by the
fluctuations of popular opinion. Instead of now and then obtaining an
office worth a thousand a year, they would hold for life, one, two, or three
offices, giving them ten, or twenty, or a hundred thousand dollars a year
after the English fashion. Hence we shall always find these men longing
after a monarchical government. Nor can we suppose this class less
numerous now, than it was thirty years ago. Indeed we know that such
men now exist… almost wholly among the leaders of the federal party.137
The old enemies might have moderated their tone, but they were still “equally insidious”
– which meant that Monroe’s “benevolent” goals were but a pipe dream.138 Hartford’s
American Mercury therefore advised Monroe to be circumspect before accepting any
Federalist declarations of goodwill at face value. They might fake conversion experiences
for the sake of obtaining offices, but their principles – if they even had any – would never
change.139 As far as offices were concerned then, the safest hands were still Republicans’
own.140 Monroe would betray his principles if he befriended these treacherous foes. “A
Chief Magistrate of this country must be either federal or republican,” wrote the
Washington City Gazette, “aristocratic or democratic.”141
Stephen Simpson, at least, saw reason for hope when he contemplated the visage
of the one Republican who seemed incorruptible enough to transcend all temptation.
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Frank, ingenious, and honest, he is a total stranger to all those vices that
constitute the courtier. No man can despise more heartily than he does, the
flatterer, the dissembler, the sycophant, the hypocrite. He uniformly treats
such creatures with the contempt that he always feels, and never can
dissemble… His deportment is the same towards all men, whether in or
out of office… [T]oo independent in spirit to expect a favor, he is equally
hopeless of patronage, and fearless of power… A man whose character
and fame are equally above the incumbents of office, and out of the reach
of their influence.
A reader who carelessly perused these passages in the Aurora might have thought they
were referring to Joseph Hiester, the Old School Republicans’ resident incorruptible elder
statesman. In fact, the author was referring to General Andrew Jackson, who had
commanded Simpson at the battle of New Orleans. Simpson could only lament
Americans’ dwindling “republican virtue” when he considered the fact that a man of
Jackson’s moral stature held no sufficiently “exalted station.”142 The writer’s despair
would not last for long.
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Chapter Seven:
Augean Stables: Power, Patronage, and Partisanship in the 1820s

With regard to Monroe’s immediate goal of disarming the Federalists, one can
concede that the fifth President achieved a partial success. The Federalist Party by 1824
would be almost completely defunct as a national organization. In his larger goal of
ending partisan strife, Monroe failed spectacularly. The slow death of the Federalist Party
left a void in Republican hearts, one that they would struggle to fill throughout the 1820s.
That decade would present Americans with the spectacle of a Republican Party that
seemed to be cannibalizing itself. No fewer than five candidates bid for 1824’s
presidential election, and every one of them identified as the true heir to Jefferson’s
mantle.
The experience of being two decades in power had saddled Republicans with
potentially onerous ideological baggage. In 1798, Republicans had warned Americans
about a growing political establishment that would inevitably encroach upon their
liberties; by 1820, Republicans were the political establishment. Wistful nostalgia began
creeping into campaign literature, as various political writers expressed their longing for
a restoration to purer times. Some cast their lots with men who promised a return to
Jefferson’s old vow of retrenchment and republican simplicity. Some identified with the
men who promised to realize Jefferson’s dream of a non-partisan republic. Still others
thought that Jefferson’s revolution of 1800 – which was to say, the revolution of 1776 –
would never be truly complete until every last Tory aristocrat was purged from public
life.
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For some observers in the 1820s, it seemed that Americans had allowed their
“Augean stables” to fester for far too long.1 But Republicans disagreed on how or even
why those stables ought to be cleansed. Some commentators, especially in the
slaveholding south, thought the government itself had grown too vast, centralized, and
expensive; some thought political parties had grown too venal and corrupt; some thought
the Republican Party had welcomed too many enemies into the fold. This confusion
would sharpen into clearer lines of disagreement after 1822. The next two elections
would witness attempts to reenact the revolution of 1800, with charismatic outsiders
promising to rescue the republic, yet again, from all the forces of “power and patronage.”
The difficulties of realizing such a promise would not fully present themselves until
1829.

The Idea of a Patriot President: Patronage and Incorruptibility, 1822-1824
With the Federalist Party rendered practically obsolescent after 1820, the field lay
wide open for Republican contenders in the 1824 presidential election. This competition
created a potentially hostile work environment in Monroe’s cabinet, as his three most
powerful department heads had all decided to throw their hats into the ring. William
Crawford, secretary of the treasury, drew his support from Jeffersonian purists who still
cherished states’ rights and rigid republican economy. John Quincy Adams, the secretary
of state and popular New England choice, harbored more ambitious plans for national
improvement, even if his campaign literature often depicted him as the status-quo
candidate who would simply continue Monroe’s good work. Secretary of War John C.
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Calhoun had a less formidable presence than either of these men, but had earned some
early support from moderate Republicans in Pennsylvania as well as his native South
Carolina. These three cabinet members were challenged by Speaker of the House Henry
Clay, a champion of western interests and perhaps the most influential congressman in
America.
Of the four candidates, Crawford had arguably the most emphatic platform. He
pitched himself as a retrenchment candidate who was more Jeffersonian than Jefferson,
and thus appealed to southern “neo-Antifederalists” like Thomas Ritchie, John Randolph,
and Nathaniel Macon.2 Crawford also appealed to individuals like Martin Van Buren,
who despised “good feelings” and wanted to keep the Republican Party united against
any Federalist threat, even if it meant adhering to seemingly un-democratic institutions
like the congressional caucus.3 Some observers saw Crawford’s promise of retrenchment
as an antidote to the large-government heterodoxies that had poisoned the Madison
years.4 Others saw his reformist rhetoric as a familiar sham, for Crawford had earned
himself a reputation as “one of the most consummate intriguers at present in the United
States.”5 He had nearly succeeded in stealing Monroe’s nomination during the 1816
congressional caucus, and many contemporaries found it ludicrous to hear this same
schemer rambling on about the “Augean stable” and other English oppositional tropes.6
According to one rival, Crawford had engineered an 1820 piece of legislation that limited
most federal officers to four-year terms, the better to make officers more dependent upon
2
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his will. Allegedly he had used his patronage as the Secretary of Treasury to build up a
loyal phalanx in the land offices and customs houses.7 At one point, he appointed an
officer, nominally for the purpose of inspecting land offices, but in reality to electioneer
for Crawford’s presidential candidacy.8
Despite all his baggage, however, Crawford in 1822 appeared to be the
frontrunner. Adams provided a formidable challenge, but he had baggage of his own – he
was, after all, his father’s son. Many New Englanders mistrusted him for his evident
apostasy, while some Republicans doubted the sincerity of his political conversion.
Adams did little to help his own cause; indeed, in one historian’s estimation, he seemed
almost determined to do as little as possible to promote himself for the presidency.
Despite these hindrances, Adams could at least count on New England’s support,
however grudgingly it was offered. By 1824, he was the only northern candidate in the
race.9
Calhoun might have seemed like a dark horse next to his two coworkers, but he
was primed to win the nomination in Pennsylvania. The more moderate, businessoriented wing of that state’s Republican Party respected the young Carolinian, who a few
years earlier had helped engineer a new national Bank charter. Pennsylvania’s more
radical Old School Republicans wanted nothing to do with any pro-Bank platform, but
they had no strong leadership, politically or intellectually. Joseph Hiester had proven
himself a disappointment as governor, and William Duane, after a quarter century of
fighting the good fight, had finally been forced to sell the Aurora in 1822. Lacking a
candidate or a party organ, the Old School seemed destined for irrelevance. And John C.
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Calhoun, drawing support from Pennsylvania’s moderate Republicans, could comfortably
expect an endorsement from one of the nation’s most politically important states. Some
unexpected news from Tennessee soon upended all of these bets.10
Andrew Jackson had been name-dropped as a presidential contender as early as
1816, and with good reason. After leading American soldiers to victory in 1815’s battle
of New Orleans, he had become by far the most celebrated war hero of his day. But few
observers in early 1822 took his prospects seriously, least of all Jackson himself. Despite
chronically terrible health, he allowed some friends to nominate him for President, if only
to block Crawford’s chances in Tennessee. When word of Jackson’s nomination reached
Pennsylvania, however, the Old School Republicans saw a window of opportunity.
Stephen Simpson, who had long distinguished himself as an enemy of the Bank and an
admirer of Jackson, started up a paper, the Columbian Observer, with an eye to
supporting his old militia commander’s presidential prospects. By early 1823, the Old
School Republicans were ready to hijack Pennsylvania on Jackson’s behalf.
The General’s candidacy suddenly seemed viable. Senator John Henry Eaton, a
fellow Tennessean who had served with Jackson in the war and subsequently
distinguished himself as an able panegyrist, recognized the political opportunity at hand.
Writing as “Philo-Wyoming,” Eaton submitted a series of campaign pieces for
publication in Simpson’s paper. He evidently knew his audience quite well; the Wyoming
letters unmistakably pitched Jackson as a man after the Old School anti-caucus
Republicans’ hearts.
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Eaton luridly painted Washington, D.C. as a cesspool infested with guileful
“leading men” circulating backdoor promises. The department heads – no less than three
of whom had now entered the presidential sweepstakes – could offer future appointments
to the congressmen, who in turn would vote to nominate those department heads in the
congressional caucus.11 The Treasury Department posed a particularly insidious threat: as
a prolific “dispenser of offices,” Crawford had cultivated his own “phalanx of
influence.”12 According to Eaton, this was a patently aristocratic arrangement.
Congressmen did not assemble in the caucus to communicate their constituents’ choice,
but rather to promote those patrons from whom they might expect some “future
favours.”13 Soon the nation would deteriorate to the point where those who panted after
offices would “only have to caress and flatter” a handful of “LEADING MEN” in
power.14 And those “leading men” desired nothing less than to cement themselves as “the
aristocracy of the country.” Thus the democratic form of government would linger, but
the democratic substance would be gone.
If we are to be controlled by a privileged order, for heaven’s sake let us
know it; and let stars and garters decorate their royal personage, that we
may know them; it will be far better than to have a parcel of sanctified
pretenders stalking through the country in sheep’s clothing, preaching up
and proclaiming their republican principles, and feelings, and purity, while
at the same time they are seeking to obtain consequence, and to elevate
themselves by secretly attempting to undermine the checks and balances
of the government.15
The caucus, in short, was an aristocratic coup in republican clothing.
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Eaton presented Andrew Jackson as a living antidote to this system of corruption,
for the General had firmly established himself as too patriotic for collusion.16 Any man
could call himself a devout Republican, but Jackson had proven his devotion “in the
storm of battle,” thus proving himself to be “above all price in sacrifices made for his
country.”17 Above all, Jackson was trustworthy because he did not even want to be
President. Time and time again, Eaton explained, the General had resigned or refused
positions in public life. He had “retired” from the Senate in 1798 and gracefully returned
to his life as “a farmer and a private citizen, soliciting no place or office whatsoever.” He
had patriotically stepped forward to lead the army in a time of need, and then retired once
again rather than lay claim to the political reward he so richly deserved.18 During the
intervening years, he had resigned another position as governor of Florida, declined a
“lucrative” diplomatic appointment, and “earnestly” begged his friends not to nominate
him for the Senate.19 And now he was once again comfortably settled into “retirement at
home,” where he could keep himself “aloof from all contemptible intrigue and
management of the day.”20
In his efforts to present Jackson as the retiring patriot-citizen, Eaton had to work
around some facts that might have complicated his idyllic pastoral tableau. Jackson had
not simply returned to private life after leaving the Senate in 1798, but had been elected
to Tennessee’s supreme court. He had resigned that position in 1804 – but in that same
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year, he had also taken keen interest in the Orleans territory governorship. These may
have been innocuous factual omissions on Eaton’s part. But Eaton was certainly more
disingenuous, if not quite dishonest, when he claimed that Jackson in 1823 was still
resting in contented retirement at the Hermitage. Jackson’s second senatorial term had
begun in March 1823, the very same month that Eaton began printing the Wyoming
letters in Simpson’s paper. True, Jackson had been reluctant to accept the nomination,
and would not actually arrive in Washington until Congress convened in December that
year. But Eaton scarcely addressed Jackson’s status as an elected senator at all, while
repeatedly and emphatically identifying the General with his presumably more bucolic
“private life.” “Retired from the busy scenes of public life, where he has been so actively
and busily employed in the perilous times of the Republic, he reposes on the laurels his
valor has won, and the affection of a grateful people.”21 “The hero of Orleans is at home,
asking nothing, desiring nothing… like Cincinnatus, he is on his farm and at his plough,
contented and willing to remain there, yet willing too to leave it, if called to do so by the
voice of the country.”22 “He holds no office, he is where the chief magistrate of the nation
should always be sought for, in private life.”23
By circling around the facts of Jackson’s biography and downplaying the
General’s experience in public life, Eaton displayed more strategic acumen than strict
honesty. He would have been foolish to stress Jackson’s relevant political experience.
Compared to his rivals, Jackson’s qualifications were negligible, his political
accomplishments practically nil. But Eaton deftly converted Jackson’s history of
inexperience into an asset by identifying political skill with cunning intrigue, and
21
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intellectual prowess with clever sophistry. In doing so, he painted a picture whose
contours must have delighted those Pennsylvanians who subscribed to the Observer.
They would have most likely been the same readers who had imbibed Simpson’s earlier
screeds in the Aurora, wherein Joseph Hiester had been painted with the same
brushstrokes – the disinterested and retiring patriot, too diffident and aloof to bargain
with courtiers, standing forth for the people rather than the officeseekers. Years before
Andrew Jackson became associated with anti-Bank crusades and Indian removal, radical
Pennsylvanians were trained to associate him with the same anti-caucus, anti-patronage
line they had been pursuing for more than a decade past. And nearly two years before
Henry Clay accepted his appointment as secretary of state, Eaton held up Jackson before
the people as an incorruptible patriot immune to corrupt bargains.24
Eaton’s decision to depict Jackson as the patriot above bargains allowed him to
write off Jackson’s enemies as soon-to-be-disappointed officeseekers. If anyone opposed
the General’s candidacy, it was only because they knew his “decision of character and
manly firmness” were “not calculated to recommend him to those who are in quest of the
loaves and fishes.”25 Such men could have no claims on this latter-day patriot king.
On nothing is he committed, and to none is he under obligation for the
distinguished stand which he occupies in life. No parasite claims rest
against him; he will be left free to administer the government, as his
24
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judgment and prudence may direct, and to call into employment, being
pledged to none, the most intelligent and virtuous part of the community.26
Already Eaton anticipated that Jackson would stride into Washington and subject its
officeholding denizens to withering moral scrutiny. The “honest and the faithful,” of
course, would have nothing to fear. Less mercy would be shown toward “those lazy
drones who hang on office, sucking in the sustenance of the country.”27 Jackson did not
need such men’s support – he already had the support of those Americans who neither
expected nor desired anything but a return to “principles of purity and virtue.”28
Eaton recognized how important it was to present Jackson’s supporters as the
more virtuous and principled citizenry, as far distant from officeseeking motives as the
hero himself. He repeatedly assured readers that no selfish incentives had compelled him
to write on Jackson’s behalf. “[B]y me nothing is wanted or sought for,” Eaton wrote,
“but to sustain our republican principles, and to see my country rise to that pride and lofty
elevation to which, the people being virtuous, she is capable of attaining.”29 And
according to Eaton, no one could doubt that the rest of Jackson’s supporters were equally
sincere, as the General had nothing to offer them but the promise of a virtuous
presidency. “[R]esting in the shades of private life,” Jackson had no “patronage” with
which to purchase support. “[T]hose who venture to speak on his behalf, are without
motive or inducement, save that of giving utterance to their feelings, and of indulging in
those proud sentiments which Republicans will ever be pleased to foster.” No matter
what course the contest took, then, Jackson would be able to take comfort in the
knowledge that his supporters had “acted from principle” and not from “the promise of
26
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future favors.” And if Jackson did triumph, he would know that he owed his victory to
the people and not to any “intrigue.”30
When the Wyoming letters first began to roll off Simpson’s press in March 1823,
Jackson did not even realize that his friend Eaton lay behind them. But Jackson evidently
found the letters’ portrait rather congenial, perhaps even inspiring, as he began to imitate
the reflection he saw in Eaton’s writings. Prior to 1823, Jackson had never uttered the
stock phrase “intrigue and management” in any of his correspondence; now that phrase
became a mainstay of his political vocabulary.31 Nor had he previously paid any
particular attention to the arguments surrounding caucuses in the previous decade; but by
the early months of 1824 he found himself haranguing personal friends with warnings
that the American experiment would soon “sink under the scenes of corruption that must
be practiced” in that system.32 “[C]oalition & intrigue” were “staking [sic] abroad
through our land,” he declared to Calhoun, and nothing less than “the whole exertions of
the virtuous portion of the people” could stop their sinister progress.33 Corresponding
from Washington, Jackson now wrote in the puritanical tones of a country dweller
longing to tear himself away from the den of corruption. “Virtue,” he wrote John
Donelson, was “to be found amonghst [sic] the farmers of the country alone, not about
courts, where courtiers dwell.”34
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In the aftermath of Wyoming, some of the other candidates’ partisans tried to
outdo Eaton by depicting their champions as high-minded men who stood above all
bargains. Adams was hailed in the press for spurning “intrigue” – quite unlike Crawford,
who supposedly kept himself busy “making great bargains, promising offices, etc.”35
Calhoun’s supporters similarly tried to present him as a man too proud to engage in any
“intrigue.”36 And by 1824, some of Crawford’s acolytes were trying to play catch-up by
pitching their man as a charismatic outsider who stood forth boldly in the face of the
government’s “influence and patronage.”37
It remained unclear, however, just much incorruptibility Republicans could
actually stomach, especially if Jacksonites’ high-minded ideals would incline them to
reconcile with Federalists. In Pennsylvania, William J. Duane, son of the legendary
Aurora editor, openly praised Jackson as the candidate for Americans who had grown
weary of the endless back-and-forth between parties.38 Many of the individuals who soon
flocked to Jackson’s banner identified themselves as being above partisanship altogether,
and some of those supporters, including DeWitt Clinton himself, were perfectly willing to
work with Federalists while still self-identifying as Republicans. Others were less openminded. Jackson’s staunch supporter Stephen Simpson, for instance, despised Federalists
and imagined Monroe’s “era of good feelings” as a plot to reintegrate old enemies back
into the government.39 All the candidates in 1824 realized that it might be dangerous to
embrace Federalism out in the open, yet they also realized that Federalist support might
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help their own chances. They all walked a precarious tightrope, seeking out Federalist
support in secret while denouncing Federalism in public.40
Crawford’s supporters found it easy to target Jackson as an un-Republican
amalgamator. John Binns, editor of Philadelphia’s Democratic Press, claimed that
Jackson had once urged President Monroe to balance his cabinet between Federalists and
Republicans.41 One of Jackson’s old letters resurfaced in 1824, and it raised some
potentially troubling questions about the orthodoxy of his republican faith. Jackson had
advised President-elect Monroe in 1816 to give a cabinet position to William Drayton, a
Federalist who had supported the Madison administration and served in the war. Some
observers in 1824 pointed to this letter as evidence that Jackson as President would
“abandon” Republicans by vesting the enemy party with “power and patronage.”42 Others
praised Jackson as a latter-day Washington who would “not be a tool to any party in his
appointments to office.”43 Jackson trimmed a delicate line whenever he touched on this
subject. He had never intended to suggest that Monroe balance parties equally within his
cabinet; what he had meant to say was that Monroe should disregard party affiliation
altogether and strictly prioritize candidates’ capability and patriotism.44 Such was the
course that Jackson intended to pursue as President. He had always openly avowed
himself a staunch Republican, but not so staunch that he would “proscribe” demonstrable
patriots just because they happened to be Federalists. In his eyes, the constitution
protected every man’s freedom of “opinion,” and he would not stoop to the level of a
petty tyrant by persecuting those who disagreed with him. For Jackson fully intended to
40
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“be the President of the nation,” “& not of a party.” That was the true Jeffersonian
standard, as Jackson saw it. “Therefore as Mr. Jefferson said,” he wrote, “‘We are all
Federalists, we are all Republicans, and we ought only to inquire is he honest, is he fit, is
he capable.”45
Jackson’s remarks on partisan patronage vindicated one of the Wyoming letter’s
most significant claims: he was indeed politically inexperienced, perhaps even naïve.
Having retired from national politics in 1798, Jackson was not privy to the more nuanced
discussions that had surrounded partisan patronage for the past quarter-century. He did
not realize, for instance, that Jefferson’s old claims about party harmony had been
predicated on the absolute destruction of high Federalism. He did not parse the vexing
lines distinguishing those who differed in opinion from those who differed in principle.
Martin Van Buren had justified cross-party alliances by limiting the offer of
reconciliation to those Federalists who had learned to embrace Republican principles; he
certainly never would have conceded that both parties’ principles deserved the same
indulgence. But Jackson evidently saw the two parties’ divergent views as petty, at least
when measured against the common spirit of patriotism that had bound them together
during the late war. He still imagined that patriotism could transcend partisanship,
whereas the truly staunch Republicans could not easily distinguish patriotism from
partisanship at all; as far as the latter group was concerned, those who differed on
political principles were enemies to the republic. If the partisans were the militant
ideologues in this conversation, then Jackson, at least in 1824, was the serene idealist.
The only other candidate whose high-minded notions might have exceeded Jackson’s was
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John Quincy Adams, and he would soon pay the price for entertaining the notion of a
President above party.

“Something Rotten in the State of Denmark”: The “Corrupt Bargain” of 1825
Crawford’s supporters quickly perceived that the Jacksonites’ anti-caucus critique
was riddled with logical errors. Whatever its shortcomings, the caucus system provided a
convenient mechanism for whittling down the number of candidates. With five
presidential contenders currently in the running, it seemed quite unlikely that any of them
would be able to capture the necessary majority in the electoral college, which meant that
the House of Representatives would choose the President. And as Crawford’s supporters
vainly tried to explain, a House election would be far more vulnerable to corruption and
bribery that a congressional caucus.46 Jackson’s supporters would soon come to recognize
the truth of this argument.
But by that point, Crawford had suffered a stroke, which effectively took him out
of serious consideration. He still managed to win forty-one electoral votes, four more
than Henry Clay could manage but less than half as many as Adams or Jackson, who had
eighty-four and ninety-nine votes, respectively. (After seeing his chances in Pennsylvania
collapse, Calhoun had decided to run as the sole Vice Presidential candidate.) The
presidential election thus fell into the House, just as Crawford’s supporters had predicted.
Clay was out of the race altogether, but far from impotent; as Speaker of the House and
an influential congressman, he could potentially sway other members’ votes. Clay chose
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to remain publicly silent about his preferences all through December 1824 and well into
January 1825.
There was good reason to think that Clay would throw his weight behind the
Tennesseean. Both men were nationalists from western states, and Jackson held
considerable support in Clay’s native Kentucky. Moreover, it seemed like there was little
love to be lost between Clay and Adams. They had notoriously quarreled while
negotiating a treaty with Britain in 1814, and Clay’s supporters had conspicuously
publicized those disagreements during the recent election contest. But if Clay found
Adams somewhat irritating, he saw Tennessee’s notorious “military chieftain” as a
dangerous loose cannon and potentially even a threat to republican government. He
decided early on that he would cast his vote for Adams, and privately encouraged other
western congressmen to do likewise. Clay publicly announced his decision on January
24, 1825.
Clay’s announcement resolved any uncertainties about his preference, but only
fueled further speculations about his motives. As early as mid-1824, rumors had
circulated about a possible conspiracy between Adams and Clay.47 Those rumors could
only grow now. Less than a week after Clay announced his choice, Simpson’s Columbian
Observer printed an anonymous congressman’s allegations that Clay had struck a deal
with Adams. Clay furiously denied these charges, demanding a House investigation and
the name of his accuser. The author was soon identified as a Pennsylvania Jacksonite,
George Kremer, who refused to defend his claims before any congressional tribunal.48
Adams subsequently won the House election and thus the presidency. And then the
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unthinkable happened: President-elect Adams offered the reins of the state department to
Henry Clay, the man who had handed him the throne.
Kremer did not present his evidence to the public until March 1825, at which
point the “bargain” was already a fait accompli. Post facto, Kremer argued that Clay’s
sudden show of support for Adams could only be explained by bribery. Back in 1817,
Clay had declared that he would always abide by the will of his constituents – but
according to Kremer, everyone in 1825 knew that the people of Kentucky preferred
Jackson to Adams. Nor could Clay’s choice be explained away as a simple matter of
personal preference, for the Kentuckian had spoken bitterly against Adams until late in
the game. One of Clay’s friends, Francis Johnson, had previously informed Kremer that
both Clay and his constituents preferred Jackson. Any rapprochement between these two
rivals, according to Kremer, could only have been brought about by some sort of tradeoff.49
As Kremer recounted details from the months of December and January, it
seemed clear – to him, anyway – that there had been some secret intrigue at work all
along. Clay had become strategically silent once the election came before the House. His
sudden reticence seemed rather suspect; according to Kremer, Clay had already known
the candidates and his constituents well enough to know how to vote. “It was also
circulated” – Kremer relied heavily on passive-voice innuendos – that Clay had advised
his friends not to make any public statements until after they had conferred with one
another. During this same time, Kremer claimed, he had been privy to some rather
sinister conversations. One of Clay’s supporters in the House had approached him to ask
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if Jackson could match Adams’s price, to which Kremer had forthrightly responded that
there would be “no pledges” from the General’s camp. And Jacksonites, according to
Kremer, had duly paid the price of such rectitude. When Clay had finally declared his
choice, he had been joined by congressmen from five western states, one of whom had
previously declared a preference for Jackson. John Quincy Adams duly received the
presidency, Henry Clay the state department. As Kremer saw it, “There was something
rotten in the state of Denmark.”50 Although the evidence for a corrupt bargain was almost
entirely circumstantial, the circumstances were enough to damn both Adams and Clay.
This “corrupt bargain” charge certainly served Jacksonians’ rhetorical purposes. It
allowed them to delegitimize opposing congressmen as unprincipled officeseekers, deftly
dismissing any real objections to their candidate. Political actors had deployed such
language for decades. But if we write off the corrupt bargain charge as some hastily
contrived specimen of electioneering cant, we risk overlooking a more deeply rooted
discursive context. English oppositional politicians had complained for the past 150 years
about powerful executives bribing members of the legislature with appointments.51
Framers of the American constitution had agonized over ways to preempt executive
bribery, and their intellectual heirs had reopened those old debates during the Madison
administration. But one did not need to scan the pages of English history or even the
constitutional debates in order to understand these concerns. The Wyoming letters had
warned readers about similar transactions between department heads and Congress just
two years earlier. The idea of a “corrupt bargain” was therefore a nightmare that had
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haunted American political actors’ dreams for decades past. When Clay accepted his
appointment from Adams’s hands, innocently or not, he appeared to be fulfilling a baleful
prophecy. In Kremer’s words, Clay had been blinded by “some fatal madness” if he
expected not to pay a price for his purchase.52

The (Other) Corrupt Bargains: Amalgamation and its Discontents
The “corrupt bargain” charge might have been sufficient by itself to doom
Adams’s hopes of reelection, but other factors complicated his presidency even further.
Even before the House crowned him President, Adams had to fend off inquisitive
Federalists pestering him for his views on partisan patronage. In January 1825, while the
House was still preparing to vote, John Reed had approached him to communicate fellow
Federalists’ concern that Adams would proscribe members of their party. Adams duly
assured Reed that he would not ban any man from office on account of his partisanship.
Daniel Webster, New England’s most influential Federalist, had needed further
reassurance. He had penned a letter advising a Maryland colleague to vote for Adams,
carefully noting therein that he trusted Adams not to exclude Federalists from
appointments. Before sending this letter, however, Webster had met with Adams to
ensure the correctness of its assertions. Adams flatly refused to barter away any cabinet
appointment, but Webster quickly clarified that even a Federalist judgeship would
suffice. Having thus reached an understanding, Adams cleared Webster to send the letter.
This confusing, guarded series of exchanges would later come back to bite Adams.53
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The new President tried to bury these matters in his inaugural address, in which
he preached a gospel of party conciliation more magnanimous than anything Jefferson
had ever dared. “Of the great parties which have divided the opinions and feelings of our
country,” Adams wrote, “the candid and the just will now admit that both have
contributed splendid talents, spotless integrity, ardent patriotism, and disinterested
sacrifices to the formation and administration of this Government, and that both have
required a liberal indulgence for a portion of human infirmity and error.” Adams chalked
up the previous decades’ party disputes to the international chaos that revolutionary
France had unleashed upon the world. With those affairs settled after 1815, “this baneful
weed of party strife” had finally been “uprooted.”
From that time no difference of principle, connected either with the theory
of our government or with our intercourse with foreign nations, has
existed or been called forth in force sufficient to sustain a continued
combination of parties… Ten years of peace, at home and abroad, have
assuaged the animosities of political contention and blended into harmony
the most discordant elements of public opinion. There still remains one
effort of magnanimity, one sacrifice of prejudice and passion, to be made
by the individuals throughout the nation who have heretofore followed the
standards of political party. It is that of discarding every remnant of rancor
against each other, of embracing as countrymen and friends, and of
yielding to talents and virtue alone that confidence which in times of
contention for principle was bestowed only upon those who bore the
badge of party communion.54
Beseeching both parties to shake off their lingering mistrustful habits, Adams implicitly
signaled that he would prioritize “talents and virtue” in his appointments. The long
awaited hour had finally arrived when a President need only consider whether an officer
was honest, capable, and faithful. There would be no purgative reformation in the public
offices, no intolerant proscription of any party, no specious plans for rotation in office, no
grandiose visions of cleansing the Augean stable.
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Throughout his presidency, Adams attempted to fulfill these promises of
harmonious administration. Although the 1820 Tenure of Office Act had limited many
officers’ terms to four years, he deliberately reappointed all but four incumbents,
removing only twelve civil officers during his entire presidency.55 Adams refused to
remove any appointee for any reason other than malfeasance or incompetence, and thus
retained numerous officers who had opposed his own candidacy; indeed, he even offered
cabinet positions to political rivals like William Crawford and DeWitt Clinton, both of
whom refused.56 Some observers approved his refusal to punish enemies and reward
supporters.57 Even a self-avowed New York democrat could praise the new chief
magistrate for defusing his enemies’ fears of proscription and defying his more venal
friends’ hopes of preferment.58
Adams warily tried to honor his implied promise of bipartisan patronage, doling
out some appointments to a few prominent Federalists like Rufus King.59 But here he
proceeded with caution. Adams was still a Republican, after all, and some members of
his own party did not take kindly to Presidents who flirted with the old enemies.60 Many
New England Republicans, for instance, were ready to rid Americans of Federalism at
long last. At least one New England paper channeled the radicals of 1801 by identifying
Federalists with old tory refugees who preyed on Americans’ gullibility to infiltrate the
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republican citadel.61 The old High Federalists’ “descendants” supposedly lurked in the
corners and waited for their moment to pounce.62 Indeed, some perceived that the
younger Adams himself was one such Federalist. He seemed, for many observers, to be
pursuing the same heterodox policies as his father, such as using the navy and internal
improvement schemes to expand his own patronage. And now, according to Adams’s
enemies in the press, this faux-republican charlatan proposed to dissolve old party
distinctions and thereby lull Americans into accepting re-branded Federalist enterprises.63
In such writers’ eyes, old Federalists like Adams had modulated their tactics without
changing their designs. They still longed for outlandish and expensive governments with
ample “patronage” to bestow, but now they masqueraded as Republicans instead of
openly avowing their “aristocratic principles.” “This is not fighting with shadows,”
warned a New Hampshire paper. “It is the shadow which has departed; the substance still
remains.”64
While Adams clung to his conviction that American party wars had represented
nothing more than provisional disputes over now archaic questions, his critics embraced a
more comprehensive theory of partisan struggle. A South Carolina “Democrat”
expounded on this theory in detail. Channeling currents of thought that had extended
from the Federal Farmer in 1788 through Martin Van Buren’s disquisition in 1820, this
“Democrat” perceived the “Aristocracy” as a natural, permanent class in every society.
They had shielded themselves for years behind the “respectable” banner of Federalism. If
that reprobate party had ever encompassed any misguided Republicans in Federalist
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clothing, those prodigal sons had by now returned to the fold. But there could be “no such
union” with the true dyed-in-the-wool aristocrats, for they had “constitute[d] a distinct
class of politicians” since Roman times, always deploying the same tricks. “If an
Aristocracy be an ingredient in every society,” he wrote, “it becomes the people, the real
democracy of the country, to inquire under what colors they are rallied at present.” For
the aristocrats were protean by nature. Sometimes they hid behind the name of a trusted
party, while at other times they pretended that party names no longer mattered. At all
times, they would assiduously cultivate minions from the lower orders. “That many of the
common people are forced into the ranks of the aristocracy is not strange… There are
jobs to be done, sinecures to be disposed, in short where there are crumbs that fall under
the table, there will be spaniels to pick them up.” Once they had built up their collection
of servile “dependents,” the aristocracy would attempt to place these lackeys “in every
office of emolument” where they could carry out “the dirty work of party.” And once the
aristocrats had charmed and bribed their way into power, they would use “the influence
of patronage” to retain it. Adams and Clay’s 1825 bargain was just one particularly
conspicuous example of these time-sanctioned aristocratic arts.65
By 1827, then, Adams’s ambitious policy proposals, combined with his
occasional gestures of bipartisan goodwill, had convinced some intransigent Republicans
that their President was really just an aristocratic Federalist by any other name. And that
was before they learned about Adams and Daniel Webster’s backdoor meeting from early
1825. Even if Adams had only promised not to rule out Federalists from consideration in
appointments, the fact that he had issued such a “promise” reeked of corrupt motives.66
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Some Federalists noted that Adams had actually overlooked or disregarded many worthy
Federalists who applied for office.67 But Jacksonians anticipated that Adams was simply
biding his time waiting for the strategic moment to fulfill his old promise.68 This socalled “Webster bargain” confirmed Adams’s growing reputation as the figurehead of an
American aristocracy. Although he had identified as a Republican for years, Jacksonians
saw Adams’s superficial political conversion as proof of his duplicitous ways.69
Even when Adams appointed well-established Republicans, Jacksonians could
accuse him of trying to purchase his enemies’ support.70 The administration’s supporters
were frustrated by the Jacksonians’ apparent inconsistency on this point: when Adams
appointed Federalists or those who had supported his election, the opposition accused
him of bestowing rewards on partisans; when Adams appointed Republicans or those
who had not supported his election, the opposition accused him of trying to purchase
votes. These maddening, paradoxical arguments persuaded some Adams supporters that
the Jacksonians only cared about getting offices and would deploy whatever arguments
might advance that goal.71 But for New Hampshire Jacksonians, at least, it was the
Adams men who lacked any consistent creed: the “unprincipled” faux-Republicans had
joined forces with the eternal aristocracy to form an unholy coalition.72
Adams thus found himself confronted with the same questions that had plagued
Martin Van Buren in New York a few years earlier. Could one appease multiple parties
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without abandoning principles? If, as Adams believed, the old sources of party division
were irrelevant, then there could be no reason to ban Federalists from the civil service.
But if, as many Jacksonians believed, the old party divisions were founded on natural and
immutable distinctions between the democracy and the aristocracy, the lines between
conciliation and corruption seemed rather blurry. A natural aristocrat could not change
his stripes, nor could he ever truly embrace republican principles. If a Republican in
power bartered with an aristocrat out of power, he could not truly care about Republican
principles; if a Republican out of power accepted offerings from an aristocrat in power,
he could not truly care about Republican principles. Jefferson and Van Buren had sought
out the lines dividing the true aristocratic Federalists from the fundamentally Republican
ones. But Adams did not believe that an American aristocracy even existed, and therefore
saw no reason to continue the old party feuds on life support.
Van Buren, now a senator and the leader of New York’s “Albany Regency,” saw
Adams’s avowed nonpartisanship as a problem. The New Yorker still hoped to restore a
woebegone system in which “party principles” would take priority over “personal
preferences.” As Van Buren had explained in 1820, the old party divisions never really
abated. “We must always have party distinctions,” he wrote Richmond Enquirer editor
Thomas Ritchie, Virginia’s most prominent Crawfordite, in 1827. As Van Buren
explained, any amalgamation between Republicans and Federalists would only open a
breach for new party rivalries. If new parties formed along sectional lines, the results
could be disastrous. But if, on the other hand, the old principled alliance between
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southern planters and “plain” northern Republicans could be revived, it might do
something to mute sectional antagonisms.73
Van Buren therefore remained hesitant about endorsing Andrew Jackson. The
Tennesseans’ widely publicized 1816 letter to Monroe had given the New Yorker reason
to think that Jackson would be just as nonpartisan as Adams. He also worried that
Jackson’s campaign would be conducted “without reference to party” or even
“principle”; it would be just another question of personal preference. But if Jackson could
be elected through the “combined and concerted effort of a political party, holding in the
main, to certain tenets and opposed to certain prevailing principles” – well, that would be
“a far different thing.” With these hopes and reservations in mind, Van Buren advised
Crawford’s old supporters to transfer their allegiances to Jackson.74
The Jackson coalition that formed between 1826 and 1828 was just as
heterogeneous as Adams’s. The Tennessean’s original supporters now mixed with Van
Buren’s Bucktails and other Crawfordites, along with anti-tariff Calhounites and some
disaffected Clay partisans. In New York, Van Buren even found himself joining forces
with his oldest nemesis, DeWitt Clinton. These alliances were undeniably useful for
Jackson’s cause. Calhoun’s friend Duff Green, for instance, furnished the Jacksonian
coalition with a vicious semi-official party organ, Washington’s United States Telegraph.
And now that Crawford’s old partisans had also transferred their allegiance to the
General, Jackson could count on support from influential printers like Isaac Hill in New
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Hampshire and Thomas Ritchie in Virginia, as well as the entire Bucktail political
apparatus in New York. But these different sects of the Jacksonian coalition disagreed
profoundly on various policy issues.75 (Jackson himself shrewdly heeded his advisers’
counsel and remained taciturn on divisive issues like the protective tariff and internal
improvements.)
Adams’s partisans speculated that the only thing uniting this strange array of
bedfellows was their shared desire for political offices, but Thomas Ritchie resented such
implications. “Can nothing but unprincipled ambition account for the active association
of different parties?” asked Ritchie’s Enquirer. “Is there no motive to explain the
phenomenon, but the lust of ‘office, and office only’?” Virginia’s ex-Crawfordites knew
that Jackson’s views on the tariff did not align perfectly with their own – but they were
willing to compromise. They knew it looked suspicious when old rivals like Van Buren
and Clinton shook hands in New York – but Adams and Clay’s fiendish compact had
made these unions necessary. “When politicians, like those which wield the power of the
nation, coalesce, it is time for others to associate.”76 Although the author did not cite any
sources, he was almost certainly inspired by Edmund Burke’s old justification for the
provisional country party. “When bad men combine,” Burke had written, “the good must
associate.”77
But it was one thing to unite fraying strands of the Republican Party behind a
provisional purpose, and quite another thing to claim that one’s coalition had united
around eternal, immutable republican principles – especially if that spirit of unity would
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extend to the reviled Federalists. Van Buren had fretted about Jackson’s evident
indifference to party distinctions, and it must have piqued him to notice others praising
Jackson as a statesman who would distribute patronage without any reference to party
rivalries. Numerous papers in 1827still read Jackson’s old letter to Monroe as evidence
that the hero of Orleans was too high-minded to proscribe Federalists.78 Jacksonians in
Virginia anticipated that the “incorruptible statesman” would “disregard all personal,
party, and sectional prejudice, and have respect only to merit and public utility.”79 This
nonpartisan interpretation complemented the emerging campaign narrative in which
Jackson played the man of the people surmounting corruption: because Jackson was
already the popular choice, he would not even need to exploit patronage and reward
partisans.80
Duff Green was able to reconcile some of these different views in the pages of the
Telegraph, where he provided a lucid clarification of the Jacksonians’ ideological
coalition as a genuine partisan movement whose principles transcended superficial
bigotry. Jackson was no amalgamation man; according to the Telegraph, the General was
an open and avowed Republican. If any Federalists supported him, they did so knowing
that he was the decided Republican candidate. Such Federalists were essentially
Republican and demonstrably patriotic. They were the ones who had proven their
patriotism, first during the war, and again in the ongoing battle against “intrigue and
corruption.” Jackson, first among American patriots, would never proscribe men of
proven worth simply because they had once called themselves Federalists. “[S]uch
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Federalists will become identified with the republican party, and as such, be entitled to
participate in the advantages to be derived from our victory.” This promise must have
seemed reassuring to those ex-Federalists who worried that their former associations
might hurt their chances for receiving appointment under a Jackson administration. But
Green also assured more militant Republicans that Jacksonians would not shelter any
neo-Tories and aristocrats. Where Adams would shower his rewards upon the
“aristocracy,” Jackson would reserve offices only for the deserving republican patriots.81
In the final days of the contest, Green repeated this ultimatum in harsher terms.
For the Telegraph – the closest thing to an official mouthpiece for the Jacksonian
movement – the battle of 1828 provided old Federalists with one last chance to prove
themselves as patriotic republicans who deserved forgiveness. Jackson had already
identified wartime service as one criterion for discerning the good Federalist; Green now
pointed to patriotic services during “the great moral revolution of 1828” as an even
“better test.” He sympathetically acknowledged that some men’s “circumstances” had
previously forced them into the Federal ranks. But the current circumstances could not
justify any true patriot’s casting a vote for Adams. Green thus invited the good
Federalists “to come out from among the TRAITORS” and “come into our ranks as
republicans.” Those Federalists who had joined “in the great struggle against corruption,”
staying true to Jackson’s cause “in the heat and burden of the day,” would “not be
forgotten in the hour of rejoicing.” But woe to those Federalists who remained in the
enemy’s ranks, for the people had selected Jackson as their “agent of reformation.” Any
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officer who clung to Adams’s traitorous coattails would be, in Green’s words, justly
doomed to “proscription.”82
Green’s piece ignited a firestorm. Administration papers construed his words as
proof that the Jacksonians were venal officeseekers planning to clear the way for their
own promotions.83 Some historians have concurred, reading Green’s declarations as a
shameless attempt at coercing executive officers to support Jackson’s candidacy.84 That
interpretation may very well contain some truth; if one were to look for a paragon of
disinterested virtue in the 1820s, Duff Green would probably not be the choice. But to
dismiss Green’s exhortations as a last-ditch recruitment effort is to pretend that these
issues had no history and thus no ideological valence. Martin Van Buren had argued
essentially the same points, albeit less histrionically, in 1820: Republicans could
welcome only those Federalists who were willing to join the fold in principle and in
action, but not the Federalists who remained hostile to Republican principles and
Republican elections. Thomas Jefferson had imagined similar distinctions between
republican and anti-republican Federalists in 1801. Green followed a similar train of
logic. He simply made one’s stance on the election of 1828 the litmus test for
distinguishing one breed of Federalist from the other.
In doing so, Green implied some difficult criteria for Jacksonian patronage. The
new administration could not indulge officers who claimed to prefer Adams for honest
reasons, because there were no honest reasons to support John Quincy Adams. They
could reward Federalists, but only those Federalists who had proven themselves to be
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essentially Republicans. Where Jefferson had tried to conciliate the misguided Americans
whose Federalist apostasy had been accidental and ephemeral, Van Buren and Green
wanted to conciliate Federalists whose conversion to Republicanism had been sincere and
complete. If Jacksonians intended to take such criteria seriously, they would have to
scrutinize the motives and sincerity behind officers’ and officeseekers’ political
conversions. The reformation of 1828 would thus come to represent, in some
Jacksonians’ minds, a climactic effort to draw firm lines between the authentic
Republicans and the deceptive aristocrats – a day of deliverance for the one and
banishment for the other.

“Power and Patronage”: The Manichean Style in Jacksonian Politics
Adams could have used official patronage to shore up support for his
administration, but he was reluctant to wield such power. Clay advised him early on to
remove a naval officer who was stirring up trouble against the administration; Adams
flatly refused, boasting that he would never punish any man merely for expressing his
opinion.85 Throughout Adams’s presidency, his shrewder allies urged him to nurture a
support base with appointments, but he stubbornly held his ground.86 Inside observers
were baffled to see Adams retaining enemies in office where they could assail him, rather
than arming his own supporters with offices to defend him.87 Adams correctly suspected,
for instance, that Postmaster General John McLean was working against his candidacy;
Adams retained him anyway, knowing that McLean was a capable officer. But Adams’s
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concerns were well placed. McLean appointed numerous Jackson men as postmasters in
prominent locations, despite some administration partisans’ pleading that he appoint
Adams men to these points.88 He even awarded mail contracts to vitriolic Jackson
supporters, including Duff Green, who used those profits to purchase the antiadministration Telegraph.89
Not that Adams’s administration was utterly sinless. He did offer appointment to
two of the western congressmen who had delivered their states’ votes to him in 1825.90
And Clay, as Secretary of State, pulled government printing contracts from many antiadministration newspapers – a strategy that amounted to proscription in practice if not in
name.91 Amos Kendall, a lapsed Clay man and editor the Kentucky Among those editors
who fell victim to this strategy were Amos Kendall, editor of the Kentucky Argus, and
Isaac Hill, editor of the New Hampshire Patriot, both of whom were destined to become
leading figures in Jacksonian politics.92 John Binns’s Democratic Press, which held a
government contract, printed “coffin handbills” depicting Jackson as a military despot
who wantonly executed his own troops.93 Clay had also provided money for a paper
entitled Truth’s Advocate, established in 1828 to lead the charge with scandalous attacks
on Andrew Jackson’s character; whether or not Clay actually encouraged those
productions, Jackson himself had no doubts about the Treasury Secretary’s culpability.94
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And Adams’s plans of national improvement would, of course, have given him more
offices to bestow, thus arousing the ire of retrenchment republicans.
These transgressions were evidently enough to convince Jackson and his inner
circle that the Adams administration could only survive by patronage.95 When John
Henry Eaton perceived Clay’s unpopularity in Washington, he could barely suppress his
schadenfreude.
The administration vainly thought that patronage & power could sustain
them and force the people to retain them… Hal walks alone, crest fallen,
dejected and almost without associates, except some wretched cleavers to
power, who are knuckling after some office, & seeking to obtain it at a
sacrafice of all feeling, these flit about him; while the high minded stand
off.96
Andrew Jackson allegedly stood above such arts. Isaac Hill’s New Hampshire Patriot, for
instance, concluded one piece with a paean to “the HERO of the Revolution who was
never an office-seeker himself, nor the friend of office-seekers.”97
Jackson and his supporters routinely depicted their cause as a battle to save
democracy from patronage.98 Adams had used his own patronage to thwart the people’s
will in February 1825; now the administration would use that power to perpetuate itself in
office. “Of what avail is it for us to condemn hereditary monarchy,” asked a Delaware
paper, “if we permit the power to pass through a line of succession established by the
Presidents themselves, by means of the corrupt use of executive patronage?”99 By mid1826, Vice President Calhoun had attached himself to Jackson’s cause, which he saw as a
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battle to decide the fate of republican government. “[I]t must be determined in the next
three years,” he wrote Jackson, “whether the real governing principle in our political
system be the power and patronage of the Executive, or the voice of the people.”100
And Jackson, of course, was the one man incorruptible enough to fight this battle
in Washington. “Corruption flees from his presence, and the energy of his character is
calculated to cleanse the Augean stable,” wrote Thomas Ritchie’s Enquirer.101 “He is
every way suited to the emergency,” declared South Carolina’s George McDuffie in a
July 4 oration.
I believe no other man living could breast the torrent of executive
patronage. If the God who conducted our fathers through darkness and
despondency to light and liberty, should condescend to indicate by a sign
from Heaven, the man best qualified to purify our political system – to
disperse the host of well dressed beggars – hungry office hunters and fat
hangers on to office – that infest the capital, and eat out the substance of
the nation – General Jackson, would, I sincerely believe, be the very man
pointed out by the finger of Heaven.102
McDuffie’s messianic portrait of Jackson was too extreme to be typical – but only
slightly. Samuel Swartwout of New York practically hero-worshipped the General in his
correspondence.
The power & patronage of the Executive is so great, that none but a pure
patriot can make head against the thousand corrupt sources of power
which he can bring to bear directly upon the people… The battle of 98
must be fought over again and no man other than yourself can lead us up
to the conflict & bring us triumphant out of it.103
Jackson’s associates now played the role of militant outsiders who fearlessly courted the
displeasure of a powerful establishment. “[I]t is my pride,” boasted Calhoun, “that I have
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been the object of unceasing attack by the corrupt occupants of power.”104 Hugh Lawson
White of Tennessee took it for granted that some heroic Jacksonian foot soldiers would
fall in the battle to come.
It is a fearful and equal contest – money office, the hope of office and
every thing which can be included under the term patronage on the one
side, confronted by nothing but intelligence and virtue of the people on the
other: but he is unworthy of public employ who will faulter for a
moment… It is a poor battle in which none are killed or wounded – if
defeated we can bury our dead and dress our wounded at leisure. If
victorious we have the highest consolation, to wit, that the slain and
mangled have suffered in the best of causes.105
Jackson’s supporters, the American people, were said to be just as incorruptible as
their champion. Louisville Jacksonians exhorted “the American people” to “punish” the
corrupt bargain’s perpetrators, and thereby prove “that there is an incorruptibility in the
honest yeomanry of this country, which renders them independent, and superior to the
political cabals and caballers.” In doing so, the people would defy “all the office holders
and office hunters of the land.”106 Jackson himself liked to describe the impending
election as “a contest between the virtue of the people, & the influence of patronage.”107
This notion eventually acquired a certain talismanic power for Jackson, as it allowed him
to banish all queries about his actual policy intentions. When a South Carolina politician
probed Jackson for his views on the tariff, Jackson evaded the question, changing the
subject to his favorite pet platitude: “The result of the present struggle between the virtue
of the people & executive patronage will test the stability of our government, and I for
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one do not despair of the republic; I have great confidence in the virtue of a great
majority of the people, and I cannot fear the result.”108
Jacksonians’ heavy-handed references to the people’s “virtue” may have served a
strategic purpose, for it allowed them to evade some more fraught political questions.
Even so, their rhetoric created the space for a perhaps more active understanding of the
people and their role in the democratic process. Earlier thinkers, ranging from “Cato” to
the Federal Farmer to Thomas Jefferson, had also trusted the people to despise patronage
– but primarily for self-interested reasons. Corrupt courts and aristocrats could not
survive without expanding their resources for bribery, and the people would naturally
resent having to pay for the placemen’s salaries. The “people,” in this perspective, were
primarily hardworking and industrious taxpayers. Jacksonians still complained about the
expenses of corruption, but at least as often they focused on the threat to democracy.
“The people,” as Jacksonians saw them, demonstrated their virtue not only through their
industrious habits, but also by their vigilant oversight of the democratic process. And if
the people were virtuous enough to be jealous of their rights, then Adams’s corrupt
bargains were reason enough for their resentment; it was not the taxes that mattered but
the principle. The people would demonstrate their republican virtue by voting out those
who had committed crimes against democratic government – and Jackson would prove
himself worthy of the people’s trust by enforcing their verdict in every department of the
government.
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Conclusion
The election itself saw no repeat of 1825’s dramatics. Andrew Jackson decisively
won both the popular and electoral votes, thus dethroning the younger Adams. But some
question still remained as to what exactly the Jacksonians would do once they took the
reins in March 1829. Some of them contemplated reforms to prevent future corrupt
bargains. Jackson himself endorsed an amendment limiting the President to a single fouryear term; like critics of the Madison administration a decade earlier, he thought such a
provision would take away the incentive for incumbents to engage in intrigue.109 And in
1828, leaders of the Jacksonian opposition in Congress had formed a committee for the
purposes of reducing executive patronage, retrenching expenses, and paying off the
debt.110 But sooner or later, Jackson and his allies would have to address the question of
who to retain in office and who to remove. Just as vexingly, they would have to articulate
a criterion of which men to appoint.
In the meantime, skeptical observers expected that the Jacksonian opposition
would reveal its true colors soon enough – for no matter what policy he pursued, Jackson
was bound “to disappoint a great many of his friends.” “Gen. Jackson will be as hard
beset by his friends as ever he was by his enemies,” wrote one New England paper. “[H]e
will find a vast proportion of them like those mercenary Italian bands who in former
times enlisted under any prince who would allow them to pillage towns and plunder the
enemy.”111 The hour now beckoned for Jacksonians to prove that they had fought for
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principles rather than patronage. Preparations for the Jacksonian reformation were
already under way.
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Chapter Eight:
The Jacksonian Reformation: Sincere Antagonism and the Manichean Style

Drawing upon our collective reservoir of received historical wisdom, we often
imagine the early days of Jackson’s presidency as a time when insatiable officeseekers
clamored for political sinecures, giving little or no thought to any ideological principles.
The practice of rewarding party loyalty with gainful employment seemed to foreshadow a
world in which politics could be reduced to a skirmish for offices, rather than a battle for
principles – fulfilling the nightmare of Ins and Outs that had haunted the American
political imaginary for decades. Curiously, however, neither Jackson nor the Jacksonians
avowed such mercenary motives in 1829. Jackson himself utterly despised officeseekers
who claimed to deserve rewards. And the actual individuals who applied for office or
recommended their friends rarely pressed their claims as a matter of simple quid pro quo.
President Jackson did not often discuss particular appointments and removals in
his correspondence; unlike Thomas Jefferson, he evidently felt little need to reassure
observers who thought his administration was going too far. Most appointments seem to
have been decided behind closed doors, perhaps in discussion with Martin Van Buren or
the members of Jackson’s infamous “kitchen cabinet.” Although Jackson left fewer
documents to explain his decision-making process, the remarks he did leave behind were
emphatic and unequivocal where Jefferson’s comments had been guarded and cautious.
Moreover, Duff Green and his more articulate supporters in the press elaborated on the
logic of a purge all throughout 1829. Jackson’s correspondence, combined with all the
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debates transpiring in party newspapers, would provide enough evidence to furnish a
clear picture of the Jacksonian reformation and its ideological underpinnings.
The individuals who sought the so-called “spoils” of office also left behind their
own enormous cache of documentation. Their thousands of letters of application and
recommendation therefore provide a treasure trove for historians of American
democracy. For it is here, in the most seemingly perfunctory slices of correspondence,
that the Jacksonians documented their political subjectivity. Each letter articulated a
justification for Jackson to remove a meretricious officeholder and to appoint a
meritorious one; each letter therefore reveals a microcosm of how Jacksonians envisioned
legitimate forms of participation in a republican state. Applicants crafted narratives that
depicted disinterested patriots, like themselves, enduring all manner of martyrial
suffering in service to their country, while corrupt and opportunistic officeseekers reaped
the glory of political offices. Party politics, for them, seems to have been more than
practical party politics as such. It was rather a form of patriotic warfare against courtiers
and aristocrats, a war in which they could demonstrate their virtue through heroic acts of
self-sacrifice. In short, they took excruciating pains to detach themselves from the stigma
that their political enemies and subsequent historians attached to them.
It might stretch credulity to presume that all the applicants of 1829 were as
selfless and sincere as they claimed. What makes the letters valuable are the discursive
ways in which they distanced themselves from any ambitions. Regardless of their
variable personal motives, applicants drew upon a common set of ideological principles
to make sense of their actions, writing and performing in ways they expected to make
sense to their audience – namely, fellow Jacksonians, either within or outside the
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administration. We can therefore discern their ideals by looking at the ways in which they
tried to navigate this discursive terrain. These letters, combined with Jackson’s own
remarks and those of his most articulate supporters in the press, provide a broad and
illuminating picture. And while this mosaic of evidence does not provide precise
explanations for all of the individual appointments and removals, it still displays some
clear contours in the larger pattern of Jacksonian thought.

Preparations for Reform: November 1828 – March 4, 1829
Retrenchment was very much on Jacksonians’ minds during the months that
elapsed between Jackson’s election and his inauguration. In Congress, South Carolina’s
James Hamilton Jr. led a House committee in devising bills to curb wasteful government
expenditures. The committee proposed a whole litany of bills and solutions, many of
which read like footnotes to Thomas Jefferson’s first annual message from twenty-seven
years earlier. They included provisions for limiting executive “discretion” in “pecuniary
matters,” paying off the national debt, reorganizing the treasury, eliminating “useless
offices,” and various other suggestions for restoring a more austere Jeffersonian state.
Congress was too distracted by other considerations to act on any of these proposals, and
Hamilton could only lament his colleagues’ inaction. “Abuses have crept into the
government,” he cried, “which would do honor to the bloated senility of the corrupt
establishments of Europe, and make Sir Robert [Walpole] himself smile at our
fructiferous maturity.” He pointed, for instance, to a government-sponsored plan for
ascertaining the circumference of the globe – a frivolous endeavor, in Hamilton’s view,
and one that could only furnish the administration with an excuse to put more officers on
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the public payroll. He also denounced the outgoing administration for sending agents “to
the small powers” – probably referencing Adams’s decision to send Daniel Cook, the
congressman who had delivered Illinois in the 1825 House election, on a diplomatic
excursion to Havana. Clearly the time had come to do away with all such “sinecures.”
The current Congress had wasted its chance to reform these “abuses,” but Hamilton did
not despair. He still held out high hopes for the incoming President, Andrew Jackson.1
As he brought his jeremiad to a close, Hamilton pulled up a copy of James
Burgh’s 1774 tome, Political Disquisitions – a vintage English commonwealth text,
compiling a vast array of quotes and arguments against court corruption. Hamilton could
not help but inform his colleagues that the edition before him had been printed in
Philadelphia in 1775, evidently for the benefit of the second Continental Congress.
Armed with this nostalgic relic of the Anglophone revolutionary past, Hamilton turned to
a passage he found applicable for the new president:
It is true an honest and wise minister who observes this conduct, and is
more frugal for the public than in his own private affairs, cannot avoid
raising many enemies… They who have been so long fed with corruption
that their stomachs can digest no other diet, will dislike such measures:
and a man treading these steps must arm himself with patience, for his
temper must often be tried; they who steal the golden apples, will hate the
watchful eyes that are upon them, and he who undertakes this post is to
expect that secret malice will be working in the dark to undermine him.2
Hamilton did not belabor the parallels; it was unnecessary. For several years now,
Andrew Jackson had been acclaimed as the heroic patriot who defied all the corruption of
Washington, D.C.’s court, and those acclamations continued to echo through the early
months of 1829, when Jacksonians literally and explicitly construed their recent success
as a victory over the government itself. One Kentuckian recalled the events of 1828 as a
1
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“severe struggle between the power of the government and the people,” with the results
of that contest “emphatically” signaling “the triumph of the people.”3 “The question at
issue,” wrote one westerner, “was whether the representative was to be governed by the
known wishes of his constituents or whether he might violate that will with impunity.” In
other words, the election had been a referendum on “the republican principle,” at least as
this writer and likeminded men understood it. Fortunately that “question” had been put
before “the people,” and they had bravely done their part by ejecting the usurpers from
power.4 Correspondents could thus celebrate a return to “the purity of elections,” praising
Jackson as “the People’s Candidate,” a messianic figure who would “save the country
from the iron grasp of Aristocracy” and thereby “redeem the government from the
downward course which it [was] so rapidly pursuing.”5
Jackson’s worshipful correspondents now exalted in their hero’s electoral
triumph, which they believed him to have earned by way of virtue rather than secure by
way of barter. “[Y]ou come here pure and free,” wrote Henry Baldwin.
[N]o party or cabal has selected you as its head and forced you into power
against the voice of the people, or intrigued you in without their
confidence – without pledge or promise to politicians or Candidates they
have no claims to urge no contract to enforce upon you – none can say to
you pay me the stipulated or understood price – and you can truly and
proudly say to any aspirant for office at this or any future election I owe
you nought, am not here at your bidding or subservient to the views of the
proudest among you.6
John Pope of Kentucky went further, praising Jackson as a statesman free even from
party obligations.
3
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[Y]ou have been placed in power not by the aspiring politicians & busy
partisans but by the affections & confidence of the great body of the
people who feel no other concern than that the government may be
administered by the man of their choice & upon just & honest principles –
Elevated like Washington by the will of the nation rather than party for
your patriotism & distinguished public servi[c]es you should look to the
moral force & sound intelligence of the country for support & not to the
mere creatures of party.
But Pope almost immediately added a qualifier to this grandiose sentiment. Even if
Jackson owed no one but the people for his success, prudence dictated that the President
had to “be mindful” of “mere partisans.” Kentucky, according to Pope, already had its
share of such men. He mentioned William T. Barry, who seemed unfit for any station of
responsibility, and Thomas P. Moore, who seemed “unscrupulous.” Both men were
politically important, however, and ought to be indulged a bit for the sake of “policy.”
But Pope still cautioned Jackson to be wary of placing too much trust in such men.7
Pope was not the only Jacksonian who mistrusted his colleagues’ motives. Caleb
Atwater advised Jackson to proceed with caution, as he had noticed state legislators in his
native Ohio signing spurious letters of recommendation for one another, heedless of any
concern for the public good.8 Viewing the wider political landscape from a vantage point
in Georgia, one observer perceived a whole brood of “hungry wolves in the waiting”;
nearly every one of Jackson’s supporters seemed “to think himself entitled to be
rewarded for his disinterested patriotism.”9 Skeptics doubted whether this latest batch of
reformers even had any intention of putting their much-avowed principles into action.
“We shall see,” wrote a New England paper, “whether the struggle has been on the one
hand altogether a matter of principle, having strenuously at heart the desire of introducing
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salutary reforms into the government, or whether it has not merely been a struggle of the
outs to win the loaves and fishes of office.”10 That same question had bedeviled Thomas
Jefferson in 1801; the same insinuations of hypocrisy had haunted his party for the past
three decades.
If Andrew Jackson simply cleaned out the federal offices only to replenish them
with loyal partisans, his enemies would sneer at the entire movement as yet another gang
of opportunistic “outs.” But Jackson’s more confident supporters insisted that “reform”
would never be safe unless he appointed likeminded men.11 Otherwise he would leave his
administration and its agenda to the mercy of bitter subordinate officers. Clay had
allegedly left “spies” in office, where they could “secretly” wield their “influence”
against Jacksonians.12 And the “people,” of course, would be gravely disappointed if
Jackson allowed “these calumniators to remain snugly in their seats as a reward for their
cupidity.”13 By electing Jackson, the American people had announced their “verdict”
against the incumbent officers of government, effectively issuing the President a mandate
to “cleanse the Augean stable.”14
Real or imagined, Jackson happily accepted the people’s commission. He had
never wavered in his belief that the entire election of 1828 represented a contest between
democracy and patronage. For him, the ideological stakes of the contest had hinged on
the question of whether the American people could be purchased or manipulated into
accepting the usurpation of their democratic rights; their rejection of Adams proved that
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they would not succumb to the terrors and temptations of power and patronage. Jackson
insinuated as much in a draft of his inaugural address:
In all other forms of government where the people are not regarded as
composing the sovereign power, it is easy to see that the safeguard of the
empire consists chiefly in the skill by which the monarch can wield the
bigoted acquiescence of his subjects. But it is different with us. Here the
will of the people, prescribed in a constitution of their own choice,
controuls the service of the public functionaries, and is interested more
deeply in the preservation of those qualities which ensures fidelity and
honest devotion to their interests.15
The voters had vindicated Jackson’s faith in American virtue and American
exceptionalism. And in doing so, they had issued a formal condemnation of all the
officers who carried out the Adams administration’s dirty work – or so Jackson reasoned.
The final draft of Jackson’s inaugural address did not include any of his remarks
on monarchy and republicanism – nor, for that matter, did it contain many substantive
statements on any other policy issues at al. But on one point, at least, it was emphatic and
unequivocal: the people had demanded a reformation.
The recent demonstration of public sentiments inscribes on the list of
Executive duties, in characters too legible to be overlooked, the task of
reform, which will require particularly the correction of those abuses that
have brought the patronage of the Federal Government into conflict with
the freedom of elections, and the counteraction of those causes which have
disturbed the rightful course of appointments and have placed or continued
power in unfaithful or incompetent hands.16
Jackson provided some more precise guidelines to his own department heads, as he
advised them to peruse their departments for any “useless offices” that could be
eliminated or malfeasant officeholders who could be dismissed. He further apprised them
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of his intention to comply with the people’s demand by removing any officers who had
been appointed against their will or had used their official stations to electioneer.17
The Senate adjourned on March 17, two weeks after Jackson’s inauguration. By
the time Congress convened in December, the President had removed at least ninety-eight
officers – including thirty-seven from the customs service, twenty-three from the land
office, twelve district attorneys, nine marshals, seven diplomatic agents, four treasury
officials, and one territorial secretary. In just under nine months’ time, then, Jackson had
removed almost as many men as had his six predecessors combined over the course of
forty years. Some scholars have tried to downplay the extent of Jackson’s house-cleaning
project. Such apologias are misleading. The only previous chief executive to remove even
a comparable percentage of officials was Jefferson – and again, that is comparing the
total percentage of executive-appointed officers that Jefferson removed over the course of
his entire presidency to the percentage that Jackson removed during his first nine months
alone. To anyone witnessing the scene in 1829, the Jacksonian “reformation” would have
seemed like a bloodbath. In the twenty years that had elapsed since Jefferson’s departure
from Washington, the three subsequent Presidents had removed about twenty-six officers
total. Jackson’s removal policy therefore marked a shocking break with practices that had
prevailed in the capitol for a generation. In some places, it might have seemed like little
changed. The “old south” states – Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia – had
overwhelmingly favored Jackson in the 1828 election, and the new President left them
nearly untouched. In other places, the reformation would have felt like a reign of terror.
More than half of Jackson’s 1829 removals were concentrated in just five states: in New
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York, Ohio, Indiana, and Louisiana, where Jackson’s popular margin had been close, and
in Adams’s native Massachusetts, which had given Old Hickory fewer popular votes than
any other state.18
The broad pattern of Jackson’s 1829 removals does suggest some possible
strategic intentions. By removing officers and doling out appointments in places where
Jackson’s majority was precarious, the administration could build up its own interest
groups and thereby secure those states for the party in 1832; by doing the same with
appointments in Massachusetts, the administration could loosen the enemy’s grip on New
England’s most electorally significant state. A few correspondents candidly encouraged
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the administration to apply such tactics for political gain. Cornelius P. Van Ness had, by
his own account, almost singlehandedly built up a Jackson party in Vermont, and now
counted on “some active assistance from the General Government” to “hasten” that
party’s “predominancy” there.19 John Bredin of Pennsylvania similarly noted that a
“thorough change” in the public offices would help “secure the permanent ascendancy of
the party.”20
But such observations on the practical benefits of political patronage were
relatively few far between in the Jacksonian discursive terrain of 1829. For those same
practical benefits would have been obvious to Jacksonians, who had spent the past four
years decrying anyone who took advantage of patronage for political gain. What is
remarkable about the Jacksonian discourse that developed in 1829, then, is not how these
men betrayed their former principles, but rather how painstakingly they tried to remain
consistent with the political narrative of Jacksonian Democracy – a narrative in which
interest-based politics were not an acceptable and realistic way of life, but rather the
scourge of democratic politics.

Rotation in Office
Much to the President’s annoyance, each one of his removals seemed to provoke
fresh cries of outrage in the opposition press. “Now,” Jackson grumbled, “every man who
has been in office a few years, believes he has a life estate in it.” The superannuated
officers who had already clung to their places for decades now believed that the offices
ought to be passed to the children. “This is not the principles of our government,”

19
20

Cornelius P. Van Ness to Van Buren, March 22, 1829, M639: 22-0053.
John Bredin to Samuel Delucenna Ingham, April 3, 1829, M639: 3-0259.

335

Jackson wrote. “It is rotation in office that will perpetuate our liberties.” Pondering the
implications of such a principle, he noted that it might be time to think about a bill
“vacating all offices periodically.”21
Jackson, of course, was not the first person to suggest that executive appointees
be subject to a regular “rotation.” The idea had flickered in and out of Republican
discourse intermittently for the past few decades. Radical Republicans had trotted it out
as a justification for Jefferson’s own reformation in 1801, but Jefferson himself had never
endorsed the concept. In the intervening years, reform-minded Republicans had
occasionally suggested that rotation in office might be an expeditious way to liquidate the
Augean stable.22 Congress in 1820 had passed a Tenure of Office Act limiting many
officers to four-year renewable terms, but the act and its implications inspired relatively
little discussion. Adams had flatly refused to replace officers after the four-year terms
ended. The idea never became a true staple of Republican thought until 1829, when
“rotation in office” suddenly became a Jacksonian standard of Jeffersonian orthodoxy.
Throughout 1829, the mainstream Jacksonian presses would reiterate arguments that had
been crafted by the most radical journalists of Jefferson’s time.
Like James Cheetham and Benjamin Austin three decades prior, Jacksonians
insisted that no officers in a republic could claim their appointments as their property.23
21
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“They are neither chattel, nor alienable or unalienable hereditaments,” wrote a Kentucky
paper.24 An officer could not claim any “birthright” or “title” in his post; it was a
“privilege.”25 If he depended on his official wages to survive, that was his own fault, for
no man had the right to live as a publicly funded “pensioner.”26 One did not have to be an
ardent Jacksonian to see the logic of this argument. When the notoriously caustic Ann
Royall noticed all the hue and cry about officers being deprived of their subsistence, she
could not help but scornfully ask whether the government was “bound to take care of
every man’s wife and children.”27
If rotation could prevent a welfare state from sprouting up in the civil
establishment, it could also prevent a more dangerous hereditary aristocracy from taking
root. Duff Green elaborated on this threat in a series of polemics for the Telegraph. “Let
us look around,” he wrote, “and see the family compacts which have been entered into,
and the places continued in those families, or the malversations &c. in office, which have
grown out of them, all having a tendency to create an official aristocracy, as odious in
itself as titled nobility, and dangerous to liberty as ‘power and patronage’ could make
it.”28 “Janus Douza” similarly feared that “the office holders” would soon ossify into “a
privileged order.” If officers could hold onto their places as long as they maintained the
superficial appearance of good behavior, their offices effectively became their property;
if they were cunning enough to secure the same offices for their next of kin, the
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appointments became hereditary.29 Such practices, as Green explained, represented an
affront to American democratic principles.
The great difference between aristocratic and democratic governments is,
that in the first, power is permanently vested by prescriptive rights in a
few individuals – in the last, it is the legacy of the people in common, to
be regulated and exercised by them. Just in proportion as we lose sight of
this distinction, and forget or abandon the principle of rotation in office,
do we insensibly slide into that abyss which has swallowed up all free
governments – the establishment of aristocratic institutions, which
whether sustained by the force of common sufference [sic], or by
constitutional guarantees, are the same in their destructive effects upon the
freedom of the people.30
Historians have construed the idea of “rotation in office” as a quintessential
exhibition of Jacksonians’ fundamentally acquisitive liberalism. According to such
interpretations, Jackson’s supporters clamored for rotation simply because they wanted a
chance to enjoy offices themselves. In this view, the Jacksonians openly embraced the
politics of competition between different interest groups, and the doctrine of “rotation in
office” allowed acquisitive individuals to compete for the spoils of office. With his path
cleared of privileged officeholding aristocrats, the common man would now be liberated
to make his fortune in the public service.31 This interpretation may contain some germs of
truth, but it overlooks perhaps the most ideologically fraught argument behind rotation.
In Jacksonian eyes, the officeholding aristocrats’ cardinal sin was not simply that
they formed a roadblock to other Americans’ hopes of advancement. They posed a
potential threat to democracy itself. As the aforementioned “Janus Douza” explained,
men who lingered in office too long would eventually learn to love their salaries more
than their duty. They would deteriorate into the “myrmidons” of their employers, willing
29
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to do an administration’s dirty work if it meant staying in office.32 “We have learned,”
wrote one North Carolina paper,
that those who first held office, only by their vigilance and fidelity,
becoming linked in with the ruling powers, useful partisans and zealous
intriguers; soon forget that the people are their masters, and look, not to
their own merit and service for support, but to the patronage of the leading
men in power – the heads of administration, the possessors or heirs of the
Presidency.
This argument for rotation grew directly out of the Wyoming letters’ earlier complaints
about officers bartering with the nation’s “leading men,” but it also tapped into much
older phobias. The Federal Farmer in 1788 had cautioned Americans to beware the
“natural aristocracy” – that talented but dishonest set of men who clung to lucrative
offices and to each other, coalescing into a separate interest group united against the
people. The aforementioned North Carolinian author expressed a nearly identical notion.
By degrees whole families are taken into the public pay, and strengthen
each other mutually by their support of each other, and their common
reliance on the favor of the great, they form an organized band of
dependents, a pensioned aristocracy, ready to stand forth on all occasions
in defence of the administration, right or wrong.
Jackson, of course, had not offered any indulgence to this class. He was not a patron of
the “pensioned aristocracy,” but a champion for “the yeomanry of the country, the
uncorrupted and incorruptible democracy of the nation.” Being himself as incorruptible
as the people who elected him, Jackson could effect some much-needed ventilation.33
The Jacksonian conversation surrounding “rotation in office” reveals important
aspects of their intellectual genealogy. These writers channeled the older antifederalist
concerns that an expanding government would create positions in which aristocrats could
gain a foothold, thus cementing themselves as a dependent, separate interest arrayed
32
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against the honest and independent American people. Such concerns had grown more
militant and extreme during the era of the French Revolution, as Thomas Paine’s
American readers learned to associate sinecures and life estates with European court
corruption. Radical Jeffersonians like Benjamin Austin and James Cheetham had drawn
on these notions in their original argument for rotation in office, and the Jacksonians
drew on those same arguments almost three decades later.34 They did not cite their
sources, but the long-term ideological parallels are striking enough to suggest that
“rotation in office,” like the earlier “corrupt bargain” charge, was more than just some
casuistic explanation for a more venal agenda. Even if Jefferson himself had never signed
off on the idea, it had an old and venerable, even radical pedigree.
But if the discourse of “rotation” displays important aspects of Jacksonian
political thought, it still falls short as an explanation for Andrew Jackson’s actual
decisions on appointments and removals. He advocated the principle without truly putting
it into practice. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that superannuated officers were not a
concern for the administration. On at least one occasion, Van Buren even stated his
reluctance to remove an officer precisely because the man in question had been appointed
by Washington.35 Historian Richard R. John, scrutinizing the details of patronage in the
Jackson administration postal department, found that postmaster William T. Barry only
began advocating “rotation” as a principle once it became clear that the removals could
not be justified by any more valid “cause.”36 A cursory look at some numbers suggests
that Jackson in 1829 was more than twice as likely to remove district attorneys who had
been appointed in the previous four years, leaving the vast majority of older appointees
34
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undisturbed.37 In simpler terms, having a long tenure in office was a statistically
insignificant variable in Jackson’s removals. What truly mattered, in practice, was
whether or not an officer had received his appointment at the hands of John Quincy
Adams. This does not necessarily mean that Jackson and his supporters were simply
insincere when they endorsed rotation. It does mean, however, that other political factors
imposed themselves more heavily upon the administration’s decision-making. For
“rotation in office” was just one facet of a much larger conversation transpiring in 1829.

The Presidential Mandate for the People’s Purge
In the summer of 1829, Benjamin Reeder was, by his own account, an unhappy
but otherwise innocuous old man. He had already served for eleven years as Marshal for
the Western District of Virginia, a job that required him to ride up to forty miles a day.
But retirement remained an elusive prospect; with his adult son recently deceased, the
septuagenarian Reeder now had to provide for eight grandchildren. It therefore came as
an unwelcome surprise when he learned that local Jacksonians were conspiring to have
him stripped of his office. With the welfare of his eight grandchildren in mind, Reeder
quickly fired off some indignant letters to the new President and secretary of state. He
also marshaled an impressive petitioning campaign, enlisting political allies and even a
few friendly enemies to write on his behalf. Reeder and his friends made their first appeal
to pathos: the old man had served the public faithfully and in various capacities for the
past four decades without complaint; he had “eight destitute orphan children” to provide
37
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for; and his only conceivable “sin” was his elderliness.38 As one might expect from a man
who had spent a lifetime in the courts, Reeder also ventured a more legalistic defense.
Did he not have a right to face his accusers and hear whatever “secret charges” had been
leveled against him?39 Should he not be allowed a chance to “vindicate” his character?40
Over the course of the ensuing debate, Reeder’s enemies would regale the
Administration with amusing anecdotes of the old man’s legendary incompetence. “He is
an infirm, intemperate, imbecile old man,” wrote one set of petitioners.41 Far from being
a devoted and gentle civil servant, they wrote, Reeder was in fact such a thoroughgoing
dipsomaniac that he had “not been sober one day in 12 months,” leaving his overworked
deputies to take care of business in his stead.42 The marshal’s managerial idiocy
inconvenienced everyone in his district. (Reeder apparently had a vexing habit of
summoning jurors from remote parts of the district, “thereby incurring to the U.S.
unnecessary expenses for mileage.”)43
But the most damaging accusations were not the ones that spoke to Reeder’s
incompetence but those that alluded to his political behavior. In addition to being
superannuated, intemperate, and a public nuisance, Reeder had supposedly displayed
"violent” and “strenuous opposition” to Jackson’s allies in Virginia. His deputies had all
been “carefully selected from his own party” so that they could use their official
influence to propagate “their political opinions in every portion of the District.”44 In
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effect, Virginia’s Jacksonians had put Reeder’s moral character on trial by identifying
him as a willing pawn of the reprobate Adams administration.
Reeder protested that he was simply an innocent public functionary. The marshal
desperately promised Jackson that he had never been one to “meddle” in political
affairs.45 One of Reeder’s allies reiterated this promise, defending him as a man who had
only ever expressed his opinions “in a moderate & becoming manner,” and would never
“mingle in the passing contest”; the old man was “content” to vote his conscience,
“without desiring to control the opinion of others.”46 Other correspondents concurred that
Reeder had never “prostitute[d]” or “perverted” his “influence and patronage of office for
party purposes.”47 But when Reeder’s enemies learned that he was being defended as a
moderate and “neutral” Adams man, they counterattacked with further accounts of
Reeder’s “violent” and disruptive antagonism. On the day of election, for instance,
Reeder and his son had allegedly tried to disrupt the voting process by harassing election
commissioners and “tearing up tickets &c.”48 In the Jacksonian discursive terrain, then,
Benjamin Reeder was not an old man with orphaned children to feed, but just another
corrupt officeholder wielding power on behalf of the Adams-Clay faction.
Which of these men was the real Benjamin Reeder? The unfairly maligned old
marshal who tirelessly performed his duty for the sake of the children, or the ruthless
enforcer of the Adams administration’s will? Were his claims of innocence sincere
protests against his unjust arraignment, or the cowardly quivering of a minion who had
lost his protectors? Here, as elsewhere in the story of the Jacksonian Reformation, the
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“truth” is a matter of more curiosity than significance. Reeder’s story is less illuminating
for what it reveals about the character of this hapless officeholder than for what it reveals
about the questions being pressed upon him. Officeholders who had served under the
Adams administration were at pains to demonstrate that they were not beholden to that
administration’s will, and had never attempted to thwart the will of the people.
According to Jacksonians, incumbent officers had demonstrated their hostility all
through 1828, whether by doctoring official documents for propagandistic purposes,
circulating malignant campaign literature, or hosting electioneering meetings in
government buildings.49 A Missouri resident claimed, for instance, that federal officers
had used their influence “to poison the public mind.”50 In Arkansas, a superior court
judge had been spotted “electioneering” at the voting site; after seeing that the results had
not gone his way, that same judge had gotten himself drunk and “cried like a stupid
child.”51 Describing the scene from Detroit, an expatriated Pennsylvania radical reported
that the most abusive men had been the “most munificently rewarded” for their “criminal
labours,” including one who had been appointed as a territorial judge after publishing a
“scurrilous” paper, and another who had received a collectorship as “remuneration for the
dirty service of his father in law and brother.” “I sicken,” this correspondent wrote,
“when I think of the incumbents of office in this Territory and feel a confidence that this
Augean stable will be cleansed.”52
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It was not persecution for Jackson to remove such men; it was basic selfprotection.53 This was not a particularly novel argument. Every previous President had
pondered the dangers of allowing hostile individuals to occupy positions from which they
might undermine the administration. But even in the early months of Jackson’s
presidency, some of his more measured supporters were beginning to worry that this
inquisition might go too far. Robert Allen of Virginia had been willing to “fight the good
fight” for the General’s cause in 1828, but was alarmed to see apparently harmless men
being arraigned for judgment. Writing to Van Buren on behalf of one terrified incumbent,
Allen urged the new secretary of state to be magnanimous. Surely, he wrote, “the spirit of
reform” would not demand “the indiscriminate removal of all officers… in order that
successors of the true faith may be appointed?” Beseeching the administration to be
reasonable, Allen’s voice of reason was lost amidst a chorus of voices crying out for
vengeance. “The spirit of reform” did, in many Jacksonians’ minds, demand a sweeping
purge of all those who did not possess “the true faith.” And in this war against the
people’s enemies, a dithering marshal like Benjamin Reeder could only expect to be a
casualty.
Many Jacksonians believed that to appoint or retain one’s enemies would reveal
not only naïveté but even apathy. If Jackson was serious about “Reform,” he had no
conscionable choice but “to remove all officers who were unfriendly to it.”54 To do
otherwise would reflect a rather casual attitude toward his supporter’s avowed principles.
“If we are contending for principles,” wrote a New Jersey paper, “then we are bound by
the interests those principles involve, to sustain ourselves, and to place the insignia of
53
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influence and power where it will be auxiliary to, and not arrayed against us.”55 A sincere
reformer would naturally want to ensure that his officers shared the same views. “[I]n no
other way can it be shown,” wrote the Telegraph, “that it was a contest for principle
which his party contended for. The placing of a single Adams man in office would be an
abandonment of that ground so tenaciously held by his friends, and defended by the
people.”56
And “the people,” according to Jacksonians, positively demanded removals.
Jacksonians could justify this claim because partisans on both sides of the presidential
question had turned removals into an election issue. Edward Everett, who cynically saw
the Jacksonians as a tribe of mendacious officeseekers, remarked at one point that
Jackson would have lost votes if he had promised not to purge the civil offices.57 And
according to the Jacksonian press, partisans on either side of the question in 1828 had
repeatedly promised that Old Hickory would ruthlessly remove incumbent officers. “By
their votes,” wrote a Massachusetts paper, the American people had “proclaimed their
desire that the ‘Augean Stable’ should be cleansed – and that it was their will that a
general change should take place.”58 The officers had thus been “all alike condemned in
the High Court of the Nation.”59 Anyone who advised Jackson to be “magnanimous”
toward enemies was effectively asking him to disregard the will of the people.60
No one embodied this ruthless spirit of “reform” more than George French
Strother, a strident Virginia expatriate who now claimed to speak for the people of
55
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Missouri. The people’s commission, he informed Jackson, was an undiscriminating purge
of the Adams men, and “nothing short of this” would suffice. There could be no
distinction between the Adams administration and the willing coadjutants who had
allowed themselves to be its “instruments.” Significantly, Strother directed his ire not just
at the Adams men but also at the alleged Jacksonians who tried to defend them. The socalled Jacksonians who “beg[ged] for exceptions,” he wrote, must have been
“influenced” by “sinister motives”; they were collaborators who “pretend[ed] to belong
to the republican party,” using the pretense of mercy to protect a corrupt status quo. Their
presence could only endanger the “permanent ascendancy of the republican party.”61
This pervasive insistence on the people’s mandate for reform ultimately led to
some ironic developments in Jacksonians’ attitude toward older republican principles.
Although they had spent years decrying executive “power and patronage,” their faith in
the democratic mandate for reform led them to a conception of presidential authority
more robust than anything either Adams would have ever suggested. Their spiritual
ancestors in 1789 had doubted the wisdom of allowing the President to remove officers at
all; now Jacksonians asserted that the President’s power over removals was nearly
absolute, and that he had a moral obligation to wield it in compliance with the demands
of the “PEOPLE.”62 They no longer worried that the executive would acquire too much
power over his officers, but that he would be rendered too impotent to carry out the
people’s will if he could not remove the people’s enemies.63 Where the Republicans of
1798 had complained about John Adams removing officers who opposed his
administration, Jacksonians of 1829 thought that even those removals had been justified –
61
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the elder Adams had been “fairly elected” and thus held a commission from “the
dominant party.”64 The people’s chosen executive held not just authority but even a duty
to appoint officers who would fulfill “the will of the majority.” Otherwise there would be
“no community of feeling between the head and the limbs.”65
Critics could not help but notice how the Jacksonians’ high-handed approach to
patronage resembled old monarchical strategies of bribery and coercion. The National
Journal, for instance, compared Jackson to a king doling out offices in exchange for
vows of “allegiance.”66 At least one Jacksonian noticed similar parallels between
royalism and reform, but was able to put a positive spin on these similarities.
“Mordaunt,” writing in Thomas Ritchie’s Enquirer, likened Jackson to Bolingbroke’s
eighteenth-century model of the “Patriot King” who fearlessly cared for the people’s
interest even when it meant antagonizing entrenched officeholders. “The first duty” of “a
Patriot King” was to “purge his court,” and if anything, the “Patriot President” held an
even more compelling mandate, for he had received his commission directly from the
people.
When a new President is put into office, by the people, on the avowed and
notorious principle of reform, it is his duty to apply the principle to all the
departments of the government which fall under his constitutional
supervision. The people have but begun the work; it is his business to
complete it…[W]hen the people have interposed to pull down a
mischievous administration, and have use of him as the instrument of a
civil revolution, it is his indispensable duty to bring justice to the abettors,
and accessories of a convicted principal. It is his business… to scatter to
the winds, those “swarms of little noisome, nameless insects, which hum
and buzz in every corner of the court.”67
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Prior Presidents had tried to claim the mantle of a patriot king who transcended
factional bickering.68 But the Jacksonians embraced a distinctly more democratic, even
radical conception of the patriotic executive. They channeled the arguments of extremist
Jeffersonians like Benjamin Austin and James Cheetham, depicting the President as a sort
of democratic avenger. In this conception of the presidential mandate, Jackson did not
“purge his court” simply because he was wise enough to discern the common good, but
because the “people” had positively demanded that he enact justice. This notion might
have struck some observers as demeaning in the way it reduced Jackson to an agent
acting on voters’ strict instructions rather than an independent statesman following his
own judgment. In truth, however, Jacksonians’ understanding of the democratic mandate
empowered the President far beyond anything that Federalists could have ever conceived.
A chief executive acting on the people’s orders knew no limits to his moral authority.
Every vindictive removal had the imagined sanction of majority will; every executive
action could be justified until the people decided to unseat him. And the people
themselves were no longer imagined to be simple and industrious taxpayers, but a sort of
collective tribunal – ruthlessly judging and weighing their officers, imperiously rendering
a verdict. If a dithering old man like Benjamin Reeder fell victim to a purge, it was
because the people willed his fate as such. Andrew Jackson was merely fulfilling his
instructions.69
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Disinterested Officeseekers
Some of Jackson’s own supporters were beginning to suspect that Jacksonian
reform might be little more than the pretext for officeseekers’ advancement. Although
“Mordaunt” approved Jackson’s purge of corrupt officers, he was more circumspect in
his opinion of the men being appointed in their stead. The writer particularly objected to
Jackson’s generous dispersal of offices among newspaper editors. Whatever Jackson’s
actual motives, such appointments looked like “ a distribution of rewards, for services
rendered.” Had the Jackson party fought so hard just for the sake of offices?70 Thomas
Ritchie, editor of the Enquirer, did not want any office for himself, and worried that
Jackson might set a precedent for corrupting the press with patronage.71
Jackson ultimately appointed at least seventy newspaper editors, some of them to
cabinet-level positions, but he did not see this as bribery. As Jackson explained to a
skeptical correspondent early on, he himself had not even solicited his office, nor had he
given “pledges to reward partizans.” The unprincipled and self-serving officeseekers
would therefore have gravitated toward the Adams administration, which had held vast
power and patronage at its disposal all along. But Jacksonian editors had chosen to side
with a candidate who refused all bargains, rather than support the powerful
administration that held out rewards for the mercenary. For Jackson, then, it stood to
reason that these editors had made their choice for “disinterested” and “patriotic” reasons;
it would not be bribery to reward someone who would have acted the same either way.72
Duff Green shared this sentiment. When he heard critics complain about Jackson
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showering offices on Bostonian newsmen, Green reassured readers that the newly
appointed printers had neither been “purchased” nor “bought up.” How could they have
been?
For if they were writers in favor of General Jackson, they espoused his
cause when a great majority of New England declared it to be impossible
that he could ever be elected President of the United States; of course, they
could not have a motive for the hope of reward, nor could they be deterred
by fear of punishment – they were disinterested; and it must be gratifying
to every patriot to see such men appointed to office.73
Had Jackson truly wanted “to corrupt the press,” he ought to have “bribed his enemies,”
all of whom readily offer their services for a price. But rather than strike such a “bargain”
for the sake of forging some “unnatural” coalition – as Adams and Clay had done – he
fearlessly chose to reward only those “who were already his friends.”74 As long as
Jackson did not purchase any supporters with patronage, he could still identify as the
candidate who drew his support from the un-bought voice of the people.
There is no great mystery behind Jackson’s sudden epiphany. His supporters had
been communicating the same argument to him for months now, and would continue to
do so throughout 1829. The men who applied for office under Jackson took pains to show
that they would have supported his election regardless of whether they could count on
rewards. Applicants and recommenders became obsessed – and “obsessed” is not too
strong a word – with proving that their convictions were sincere and their exertions
selfless. One Connecticut applicant referenced “the sincerity of [his] heart,” “the sincerity
of [his] devotion,” his “sincere and unyielding efforts,” and his “sincere expostulations” –
all in the space of two sentences.75 Other applicants went out of their way to assure the
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administration that they had never expected any rewards for their service but had only
followed “the dictates of conscience,” and would remain loyal even if they did not
receive the coveted appointments.76 Joseph Scott of Alabama was candid enough to
admit that the office he sought was a “sinecure,” but at the same time he insisted that he
had earnestly supported the cause and had never previously thought of “obtruding”
himself upon the administration’s “notice.”77 Alexander Hamilton’s son and namesake,
now a Jackson man himself, similarly proclaimed that his political “support” for Jackson
had always been “disinterested,” but alas, “a change of times and considerable losses”
had forced him to make “new arrangements.”78 When applicable, a recommender would
praise a favored applicant for refusing even to solicit letters of recommendation.79 Some
of these recommenders evidently feared that their own motives might be subject to
similar scrutiny, and took pains to insist on their disinterested impartiality.80 There was
more than just obsequious dissembling in such remarks. By performing in all these roles
– as officeseekers too proud to seek office, as public-minded recommenders with no
selfish interests to gratify – they conducted themselves in accordance with the example
that Jackson had set in 1824: like the old General, they only served their country out of
duty. By proclaiming the “sincerity” of their “devotion,” they were not performing the
76
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role of sycophantic courtiers exchanging principles for positions, but that of proud
patriots whose loyalty could not be purchased at any price.
Some applicants thought they could prove that their interest in the General’s cause
had been motivated by principle rather than by cupidity, and pointed to their past history
of refusing offices. “After Mr. Adams was chosen President” by “corrupt bargain and
intrigue,” wrote a former consul, “I made up my mind to resign… saying to his friends
that I would not accept of any office that he could give me during his term of four years,
after that I would again receive any appointment that might be offered me by any
President fairly elected by the people.”81 The ironically named John Adams Dix of New
York had previously been recommended to President Adams for a diplomatic position,
but had “discontinued” the application once he came to recognize the moral bankruptcy
of that administration.82 Henry Ashton had never refused an office that was offered to
him – indeed, he had been humiliatingly rebuffed when he applied for a district attorney
position in 1820 – but he still depicted himself as “anti courtier” for having refused to
apply for any offices during Adams’s administration, choosing instead to wait “patiently
until one true republican” assumed the presidency.83
Within this prevailing narrative of incorruptible men refusing to accept unsavory
corrupt bargains, William Claggett of New Hampshire was a master tragedian, able to
spin everyday political machinations into dramatic clashes between virtue and intrigue.
Throughout the previous nine years, Claggett had repeatedly sought the office of New
Hampshire district attorney, but always found that his enemies had arranged for rivals’
appointments before he could even apply. Upon the incumbent attorney’s unexpected
81
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death in 1828, Claggett flung himself once more into the breach – and this time, it had
looked as though his long-simmering hopes might be gratified, but only if he were
willing to pay the administration’s price. He had then been “informed from Washington”
that he would finally receive the coveted appointment if he pledged fealty to the Adams
administration. Claggett refused to strike such a Faustian pact “for any office in the gift
of Mr. Adams,” and the appointment was awarded to a more reliably pliant rival. As
Claggett concluded this interminable tale of woe, he complained that this “unqualified”
rival officeseeker had obtained his appointment through an “improper,” “secret
movement.” In other words, Claggett accused his new rival of offering his political
loyalties to the highest bidder, and praised himself being too proud to do likewise.84
Such were the tales that Jacksonian applicants and recommenders told the
administration in 1829. Whether or not these stories were true, the proliferation of these
“corrupt bargain” narratives illustrates a crucial trope in Jacksonian thought. Adams’s
appointees were almost invariably depicted as talentless men who had been “smuggled
into office” in exchange for their political support.85 One incumbent was dismissed as a
“gentleman of very ordinary attainments” while another one’s legal abilities were said to
be “not of the highest order”; both were condemned for using their office to promote
Adams’s cause, thereby committing the gravest of sins against republican government.86
Jacksonians thus perceived 1825’s “Corrupt Bargain” as something far more
ominous than an isolated political scandal. “Corrupt bargains” were pervasive features of
the Jacksonian political imagination, everyday occurrences whose sheer ubiquity
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reflected a moral decline in public life. The honest republican who refused to partake in
such bargains inevitably fell victim to the aristocrats’ “proscription.”87 The remaining
officers of government had all allowed themselves to become beholden to the whims of a
self-seeking ministry. Washington had become a European court, with all the due
trappings of secrecy and intrigue; the supplication of Adams’s appointees reflected the
royal pretensions of the Adams house. In a world of corruption, there was no place for the
incorruptible, meaning that men like William Claggett could never be anything more than
the victims of their own tragic integrity – or so the story went.
Indeed, many Jacksonians had proven their sheer incorruptibility with
masochistic, almost ritualistic displays of personal defiance – defiance against the
“aristocracy,” against the agents of the entrenched political establishment, against anyone
who might attempt to influence their behavior. Other applicants never had the
opportunity to demonstrate their republican asceticism by refusing offices, and had to
devise other ways to demonstrate their appetites for persecution. A Floridian commended
himself for enduring all the “malice of our opponents”; a Vermont applicant was praised
for having exposed himself to “the inveterate hostility of the late administration”; a
Pennsylvanian’s “bold and manly stance” was said to have incurred the Adams men’s
“bitterness and wrath”; while in Vermont, an applicant was eulogized as “a martyr in the
cause not only of correct principles but of freedom of opinion.”88 In Maryland, multiple
applicants were commended for standing firm against the twin threats of “power” and
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“patronage,” keeping to their course “through good and through evil report.”89 “[N]o man
has been more abused and persecuted than myself, nor spent more time or money,” went
a fairly typical refrain.90
In crafting these narratives of corruption and incorruptibility, Jacksonians
recreated the recent past as a heroic war in which they had placed themselves on the
firing line, rather than wait to see which way the winds of fortune blew. Their gestures of
defiance were routinely denoted as “manly” – a “manly adherence to principles,” a
“fearless and manly opposition,” or a “bold and manly defense” of Jackson’s honor.91
Their masculinity was often intertwined with their “boldness.” One correspondent rallied
a fellow Jacksonian with a line from Vergil, exhorting him to “Yield not to misfortunes,
but advance more boldly against them.”92 Another correspondent praised his
Pennsylvania comrades as those who had “stood forth boldly and braced the late political
storm,” while a fellow Pennsylvanian was lauded for his ability “to ride upon the
whirlwind & direct the storms of political contest.”93 These meteorological metaphors
were well suited to a meta-narrative that elevated political partisanship to the height of
valor.
For the election of 1828 was, in this narrative, more than an ordinary election: it
was a battle for the soul of the republic. And fittingly enough, Jacksonians did not
describe the election in the sportsmanlike language of amicable political rivalries, but in a
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strident military idiom. Countless applicants and recommenders referred to the events of
1828 as an “arduous contest” or “arduous struggle.”94 One correspondent recalled that
“all the artillery of the base Coalition” had been pointed at the Jackson men in “‘old
Kentuck’”; a fellow Kentuckian recalled having been “forced into the front rank” of the
“Political warfare,” refusing “to quit the field of battle until the Fall of 1828.”95 “The
Tocsin of political war is again sounding,” warned a Pennsylvanian, “and summoning the
embattled ranks.”96 Within this culture of defiance, it seems, politics was war by other
means – and the ability to cultivate enemies rather than friends showed one’s worthiness.
A Louisianan, for instance, offered witnesses who could prove that his “decided stand”
had brought “the opposition of the Aristocracy of New Orleans” down upon his head.97
An applicant in Indiana was similarly praised for having “merited the opposition” of the
enemy party, while a Pennsylvanian was recommended explicitly because he had shown
an aptitude for making Jackson’s enemies his own.98
As a righteous outsider who refused to bargain or yield, Andrew Jackson was
often envisioned as an inspiration for truehearted republicans who had held firm through
similar ordeals. One Kentuckian likened Jackson’s political trial-by-fire to a furnace in
which only the purest of hearts could survive: “[I]n spite of all the lies and slanders
heaped upon him and his family, he came out gloriously triumphant, and like pure gold,
seventy and seven times refined, he shone brighter and brighter in the eyes of the
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world.”99 When a Floridian recounted stories of the abuse that he had suffered for
fighting the good fight, he took care to mention that only two individuals had suffered
more than he had – Jackson himself and his late, slandered wife.100 The pugnacious
William Claggett boasted that he had spent “seventeen years… engaged in an arduous
struggle in the defence of the republican cause against a powerful New England faction,”
and had therefore been “assailed by the venomous weapons of that faction”; others who
had labored for the same cause had seen “vials of wrath” poured down upon their heads
by this same “faction,” which was, not coincidentally, the same political faction that had
assailed Jackson himself.101 In such ways, applicants for office could depict themselves
as men who had, like Jackson, been willing to endure all manner of hostility for the sake
of the cause.
As long as Jackson’s appointees were so demonstrably selfless and disinterested,
his willingness to purge enemies and reward friends did not mean he was just some
selfish party chieftain; it instead revealed his courageous self-assurance and powers of
discernment. Here, according to one newspaper, was a President who acted without fear
of personal or political consequences – unlike the squeamish and calculating John Quincy
Adams, who had left officers in place just to avoid making enemies.102 Jackson would, in
another paper’s words, punish the unworthy “without stopping to inquire whether this
would be a popular act, or that would conciliate his enemies – this would gratify personal
resentment, or that would purchase new friends, but looking solely as we believe to the
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good of the country.”103 He was discerning enough to see through the aristocratic
officeholders’ flattering words, and bold enough not to fear their resentment.104
Seen in this light, Jackson was not distributing spoils among his minions; he was
dispensing republican judgment among the worthy and the unworthy. The partisans he
appointed were not covetous sycophants who clung to whichever patron offered rewards;
they were undaunted patriots who had already withstood the lure of office while braving
the heat of battle. Jackson and his followers could prove their moral authority as long as
they had demonstrated their selfless defiance. This logic allowed them to escape
accusations of hypocrisy. But at the same time, it conferred a troubling burden on any
Jacksonian who had ever flinched in the face of power and patronage. And as rival
Jacksonians scurried for the soon-to-be-vacated federal offices, they turned their sights
upon one another. The Jacksonian reformation soon became, in practice, an intra-party
inquisition.

The Problem of Sincerity in the Age of Jackson
One of the less heroic applicants to rush into the fray was the young Benjamin
Tyson Moore, who in March 1829 was brought before Jackson as a candidate to fill an
appointment as marshal for the northern district of Alabama. He was preposterously
under-qualified for the task. No more than twenty-six years old, he had spent the past two
years working in the office of a court clerk. Most of his recommenders were content to
keep their endorsements succinct, reiterating his “qualifications” in a perfunctory and
business-like manner, drawing special attention to the fact the young man’s uncle was
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both the governor of Alabama and a known Jackson man. Within six weeks of Jackson’s
inauguration, Moore received the office.105
Moore’s appointment baffled some fellow Alabamans – not because he was
unqualified, but because his political principles were a matter of mystery. “The question
is repeatedly asked, who is he? Does he belong to the great republican party in this
Country?”106 James G. Carroll, who coveted the office for himself, managed to produce
some evidence of Moore’s secret heterodoxy. During the two years that Moore had spent
as a clerk in the Circuit Court, neither of his co-workers had ever heard him express a
political preference. Moore’s pedigree was as questionable as his record: some of the men
who had recommended him were said to be Adams supporters, and one of them had even
been an Adams elector. Moore’s uncle may have been a prominent Jacksonian politician,
but according to Carroll, the young man had voted against Jackson in the late contest.
This circumstantial evidence was enough to make Carroll suspect that Moore was, in fact,
“the silent friend of Mr. Adams.”107 Relaying these suspicions to Jackson, Carroll insisted
that honorable appointments ought not to be squandered on those who had “folded their
arms in indifference & silently awaited the result of the great struggle, prepared to ask of
Adams, if successful, any office, within his gift, with the same propriety & show of
friendship.”108 In other words, Moore was not a sincere friend but just another mercenary
officeseeker.
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Many Jacksonians feared the infiltration of “false friends” who would corrupt
democracy from within.109 As one Indiana Jacksonian predicted, the enemies of the
people would surely not be long in “shouting hosannas to the king that ruleth to preserve
their influence in appointments.”110 A likeminded Kentuckian similarly warned that the
cowardly incumbents would “begin to fawn and bow to the powers that will soon be.”111
These references to kings and kowtowing implied that the false friends were just the
latest incarnation of the seeker class – sycophantic, unmanly, and unprincipled. The
presence of such men within the Jacksonians’ ranks threatened to make a mockery of the
entire “Reformation” by undermining the party’s image as a battalion of selfless,
disinterested outsiders.
Consider, for instance, the way in which the pugnacious William Claggett berated
Jackson for appointing a lapsed Federalist, Samuel Cushman, as district attorney of New
Hampshire. “Why,” demanded Claggett, “should the people have any faith in him! Until
a few years, he has been their bitter enemy.” According to Claggett, Cushman had staged
a “pretended political conversion.” Claggett ransacked Cushman’s political past for
evidence of his opposition to the War of 1812, thus calling the man’s republican
patriotism into question. More recently, Cushman had allegedly abused his judgeship to
commit “an act of severe oppression” against a local pro-Jackson postmaster. And what,
Claggett asked, “could have been Mr. Cushman’s motive, unless to gain the confidence
of his former federal friends!”112 Cushman, for his part, was perfectly willing to proclaim
his sincerity, declaring that even his “prayers” had been directed toward the General’s
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success.113 But in the eyes of a long-suffering believer like Claggett, Cushman had
simply staged a “pretended political conversion” in order to continue the work of
corruption under new auspices.114
Jacksonians expressed a particular disdain for the “eleventh hour men” who had
waited until the hour of danger passed before declaring their loyalties.115 Sometimes a
correspondent would affect a tone of bemused indignation, expressing disingenuous
surprise at the sight of offices being claimed by those who had never been “known as
Jackson men until since the election.”116 At other times correspondents were
unapologetically irate as they protested that men who had “not been Eighteen months in
the Jackson ranks” were now attempting to gorge themselves on the “loaves and fishes”
of office.117 Such protests may have simply reflected the predictable mistrust between the
old guard and the neophytes, but the accusations had to be taken seriously. When a man
was identified as a “sudden convert,” his recommenders could find themselves at pains to
refute the charge.118
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The presence of opportunists in their midst exposed an awkward irony that
Jacksonians were never fully able to resolve. Andrew Jackson had distinguished himself
as the enemy of aristocratic political patrons and office-seeking courtiers; and no matter
how fervently these new applicants vaunted their claims as incorruptible patriots, they
were, at the end of the day, the new officeseekers, and therefore vulnerable to the charge
of trading their own principles for the promise of employment. This irony was not lost on
the applicants or their recommenders; as we have seen, they dexterously – and sometimes
desperately – looked for ways to present themselves as men who had always been, and
still remained, completely disinterested. In order to fit the narrative of disinterested
patriots versus interested courtiers, applicants had to ask for offices without becoming
mere “officeseekers.”119
The plight of Joseph Johnson, a former Virginia congressman and future
governor, reveals the scrutiny to which Jacksonian applicants could be subjected.
Johnson in 1829 certainly had reason to believe that he was safe from accusations of
opportunism, having demonstrated his Jacksonian credentials early on; he had been the
only Virginia congressman to cast his vote for Old Hickory during the 1825 House
election. Johnson had since then lost his seat in congress, but he could reasonably expect
some gratitude for this early gesture of good faith. In the summer of 1829, he set his
sights on Benjamin Reeder’s position as marshal for the Western District of Virginia.
Johnson’s friends assembled the usual array of platitudes, proclaiming that he had stood
forth against “a large majority of the wealthy” and “most influential” men in Virginia,
remaining “unchanged and unchangeable” in the face of hostility. He had even suffered
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the requisite victimization, for “the intrigue and management of the coalition party” had
cost him his bid for reelection. With this track record of disinterested courage and his
impressive list of endorsements, Johnson probably assumed that his Jacksonian
credentials would be above suspicion – just as Benjamin Reeder, the hapless and elderly
incumbent, immediately recognized that his own position was in dire jeopardy. It is a
measure of Jacksonians’ ruthlessness that Johnson, like Reeder, became the subject of a
merciless inquisition.120
While Reeder awaited his comeuppance and Johnson his reward, Thomas P.
Moore penned a scathing indictment of Johnson’s political character. Writing to the
President himself, Moore declared that Johnson had always been the secret devotee of
Clay and Adams. He alleged that Johnson’s vote for Jackson in 1825 had been nothing
more than an attempt to curry favor with his constituents, and that every stage of the
man’s career since then had been marked by similar instances of opportunism. Moore
condemned Johnson as “an invidious foe” whose defining characteristics were “duplicity
& indecision.” Johnson lacked “consistency,” but “endeavor[ed] to appear sincere”; he
lacked “talent,” but was nevertheless “ingenious”; he lacked “education,” but was “subtle
and persuasive.” He was, in other words, an artful seeker who lived by his wiles and
calculation rather than by principles and loyalty – the epitome of everything that
disinterested Jacksonians held in contempt.121
What had Johnson done to provoke such malignant criticism? His sin, it seems,
was one of equivocation. In 1828, Johnson’s name had been attached to a pro-Adams
convention in Richmond, and rumor had it that he had even “taken an active part” in this
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sinister meeting. Moore subsequently confronted Johnson in person, demanding to know
if these rumors were true. When Johnson protested that he had never authorized the use
of his name in this program, Moore admonished him “to denounce the party who would
use his name without permission.” But Johnson, according to Moore, responded by
“wrapp[ing] himself in his dignity.” Rather than publicly deny his involvement with the
Adams men, Johnson blithely declared that he had already provided “sufficient evidence
of his devotion to the will of his constituents.” Moore was not satisfied, and this
confrontation ultimately inspired his seething letter to Jackson.122
An epistolary debate ensued throughout the summer of 1829, as Johnson’s
friends tried to discredit Moore’s allegations. One of them challenged Moore’s account,
insisting that Johnson had forthrightly denied any involvement with the Adams men.
Another friend declared that Johnson had always been open in his support for Jackson,
and that the Adams convention members had used Johnson’s name “without his
knowledge or consent.” And both authors took care to remind the administration that
Johnson had performed a useful, early service to the General in 1825.123
But other correspondents continued to criticize Johnson’s “wayward course” in
politics, pointing to numerous instances of opportunism in his past. “At the day of our
greatest exertion and in the hour of doubt and gloom,” wrote one correspondent, Johnson
had even applied for the same office under the reviled John Quincy Adams.124 The most
lacerating blow came from Alex S. Withers, who challenged Johnson’s motives for
casting his vote for Jackson in 1825. Like Moore, Withers accused Johnson of being a
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Clay man at heart. As “proof” of the man’s duplicity, Withers furnished the text of a
congressional speech that Johnson had given in 1825. At first glance, this extract seemed
politically innocuous, as it showed Johnson openly defending his decision to break ranks
with Virginia’s other Representatives by casting his vote for Jackson. But the address
contained one potentially objectionable line, in which Johnson briefly remarked that John
Quincy Adams would still make for a fine President in his own right. Withers saw this
polite concession as evidence of Johnson’s temporizing nature. He continued to dismantle
Johnson’s political persona, claiming that the man’s alleged martyrdom had been nothing
of the kind. Although Johnson had indeed lost his seat in the 1828 elections, his defeat
had nothing to do with any special dedication to Jackson’s cause; for, according to
Withers, Johnson had been perfectly willing “to express himself inimical” to Jackson
whenever it suited his own “interest.” After reviewing the available evidence, Withers
rendered a draconian verdict. “A more temporising, vacillating politician,” he wrote,
“never perhaps appeared on any stage.”125
In the space of a few weeks and a few letters, the once heroic Johnson had been
transubstantiated into a living embodiment of corruption. No longer the early standardbearer of the Jacksonian cause, Johnson was targeted as a treacherous dissembler and
indifferent opportunist, a man of ephemeral principles and fleeting loyalty, a man whose
conduct undermined the disinterested ideal of Jacksonian Democracy. Compared to a
politician of such serpentine character, a belligerent and senile old man like Benjamin
Reeder seemed relatively harmless. Better to have an “avowed enemy,” wrote one
Virginian, than an enemy hiding “under colour of friendship.” In the end, Johnson did not
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receive the appointment, and Reeder was allowed to enjoy the rest of his term in peace.
Reeder’s eight “orphaned” grandchildren undoubtedly breathed a sigh of relief, knowing
that the old man could resume his miserable job duties and continue collecting his
salary.126
Which was the real Joseph Johnson – the heroic representative or the self-serving
careerist? Johnson himself remained aloof from the debate, never condescending to write
a letter on his own behalf, which means that his true intentions must remain a matter of
speculation. Considering that he would remain a Jacksonian Democrat for the career, it
seems reasonable to infer that his early support for the General had been genuine. His sin
was probably that he chose not to alienate his acquaintances in the Adams party. As with
Benjamin Reeder, however, the answers to these questions are less important than the
questions being asked. Who did this man truly support? Were there witnesses who could
attest to it? Were there newspaper clippings that might reveal his secret infidelity? And
above all, what were the man’s real motives? Such questions reveal the depth of
Jacksonians’ obsession with selfless, militant sincerity as the legitimizing feature of their
party.
The very ideal of Jacksonian Democracy was the disinterested officeseeker, an
ideal made corporeal in the form of Andrew Jackson. He was a patriot who trusted in the
American experiment enough to leave it alone during times of peace, but cared for it
enough to rally during times of war. He would not seek office himself but, like
Cincinnatus, would heed the country’s call – and, like Cincinnatus, he longed only to do
his duty and then return to the plow. He could be trusted with power because he did not
want it. He was beholden to no one but “the people,” and because he made no promises,
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he made no bargains. Ultimately no one, not even Jackson himself, could live up to this
ideal.

Conclusion
The story of the Jacksonian reformation is littered with ironies. The applicants of
1829 wanted offices; otherwise, they would never have applied or enlisted friends to
write letters on their behalf. But they fervently denied that self-interest was the sole or
even the primary motive for their own political conduct. This concern with sincerity
raised troubling questions for rival Jackson men, who often fixed their attention on the
hidden motives that lurked beneath grand declarations. That question remains just as
nettlesome for the present-day historian. Was the standard Jacksonian applicant’s
partisanship as morally pure as he claimed? Could one’s political loyalty be separated
from one’s personal ambition? In short, were the Jacksonians of 1829 sincere when they
flaunted their sincerity? The question is likely to remain irresolvable, the answers at best
unsatisfying.
Motives, after all, can be multifaceted. It is perfectly possible that some of
Jackson’s supporters only entered the political fray in hopes of procuring public
employment. It is equally possible that many applicants’ convictions really were sincere,
even if they tried to leverage that sincerity to acquire jobs. They had taken a risk – a
calculated risk, but a risk nonetheless – by backing the General’s cause. In many cases,
they had openly defied and antagonized powerful enemies. And as we have seen, the
most self-righteous “Jackson men” despised the prevaricators who tried to steer a neutral
political course: such men, in their minds, were the true “officeseekers,” unprincipled and
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indifferent men who would do anything, or nothing, as long as it bettered their chances
for securing an appointment. The self-proclaimed true believer therefore walked a
precarious tightrope, claiming or at least insinuating that he deserved an office because he
was more than just a man who wanted an office.
Regardless of the personal motives that varied across individual cases, these
numerous inflections of the Jacksonian heroic narrative demonstrate a significant gap
between the original ideology of “Reformation” and our historical image of the “Spoils
System.” By performing the role of a hero who had defied corruption or a martyr who
had suffered for the cause, an applicant could assure himself and the Administration that
he was not, as political rivals and subsequent scholars would have it, merely an
officeseeker pledging his principles in exchange for a job. Having established themselves
as patriots who transcended self-interest, they could assure each other that the Jackson
administration was not just perpetuating the culture of corrupt bargains under new
auspices. They could believe, in other words, that they were and continued to be
disinterested, selfless patriots.
These applicants’ insecurities had been fostered by decades’ worth of political
debate. Anglophone political actors had been trained since the seventeenth century to see
political appointments as bribes. And Americans since Revolutionary times had grown
accustomed to denouncing any man who disagreed with their arguments as the purchased
dependents of a separate interest group, indifferent or even adverse to the orthodoxies of
“the people.” By 1829, every avenue of corruption and purchase had been mapped and
explored. No appointment could be innocuous. Any man who openly espoused a political
cause could be construed as an unprincipled officeseeker attaching himself to the
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strongest branch; any man who did not openly espouse a political cause could be
construed as an unprincipled officeseeker waiting to see which way the wind blew.
The applicants’ sincerity was their only defense against these suspicions. They
tried to outdo each other in proving their sincerity of purpose – which, in practice, meant
that they outdid each other in proving their devotion to Andrew Jackson. But sincerity, by
definition, cannot be proven. It fell to the observer to decide whether or not the applicants
were truly disinterested. Critics of the Jackson administration were not convinced, then or
now. The Jacksonians’ cardinal sin, in some critic’s eyes, was that they ultimately wanted
political offices.
The fact that such an accusation could hold such damning power testifies,
ironically, to the ideological triumph of Jacksonian Democracy. The Jacksonians had
finally and conclusively succeeded in criminalizing politics itself. Their own logic
doomed them to infamy. Had Jackson left more officers in place, let alone appointed
Adams men – indeed, had he made any gestures of goodwill or compromise with his
political enemies – he could have been assailed as a cunning politician who held out
“corrupt bargains.” But by arguing that offices ought to be reserved only for their
disinterested political allies, Jacksonians bet their moral authority on their sincerity – a
losing bet at a time when sincerity was subject to political litigation. Anyone attached to
any administration could be targeted as the minion of power. The only heroes left were
the charismatic individuals who went on the offensive against all the government’s
“power and patronage.” Thus, ever since Mr. Jackson went to Washington, the most
reliable American folk hero has been the party politician who claims to transcend both
partisanship and politics. The eternal recurrence of American politics is that such heroes
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always expose their Achilles heel the moment that “power and patronage” fall into their
own hands.
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Conclusion

When Congress convened in December 1829, President Jackson had the chance to
explain his philosophy on political patronage. And fittingly enough, his first annual
message included a manifesto cautioning his audience against allowing officers of
government to congeal into their own insidious interest group.
There are perhaps few men who can for any great length of time enjoy
office and power, without being more or less under the influence of
feelings unfavorable to the discharge of their public duties… [T]hey are
apt to acquire a habit of looking with indifference upon the public
interests, and of tolerating conduct from which an unpractised man would
revolt.1
One can only conjecture about what thoughts ran through the minds of his critics as they
contemplated these words. Some of them might have snickered with contempt as they
witnessed Andrew Jackson waxing poetic about the corrupting influence of office. The
President had only been in his station for nine months, and already he seemed to be
perpetrating the same sins his followers had previously discerned in the Adams
administration. To take just one example, the Jacksonians in 1828 had furiously
condemned John Quincy Adams for appointing members of Congress to executive
offices; and then Jackson in 1829 had loaded his cabinet with ex-senators and
congressmen. Jackson obliquely addressed this contradiction in his annual message when
he noted the importance of selecting the most qualified and talented men for the most
important offices of trust. He now proposed only to stop congressmen from receiving
appointments at the hands of Presidents they had helped to elect.2
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These legalistic maneuvers might have allowed Jackson to evade charges of
hypocrisy on that front, but he remained vulnerable on a more tender point. He and his
followers had spent years disparaging Washington as a place where patronage facilitated
corrupt bargains and political chicanery between unprincipled officeseekers. But as of
December 1829, one could just as easily accuse Jackson of being the source of all
corruption himself. The President had already removed nearly one hundred men from
office, and his allies in the postal department had gone even further.3 Before the end of
that congressional session in May 1830, Jackson would remove twenty-three more
individuals from office, bringing the total up to 121, or nearly twenty percent of all
officers appointed by the president; by the end of his presidency, that figure would swell
to 164.4 It could easily appear, then, that Jackson was using patronage to terrify or lure
men into supporting his cause – which would have made him a petty tyrant, or worse, a
monarch in democratic clothing.
But the first annual message’s remarks on human corruptibility did not represent
any sort of apology for Jackson’s possible lapse in principles. They were instead the
preamble to a soaring manifesto in defense of his policies. According to the innuendos of
his message, it had been the incumbent officers who succumbed to corruption simply by
virtue of being in office for too long and growing too attached to their places. “Office,”
Jackson declared, had been reduced to “a species of property; “government” had become
“a means of promoting individual interest,” “an engine for the support of the few at the
3
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expense of the many.” And then Jackson proceeded immediately into one of the most
infamous sentences of his entire presidency: “The duties of all public officers are, or, at
least admit of being made so plain and simple, that men of intelligence may readily
qualify themselves for their performance.”5 And to that end, Jackson proposed a law
requiring that would have rendered all federal appointments non-renewable after their
four-year terms expired.
This proposal could be read – and indeed, has been read – in various ways .One
could argue that it typified Jacksonians’ alleged disdain for anyone claiming intellect and
expertise beyond that of the common man.6 Putting a more democratically uplifting spin
on the words, one might perceive Jacksonians’ idealistic commitment to elevating that
same common man beyond his designated lot in life, thus inducting the hoi polloi into the
workings of government.7 Or one could interpret this suggestion as a desperate casuistry
that Jacksonians had to fall back on in order to justify patronage policies that would
otherwise seem unconscionable.8 Certainly it is possible to marshal evidence for the latter
interpretation. The idea of rotating civil servants had grown from an almost casual aside
from Thomas McKean in 1800. Radical Jeffersonians had developed more cogent
explanations for rotation in office, but the concept had certainly never been a “leading
principle” of republican government, as Jackson now claimed. And as we saw in the final
chapter, the idea of rotating old officers does not seem to have motivated specific
removals. Some of Jackson’s language in the first annual message suggests that he was
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simply trying to defuse criticism. He emphatically insisted, for instance, that there was no
punishment in removals, as no man had any right to live off “public expense” anyway.9
But any scholar who wants to write off “rotation in office” as simply a convenient
excuse has to contend with the fact that Jackson did recommend a specific piece of
legislation that would have fulfilled the principle in practice. The suggestion never
became an actual law, of course. Nor did Jackson’s recommendation that Presidents be
themselves limited to single terms. (Jackson, of course, ultimately decided not to “rotate”
himself out of office after four years.) But there is little reason to think that Jackson
would have urged Congress to adopt a law that he did not want to succeed.
The idea of rotation could resonate with Jacksonians, even if it did not direct their
practice at the level of specific removals and appointments. For the idea of rotation
played on Americans’ decades-old fear that the government would create a hostile
separate interest of dependents, all of them bound together by their willingness to put
places and pensions above the people’s interests. The Jacksonians had always identified
the people as victims of those unprincipled men who disregarded the majority will and
honored their corrupt bargains above all else. All across the Jacksonian spectrum, from
Martin Van Buren to Duff Green, spokesmen had insisted that the majority will ought to
dictate all actions of government. Jackson’s first annual message even said as much. In
addition to proposing term limits on the President, Jackson also suggested amendments to
ensure that “the will of the majority” would always prevail in presidential elections. This,
more than rotation in office for its own sake, was the core Jacksonian creed. The “first
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principle of our system,” Jackson stridently declared, was that “the majority is to
govern.”10
It was an elegantly symmetrical rebuttal to John Quincy Adams’s first annual
message four years earlier, at which time the hapless statesman had exhorted
congressmen to embrace his projects of national improvement rather than allow
themselves to be “palsied by the will of our constituents.” Jackson, far from being
“palsied” by his constituents’ will, was rhetorically empowered by it. The idea that a
united majority existed, demanding that its will permeate every department of
government, gave a democratically elected chief executive authority to remove any man
deemed adverse to that majority will. If the people were a check on his power, they were
the only check. Jackson said as much in his defense of rotation in office. Because office
was no right, he explained, no one but the people had any right to censure presidential
removals.11
The minority that Jacksonians had claimed to fight against was, in a sense, the
government itself. Jackson and his followers had repeatedly identified the contest of 1828
as a battle between the people’s “virtue” and the government’s “power and patronage.”
“The people” had proven themselves incorruptible by defying all the terrors and
temptations of government. Jackson’s active partisans had proven themselves worthy of
the people’s trust by defying corrupt bargains, by supporting their hero at a time when the
bait of patronage might have lured them a different way, and by positively courting
adversity rather than reward. Jackson himself had now proven his incorruptibility by
refusing to barter with his enemies, boldly incurring the displeasure of those who thought
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they could intrigue their way out of receiving the people’s judgment. In the Jacksonian
discursive universe, then, moral authority was measured by the sincerity of one’s
devotion to the will of the people – and by the conspicuousness of one’s contempt for any
other interest group. Their whole sense of legitimacy was predicated on intolerant
antagonism, because only the defiant and bellicose could prove that they were not simple
officeseekers.
The story of the Jacksonian reformation did not resolve with an emphatic period,
but with a prolonged series of ellipses. One could choose to end it with a dramatic
account of Jackson’s numerous and embarrassing clashes with the Senate on some of his
appointees, or with a tragi-comic account of the malfeasance committed by some of those
allegedly disinterested patriots in office. One could conclude with an epic depiction of the
American Whigs forming yet another oppositional party and denouncing “King Andrew”
for his tyrannical use of patronage, or with an ironic reflection on how Jacksonians after
1840 realized that the people had rejected the party of the people. Contemplating the
landscape of the twenty-first century – a time when charismatic outsiders prove their
sincerity through demonstrations of malice, regularly infusing the political imagination
with images of “the people” being preyed upon by the government-dependent denizens of
the swamp – one could be forgiven for asking if the Jacksonian reformation ever really
ended at all.
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